# Neg vs K Affs Toolbox—FMPS

This file includes a lot of stuff! There are a few new off-case arguments and supplements for existing ones, some topic-specific impact turns vs K affs, some framework updates, and some case answer updates (both all-purpose and vs specific affs).

Shout out to everyone who helped out—Aryan Kumar, Brooks King, Esther Li, Kate Halabi, Natalie Stone, Nihar Abhyankar, Sam Fowler, and Sasha Turner all contributed some awesome evidence to this file at various points. Seriously, there are so many cards!

# Framework

## Topshelf

### Policy Research Good—AI

#### AI discussions create crucial, sober policy analysis that informs governments and the public.

Bryce and Parakilas 18 (Hannah, formerly assistant head of the International Security Department (ISD) at Chatham House and worked on the secretariat of the Global Commission on Internet Governance. Her areas of research included human security (particularly related to explosive weapons), the role of women in the military, cybersecurity and its policy implications, and the impact and effectiveness of the humanitarian sector, particularly the UN. She is co-editor of the Journal of Cyber Policy; Jacob, researcher and manager working on issues related to US foreign policy and international security. I've worked in the public, private and nonprofit. From 2014 until 2019 I was the deputy head of the US programme at Chatham House, working on issues relating to the US role in the world and foreign perceptions of America. I've also been Head of Weapons at Action on Armed Violence, an NGO working on armed violence reduction worldwide and a team leader at US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, working on student visas. I did a PhD in International Relations at the London School of Economics focusing on drug violence in Mexico and a Master's in Middle East and Central Asian security issues at St Andrews. “Artificial Intelligence and International Affairs Disruption Anticipated,” Chatham House Report, pages 50-53, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-06-14-artificial-intelligence-international-affairs-cummings-roff-cukier-parakilas-bryce.pdf>, AK)

Where AI is discussed in reference to public policy, the narrative tends to veer towards the extreme. Elon Musk’s widely reported warning, in August 2017, that AI represents ‘vastly more risk’ than North Korea is a case in point.138 While AI undoubtedly poses some significant risks that must be mitigated, discussion of these often crowds out sober analysis of the ways in which machine-aided decision-making is likely to change international politics in the relatively near term. Such analysis should have both near- and far-term goals. For the near term, the aim should be to achieve meaningful and measureable progress towards demystifying the technology and enabling productive conversations between those developing it and those who will be responsible for implementing and regulating it. At the same time, discussions around AI should not lose sight of the fundamental ways in which it may change the nature of international politics and power structures, and should aim to build up ethical and legal frameworks to manage those changes.

While no one can predict the exact trajectory that AI will take over the coming decades, it is clear that it will have an increasing and profound impact on society. To prepare for this transformation, this report makes a number of recommendations for policymakers:

* AI expertise must not reside in only a small number of countries – or solely within narrow segments of the population. As AI is entrusted with more and more significant responsibilities, programmers and policymakers alike must be more aware of its potential impact on existing structural inequalities. The processes by which AI systems are developed and deployed must be as inclusive as possible in order to mitigate societal risks, and inherent bias issues, at the point of inception. Policymakers must invest in developing home-grown talent and expertise in AI if countries are to be independent of the current dominant AI expertise that is concentrated particularly in China and the US. This will mean investing in education at all levels, both to foster a pipeline of leading AI engineers, and to ensure a workforce that is developing skills that AI possibly will not be able to replicate, such as those that value emotional capital.
* Corporations, governments and foundations alike should allocate funding to develop and deploy AI systems with humanitarian goals. There are significant advantages that AI could bring to the humanitarian sector, including through the use of complex datasets and planning algorithms that could, for instance, improve response times in humanitarian emergencies. More research needs to be done with discrete sectors to consider the specific implications that advances in AI will bring to them. Because AI development for humanitarian purposes is unlikely to be immediately profitable for the private sector, a concerted effort needs to be made to develop such systems on a not-for-profit basis.
* Understanding of the capacities and limitations of artificially intelligent systems must not be the exclusive preserve of technical experts. The information technology revolution will undoubtedly need more STEM graduates, but AI developers also need more ‘soft’ skills both at the operator level and in terms of integrating AI successfully into larger decision-making networks. Better education and training on what AI is – and, critically, what it is not – should be made as broadly available as possible.
* Developing strong working relationships, particularly in the defence sector, between public and private AI developers is critical, as much of the innovation is taking place in the commercial sector. The defence sector needs to find a way to harness and utilize the innovation that the rapidly evolving commercial market for AI technology is developing with, in some cases, greater resources to dedicate to it. Ensuring that intelligent systems charged with critical tasks can carry them out safely and ethically will require openness between different types of institutions.
* Given the broad applicability of the technology, clear codes of practice are necessary to ensure that the benefits of AI can be shared widely while its concurrent risks are well managed. Neither engineers nor policymakers alone possess the tools necessary to design, test and implement these codes – rather, they will require sustained and cooperative engagement between those communities. Policymakers and technologists should, moreover, understand the ways in which regulating artificially intelligent systems may be fundamentally different from regulating arms or trade flows, while also drawing relevant lessons from those models.
* Particular attention must be paid by developers and regulators to the question of human–machine interfaces. Artificial and human intelligence are fundamentally different, and interfaces between the two must be designed carefully, and reviewed constantly, in order to avoid misunderstandings that in many applications could have serious consequences.

It is essential for the public debate to move beyond an apocalyptic vision of robotic disruption on the one hand and a fanciful, automated idyll on the other. This is not a conversation about the future: AI is already in everyday use in mundane and not very spectacular ways – in areas such as navigation, text translation and retail. As the integration of AI applications with daily life continues, it is important that governments and publics alike understand what this means for now and for the future. Enabling an informed, nuanced and in-depth discussion will mean moving one step closer to that understanding.

#### NATO’s involvement in AI ensures global prosperity and ethical use.

Gilli 19 (Andrea, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College. “Preparing for ‘NATO-mation’: the Atlantic Alliance toward the age of artificial intelligence,” February 2019. *NDC POLICY BRIEF*, <https://project-hybrid.upt.pt/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Preparing_NATO_mation.pdf>, AK)

AI, ML and BD offer great opportunities, but also present risks and challenges. This analysis has tried to alleviate the most pressing worries: in so far as the public concerns are related to rapid geo-economic transitions, sudden redistributions of military power, or the escalation of military crises, there are reasons to be relatively optimistic. This has many implications both for international security and for NATO, its constituent bodies, its member states and its partners.

First, many are worried about an AI arms race. Based on the analysis presented in this article, we should not be and, probably, we should even reinterpret our competitors’ actions. Put simply, based on what is written so far, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s famous Lords of the Ringslike speech about AI as a key instrument to control the world could have been intended to generate panic and thus slow down NATO and its member countries since Russia lacks the technological bases for competing in this field. However, if Russia’s Ministry of Defense agrees with President Putin and then wants to reduce funding to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines in order to invest in a set of so far unproven, unreliable and combat-ineffective technologies, we should definitely not oppose this move – and probably even encourage them to.

Second, NATO and its member states should not remain passive observers. On the contrary, they should start preparing to address the challenges that AI, ML and BD raise. In other words, the Alliance should start a process of “NATO-mation”. This is important for three main reasons. By honing and improving existing technological and industrial capabilities, NATO can preserve and enhance its military superiority and thus guarantee its contribution for global security in the years ahead. Next, for this purpose, NATO should start thinking and addressing the complements challenges that will emerge: from infrastructural constraints to shortage of talent. Last but not least, by engaging with these issues, the Atlantic Alliance can ensure that its values, ethical stances as well as moral commitments will inform this new age.

### Policy Research Good—Biotech

#### Debates about biotechnology are good. It informs student’s ethics, challenges preconceived biases, and increases engagement.

Kedraka and Kourkoutas 18 (Katerina, Associate Professor, Democritus University of Thrace. Yiannis, Democritus University of Thrace, Department of Molecular Biology & Genetics. Journal of Curriculum and Teaching, Volume 7, No. 1, pages 32-41. <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1170331>, AK)

1.3 Debate as a Good Educational Practice in Higher Education

Quality instruction is a strong motivating factor in higher education (Sogunro, 2017), linked to critical thinking, problem solving, communication, acquiring of presentation skills and team working (Roy & Macchiette, 2005). Cranton (2002) reported that critical thinking should become a clear target of all forms of education and mainly of the adults, since by this way the students become open minded in new ways of thinking. However, Bissell and Lemons (2006) noted that higher education do not always encourage the students to think critically. Literature review shows that the debate as an educational technique is considered to significantly contribute to the development of equivalent skills. Walker and Warhust (2000) argued that the use of debates in the educational process is effective for the development of critical thinking and strengthens analytical problem solving, communication, presentation skills, group forming and cooperation skills, as well as critical approaches of the subject of the course. Brown (2015) argues that the use of debates as an in-class teaching strategy improves students’ critical thinking and collaborative learning skills. Moeller (1985) realized that although many trainees are initially concerned regarding the procedure of the debate, the technique was proven to be valuable and helped them in developing critical thinking skills. Goodwin (2003), who also used the debate as a teaching method, asked the opinion of the students on the process he followed and he reported that many students commented the lack of familiarization with this method and that sometimes they felt awkward. The majority of the students, however, responded positively, noting that the debate helped them in acquiring in-depth knowledge and in familiarization with the arguments’ quest, analysis and presentation. The debate helped them to come across and face different views and to improve their critical thinking.

Professors use often the debate in order to increase the active participation of the students, especially in the field of Human and Social Sciences and selectively in the field of Natural Sciences or Technology (Jugdev, Markowski, & Mengel, 2004). Proulx (2004) used the debates in the field of Biosciences for the analysis, control and assessment of arguments and the results of his research showed that the technique helps the students to investigate critically biological issues that influence the society. Vo and Morris (2006) discovered that the debates used during their teaching increased the benefits of the traditional lecturing, due to the active and creative participation of the students. In addition, Osborne (2005) realized that this technique helps the students to learn discipline and strengthened their ability to approach knowledge with critical and moral spirit. He also argued that the ability to focus and present valid and convincing arguments contributes positively to the preparation of their future carrier. Dickson (2004) reports that, through the debate, the ability of the students to work in groups and to analyze the arguments is enhanced, improving by this way their ability to think critically. Team working may lead to higher levels of thinking, involving analysis, synthesis, and evaluation through the use of convincing evidence that they have to present and provides them the chance to participate actively in the process of learning, therefore critical thinking is achieved (Gokhale, 1995).

The debates may take many forms. The most common kind of debate is in a class when there is the option for two trainees or two groups to develop opposite opinions for a certain issue (Tumposky, 2004). The traditional process of the debates begins with the choice of the topic, which leads the two groups either to defend it or to oppose against it; in other words, the one group supports the one aspect and the other group is opposed to it. However, in the debate, success does not mean victory, but the degree of interest and motivation achieved by each group. Roy and Macchiette (2005) highlighted particularly the importance of the assessment and the feedback processes for the successful application of the debate technique.

Darby (2007) argued on the benefits arising from the use of debates in teaching: the development of critical and analytical thinking, strengthening at the same time group working and communication. He believes that it is an effective educational tool that increases the responsibility for learning and the active participation required by all participants. Moreover, it provides an experience through which the students can develop research abilities on current issues, become capable in preparing rational arguments, learn to differentiate between subjective and well-documented information, to express their aspects and pose question based on evidence and to listen actively different opinions, as Kennedy (2007) noted. The most important, however, advantage of the method, as highlighted by Darby (2007), is that the students reported that the experience of the debate is amusing and that they really have a great time working!

1.4 Debates in Teaching Bioethics in the Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics, Democritus University of Thrace

The module “Bioethics” is an elective course in the curriculum of the Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics (DMBG), Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH) in Greece. In the frame of the course, several topics relative to the ethical development of Bioscientists associated with their role as scientists and researchers in the modern scientific world are set. The goal is the development of critical scientific thinking and analysis of complex scientific and social problems that arise from the biotechnological evolution in the frame of a responsible and ethical approach in the field of Biosciences.

McGonigal (2007) noted that educators in any field may use the theory of Transformative Learning, so the two professors who were assigned the co-teaching of Bioethics decided to base their approach on Transformative Learning Theory, as it was considered suitable for the development of critical thinking on ethical issues in the field of Biosciences.

Τhe course was structured in four major chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction to Bioethics

Basic principles of bioethics

Issues of scientific development and management of ethical dilemmas in the modern scientific environment

Chapter 2: The legal framework

The legal framework in Greece – directives and legislation

The legal framework in Europe – directives and legislation

Bioethics and International forums

Chapter 3: Modern issues of Bioethics in Molecular Biosciences

- Designer babies

- DNA banks

- Genetic modification and agricultural activity

- Human genome and associated challenges

Chapter 4: The role of the Bioscientist

Ethical dimension of the role of the Bioscientist

Professional ethics in Biosciences

The topics of the 3rd Chapter mentioned above, along with the proposed references were announced to the students, who chose their partners and formed groups of three and then they selected the topic that they wanted to work on, as well as the negative or positive aspect to support. The process of the debates included the stages below:

- 10 min presentation of the aspect of each group, based on scientific data and arguments

- 5 min development of arguments in response to the points that the opposed group has posed

- 3 min for concluding remarks of each group.

Subsequently, all students and trainers voted for the most convincing aspect and the lesson was completed with an extensive and open discussion on each topic.

2. Methodology

The present study is a small scale study that was focused on the students’ debate experience. The methodology of the research followed the qualitative approach, because it was considered the most appropriate for the in-depth penetration in the students’ opinions. The research question was: What would the students consider as significant regarding this specific learning experience? Data was collected in June 2016, by the free, associative recording of the students’ opinions, that allowed the respondents to report what was worth highlighting, the “truth” that they wanted to mention by answering the open question: "How would I describe my experience from my participation in the debate?". This technique, because it is anonymous, free and open, ensures that the original experiences and feelings will be deposited (Atkinson, 1998). It is noted that from the 24 students who followed the course of “Bioethics” during the academic year 2015-16, 19 students responded and thus, constituted the sample of the research.

Data was processed by the Content Analysis method, which, using the data categorization process and classification into thematic categories with a clear conceptual definition, allows the contents of the narrations to be translated into findings, which are then interpreted and discussed in qualitative terms. Content Analysis is considered appropriate for “decoding and interpreting written data and especially personal beliefs, attitudes, assumptions and perspectives” (Verma & Mallick, 2004: 224). The analysis process included data interpretation by the researchers, which is the most interesting and provoking - at the same time - part of data processing in qualitative research (Kyriazi, 2006). The views of all students who participated in the survey were used.

The five categories of data that occurred were:

- interesting learning experience

- skills acquired

- co-operation and teamwork

- active learning

- development of critical thinking and transformation of assumptions

2.1 Study Constraints

It should be noted, however, that since this is a small-scale study and the qualitative analysis is based on the description and discussion of the views of the particular students questioned, this research does not lead to the generalization of its findings. Therefore, generalization of the findings is not supported in any way, but the essential aspects regarding the educational process of a debate and the experience gained by the students of the Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics is highlighted.

3. Findings

The students' answers showed how interesting the learning experience of integrating debates into the “Bioethics” course has been for them. They noted that debates have been an unprecedented, significant and distinct learning experience, with multidimensional components:

My participation in the debate, was absolutely positive. It has been a very important and original life experience.

Very nice experience and I'm glad I had the opportunity to attend this course before I finish my studies.

It was an interesting, pleasant and creative experience. Although pilot, the course was ‘smooth’ and efficient.

My experience in the debate was something special.

Initially, I would describe my experience in the debate as unique, since there has not been anything like that in any other course.

My participation in the course of Bioethics was a very special experience, mainly due to the teaching methods. The use of debates was undoubtedly unprecedented for all of us. When I applied for the course, I could not imagine how terrific experience it would be.

I think my participation in the debate was a very good experience, because I did not have the opportunity to take part in anything similar before.

Indeed, I was impressed by the excellence of the students' presentations, who supported their topics and the good work and research accomplished was obvious, based on the latest scientific facts.

I will be absolutely honest. The teachers were there for us (believe me they are not all like that!), the course was interesting (VERY) and not boring at all.

Many students focused on the skills they acquired as a very important element of this educational experience:

It contributes to the development of other skills beyond scientific knowledge (e.g. speech readiness, argumentation).

Personally, it has given me the opportunity to develop skills that I could not develop tthrough [sic] the other courses, mainly soft skills, which is well known that we will need in the future.

We worked as much as we could on the topic we had been assigned and focused on both the techniques used in debates and the scientific part (scientific presentation of the aspect and readiness to answer in potential "attacks").

Through the debate, I mainly managed to get experience of what is like to debate in front of an audience (most important, especially in our science).

Not only we had to acquire the knowledge about the topic we had to defend, but mainly to assimilate and "filter" it, so that we can cope with any arguments that the opposing team would put forward.

It was indeed a very enjoyable and productive process and what I mainly gained, beyond knowledge, was the ability to respond quickly to a question within a friendly and safe climate.

Personally, it was the first time I participated in a similar activity and I think I have been left with new knowledge, skills in argumentation and a lot of questions.

Some, in fact, focused on the co-operation and teamwork they had to display, in order to organize their work:

Initially, there was trust and excellent cooperation among my team members. The way in which the arguments and concerns were presented was also a challenge while working in a team, but also a lesson of respect for those who may have the opposite view.

I worked with people I had never worked before, and with their help we managed to reach teamwork.

I think that our participation in the debates and discussions that followed brought us all a little closer, giving us the opportunity to meet students we didn’t know.

The most appreciated element was the energetic way of learning promoted through the course, instead of traditional lectures:

Information collection on the topic, the organization of data and the confrontation with the "rival" group offered an environment for arguments’ exchange, something that I haven’t experienced in the past. For this reason, I believe the whole experience was excellent and I would definitely repeat it if I had the chance.

Knowledge was not simply provided by the professors, but we went deep into the essence of it. This is the reason why I consider the debate very educative and effective for this course. In addition, by listening to other groups, we consolidated the information much better than in the form of a simple lecture and we were able to form our own opinion on the topics presented.

The experience was exciting. We worked at regular meetings with my colleagues and we had a lot of fun, because we discovered each time new arguments, keeping us alert concerning our data research.

It "forces" you to get deeper into the topic you have to defend, and it proves challenging if you have to defend the opposite view from what you actually believe. Therefore, I think it is better the course is taught this way, rather than providing theoretical knowledge on Bioethics.

The debate was a very nice experience, but mostly a very efficient way of learning.

Totally different teaching method. Very good experience, especially taking into account the theoretical courses we have to follow as students.

I did not have the chance to participate in something like this before and it helped me a lot to get prepared for similar situations that will logically arise in the future in my work. Also, the fact that the course was interactive automatically increased its value and my will to attend it.

The experience of the specific course was quite different from what I have seen so far.... Certainly, this course was not only based on information transmission, like teaching in an amphitheater.

Indeed, even after the debates, I often felt the need to approach deeper some topics, due to the high interest originated from the original, lively and energetic process of the debate.

I think that the choice to offer the course in the form of debates was interesting; it was something we had not been experienced in another course.

Finally, the debates helped the students see that there is not a single answer to ethical issues in the field of Biosciences, but they have to develop their own critical thinking and maybe transform their opinions and assumptions:

The initiative undertaken by our Professors, Mrs. Kedraka and Mr. Kourkoutas led to an exciting course and in collaboration with the students we acquired experiences, a way of critical thinking on ethical issues that concern the scientific community.

#### Project-based learning is the best pedagogy for biotechnology. It promotes action research that teaches students to develop real world solutions. That’s the only exportable impact!

Siegel and Nguyen 15 – Associate Professor in the Biochemistry Department at the Learning, Teaching, & Curriculum Dept of the University of Missouri; postdoctoral associate. [Phuong D., Marcelle A. “Community Action Projects: Applying Biotechnology in the Real World.” The American Biology Teacher (2015) 77 (4): 241-247. April 1, 2015.]

Abstract

Project-based learning and action research are powerful pedagogies in improving science education. We implemented a semester-long course using project-based action research to help students apply biotechnology knowledge learned in the classroom to the real world. Students had several choices to make in the project: working individually or as a team, selecting a topic of interest, and targeting a local community group. To enhance teachers’ abilities to lead students through action projects, we describe the framework, provide class data, and discuss ben- efits and challenges encountered. This course could serve as a model of how project-based action research can benefit student learning in biotechnology.

Key Words: Biotechnology; project-based research; action projects; community; real world.

Introduction

Biotechnology is an interdisciplinary subject that often involves medicine, agriculture, industrial technology, and commerce. The International Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has defined biotechnology as the application of science and technology to living organisms or parts of them (e.g., micro­ organisms, enzymes, cells of animals and

plants) to alter living or nonliving materials for the production of knowledge, goods, and ser­ vices (Chabalengula et al., 2011). Our course within a biochemistry department focuses on the biochemical knowledge needed for topics such as genetic modification of food, forensic analysis, and stem cell research (Halverson et al., 2009, 2010; Rebello et al., 2012a; Witzig et al., 2013).

The diverse benefits of biotechnological processes highlight the need for students to be

scientifically informed so that they can appreciate how biotechnology affects their lives and communities. The traditional instruction of biotechnology, limited in classrooms, also makes it difficult to engage students in using biotechnology meaningfully in real life. Active learning of biotechnology can involve students in serviceable activi­ ties in healthcare, agriculture, and industry.

To stimulate student learning and heighten curiosity, the National Research Council emphasized a new way of teaching and learning about science that reflects the science discipline and implies changes in what and how students are taught (Singer et al., 2012) and in how students are assessed (AAAS, 2011). Studies have demonstrated that a project­based approach has the potential to enhance student­directed scientific inquiry by using technology and collaboration (Krajcik et al., 2000; Schneider et al., 2002; Alozie et al., 2009). Moreover, students can achieve deeper understanding of science content and processes when they engage in inquiry (Schneider et al., 2002). In action research, students ask questions, assess needs, design plans, and carry out actions to benefit a particular group (Bradbury & Reason, 2003). In this project­based action research, students encountered five requirements based on scientific inquiry and action research (Krajcik et al., 2000; Krajcik & Blumenfeld, 2006): (1) assessing the needs of a community (related to biotechnology by driving ques­tions), (2) designing and planning actions to address those needs,

(3) making specific actions to benefit the selected community,

(4) gathering and analyzing information and data from those actions, and (5) reporting find­ ings and reflection. Collaboration and conver­ sation, including discussions with classmates and with adults outside the classroom, are also considered essential for students to build team­ work skills and share understandings of ideas (Krajcik et al., 2000; Krajcik & Blumenfeld, 2006; Alozie et al., 2010).

Here, we describe how we employed project­based action­research feature as a framework for the design and enactment

of a community action project and discuss what we have learned. The project was developed for one semester of an undergraduate,

Table 1. General guidelines given to students at the beginning of the project. These questions scaffold students to plan their project (in conjunction with details for each step). \*\* Omitted

Table 2. Prompts provided to students for choosing a project. \*ommited

nonmajors biotechnology class. The course challenged students to choose a topic, assess the needs of a community related to that topic, design an action addressing the needs, and document their work in a multimedia format of their choice. The project aimed to be mean­ ingful to students by connecting to the “real world” of the commu­ nity, requiring students to witness reactions of citizens regarding biotechnology ideas from class, and putting ownership of the inquiry in students’ hands.

Description of the Community Action Project

Overview

Arguably, the highest form of learning stems from not just knowing something, but using it and applying it in the real world to help someone else learn, change their mind, or act differently. In this unit, students had opportunities to relate their own interests in a biotech­ nology issue to communities by (1) choosing a topic, (2) assessing the needs of a community and planning an action related to biotech­ nology, and (3) taking action and documenting it. Student work was scaffolded by framework questions in each step (Table 1) to generate the action plan. If students could not complete their action because of extracurricular demands, they could choose to write a 15­ to 17­page, double­spaced research paper for step 3, based on their needs assess­ ment. The length was effective in discouraging those who might take advantage of the option – only one student submitted a paper, and it was well developed. Moreover, students could choose to work indi­ vidually on the project or in a group of up to five. The larger the group, the higher the productivity expected. Class time was provided to help students find people who shared an interest in similar topics. Class time was also used to plan, get feedback from instructors, and discuss ideas. The project entailed a small time commitment outside of class to collect data – approximately 2 hours, depending on the type of project.

Choosing a Community & Topic

The first step of the project was to figure out a topic of interest and how it might relate to a group in the real world. Students were given examples of potential projects and a list of topics and groups to con­ sider as a starting point (Table 2).

Assessing the Needs of a Community Group

The second step of the project involved assessing the needs of a group that had a stake in the topic. Students could conduct background research, interview stakeholders, or collect survey data to accom­ plish this. To better assess the targeted community’s knowledge, stu­ dents conducted varied approaches – such as questionnaires, e­mail surveys, site visits, and interviews – demonstrated in the examples below. It was not necessary to conduct a major research investigation

Table 3. Overview of final action requirements. \*omitted

Table 4. Participation Form in final report. \*Omitted

Table 5. Biotech action research timeline. \*Omitted

for this nonmajors class, but the results were intended to provide students with evidence to inform their action.

Plan an Action Related to Biotechnology

Next, students employed their findings in planning steps to inform, influence, help, and/or support their community groups. Students provided all action­plan materials and concisely documented their work in the community (Table 3).

Additional Teaching Suggestions

Group evaluation of peers and instructional feedback were impor­ tant for effective group collaboration (e.g., see Table 4). Deadlines were spaced for the three steps of the project (Table 5) to allow for instructional feedback. This enabled instructors to provide written feedback at the completion of each step. Scoring guidelines for step 3 were given to support students in reporting their actions or paper effectively.

Instructors also met with students throughout the project as needed.

What We Have Learned

Seeking methods to enhance science teaching and learning at the undergraduate level, we realized that adding project­based action research to the biotechnology nonmajors course benefited students in several ways. It encouraged students to develop skills in collabo­ ration, investigating questions and analyzing data. The course also appeared to benefit problem­solving skill development, interest in applying academic knowledge to the real world, and excitement in contributing to local community issues. Although challenges arise with any authentic group project, students were able to work through all stages with concrete guidelines and instructor feedback. Below, we illustrate representative projects and discuss benefits and limitations.

Evidence of Action Projects in Biotechnology

We show two projects with excerpts from steps 1, 2, and 3 and the multimedia reports that students developed to inform or influence their community groups (Figures 1 and 2). These two projects had topics that were common among the students.

• Sample of project 1: Stem cell research (one student) (Figure 1)

• Sample of project 2: Genetically modified plants (team of three students) (Figure 2)

Figure 1. Example project of stem cell research.

Figure 2. Example project of genetically modified plants.

Benefits

Students were challenged to develop skills in interpreting and applying knowledge in an action plan based on a community’s needs. During their execution of project­based research, students were encouraged to connect their personal goals with academic study and to solve real­world problems. Through action research, they devel­ oped positive attitudes toward community engagement and action, along with problem­solving skills and deeper understanding of social issues. Moreover, students gained experience in communicating and explaining scientific knowledge to public audiences of various levels and ages through brochures or presentations.

The project also focused on students’ collaboration and team­ work skills. Students constructed a shared meaning of concepts and experiences, drew on others’ experiences, and reflected on their own thoughts. In general, this provided opportunities for students to form connections with peers, faculty, and community members while con­ ducting worthwhile projects.

Students were provided ownership in choosing topics. Several options within the project seemed to empower students with a sense of personal efficacy and commitment, since they could integrate their own interest and strength into biotechnology research. Whatever options they chose, students would earn research experience related to real­world application.

It appeared that the semester­length project with a specific time­ frame for the three steps fostered commitment by the students. They were aware of the timed nature of their assignments and were not allowed to procrastinate. The three­step guideline questions and instructor feedback were helpful in preparing students to implement their action plan and benefit from the project.

The action project triggered excitement and linked inquiry, curi­ osity, and creativity to the learning process. Therefore, students were more curious about the uncertain aspects of the project and eager to explore their topic through research. Developing students’ curi­ osity and creativity may be crucial in affecting later interest in science fields. Astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson says it best: “In the end, it is the people who are curious who change the world.”

Limitations

Adding action research to the biotechnology course appeared to aid the students, teacher, and community. However, at the initial stage, students may find it difficult to find partners and design an action plan. Therefore, instructors adopting this project approach may need to provide office hours to assist students and give them sufficient time to work on their projects.

The projects were designed to benefit the students. While com­ munities perhaps benefited as well, for example by becoming more educated, long­term collaborations and partnerships are needed to institute real change in communities. A potential next step would be to develop partnerships with a few of the community groups so that they could work with students each semester. This would also lessen the difficulty of choosing and networking with particular groups each semester.

Action projects may bring up time­ and group­management chal­ lenges. Giving advice for planning projects and then grading various topics can be time consuming. Also, ensuring fair grading of group projects on different topics could be difficult, and the scoring guide and participation form were helpful in this regard.

#### Posing specific research questions about biotechnology is good. It promotes scientific literacy, analytical reasoning, and information testing. And, peer dialogue over research is an intrinsic good!

Bielik and Yarden 16 – researcher in the Department of Science Teaching at the Weizmann Institute of Science; researcher in the department of Science Teaching at the Weizmann Institute of Science. [Tom, Anat. “Promoting the asking of research questions in a high-school biotechnology inquiry-oriented program.” International Journal of STEM Education 3, 15 (2016). Sept 6, 2016.]

Background

Asking questions is considered a crucial component in developing scientific literacy, as emphasized in various policy documents worldwide (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority [ACARA] 2012; European Commission 2007; National Research Council [NRC] 2012; United Kingdom Department of Education 2013). Students’ questions play an important role in promoting their scientific habits of mind and their understanding of scientific knowledge (Chin and Osborne 2008). Students are expected to ask their own research questions while participating in inquiry learning (Lombard and Schneider 2013), and teachers are expected to teach their students to ask research questions that are feasible for investigations, by providing them with inquiry environments that encourage asking research questions (Hartford and Good 1982). The teacher’s assistance is required in scaffolding students’ learning, transforming their questions into research questions that are appropriate for authentic scientific inquiry (Wayne Allison and Shrigley 1986). However, in most simple inquiry tasks that are carried out in schools, the research questions are given to the students, in contrast to authentic scientific inquiry, where scientists are expected to develop and explore their own research questions (Chinn and Malhotra 2002). In light of the need for a better understanding of the processes contributing to the development of students’ ability to ask research questions, we explored the teaching and learning of this ability in an innovative inquiry-oriented program entitled Bio-Tech. We demonstrate that a student-centered teaching strategy that includes a peer-critique activity during the lesson on how to ask research questions improved students’ ability to formulate research questions that are appropriate for investigation in the Bio-Tech program.

Inquiry-based science teaching

Engaging students in scientific inquiry is one of the principal goals of science education, recommended by researchers and in various policy documents (Bybee 2000; European Commission 2007; National Research Council [NRC] 1996, 2000).

One of the commonly accepted definitions of scientific inquiry is the one published in the National Research Council (NRC) (1996): “Scientific inquiry refers to the diverse ways in which scientists study the natural world and propose explanations based on the evidence derived from their work. Inquiry also refers to the activities of students in which they develop knowledge and understanding of scientific ideas, as well as an understanding of how scientists study the natural world” (p. 23). The NRC further elaborates on the components of scientific inquiry: “Inquiry is a multifaceted activity that involves making observations; posing questions; examining books and other sources of information to see what is already known; planning investigations; reviewing what is already known in light of experimental evidence; using tools to gather, analyze, and interpret data; proposing answers, explanations, and predictions; and communicating the results. Inquiry requires identification of assumptions, use of critical and logical thinking, and consideration of alternative explanations” (p. 26). We base the research presented in this article on the above definition of inquiry.

The NRC (2000) suggests five features that best define the teaching and learning of inquiry. Engaging in scientifically oriented questions is one of these features. Asking questions is also one of the eight crucial scientific practices suggested in the recent framework for K-12 science education (NRC 2012). Students around the world are required to learn about and gain an understanding of the inquiry process and develop their understanding of scientific practices by experiencing authentic inquiry in an active learning environment (Abd-El-Khalick et al. 2004; Bybee 2000; European Commission 2007; National Research Council [NRC] 1996). By practicing inquiry, students are expected to cultivate scientific habits of mind, practice logical scientific reasoning, develop critical thinking abilities in a scientific context, and experience meaningful learning of scientific concepts and processes (Chinn and Malhotra 2002; Harlen 2004; Hmelo-Silver et al. 2007). However, a debate still exists regarding the goals, methods, and strategies used to incorporate inquiry into the science-education classroom (European Commission 2007; Tamir 2006; Windschitl et al. 2008), and many issues remain unclear regarding the learning goals and suitable strategies for teaching scientific inquiry (Furtak et al. 2012; Minner et al. 2010).

Asking research questions

Asking questions is a core scientific practice required for gaining scientific literacy and developing students’ critical thinking and their understanding of the inquiry process (Cuccio-Schirripa and Steiner 2000; Dori and Herscovitz 1999; Hartford and Good 1982; National Research Council [NRC] 2012; Pedrosa-de-Jesus et al. 2012). The goals of teaching how to ask questions are to direct students’ knowledge construction, foster communication, help them self-evaluate their understanding, and increase their motivation and curiosity (Chin and Osborne 2008). Asking questions is an integral part of the practice of critiquing, which is important for developing students’ scientific literacy (Henderson et al. 2015).

Research questions, also termed researchable questions (Chin and Kayalvizhi 2002; Cuccio-Schirripa and Steiner 2000), investigable questions (Chin, 2002), or operational questions (Wayne Allison and Shrigley 1986), are questions that call for hands-on, manipulative, operational actions and can lead to a process of collecting data to answer them (Hartford and Good 1982). Research questions should be meaningful, interesting, and challenging for the students, providing them with opportunities to demonstrate their knowledge, skills, and abilities and also encouraging them to exercise their critical and creative thinking (Chin and Kayalvizhi 2002). To answer the research questions, they must be appropriate to the student’s cognitive developmental level and the procedures should be accessible and manageable to the student (Keys 1998). Students’ research questions should be investigable within the limitations of time and materials. The inquiry process that is required to answer research questions should not be too expensive, complicated, or dangerous to perform (Chin and Kayalvizhi 2002). Furthermore, research questions should lead to genuine exploration and discovery of previously unknown knowledge (Cuccio-Schirripa and Steiner 2000).

Students are expected to ask their own research questions while participating in scientific inquiry (Cuccio-Schirripa and Steiner 2000). These questions should help students progress to the next stages of the inquiry process (Chin 2002) and develop their procedural and conceptual knowledge (Chin and Brown 2002). Students are expected to formulate their own research questions during their school science learning (National Research Council [NRC] 2007). In addition, students should be able to distinguish between research questions and other types of questions and to refine their empirical questions that lead to open investigations (National Research Council [NRC] 2000). Harris et al. (2012) investigated fifth-grade teachers’ instructional moves and teaching strategies while teaching students how to ask research questions. They found that although the teachers displayed a student-centered and dialogic approach, they experienced challenges in developing their students’ ideas into investigable questions. Lombard and Schneider (2013) found that high-school biology majors’ ability to write research questions appropriate for investigation improved while maintaining their ownership of the inquiry process. Some of the students’ ability to write appropriate research questions was achieved by employing structured teacher guidance while engaging students in peer discussions (Lombard and Schneider 2013). Considering the above, there is a need to explore means of promoting the learning of how to ask research questions in science classrooms. This study aims to explore the development of students’ ability to ask research questions while participating in an inquiry-oriented program.

Classroom discourse and communicative approach

Examining classroom discourse is a powerful tool for evaluating the development of students’ scientific understanding and abilities (Osborne 2010; Pimentel and McNeill 2013). The discourse that is carried out in most secondary science classrooms is teacher-centered (Newton et al. 1999), as it is difficult for teachers to shift from the traditional teacher-centered instruction to more student-centered discursive teaching strategies (Jimenez-Aleixandre et al. 2000; Lemke 1990).

One of the methods of investigating classroom discourse is the communicative approach. The communicative approach analytical framework was developed by Mortimer and Scott (2003) to examine and classify types of classroom discourse. This approach focuses on the teacher–student interactions that serve to develop students’ ideas and understanding in the classroom. The framework is based on sociocultural principles, according to which individual learning and understanding is influenced by the social interaction context (Scott 1998; Vygotsky 1978) and the role of language during classroom talk (Lemke 1990).

Central to the communicative approach are the dialogic/authoritative and interactive/non-interactive dimensions. The dialogic/authoritative dimension determines whether the teacher acts as a transmitter of knowledge embodied in one scientific meaning or adopts a dialogic instruction that encourages exploration of different views and ideas to develop shared meaning of new knowledge (Scott 1998). In an authoritative discourse, the discussion is “closed” to other voices, having a fixed intent and controlled outcome. In a dialogic discourse, the teacher encourages the students to express their ideas and debate their points of view. The discussion is “open” and may include several different views. The intent of the dialogic discourse is generative, and the outcome is unknown. Scott et al. (2006) suggested that there is a necessary tension during classroom discourse between the authoritative and dialogic dimensions. The teachers may shift between approaches, according to their teaching purposes and goals (Scott et al. 2006). The interactive/non-interactive dimension determines the students’ involvement level during the discourse. In interactive discourse, many students participate in the discussion, whereas in non-interactive discourse, the number of students participating in the discussion is limited to one or a very few.

#### Research and dialogue about biotechnology increases scientific literacy and analytical skills

Bielik and Yarden 16 – researcher in the Department of Science Teaching at the Weizmann Institute of Science; researcher in the department of Science Teaching at the Weizmann Institute of Science. [Tom, Anat. “Promoting the asking of research questions in a high-school biotechnology inquiry-oriented program.” International Journal of STEM Education 3, 15 (2016). Sept 6, 2016.]

Discussion

To examine the possible development of students’ ability to ask research questions, their questions during lessons designed to formulate research questions appropriate for investigation in the inquiry-oriented Bio-Tech program were analyzed. The possible connection between the two Bio-Tech teachers’, Rebecca’s and Sam’s, teaching strategy during formulating research-question lesson and the students’ ability to ask research questions was investigated. Rebecca’s students’ ability to ask research questions improved during the examined lesson, whereas that of Sam’s students remained low. Since most of Rebecca’s students’ research questions were subsequently used for the inquiry conducted by the students in the Bio-Tech program a few months later, it is assumed that Rebecca’s lesson was fundamental to the students’ acquisition of this ability and for its sustainability for a long period of time. Sam’s students did not demonstrate a significant increase in the number of written research questions during the lesson, and none of their questions that were formulated during the lesson were later investigated in the program.

The initial number of research questions in Rebecca’s class was higher than that in Sam’s class. This difference could be explained by the fact that Rebecca’s students had experienced inquiry and the asking of research questions on other occasions, besides the Bio-Tech program, as mentioned by Rebecca. Therefore, as suggested in other studies (Chin and Osborne 2008; Lombard and Schneider 2013), it is important to provide students with opportunities to learn and practice asking research questions in earlier years and in a variety of educational activities. Previous findings regarding the teaching and learning of how to ask research questions in authentic-inquiry environments suggest that students’ ability to ask research questions improve following explicit classroom instruction (Chin 2002; Chin and Osborne 2008; Cuccio-Schirripa and Steiner 2000; Roth and Roychoudhury 1993). Similarly, our results indicate that 11th-grade biotechnology students’ ability to ask research questions improved following explicit instruction on how to ask research questions in the lesson that included dialogic and interactive whole-class discussions.

Examining the communicative approach and main teacher moves during the lessons indicated that students’ ability to ask research questions developed in the student-centered, dialogic, and interactive lesson and not in the teacher-centered, authoritative, and non-interactive lesson. Most whole-class discussions are usually teacher-led (Newton et al. 1999), governed by the triadic I-R-E dialog (Duschl and Osborne 2002; Lemke 1990), and teachers tend to avoid probing and toss-back questions, resulting in limited and simple responses from the students (Pimentel and McNeill 2013). Dialogic interactions during whole-class discourse encourage students to share and discuss their own ideas and views (Lehesvuori et al. 2013). Pimentel and McNeill (2013) found that teachers who used more dialogic student-centered interactions in their teaching encouraged the students to have more reflective thinking and meaningful discussions. In line with those studies, the Bio-Tech teacher who displayed a student-centered teaching strategy and dialogic/interactive communicative approach had greater success in teaching her students to ask research questions than the teacher who displayed a more teacher-centered teaching strategy and authoritative/non-interactive communicative approach. Teachers often shift their communicative approach during the lesson or teaching sequences (Lehesvuori et al. 2013; Scott et al. 2006). In the whole-class discussions that were examined in our study, the two teachers retained their communicative approach throughout the discussion. It is possible that examining other parts of the lessons or other Bio-Tech lessons given by the same teachers might reveal shifts in their communicative approach and teaching strategies, according to their goals and lesson plans.

Some studies suggest that the more experience teachers have in performing authentic scientific inquiry, the better their ability to teach inquiry becomes (Blanchard et al. 2009). Therefore, a possible explanation for the differences that were found between the two Bio-Tech classes could be attributed to the teachers’ scientific research experience. Studies regarding the correlation between teachers’ research experience and their students’ learning during inquiry activities have yielded mixed results. For example, Windschitl (2003) found that among pre-service science teachers, those who implemented open inquiry in their classes were those with significant undergraduate or professional scientific research experience. However, other studies concluded that neither the academic degree nor the research experience of the teachers impacted their students’ learning during the inquiry school activities (McNeill et al. 2011; Monk 1994). In the two Bio-Tech case studies analyzed here, the teachers’ academic research experience was negatively correlated with the development of their students’ ability to ask research questions. Namely, despite the fact that Sam is probably more experienced in conducting scientific research from his MSc studies (see Table 1), the students of Rebecca who holds a BSc degree (Table 1) performed better. This indicates that the academic level of the examined Bio-Tech teachers may have hindered the students’ learning to ask appropriate research questions. Another possible explanation for this result is that there were other factors that that may have affected the students’ learning. Such factors might be Sam’s students’ low cognitive level prior to the lesson, as was seen in their limited ability to ask research questions in the pre-lesson questionnaire compared to Rebecca’s students, or Sam’s authoritative and non-interactive communicative approach during the discussed lesson. Another possible factor could be the size class, since the number of students in Sam’s class was larger than the number in Rebecca’s class.

One of this study’s limitations is that it examined only two Bio-Tech teachers and their classes and the teaching that was carried out in one classroom lesson. However, these teachers are believed to represent typical high-school biotechnology teachers. Other teachers and lessons should be investigated to further support our conclusions. Further research is required to gain a broader view of the teaching and learning of how to ask research questions.

This study’s results indicate that students’ ability to ask research questions may develop in student-centered, dialogic, and interactive lessons. Encouraging teachers to implement dialogic and interactive classroom discourse in authentic inquiry could be a meaningful tool to support the teaching and learning of scientific abilities such as asking research questions. In line with other studies that have recommended promoting student-centered teaching strategies in science classrooms and inquiry learning (Pimentel and McNeill 2013; Scott et al. 2006; van Zee and Minstrell 1997), we suggest that applying student-centered, dialogic, interactive teaching strategies during the teaching of how to ask research questions in inquiry-oriented programs may develop students’ question-asking ability.

Conclusions

In the two examined case studies presented here, a connection was demonstrated between the more student-centered, dialogic, and interactive teaching strategy and the development of students’ ability to ask research questions. In the student-centered class, most of the research questions that were investigated in the Bio-Tech program originated from the peer-critique activity during the lesson. This indicates that a student-centered, dialogic, and interactive teaching strategy may contribute to the development of students’ ability to ask research questions in an inquiry-oriented high-school program.

### Policy Research Good—Cybersecurity

#### Cyber research is good---academia must incorporate civilians to inform cyberattack attribution.

Egloff 19 (Florian J., Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland; Centre for Technology & Global Affairs, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. “Contested public attributions of cyber incidents and the role of academia,” Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 41, pages 51-58, October 12, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2019.1677324>, AK)

**[ABSTRACT]**

Public attributions of cyber incidents by governments and private industry have become prevalent in recent years. This article argues that they display a skewed version of cyber conflict for several operational and structural reasons, including political, commercial, and legal constraints. In addition, public attribution of cyber incidents takes place in a heavily contested information environment, creating fractured narratives of a shared past. The article uses three cyber incidents (Sony Pictures, DNC, and NotPetya) to show how actors cope with this contested information environment and proposes a changed role of academia to address some of the problems that emerge. To become competent in contesting public attribution discourses, universities would have to work more across physical, disciplinary, and academic boundaries. The main implications for democracies are to be more transparent about how attribution is performed, enable other civilian actors to study cyber conflict, and thereby broaden the discourse on cybersecurity politics.

**[ABSTRACT ENDS]**

The “attribution problem,” the difficulty of finding out who did it, used to be one of the most discussed questions in the study of cyber conflict (Boebert, 2010; Clark & Landau, 2010; Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p. 20; Kello, 2013, p. 33; Lindsay, 2015; Lupovici, 2016; Morgan, 2010; Nye, 2017; Rid & Buchanan, 2015). Yet, recent empirical practice suggests that various actors not only have the capability to attribute, but have decided to share their findings in public. Public attributions claims, however, often remain contested.

So what is public attribution? Public attribution in its most elementary form is the blaming of a particular actor as responsible for a cyber incident.1 It can be undertaken by a variety of actors, including governments, companies, NGOs, and academia. Governmental attribution is of particular importance, as government action to assign blame is an inherently political act. Governments thus have a strong incentive to use public attribution as a political tool, thereby making it interesting to the study of contemporary security politics. For research on governmental public attribution as an element of security policy, one can split the public attribution process into two phases: mechanisms that lead to public attribution and what happens after an incident is publicly attributed. Little research exists on either phase with regard to attribution of cyber incidents. This is problematic, as our understanding of contemporary security policy rests on understanding what drives threat narratives, how and why those particular ones are introduced publicly, and how contestation of threat narratives takes place in the public sphere.

My main contribution is to focus on the second phase of attribution, namely, what happens after a government goes public about a cyber incident.2 Understanding this phase is important, as public attributions of cyber incidents are one of the main sources from which the public learns about who is attacking whom in cyberspace, thereby shaping the threat perception of the general public. Most attribution judgements are published by governments, the private sector, and a small number of civil society actors. To situate the knowledge space, in which attribution claims are introduced to, I reflect on this source of knowledge about cyber conflict by identifying how this knowledge structurally shapes our understanding of cyber conflict, in particular due to operational and (political, commercial, and legal) structural factors. In short, due to the commercial incentives on the private sector side and the political bias on the government side, the public data about cyber conflict structurally induces distrust into the representativeness of the public attribution statements.

A second contribution is to focus on the contestation of public attribution claims in democracies and the consequences such contestation brings. Contestation is fundamental to democratic politics. The open debate, the ability of everyone to freely voice opinions, and the emergence of truth trough democratic discourse is foundational to the public sphere of democratic polities. Thus, the ability to contest is a sign of healthy democratic politics. As this article will show, however, this openness to contestation, coupled with the information poor environment, creates particular problems in the area of cybersecurity. Two main questions are pursued: How do actors engaging in public attribution cope with the contestations that follow the introduction of their attribution claims? In what way could academia address those problems?

Investigating the contestation of public attribution claims and the consequences of such contestation enables us to better understand the politics of public attribution. The article argues that public attribution of cyber incidents takes place in a heavily contested information environment, creating fractured narratives of a shared past. Due to the secrecy attached surrounding the attribution processes by governments, particularly due to concerns of intelligence agencies about sources and methods, governments are often reluctant to reveal the evidence underlying the attribution judgments. These are ideal enabling conditions for other actors to contest governmental claims. In a series of empirical examples, I reflect on the drivers of contestation after an incident is publicly attributed and show how attackers and other constituencies with various political and economic motivations drive particular narratives.

In a final part, I propose how academia could be a partial remedy to this situation. Academia, so far, has not been a strong participant in the discursive space around particular attributions. This is despite its commitment to transparency and independence theoretically making it a well-placed actor to contribute an independent interdisciplinary contribution on the state of cyber conflict. Thus, I argue for an increasing need for academic interventions in the area of attribution. This includes interdisciplinary research on all aspects of attribution (not just in cybersecurity), and conducting independent research on the state of cyber conflict historically and contemporarily. One of the main implications of this research on contestation of attribution claims for democracies are to be more transparent about how attribution is performed, to enable other civilian actors to study cyber conflict, and to thereby broaden the discourse on what is one of the main national security challenges of today.

The article is structured in three parts: First, public attribution is situated in the context of the literature on the contestation of claims in public opinion formation and the general biases underlying current public attribution claims are explained. Second, three empirical examples are used to reflect on the interaction of public attribution with a contested information environment, namely, the public attributions of the intrusions into Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014, of the intrusions into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 2016, and of the NotPetya incident in 2017. In the third part, I assess the implications of contested attributions and suggest how this calls for a different role of academia, particularly with regard to research on attribution in universities. The conclusion offers a perspective on the biggest research opportunities and challenges in the study of cybersecurity and attribution in the future.

Public attribution fosters a skewed picture of cyber conflict

Contemporary security policy takes place within a heavily contested information environment. To better understand how security politics takes place with regard to cybersecurity, we first have to reflect on how our knowledge of cyber conflict is constructed. At an elementary level, we do not directly observe who is using cyber insecurity to further their interests against whom. Thus, our knowledge space of cyber conflict is constructed by different information providers. In this first part, I first situate the contestation of public attribution claims within the literature on attribution of cyber incidents, before reflecting on how two operational and three structural factors shape the public data about cyber conflict in such a way so as to structurally induce distrust into its representativeness.

Situating public attribution in the literature on attribution of cyber incidents

The literature on cyber conflict has focused on documenting the shift from the attribution problem hindering successful policy responses, towards attribution being often possible for state agencies. For example, in 2015, Rid and Buchanan challenged three assumptions prevalent in parts of the literature: Namely, that attribution is intractable due to the nature of cyberspace, that the difficulty in attribution is finding the evidence, and that attribution is either solved or unsolved (Rid & Buchanan, 2015, p. 6).

More recently, scholars are focusing on public attribution, including whether and how to build an international organization aiding attribution processes (Eichensehr, 2019, 2020; Finnemore & Hollis, 2017, pp. 475–476, 2019; Grindal, Kuerbis, Badiei, & Mueller, 2018; Schulzke, 2018; Solomon, 2018). Reflections on the legal, and naming and shaming aspects of public attribution help to clarify the international normative function of public attribution (Eichensehr, 2020; Finnemore & Hollis, 2019), whilst analysis of institutional policy proposals shows potential ways towards improving transparency and credibility problems (Egloff & Wenger, 2019; Eichensehr, 2019, 2020; Grindal et al., 2018; Solomon, 2018). Empirically, in the last five years, public attribution of cyber incidents has moved from being incredibly rare, to becoming a more routine national security policy option in international politics. Despite the increasing prevalence of public attribution claims, little research—with the exception of Schulzke (2018, discussed below)—has zoomed in on the two phases of public attribution, namely, first, the mechanisms that lead to public attribution and second, what happens after an incident is publicly attributed. Splitting public attribution processes into these two phases is a useful conceptualization, as there are a whole series of political processes giving rise to a government considering public attribution, whilst a different set of political challenges inform the handling of the situation after having introduced the public attribution claim.

The lack of research is unfortunate, as both parts are relevant to understanding where attribution sits within the larger domain of the politics of cyber insecurity. First, better understanding the mechanisms leading to public attribution is important to situate the actor’s own understandings of the domain and their activity in a larger context. As an example, for the international relations scholarship it matters whether public attributions are aimed at domestic or international audiences. Furthermore, the incentives to go public will shape the type of attributions representing the public record of cyber conflict, whether they be court cases, public ministerial statements, technical reports, or joint diplomatic statements delivered with allies. Second, better understanding what happens after an incident is publicly attributed is important to assess the utility of public attribution as a policy tool, but also, to better understand the wider politics of cyber insecurity. For example, if public attributions are used by elites to frame our understanding of cyber conflict, the type of framing, and the effect thereof are worthy of further study. This article focuses mainly on this second part of the process, namely, what happens after an incident is publicly attributed.

Schulzke (2018) has suggested some theoretical reasons why we should pay careful attention to the effects of public attribution of cyber incidents. Drawing on psychological research, he argued that people do not like ambiguity when searching for explanations of unexpected threatening events (p. 957). In the attribution of cyber incidents, the relatively long time-frame between the event and a confident attribution statement results in people already having drawn their own conclusions, before “better” information may be available. Schulzke draws out four theoretical mechanisms particularly poignant for public opinion formation of attribution of cyber incidents. First, due to the information poor environment, causal narratives offered by elites gain large weight in media coverage (Baum & Groeling, 2010; Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007; see also Stone, 1989). This effect is stronger in the cyber environment compared to kinetic incidents, as in many cases the victim has the ability to keep the occurrence of a cyber incident a secret. Second, existing hostilities influence subsequent threat perception, with attributional uncertainty having the potential to reinforce current strategic narratives. Schulzke argues that this, again, is particularly exacerbated compared to kinetic attacks, as evidence is harder to grasp and attribution, in general, is more ambiguous resulting in even stronger power of initial framings of blame (p. 959).

Third, information about cyber incidents is regularly not forthcoming, reinforcing the perception of hidden processes and making cyber attack causal narratives very similar to conspiracy theories (i.e., “a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons-the conspirators-acting in secret.” Definition from Keeley, 1999; see also Schulzke, 2018, p. 962). Fourth, because of time delays in attribution processes it is hard to hold policymakers accountable. In addition, because cybersecurity as policy issue is distributed amongst different stakeholders, responsibility is diffused and susceptibility to partisanship increases. From these four mechanisms, Schulzke (2018) concludes,

the public should be sensitized to the problem and to a security context in which blame takes time to establish. It would be prudent for policymakers and journalists to avoid a rush to judge who is responsible for an attack, regardless of how obvious the answer may initially seem. This would promote greater openness to information that is uncovered by investigators. Political scientists can play a role in this by exploring how these novel threats fit into what previous research has uncovered about opinion formation and conflict processes. Future research should continue to investigate the political challenges associated with attribution and to consider what additional steps could be taken to manage this problem. (p. 964)

Agreeing with the desirability of Schulzke’s prescriptions, and following his call for more research in this area, this article introduces a set of arguments beyond the four mechanisms raised. Schulzke mostly draws on psychological, opinion formation, and media research, arguing about the attribution environment in abstract. This article contributes another element: contestation of public attribution claims and the consequences such contestation brings. To do so, the article first introduces factors skewing the public discourse on cyber conflict. This is an important reflection in order to contextualize our knowledge of cyber conflict. Second, the drivers of contestation after an incident is publicly attributed are discussed, with particular focus on how contestation is partially driven by the attacker and partially by other constituencies with various political and economic motivations. This has consequences for the opinion formation processes. Third, the article concludes drawing out the likely consequences for the overall discursive environment in public attribution, and recommends a changed role for academic interventions in this space. Only few places in the world have specialized programs to perform interdisciplinary research on cybersecurity and international relations. While outliers exist (see research of the Citizenlab; for a different example see Demchak & Shavitt, 2018), a sustained academic engagement with the process that produces the realities of cyber conflict and an active positioning within that is sorely needed.

A skewed (public) picture of cyber conflict

To better understand the consequences of governments and private actors publicly revealing the perpetrators behind cyber campaigns, we need to understand the biases underlying the data and judgements made. Those biases in the data and judgements will shape our knowledge space on cyber conflict. There are at least two operational, and three structural factors that jointly skew our picture of cyber conflict.

The first two factors are operational. First, offensive actors hide their tracks. The actors engaging in offensive behavior often have incentives to hide their tracks to achieve their goals. Thus, the attackers may sometimes be the only ones knowing they are engaging in offensive behavior. Of course, some actors want to advertise the origin of cyber activity broadly, but this remains the minority of publicly known incidents (Poznansky & Perkoski, 2018). Second, the victims often have incentives to keep their victimhood secret, limiting the amount of information we have about the impact of cyber conflict. This is both due to operational and reputational reasons: Operationally, it can be advantageous to not disclose your knowledge to the attacker; reputationally, organisations may come to the conclusions that it is better not to disclose having been breached.

There are three structural factors that further skew our public knowledge of cyber conflict. First, the security companies, which are one of the main sources of how we learn about cyber conflict, have limited visibility, mostly defined by the technologies employed and the markets they serve. Furthermore, they have a specific prism of what kinds of threats they investigate further (on the political choices made by security companies, see Stevens, 2020). That prism results in highly detailed knowledge about a subset of actors engaging in offensive measures. Only a subset of the research on these investigated actors is then published and picked up in the public’s awareness of cyber conflict. In addition, most of the companies investigating threats (threat intelligence companies) are based in Western states—though this is changing, for example, with China-based threat intelligence teams increasingly reporting on threat activity within China (one example is Qihoo360). Partially due to their client base, partially due to political sensibilities, and partially due to different political priorities resulting in a different target set, threat intelligence companies rarely publicly reveal Western operations (for an analysis of threat intelligence reporting focusing on civil society, see Maschmeyer, 2019).

Second, there exists an attribution asymmetry. The rights and responsibilities of governments and private actors are still in political dispute. This means, there still is a lacking baseline on who has to provide security for whom, and for what price, in what circumstance (see Dunn Cavelty & Egloff, 2019). The result is highly unequal investments with regard to whom attribution capabilities are used for: The financially potent have the means to buy attribution, whilst some of the political targets have the public visibility for security companies to show off their skills. Outside of those two categories, most organizations and citizens never get in contact with an attribution investigation. Third, recently, some governments, most prominently the members of the Five-Eyes signals intelligence alliance (consisting of the United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), have started to publicly attribute some cyber intrusions. Governments, however, have their own, politically derived incentives to publish some results of investigations and not others.

The political motivations behind public attributions, coupled with the scarce evidence offered for the attribution judgements, skews our knowledge of cyber conflict. Because of the operational factors leading to underreporting, the commercial incentives on the private sector side, and the political bias on the government side, the public data about cyber conflict structurally induces distrust into the representativeness of the attribution statements made by these actors. However, due to the secrecy of the cyber incidents, the knowledge introduced in to the public domain by these actors is key in providing the discursive baseline for contestations about cyber conflict.

The remainder of this article focuses on this understudied element: The contestation phase that follows a public attribution. This phase is important, as by introducing attribution claims into the public discourse, actors are laying political blame for specific actions onto other actors. The next part shows how different actors are challenging these political acts in a contested information environment.

Contested public attributions in democracies

Contestation of the attribution offered by a government regularly follows attribution statements. This part focuses on this contestation phase, and the implications contestation has on the perception of cyber conflict, and the trustworthiness of attribution claims by society.

Contestation is fundamental to democratic politics (see, for example, Dryzek, 2002). The open debate, the ability of everyone to freely voice opinions, and the emergence of truth trough democratic discourse is foundational to the public sphere of democratic polities. Thus, the ability to contest is a sign of healthy democratic politics, or, in Dryzek’s terms: “Contestation is democratic to the extent that it is engaged by a broad variety of competent actors under unconstrained conditions” (p. 77). Thus, ideally, there are a broad set of competent actors participating the contestation in the public sphere. As the series of empirical examples in this section will show, however, whilst the discourse on public attribution is generally open to contestation, the problems raised with the actors (see above), coupled with the information poor environment about cyber incidents to the broader public, creates particular opportunities for motivated, sometimes adversarial, intervention in the area of cybersecurity.

In abstract, there are different phases that contestation occurs within. At some point in time, an intrusion is discovered by the victim. The fact of the existence of the intrusion may, but does not have to, leak into the public domain. If it does, public contestation around who might be behind the intrusion starts at that point. If it does not, contestation starts the latest with the first public statement attributing the intrusion.

Contestation is undertaken by several different communities and is case-specific. As a generalized matter, contestation will depend on the type of evidence that the attributor offered. The government has some choice over whether, and how much to reveal. Thereby, trade-offs have to be made on how much detail is revealed: revealing more detail is giving the attacker more insight into the governmental processes, particularly with regard to sources and methods. Concealing the incident entirely runs into the risk of not being in control of the narrative, should the fact of the existence of the incident leak. Revealing part of the incident, but not others, opens up contestation as to the credibility of the evidence. Overall, the less clear the matching between the evidence disclosed and the conclusions proffered, the more opportunity there is for antagonistic communities to introduce doubt unto the claims made.

This does not mean that all claims always have to be supported by public evidence: Indeed, we trust other people’s claims based on trust in their person, their procedures, or their institutions all the time, often based on a common sense, that is, “our acceptance of the intractable facts about the world and our already existing shared experience and understanding about the social world” (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2019, p. 127). However, with regard to the attribution of cyber incidents, there is not yet a wealth of shared experience and understanding to draw upon, let alone intractable facts, opening up the space to fundamental contestation.

In this contestation process, the attacker is able to influence the contestation. Hence, the attacker can offer alternative interpretations vying to persuade the same audiences the victim wants to convince. As such, Guitton (2014) was right when he cast public attribution as a “game to convince an audience.” We now have evidence that different actors actively engage in this type of contestation, and that some of the actors are becoming more skilled at it. This can be best observed using empirical examples. For this reason, to illuminate the contestation phase of public attribution, the article observes some short empirical examples of contested attributions.

The universe of cases of public attributions in democracies is growing, with my current research project on the politics of public attribution already having identified around 50 cases across Western Europe and North America (Center for Security Studies, n.d.). The empirical examples included in this article are selected, because they are particularly instructive to observe the contestation phase, and to see the development of government policy to address some of the challenges of engaging in public attribution.3 The Sony attack in 2014 is one of the earliest examples, where a government publicly blamed another government for a cyber incident, and tried to convince its audience by offering up evidence. It is particularly instructive, as it shows the contestation that can occur domestically, when a government claims attribution. The DNC case of 2016 is one of the (rare) examples, where we have corroborated public documentation of the adversary directly engaging in countermessaging, trying to muddy the attribution claims offered by the private sector and government. It adds empirical illustration to the phenomenon of contestation by demonstrating the active nature of some adversaries in interfering in (domestic) political discourses. Finally, the NotPetya case of 2017/8 is one of the newer cases where a new policy of diplomatic collaboration to address the problem of not being able to share all the evidence is observable. Governments, recognizing their trust deficit in claiming attribution in public, have teamed up with other governments to lend more political weight and credibility to their claims: The NotPetya case illustrates this well.

Cyber intrusion at Sony Pictures Entertainment 2014

On November 24 2014, a wiper malware was activated on a large part of SPE’s infrastructure, crippling the company’s ability to continue their work. The malware issued a warning that company documents would be released if demands were not met by 11:00 at night. Having let that deadline pass, the group Guardians of Peace (GOP) published several movies, SPE internal documents, and e-mail archives of SPE executives over the next month, thereby alerting the public of the intrusion at Sony Pictures Entertainment.

Given the upcoming release date of the movie The Interview, speculations about possible North Korean connections were raised. North Korea reacted by issuing a press statement denying responsibility, but praising the attacking group for their actions and condemning SPE for producing a film “abetting a terrorist act” (KCNAWatch, 2014). This was followed by a statement by GOP on December 8 2014, which directly connected the showing of a movie to their actions. It demanded that SPE should “stop immediately showing the movie of terrorism which can break the regional peace and cause the War!” (Gallagher, 2014).

Lacking any indications of canceling the movie, it was a threat of terrorist attacks against moviegoers issued on the Pastebin platform on December 16 2014 that changed the dynamic. Despite the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s claim of having no intelligence about a plot against movie theaters, many movie theaters opted-out of showing the movie (Perera, 2014; Seal, 2015; United States Department of Homeland Security & Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2014). The next day SPE issued a press statement canceling the release, which had been scheduled for Christmas Day. By that time, the public discourse in the United States was still focused on whether it could really be North Korea behind the intrusion. For example, on the December 17, Kim Zetter, a renowned journalist covering information security, in an article weighing up different theories concluded: “Regardless of whether the Sony, Saudi Aramco and South Korea attacks are related, the evidence indicating they’re nation-state attacks is circumstantial. And all of the same evidence could easily point to hacktivists. Our money is on the latter” (Zetter, 2014).

On December 18 2014, the White House announced it was considering a proportional response (White House, 2014). On December 19 2014, the FBI officially attributed the GOP’s actions to the North Korean government (FBI, 2014). The same day, U.S. President Barack Obama confirmed the attribution to North Korea (Obama, 2014). The FBI did not offer specific evidence, but explained that their judgement was based in part in overlap of previously used malware, infrastructure, and tools used in previous attacks carried out by North Korea. Some experts arrived at the same conclusion. For example, Brian Krebs (2014) laid out in detail the evidence why it is plausible for North Korea to be behind the intrusion. Similarly, Nicholas Weaver (2014) explained why the U.S. government is credible in claiming North Korea provenance. Bruce Bennet (2014) of RAND explained how this fits within the larger North Korean political and security context. And finally, Dmitry Alperovitch (2014) of Crowdstrike asserted that his company’s own assessment supports the attribution to North Korea.

However, this did not assuage the skeptics. The generic language used by the FBI led to skeptical statements from some information security specialists. For example, Robert Graham (2014) entitled his blog post “The FBI’s North Korea evidence is nonsense,” whilst Marc Rogers (2014a, 2014b), DEFCONs head of security, published two contributions explaining his doubt of the FBI’s attribution claims.

Bruce Schneier (2014) entitled his December 24 blog post “Did North Korea really hack Sony?” and voiced his deep skepticism of the North Korea attribution. By the December 26 2014, NPR featured a segment on “Doubts Persist On U.S. Claims Of North Korean Role In Sony Hack” (Shahani, 2014). Some people also used the skepticism of the Sony attribution to feature their own companies. For example, Kurt Stammberger of Norse Inc. and Jeffrey Carr of Taia Global both claimed that their own company’s analyses led them to different judgements (Biddle, 2014; Taia Global, 2014). Thus, the original FBI/Obama attribution was not convincing to parts of the security community, which was used to see arguments to be supported with data, and which was inherently skeptical of the use of government authority to give weight to a truth claim. At the same time, the Russian government expressed solidarity with North Korea on the film being “aggressive and scandalous,” and charged the United States with escalating tensions without presenting direct evidence linking the intrusions to North Korea (Lukashevich, 2014).

There was still much speculation about the provenance of the Sony attack. So much so, that the then director of the FBI, James Comey, released more details on the Sony attribution on January 7 2015 (Comey, 2015). In a speech at Fordham University, he informed the public that one element they based their attribution on was an operational security mistake, where the North Koreans forgot to mask their true IP addresses. Immediately, this was challenged by skeptics. Kim Zetter (2015) at Wired again covered the critics, this time leaving the last word to Richard Bejtlich, who offered some context:

I don’t expect anything the FBI says will persuade Sony truthers. The issue has more to do with truthers’ lack of trust in government, law enforcement, and the intelligence community. Whatever the FBI says, the truthers will create alternative hypotheses that try to challenge the “official story.” Resistance to authority is embedded in the culture of much of the “hacker community,” and reaction to the government’s stance on Sony attribution is just the latest example.

Bejtlich was right. Some parts of the security community continued to voice their skepticism. Particularly, Jeffrey Carr’s Taia Global followed up with a report alleging Russian hackers still being on Sony’s networks, and that this claim sheds doubt on the veracity of the U.S. government’s attribution (Taia Global, 2015; see also Pearson, 2015). Carr’s source offered as bona fides some documents that the hacker claims to originate from the Sony network, which Carr tried to verify. Problematically, Carr’s source for this claim was a well-known Russian hacker with self-claimed previous contracting relationships to the Russian state (Best, 2019; Pearson, 2015). Of note: both Jeffrey Carr and Kurt Stammberger have since left the cybersecurity industry (Collier, 2018).

This empirical example shows some of the dynamics that occur in the contestation of a governmental attribution claim. While the government insists on its legitimacy to claim attribution without revealing sources and methods, other audiences use this predicament for their own argumentative strategies. Firstly, the perpetrator can contest the attribution claim by denying sponsorship and demand proof for the attribution claim. Secondly, skepticism of government authority will fuel distrust in a governmental claim without the evidence being offered.4 Thirdly, interested third-parties can use this situation to influence the contestation, as had happened in the Sony case with the Russian government aligning itself with the North Korean narrative. In such a contested information environment, multiple “truths” will continue to co-exist. For example, Seth Rogen, the director of the film The Interview, claimed in 2018 that he still does not believe North Korea to be behind the hack (Marchese, 2018). The U.S. government, meanwhile, reinforced its attribution claim multiple times to gain legitimacy, eventually resulting in a detail-rich criminal complaint of a North Korean citizen (United States of America v. Park Jin Hyok, 2018).

Cyber intrusions into the Democratic National Committee 2016

The intrusions into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) before the U.S. presidential election in 2016 are a second example for how contestation of the attribution takes place in a politicized information environment.

In April 2016, Crowdstrike was called to help with incident response for the DNC. They discovered at least two threat actors were active on the DNC networks, one had been there since at least summer 2015, the other since April 2016. On June 14 2016, the DNC, together with the cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike, publicly attributed the intrusions into its networks to two separate Russian espionage groups, APT28 and APT 29 (or FancyBear and CozyBear in Crowdstrike’s terminology). Immediately, the media enquired whether Crowdstrike was right. Various other security companies confirmed their findings, including Fidelis, ThreatConnect (2016), SecureWorks (2016), and Mandiant (Kopan, 2016a; Nakashima, 2016).

Just as immediate was the attacker’s reaction, which was later confirmed to be the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (also known under its former name GRU). On June 15 2016, they created a fake hacker persona named “Guccifer 2.0” and attempted sowing confusion and doubt over the attribution claim (United States of America v. Netyksho et al., 2018). They claimed to have hacked the DNC and as bona fides offered documents, which the hacker claimed to originate from the DNC network. Over the next few months, the attackers used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to distribute documents on the Democratic Party’s campaign and to shed doubt about the attribution to Russia. RT (2016), a Russian government funded media network, immediately picked up on the content and the contradictory claim of hacking provenance, and further distributed this interpretation.

However, by late July 2016, the cybersecurity community had identified parts of the broader Russian subversion campaign, including some of the influence elements (Gioe, 2018; Rid, 2016a, 2016b, 2017). Information security specialists and some journalists were quick to point out that Guccifer 2.0 was likely a front of the Russian intelligence services. Meanwhile, the U.S. government officially did not attribute cyber intrusion at the DNC.5 Despite the broad sourcing and unusual clarity of evidence, it took another month for members of the legislative to go public (September 22 2016), and two months for the U.S. government to release a meagre public statement by the executive (October 7 2016) (Feinstein & Schiff, 2016; United States Department of Homeland Security & Director of National Intelligence, 2016).

Despite this, Republican presidential nominee Donald J. Trump further fueled the uncertainty about the origin of the leaked material by during the first presidential debate on September 26 2016, implicating other theories of provenance such as Russia, China, or a 400 lbs hacker (Kopan, 2016b). This is important, as the presidential debates are moments of highest political media exposure, and do lead to follow-up media stories, giving the multiple theories of provenance angle a bigger discursive platform. He continued to reiterate this position even after the election. On the December 11 2016 he implied on FoxNews Sunday interview with Chris Wallace that the intelligence community has “no idea if it’s Russia, or China, or somebody. It could be somebody sitting in a bed someplace” (FoxNews, 2016).

Only by the beginning of 2017, the government released an intelligence community assessment attributing various interference activities, including Guccifer 2.0, to the Russian government (National Intelligence Council (Office of the Director of National Intelligence), 2017). On January 12 2017, the GRU again used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to dispute the relationship to Russia. By alleging the falsification of evidence, it further fueled speculation about other theories of provenance, which continued to be covered by publications such as The Nation (Lawrence, 2017). In the end, the United States released a detailed indictment assigning blame to the Russian military intelligence service (United States of America v. Netyksho et al., 2018).

Much of the delay in the U.S. public response is explained by domestic political concerns of the executive being seen to unduly intervene in the election process. At the domestic level, the procedures were underdeveloped and unprepared for a coordinated response between the federal government and the state-based election officials. Inter-agency discussions and indecisiveness about what to do next significantly slowed down this process. For example, in August 2016, then FBI Director James Comey drafted an op-ed publicly attributing the Russian activities that was debated in the inter-agency process but was never published (U.S. Office of the Inspector General, 2018).

The contestation of the provenance of the intrusions was enabled by this lack of a public response. As a consequence, the use of the materials, also by the traditional media, was less problematized, as there was no governmental voice claiming illegitimate interference into the election. This is consistent with research on the influence of elites on initial framings, in its absence opening up space in the initial coverage of the incident to the attacker’s narrative (see for example Baum & Groeling, 2010). This effect will diminish over time, as the official narrative settles (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2006). However, because of the uncertainties in this initial contestation, doubts on are going to persist, and significant work on behalf of the government has to be undertaken to gain credibility for its version of events. In the case of the election interference in the United States in 2016, this included the appointment of a special counsel, who brought detailed indictments against Russian activity as well as published two reports on the outcome of the investigation (Mueller, 2019).

NotPetya incident in 2017

Finally, NotPetya, a third empirical example, can demonstrate how the meaning-making activities of governments have changed, partially, in order to address the problem of not being willing to release clear and convincing evidence in a timely manner in the public domain.

NotPetya was a severe destructive cyber campaign aimed primarily at Ukraine on the June 27 2019. It employed a wiper worm, which caused destruction worldwide. As with any large cyber incident, the question quickly arose, who is behind this campaign. Pretending to be ransomware, the worm itself displayed none of the elements a cyber criminal campaign would entail. The Ukrainian security service soon claimed for the Russian special services to be behind the attack (SBU, 2017). This claim was reinforced by cybersecurity companies, who independently found technical links between the NotPetya attack and the BlackEnergy group, a group who was also associated to the previous attacks on the Ukrainian energy grid (Cherepanov, 2017; Kaspersky Blog, 2017). Russia immediately denied these allegations (Brewster, 2017). Thus, the matter rested in a stand-off. This is until the Five-Eyes, the signals intelligence cooperation between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, decided to publicly attribute the campaign to the Russian military.6 Again, Russia swiftly denied the allegations (Russian Embassy in the USA, 2018). However, the political momentum behind this attribution differed from the Ukrainian response. The British attorney general, Jeremy Wright (2018), outlined the reasoning:

If more states become involved in the work of attribution then we can be more certain of the assessment. We will continue to work closely with allies to deter, mitigate and attribute malicious cyber activity. It is important that our adversaries know their actions will be held up for scrutiny as an additional incentive to become more responsible members of the international community.

This joint approach of the Five-Eyes was corroborated by the U.S. State Department, which highlighted the importance of partners in buttressing each other’s attribution claims and responses (Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, 2018).7 Thus, the Five-Eyes governments had decided that they use public attribution as a way of shaping the environment. By building an international coalition, attributing blame publicly to an actor for specific actions that are deemed undesirable to the international community, the coalition of states is changing the operational environment.

The intent, as outlined by the British government official, is to establish boundaries for responsible behavior, respectively clearly labeling the behavior deemed “irresponsible.” Indeed, the United Kingdom's hopes to attain benefits with pursuing public attribution more broadly, including making cyberspace “more transparent as counter-normative and destructive behaviour (i.e. Wannacry and NotPetya) are attributed” leading to “greater stability in cyberspace as clear lines of unacceptable behaviour are drawn,” increasing the legitimacy of attribution by undertaking attribution with allies, and using attribution as a first step “to enable wider response options to impose costs on the responsible actors” (UK government, n.d.). Thus, the British government identifies its activities in public attribution as boundary drawing behavior that gains more legitimacy as it is undertaken in coalitions of states. Though an in-depth international legal analysis is out of scope, one can also note, that by acting in coalition states prepare the ground for establishing state practice, one of the sources for international customary law (see further Finnemore & Hollis, 2019).8 This is in congruence with the literature on international norms: In order for norms to be effective, norm violations have to be acknowledged (Finnemore & Hollis, 2017; Miller, Nakashima, & Entous, 2017). The norm shaping activity seems to be targeted at encouraging state actors to not indiscriminately deliver effects.

What the years of experience with public attribution since Rid and Buchanan’s (2015) seminal article have shown that, contrary to their suggestions, specificity in the data presented to support a public attribution claim is not a necessity to advance such a claim successfully. In the examples raised in this article (Sony, DNC hack, NotPetya), the government did not readily offer up specific data to back up their attribution claims. The Sony hack thereby is particularly instructive: The pointing to declassified evidence actually weakened the government’s truth claim, as it enabled other commentators to find alternative explanations for the particular data. In the DNC and NotPetya case, the governments initially were able to build on the private sector claims, and used the government’s reputation of possessing capable (signals) intelligence capabilities to convince some audiences of the trustworthiness of their claims.

Implications of contested public attributions for the role of academia

Whilst the first section of this article reflected on the operational and structural factors leading to a skewed picture of cyber conflict, the previous section identified in three empirical examples the contestation around the provenance of cyber intrusions. This last section reflects on where this leaves the knowledge space on public attribution, and proposes how academia, if it became a competent stakeholder in the contestation of the public attribution discourse, could partially remedy some of the problems identified.

The three empirical examples showed that public attribution takes place in a contested information environment, with the attacker also having a voice. Attribution claims are introduced mainly by two sets of stakeholders: governments and cybersecurity companies. Whilst cybersecurity companies provide technical data, forensic links, and estimates about who might be behind a cyber intrusion, they are often not the political entity laying blame on a specific attacker. In the Sony case, Mandiant provided the incident response services to Sony, but refrained from publicly attributing the incident. The DNC intrusions are the exception, where Crowdstrike was asked by the DNC to go public with specific attribution claims. In the NotPetya case, private industry provided much of the remedy to the infection, and offered analysis connecting the operation to previous campaigns, but refrained from making political attributions. Rather, it was governments that, in a coordinated manner, laid blame onto the Russian military.

There are long-term ramifications stemming from attributions in such contested information environments. First, the uncertainty about the truth claims persist. Thus, even several years after a specific cyber incident, there are people asking about whether we can really know who is behind the incident. This is due to the original event being clouded in this contested information environment, where the multiplicity of narratives offered to the public create an impression that one really cannot know who is behind a cyber incident. The secrecy of the attribution processes thereby lays fertile ground for conspiratorial thinking (Schulzke, 2018). This is beneficial to perpetrators of cyber intrusions, who, despite implausible deniability, can continue operating with relative impunity (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018).

Indeed, whilst not unique to the area of cyber incidents, the destabilization of the perception of the achievability of attribution is particularly impactful in an information poor environment, where outside verification is difficult (For an example of the destabilizing an official narrative laying blame onto a specific actor in a physical incident, see Ramsay and Robertshaw’s (2018) analysis of the narratives proffered in the wake of the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal). For democracies, thereby, secrecy surrounding the attribution processes poses a particular challenge in this contested information environment: Legitimacy of state action is dependent on it being explainable, accountable, and ultimately transparent (even if in hindsight). For this democratic accountability, the public should be able to get an accurate understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics that the use of public attribution is part of (see also Nincic, 2003; Nothaft, Pamment, Agardh-Twetman, & Fjällhed, 2018).

Second, the actors providing the attribution judgements are motivated by political and financial incentives. The strongest cybersecurity policy actors have, however, been (signals) intelligence agencies, who by design are not very public entities. So far, only the United States government has released how they approach attribution processes of cyber incidents (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018). Traditionally, intelligence agencies have been the locus with the most resources and abilities to pursue attribution processes at the state level. The recent political use of their analytic work in public is democratically problematic, as the underlying processes for reaching their conclusions are kept secret, usually for at least thirty years. The governments choose, based on political considerations, which incidents to attribute publicly. Oversight bodies remedy some of the trust deficit, though their remit is much wider than overseeing attribution processes. Yet, state intelligence agencies remain one of the main sources of information about cyber conflict.

Thus, the electorate is dependent on other sources of information that can triangulate governmental information. Whilst governments may have good reason for not disclosing their sources and methods, private sector structurally does not provide a remedy, as it has its own structurally induced incentives to be only partially transparent. Particularly, claims made based on data gathered in customer engagements often legally have to be cloaked in secrecy. As previously noted, structurally, we end up with a lack of transparency both about the baseline of the actual events as well as about how actors have reached their judgements about the events. Similarly problematic are the trust issues associated with cybersecurity companies. The politicization of the companies themselves, as well as the selection of knowledge that they publicly produce, make the establishment of trust in a country as well as across countries challenging. However, shared discursive spaces for trust in knowledge about cyber conflicts across societies are much needed, particularly as future conflicts are likely to rely on digital interaction to an even higher degree than today.

Finally, academia, so far, has not been a remedy, as researchers use the public record as the baseline for studying cyber conflict (see Valeriano & Maness, 2014). In order for academia to be a check on the biases introduced, it would have to establish itself as a trustworthy source of data and interpretation. For that to happen, interdisciplinary knowledge on attribution processes is required. For example, the ability to judge a company report’s attribution claims depends as much on the ability to understand the data, the judgements made, and the hypotheses analyzed, as it does to understand the specific company’s access to the data it may not make public, but rely upon, to make its analytic judgements. Thus, there is a need for additional trustworthy sources of data and interpretations of data. In addition, there exists a call for a less elitist, more democratic access to attribution knowledge (Schulzke, 2018). One answer could be a network of distributed and regionally trusted public knowledge-creators (as, for example, proposed by Deibert in Solomon, 2018). Universities may provide one such possible locus to remedy the trust problem. Their strong rootedness in academic, transparent, and peer-reviewed research affords them societal trust, which other actors, due to their structurally induced incentives do not, and possibly cannot, have. In addition, universities are well positioned to be independent stewards of data and analytic methods. They can transparently analyze, provide context, and integrate new phenomena of digital conflicts into shared knowledge structures.

However, to be such sources of trustworthy information on attribution, universities have to engage, even more than today, in work across both physical, disciplinary, and academic boundaries. They have to transcend physical boundaries, as part of the trust problem is associated with national political interests. A cross regional collaboration therefore could ensure that, should national political priorities taint a specific attribution process, other universities are able to balance that process. They have to transcend disciplinary boundaries, as attribution processes inherently draw on multi-disciplinary knowledge. Finally, they have to transcend academic boundaries, as much of the data resides with governments, companies, and civil society. Thus, academics have to be willing to collaborate across multiple entities to for their engagement in attribution research. The outcome is in line with what Ronald J. Deibert, the head of the CitizenLab at University of Toronto called for, namely, “to empower civilian institutions in multiple countries with resources and capabilities to do independent research on threats to cyberspace in the public interest regardless of boundaries, and regardless of whose national or commercial interests are concerned” (Deibert, 2017). Should such a network of independent institutions with capabilities in the attribution space exist, they could become a stabilzing element in the contested information environment (see also Eichensehr, 2019, 2020). Whilst universities are often accused to be risk-averse institutions, in the context of research on attribution, this would be an asset.

#### Cyber research drives cybersecurity knowledge further.

Hooper et al 16 (Andrew Hooper, co-chair of the report, Professor of Computer Technology, Head of Department, Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge. John McCanny, co-chair of the report, Director of the Institute of Electronics, Communications and Information Technology, Queen’s University Belfast. Ross Anderson, Professor of Security Engineering, Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge. Philip Bond, Visiting Professor, Department of Engineering Mathematics and Computer Science, Bristol University. Martin Borrett, IBM Distinguished Engineer, CTO IBM Security Europe, Sadie Creese, Professor of Cybersecurity, Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford. Steven Murdoch, Principal Research Fellow, Department of Computer Science, University College London. Angela Sasse, Director, UK Research Institute in Science of Cyber Security (RISCS), Department of Computer Science, University College London. Alex van Someren, Managing Partner, Early Stage Funds, Amadeus Capital Partners. Dr Claire Vishik, Security, Privacy Standards and Policy Manager, Intel Corporation UK. “Progress and Research in Cybersecurity: Supporting a resilient and trustworthy system for the UK,” The Royal Society, July 2016, page 45, AK)

4.1 Cybersecurity research, policy and practice face distinctive challenges

Research needs the right support to be effective in improving cybersecurity policy and practice, and making digital systems more trustworthy and resilient. Cybersecurity’s distinctive characteristics include its multidisciplinary, global reach, and cross-sectoral interests. The research takes place across the academic, commercial and government sectors, such that research policies in all of these sectors will need to adapt.

To ensure future research funding decisions promote world-class work, all research funders must take advantage of international peer review and expertise. Since funding for academic cybersecurity research is concentrated among relatively few major funders, it is particularly important that those funders ensure their processes are rigorous.

Research can help level the playing field between attackers and their targets by improving the tools and techniques at the disposal of cybersecurity practitioners. These improvements can best be realised through ambitious challenge-led research.

Cybersecurity research must cover the full spectrum of inquiry. Discovery research will push fundamental cybersecurity knowledge forward, while clear links between research and practice are needed at the applied end of the spectrum.

The UK Government has committed to providing £1.9 billion over five years for cybersecurity. Some of this funding will be allocated to research. This funding enables the UK to pursue an ambitious research agenda. To be successful, this agenda will need to have a strong challenge-led element and to enable collaboration across sectors, disciplines and countries. It will also need to support the digital environment’s ability to use the products of research and, in turn, to feed back into the research agenda.

### Policy Research Good—NATO/Russia

#### Debates about NATO and Russia challenge cognitive biases.

Epstein 21 (Rachel, professor of international studies and associate dean of faculty & research at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. This post is the first in an occasional series discussing the ethical dilemmas engendered when academics engage with policymakers and the broader public. Note: the article was posted by Cullen Hendrix, but I think Rachel Epstein is the actual author of the article. Cullen Hendrix is Professor and Director of the Sié Chéou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy at the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. His current projects explore conflict and cooperation around natural resources and the ethics of policy engagement by academic researchers. “CONFRONTING BIASES IN POLICY-ENGAGED RESEARCH: THE CASE OF NATO AND RUSSIA,” THE DUCK OF MINERVA, March 15, <https://www.duckofminerva.com/2021/03/confronting-biases-in-policy-engaged-research-the-case-of-nato-and-russia.html>, AK)

https://www.duckofminerva.com/2021/03/confronting-biases-in-policy-engaged-research-the-case-of-nato-and-russia.html

As early as middle school, we are teaching young minds to think critically and notice bias when it inevitably arises in news and media. Yet as academics, there is an illusion that we are free from bias and conflicts of interests that permeate all other parts of the world. To perpetuate this illusion only hinders policy engagement and deepens the divide between academics and practitioners. PhD training addresses part of this problem pretty effectively—by teaching us to consider alternative explanations in depth, to articulate the limits of any given study, and to avoid making sweeping statements about future developments that are intrinsically unknowable.

However, in light of a recent review of literature on NATO enlargement, I ponder whether there is a critical strategy to be added to the discourse. Antithetical to what we are taught at the advanced level—to strive for objectivity— academics should openly acknowledge political commitments where they exist, because of course they will exist. These political commitments can lead us to become “stealth issue advocates,” in the words of Roger Pielke, where social scientists claim to be arguing from expertise but are in fact arguing from a political position. And we may only be dimly aware of doing this; the first victim of the deception may be the researchers themselves, in terms of not recognizing their own biases.

This is not to suggest that researchers fail in general to approach their topics with an open mind or that our political commitments cannot change as a result of our research—ideally, they would. But in the area of NATO enlargement’s hypothesized effects on the Russian regime’s conduct in recent decades, there is evidence that in striving for objectivity, scholars actually just hide their biases rather than incorporating them explicitly into the debate, which has in turn undermined the quality of discourse. NATO enlargement is a particularly good case through which to examine this issue because although the biases are relatively subtle, they have had undeniable influence on the conclusions scholars draw and the stridency of their claims.

The early debate about NATO enlargement’s likely effects on Russia generally had various contours. Critics of enlargement to East Central Europe in the 1990s, such as Michael Mandelbaum and George Kennan, argued that it would incite Russian nationalism, elevate that country’s sense of humiliation and defeat, and lead to the dramatic worsening of Russia-Western relations. Other skeptics downplayed Russia’s objections or potential capacities, finding fault with the policy instead on the basis of its limited utility and high cost. Meanwhile, supporters of enlargement, including yours truly, speculated that Russian domestic politics would take their own course regardless of NATO actions or concluded that NATO enlargement would be a productive hedge if Russian revanchism resurfaced and/or a useful tool for stability, even if it didn’t. But early on, whether NATO enlargement would cause Russian aggression, revanchism and heightened hostility with the West was essentially unknowable.

So have we learned anything in the intervening decades about who was correct? While the short answer is “no,” this has not stopped committed observers, myself included, from marshaling confirmatory evidence for their side. On the surface, the debate over NATO’s effect on Russia takes the following form and reflects an update to the version outline above. Critics of NATO enlargement, as of 2021, could plausibly argue that NATO enlargement since 1999 had encroached on Russia’s sphere of influence, pushed Western forces up to Russian borders, and provoked Russia into launching conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Meanwhile, having fed Russia’s sense of insecurity and encirclement, critics argue, the leadership embarked on a series of ferocious domestic repression measures, including poisoning, jailing or killing journalists and opposition members, curtailing protest and severely limiting the free flow of information. None of this was necessarily inevitable, this reasoning suggests.

The other side of the argument insists, however, that the Russian regime was riddled with corruption and was intent on covering it up. Governments from Yeltsin to Putin very likely engaged in subterfuge that resulted in the massacre of their own citizens to build support for authoritarianism and relentlessly pursued imperialist ambitions, regardless of the will or sovereignty of neighboring states. Whether NATO enlarged or not, this argument goes, democratic endurance in Russia was never likely. And given Russian and Central-East European history, it was better to secure the small, vulnerable states to its west rather than risk further curbs on their autonomy—or worse—infringements by Russia.

But beneath the surface, another debate was playing out—and this is where consequential bias is revealed. While some scholars prioritized relations between “major powers” (particularly Russia and the US in this case), others were more concerned about guaranteeing the rights, prosperity, and security of the countries in “Zwischeneuropa”—those states sandwiched between Russia and Germany that had long been beholden to large power rivalry. As two scholars, Goldgeier and Shifrinson, concede themselves, while they “agree on how to go about evaluating the costs and benefits of enlargement,” they nevertheless “disagree on the merits of the policy because [they] place different weights and assign different probabilities to those different factors.” And both the weights and probabilities depend largely on the personal beliefs of the author.

It turns out that the value judgments Goldgeier and Shifrinson point to permeate the literature without scholars being in direct dialogue about how central those differences are to the conclusions they draw. On the side of privileging “great powers,” Stephen Cohen, for example, argued that after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, “the foremost goal of U.S. policymaking should have been a Russia. . .that was prospering, politically stable, at peace and fully cooperating with the U.S. on the most threatening international problems”. John Lewis Gaddis agreed, stating that among the most important rules of foreign strategy was to “treat former enemies magnanimously” and that NATO enlargement violated not only this basic principle of diplomacy, but every other, as well. Mandelbaum’s assertion that the policy of enlargement was “largely irrelevant to the problems confronting countries situated between Germany and Russia” mirrored another sentiment in the literature, which was that East Central Europe was not in the Western strategic interest to protect. As Dani Reiter matter-of-factly pointed out, “The West did after all accept Soviet annexation or domination of all of these states during the Cold War without taking military action”.

### Policy Research Good—Russia

#### Debates about Russia are good. Misperceptions fuels interventions and risks extinction.

Rumer and Sokolsky (Eugene, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Richard, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. His work focuses on U.S. policy toward Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. “Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2021. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/30/grand-illusions-impact-of-misperceptions-about-russia-on-u.s.-policy-pub-84845>, AK)

A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it.

The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats.

Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain.

Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise.

In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them.

Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future.

Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation.

In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests.

The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future.

At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.

### Scenario Planning Good—Biotech

#### Scenario planning in biotech is good. It guides R&D, innovation, and risk analysis to produce effective future tech.

Cornelissen et al 21 – Head of Omics Research at BASF Agricultural Solutions. [Marc., Aleksandra Malyska, Amrit Kaur Nanda, René Klein Lankhorst, Martin AJ Parry, Vandasue Rodrigues Saltenis, Mathias Pribil, Philippe Nacry, Dirk Inzé, Alexandra Baekelandt. “Biotechnology for Tomorrow’s World: Scenarios to Guide Directions for Future Innovation.” Trends in Biotechnology, Vol 39, Issue 5, pgs. 438-444. May 2021.]

Depending on how the future will unfold, today’s progress in biotechnology research has greater or lesser potential to be the basis of subsequent innovation. Tracking progress against indicators for different future scenarios will help to focus, emphasize, or de-emphasize discovery research in a timely manner and to maximize the chance for successful innovation. In this paper, we show how learning scenarios with a 2050 time horizon help to recognize the implications of political and societal developments on the innovation potential of ongoing biotechnological research. We also propose a model to further increase open innovation between academia and the biotechnology value chain to help fundamental research explore discovery fields that have a greater chance to be valuable for applied research.

Developing Scenarios for Biotechnology in Complex Social Systems

Biological science is expanding its knowledge frontiers at an ever-accelerating pace. The progressing insights into biological processes offer a broadening array of options to develop incremental and differential innovations across the medical, agricultural, and industrial biotechnology sectors.

As timelines from understanding basic biological processes to the conception of an innovation and the development of a marketable product may range from 10 to 25 years, a prime question for today’s biotechnology discovery research is ‘innovation for what future world?’ (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Download : Download high-res image (210KB)Download : Download full-size image

Figure 1. Innovation Flow.

In the coming 15 years, the market will be served by R&D that is performed today. Different biotechnology sectors address changes in demand by repositioning and emphasizing what is in today’s pipeline. New R&D and public research ideally address the demand of the future market. Scenario analysis is well suited to narrow down the most promising fields of investigation and to address the unmet needs of future markets. Abbreviations: R, research; D, development.

To this end, in 2019, we conducted a first-of-its-kind scenario analysis with a 2050 time horizon to understand the option space of agricultural biotechnology.i Forty-five trends and 22 uncertainties dealing with the entire agricultural socioeconomic system were reviewed to map the range of directions the future may take and to narrow down how agricultural biotechnology could best future-proof food, nutrition, and health security. Trends ranged from consumer and demographics, farming and technology to politics, economy, and societal developments while identified uncertainties were clustered around three themes: needs for adaptation, priorities in the value chain, and the role of science (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Download : Download high-res image (814KB)Download : Download full-size image

Figure 2. Trends and Uncertainties.

Trends are considered developments going in a certain direction, while uncertainties can determine distinct outcomes with very different implications. Here the two most extreme ways that the uncertainties could play out are presented. Examples of specific uncertainties clustered around three more general themes are provided in the footnote. The exercise delivered four contrasting learning scenarios by detailing out specific aspects of possible future worlds and making them as concrete and vivid as possible (Figure 3). As the selected trends and uncertainties deal with society, environment, innovation, and policy, the learning scenarios helped to characterize implications not only for the future of agriculture in Europe, which was the initial scope of the scenario building, but they can also serve to aid decisions on future research and innovation (R&I) investments in other fields of biotechnology globally. Abbreviations: AI, artificial intelligence; AR, augmented reality; NBT, new breeding technique; VR, virtual reality.

In order to identify toward which scenario today’s world is heading, relevant indicators need to be developed [1,2]. For this, the critical developments or events that will be necessary for a scenario to arise need to be named, put in a chronological order through narratives, and checked for their informative value. Learning scenarios are reusable, and the scope of the indicators identified will depend on the diversity of expertise within the team exploiting the learning scenarios (Figure 3). Obvious examples of indicators are the developments around the legislation related to gene editing in the Bio-innovation and REJECTech scenario or personal data protection regulations in the My Choice scenario, while for instance the evolution of water availability in a particular country can be an indicator for Food Emergency, as well as for Bio-innovation or REJECTech.

Figure 3

Download : Download high-res image (155KB)Download : Download full-size image

Figure 3. Learning Scenarios.

Four contrasting learning scenarios enable us to delineate the option space for the direction and context of future biotechnology. Bio-innovation: Biotechnology solutions are intensively used and sustainably provide sufficient high-quality food and large-volume feedstock for a thriving bioeconomy; My Choice: Health and sustainability concerns drive all sectors to be diverse and transparent; meeting the needs and preferences of individuals, personalized medicine, and nutrition are the norm; REJECTech: Consumers have little trust in politicians, scientists, and big industry. Society is highly polarized and rejects biotechnology-derived products and services, despite dissatisfaction about missed opportunities, such as a broad adoption of the bioeconomy due to limited agricultural production; Food Emergency: Due to severe environmental degradation, the world is struggling to fulfill basic food demand. In response to the crisis, global adoption of innovation, including biotechnology, occurs to mitigate impacts.

Steering Focus in Biotechnology Discovery Research with Scenarios

The way the world will evolve will depend on a myriad of developments. Examples are the transition to renewable energy and decentralized storage, the global policy approach to enable the use of new genomic technologies, patients embracing new treatments, society buying into preventive medicine or demanding transparency about food properties, dietary shifts, development of new high-tech materials, shifts in lifestyle, and progress in robotics and artificial intelligence. Following such developments and extrapolating their long-term impact on the way we live may inspire scientists to take a translational step and to open avenues of biotechnology discovery research that would provide the starting basis for research and innovation (R&I) addressing future needs.

Biotechnology discovery research will undoubtedly be at the core of numerous innovations that will reach society by 2050. However, depending on how the future will unfold, today’s progress in biotechnology research has a greater or lesser potential to be the basis of subsequent innovation. In addition, the lack of a widespread open innovation culture between industry and academia increases the risk of missing out on innovation that trend-wise is likely to meet industry or consumer demand.

For example, it is clear that the demand for climate change-related biotechnology innovation will be high, and will be supported by policy makers [3,4]. However, what the unmet needs will be for the different stakeholder groups is still unclear. Effects on cities, gardens, parks, lakes, and crop fields linked to shifts and volatility in weather and the resulting new environmental conditions, including new pests and diseases, are not yet fully appreciated. Consequently, a translational step from innovation opportunity to required new knowledge is not obvious. Similarly, it is not clear how to incorporate innovation into products [5]. It may range from gene editing to novel knowledge-driven, societally accepted workflows that are not yet in place. The first activity, developing climate change know–how, has a low risk of not being of relevance. The second, developing biotechnology innovation addressing climate change, is dependent on how policies develop across the globe, and therefore carries a higher risk [6]. For example, whereas it is conceivable in a bio-innovation world that society may see a broad replacement of fossil-based synthetic materials by bio-based alternatives, such a development is less likely to occur in a REJECTech setting, as although the know–how to do so would exist, the technical enablement would not be supported.

Another example relates to the exploitation of the microbiome. As microbes impact most, if not all, complex ecological systems, exploitation of biological know–how is expected to offer innovation options in a broad range of biotechnology fields and be at the core of new markets and business models. These may include medicine, health care, food systems, industrial and household processes and materials, resource recycling, and energy capture. For this to become reality, broad fundamental biotechnology discovery research on microbiomes needs to reach a tipping point, so that R&I for smaller and bigger opportunities across sectors becomes viable [7]. This necessitates a major public effort to advance precompetitive know–how and an enablement to a level sufficient for sector adoption within a reasonable risk perspective on a return of investment. A flagship approach in, for example, medicine building on ongoing big data efforts, such as in the human ‘100K genomes project’ii, may serve as a vehicle to reach, in a 5-year time span, the desired state of enablement and allow smaller initiatives to build on this cost-effectively. However, an entrepreneurial ecosystem is critical for this to happen, implying that such developments are more likely to occur under a Bio-innovation scenario or even in a Food Emergency scenario, once society starts prioritizing access to food and health.

A third example refers to diet shifts toward alternative protein sources. Consumer choice strongly depends on food properties such as taste, texture, palatability, color, convenience, and price. Making alternative protein products competitive to meat would require, among other improvements, major advances in biological insights to upgrade food sources [8]. The challenge is to get specific on the carriers, such as algae, insects, crops, fermentation, and so on, and the exact properties, so that the investments in biotechnology discovery have a practical effect. How to do this successfully is not obvious as it is currently not clear which products and product properties will match future market demands. This re-emphasizes the importance of contrasting learning scenarios and the need to identify scenario-specific indicators to get insights early in time about how particular trends are panning out. These indicators may relate to yes/no decision points in policy development, or the timely establishment of critical enabling technologies or of sizeable consumer demands. Tracking progress of multiple, scenario-specific indicators thus helps to steer focus in discovery research and to emphasize or de-emphasize timely manner to maximize the chance for successful innovation.

A current real-life example is the COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) pandemic, an occurrence that was not foreseen because of which only relatively small and scattered efforts of research have been conducted prior to the pandemic. The current R&I race to develop a cure and vaccine against COVID-19 would have greatly benefitted from an advanced knowledge on coronaviruses, obtained through biotechnology discovery research [9,10]. Of course, in hindsight it is easy to highlight what should have been done. In practice, there are several million viruses in the world, over 200 of which are known to infect humans. Conducting extensive research on all these viruses in parallel would be too labor-intensive and unsustainable from an economical point of view. However, the current crisis reveals the advantage in time the use of scenario indicators can offer to international and local organizations dealing with public health. Such indicators might have flagged previous smaller outbreaks of other coronaviruses such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) in the past two decades. These outbreaks could then have been predictive for scenarios in which coronaviruses would become a major threat to human health, and could have triggered dedicated funding to advance specific biotechnological know–how, as well as to develop strategies to minimize the spread of this type of disease. Major funding is currently being gathered to mitigate the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis, including $8 billion pledged by world leaders to support dedicated R&Iiii. However, today’s continuing need to conduct significant biotechnology discovery research means that time, not necessarily funding per se, is a bottleneck. Along the same lines, developing scenarios today to understand how the future may unfold in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic could help anticipate the long-term consequences of the actions that are being taken and could allow countries, states, and communities to react to the crisis more effectively. In the context of the scenarios presented in Figure 3, the current pandemic emerges as a relevant indicator for the Food Emergency scenario. A global economic crisis may put critical agricultural supply chains at risk, such that food security becomes an even greater issue in certain world regions.

#### Scenario-based approaches to biotech analyze innovation and ethics. That identifies costs and benefits of technology and considers ethical questions.

Kendal 22 – Bioethicist and public health researcher in the School of Health Sciences and Biostatistics at Swinburne University of Technology. [Evie. “Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Emerging Technology (ELSIET) Symposium.” Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (2022). June 24, 2022.]

Technology Assessment (TA) to Ethical Technology Assessment (eTA)

Alongside the PP, technology assessment (TA) is one of the best-known methods of dealing with uncertainty (Mittelstadt, Stahl, and Fairweather 2015). Grunwald (2020) notes that because TA is not focused on technologies that actually exist yet, it is a method that “creates and assesses prospective knowledge about the future consequences of technology,” through evaluating and scrutinizing “ideas, designs, plans, or visions for future technology” (Grunwald 2020, 97; Grunwald 2019). He further notes that participatory versions of this speculative evaluative process are less about imagining technologies per se, and more about envisaging future technologies as situated in a specific “societal environment” (Grunwald 2019). The inputs for analysis are thus “models, narratives, roadmaps, visions, scenarios, prototypes” etc. (Grunwald 2020, 99). Mittelstadt, Stahl and Fairweather (2015) note traditional TA arose in response to “undesirable or unintentional side effects of emerging technologies” with a primary focus on considering the impact of technology on “the environment, industry and society” (1035). Its goal is to foster responsible regulation to maximize benefit and prevent harm caused by advances in technology.

While TA has been highly influential, particularly for establishing environmental impact assessments and other forms of risk analysis, Palm and Hansson (2006) claim ethical and social dimensions of emerging technologies have often been neglected (546). They propose the ethical technology assessment (eTA) approach that adjusts development in line with ethical concerns and guides decision-making (551). Their ethical “checklist” contains nine items that, if implicated in an emerging technology, indicate an eTA should be conducted. Examples include if the proposed technology might be expected to affect concepts of “privacy” or “gender minorities and justice” (551). Brey (2012) states the purpose of eTA is to “provide indicators of negative ethical implications at an early stage of technological development … by confronting projected features of the technology or projected social consequences with ethical concepts and principles” (3–4). Palm and Hansson (2006) note that current obstacles to this process include fear of the unknown, assumptions about the self-regulation of technological development, and citizens feeling ill-equipped to engage in discussions of technologies that are becoming increasingly complex (547). They describe the result in terms of W.F. Ogburn’s concept of “cultural lag,” where technology, as an instance of material culture, is now released into society before “non-material culture has stabilized its response to it” (547). In other words, social, ethical, legal, religious, and cultural systems have not yet grappled with the implications of technologies before they are unleased on society. Some of these challenges are met by scenario-based approaches to emerging technologies, as demonstrated below.

Scenario Approaches

While many scenario-based approaches to emerging technology ethics overlap methodologically with eTA, there are some features that are worth discussing separately. Brey’s (2012) account of the techno-ethical scenario approach describes it as ethical assessment that helps policymakers “anticipate ethical controversies regarding emerging technologies” through analyzing hypothetical scenarios (4). He notes a unique feature of the method is that it not only tries to predict what moral issues will arise with the advent of new technologies but also how those very technologies will impact morality and “the way we interpret moral values” (4). Boenink, Swierstra, and Stemerding’s (2010) framework breaks this process up into three distinct steps: 1) “Sketching the moral landscape,” which provides a baseline narrative from which the introduction of the new technology can be compared; 2) “Generating potential moral controversies” using “New and Emerging Science and Technology” (NEST) ethics, with the aim of predicting realistic ethical arguments and issues regarding emerging technologies; and 3) “Constructing closure by judging plausibility of resolutions,” where arguments and counterarguments are considered in the light of the most likely resolution to the issues raised in step 2 (11–13). The process can draw analogies to existing or historical examples of technological change, and the ethical consequences involved, or construct specific controversies and “alternative futures” (14). The most important step to consider here is the second, of which Brey (2012) states:

The NEST-ethics approach performs three tasks. First, it identifies promises and expectations concerning a new technology. Second, it identifies critical objections that may be raised against these promises, for example regarding efficiency and effectiveness, as well as many conventionally ethical objections, regarding rights, harms and obligations, just distribution, the good life, and others. Third, it identifies chains of arguments and counter-arguments regarding the positive and negative aspects of the technology, which can be used to anticipate how the moral debate on the new technology may develop. (4–5)

In this way, scenario analysis can consider how technology and ethics change in tandem when new technologies emerge.

Socio-technical scenario approaches are similar to the techno-ethical approach outlined above; however, according to Schick (2019), they owe their origins to utopian studies and traditional philosophical thought experimentation (261). Claiming they are now used “as a form of moral foresight; an attempt to keep the ethical discourse ahead of the technological curve,” Schick (2019) suggests the goal of socio-technical speculation is to “guide society toward morally sound decisions regarding emerging technologies” (261). Thus, the scenarios being discussed are deeply embedded in hypothetical future societies. The Collingridge dilemma is also noted as a potential pitfall for this method, which the final technique covered here tries to avoid through engaging anticipatory models of ethics and governance.

### Scenario Planning Good—Generic

#### Scenario planning in IR is good---there’s a lack of it now, it improves theories and data-poor topics, sets research agendas, avoids cognitive biases, informs policymaking, and is an important pedagogy for teaching students. Our scenario planning can overcome shortcomings.

Junio and Mahnken 13 (Timothy J. Junio, Senior Vice President, Cortex and former Co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Expanse, a San Francisco-based software company, recently acquired by Palo Alto Networks. Expanse’s software was deployed at many of the world’s largest organizations, including all of the US’s military services and dozens of Fortunes 500 companies. He has over a decade of experience in cyber operations and large-scale distributed sensing. Prior to co-founding Expanse, he worked at DARPA, RAND Corporation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA. Junio holds a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, with master’s and bachelor’s degrees from Johns Hopkins University, and was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University. Thomas G. Mahnken, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He is a Senior Research Professor at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He currently serves as a member of the Congressionally mandated National Defense Strategy Commission and as a member of the Board of Visitors of Marine Corps University. “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” Oxford Academic International Studies Review, Volume 15, Number 3, September 2013, Pages 374-395, Accessed 7/6/22 via UMich databases, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24032900>, AK)

\*edited for gendered language

**[ABSTRACT]**

This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating "world views," setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios.

**[ABSTRACT ENDS]**

In his classic work on scenario analysis, *The Art of the Long View*, Peter Schwartz commented that "social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from 'what if?' questions and concentrate on 'what was?'" (Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny. Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future —are woefully underutilized among political scientists. The method is almost never taught on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios—less than 2% of the time—is surprising; the method is popular in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology, pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hülse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study.

This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. In the below, a "best practices" guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose fa hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs.

*Scenarios in the Discipline*

What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this art to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regard a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur:

During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but "dumber," weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region.

This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional," or "escalatory" uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on data, may improve the study of IR. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.

*Scenarios as Future Counterfactuals*

Scenarios may be understood and applied through the existing and widely published framework of counterfactuals. Political scientists almost exclusive on historical counterfactuals, but future counterfactuals exist in the same logical space and offer additional advantages to the discipline. Richard Ned Lebow, example, one of the few IR scholars to enter this methodological domain seriously, writes that "counterfactuals are 'what if statements, *usually about the past* [emphasis ours]" (Lebow 2000:551). While such a definition leaves room to consider future counterfactuals, Lebow focuses on historical ones in his essay. Similarly, in *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics*, editors Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin focus on historical analysis in their counterfactuals "best practices" chapter although they are not definitionally bound to the past. For them counterfactuals are "subjective conditions in which the antecedent is known supposed for purposes of argument to be false" (Tetlock and Belkin 199 6:4). Another prominent figure in the counterfactual methods literature is J Fearon, whose foundational work on the subject writes the future out of the definition: "counterfactuals make claims about events that did not actually occur” (Fearon 1991:169). Similarly, while his arguments are oriented toward the past, they are relevant for analyzing the future. For instance, when Fearon speak hypotheses that may not be tested due to a lack of historical data (thus requiring counterfactuals), his points are logically applicable to the future—another realm in which the desired data do not (yet) exist.

One author, Steven Weber, is exceptional and articulates the perspective of scenarios as future counterfactuals. In Tetlock and Belkin's book, Weber writes of "Counterfactuals: Past and Future." Weber argues that political scientists have a tendency to treat history as overdetermined and, like Lebow, is skeptical regarding what is considered a "fact" versus "non-fact" in historical analysis (Lebow 2000:551). Scholars tend to think of past counterfactuals as logically distinct from future counterfactuals, according to Weber, because in the former case things have actually come to pass. Weber argues that past and future counterfactuals should be considered logically equivalent (see Figure 1) (We 1996:277). A common goal of counterfactual historical analysis is to manipulate one variable while trying to keep others constant. As Weber points out, manipulating one variable in a complex system often creates nonlinear consequences and interaction effects that are difficult for researchers to discern. The historical counterfactual thus exists in the same logical space as a future counterfactual there may be greater certainty regarding some boundary conditions in the (the Earth existed with gravity, the US Government was not overthrown in revolution, etc.), but much of this background context may be reasonably assumed to be stable in the future. In addition to the reasonableness of such assumptions in probability terms, they are also methodologically sound, because: (i) background conditions are not dependent or independent variables of in in the research at hand; and (ii) if background conditions change, such as with a large exogenous shock, political scientists are likely to ask completely different research questions. Many other variables of interest, such as those affecting the




Fig. 1. Counterfactuals in Time (adapted from Weber 1996)

stability of political, economic, and social systems, are just as tenuous in past counterfactuals as they are in future ones.

If scenarios are counterfactuals about the future, they may be further compartmentalized to advance a methodological discussion. Following the leaders literature, we turn to Tetlock and Belkin, who offer a categorization sch five categories of counterfactuals: idiographic case studies (usually something like "what if the Black Plague had not hit Europe?"); nomothetic, which "apply well-defined theoretical or empirical generalizations to well-defined antecedent conditions"; joint idiographic-nomothetic counterfactuals; computer-simulation counterfactuals; and mental-simulation counterfactuals (for example, abstract experiments that seek to identify upper and lower bounds of theory) (Tetlock and Belkin 1996:6). Observed scenarios may be matched to these categories link the literatures. For instance, future warfare and political narrative scenarios generally fall into the joint idiographic-nomothetic category, theory-building scenarios may be of any kind (the most abstract would fall into the categories of computer or mental simulation), and scenarios inclined toward data generation/projection are largely idiographic. This categorization allows scholars to begin discussing scenarios within the language of the existing counterfactuals literature.

*Use of Scenarios*

An important starting point for the advocacy of the scenario method is to how the approach fits into the political science discipline. This article in the results of the first extensive survey of the use of scenarios in peer-reviewed journal articles. This survey reviewed the electronically searchable history of elven journals (18,764 articles) and collected data on all articles that use that use the word "scenario" (1,559).3 Of these articles, a large majority (1,057) do not use the word "scenario" in a methodologically meaningful way; a quick rule of thumb for this coding is that an article is discounted if it uses "scenario" in a manner interchangeable with "situation." For instance, an author writing about the "post-Cold War scenario," meaning the world after the fall of the Soviet Union, is not using the word "scenario" in a methodologically meaningful way. The use of the word "scenario" to refer to *historical* counterfactuals also was not included in the survey. The remaining 502 articles were coded along the following criteria:

* Is the scenario a “future counterfactual”?
* If so, what kind of future counterfactual is it? Future warfare narrative, other political narrative, quantitative projection, theory developing, and/or theory extending?
* If the scenario is not a future counterfactual, what method is the author using the world “scenario” to refer to? Formal modeling, game theory, experimentation, or other?
* Is the scenario a “full” or “vignette” scenario?4

The survey found nine ways in which authors use the word "scenario" to refer to a methodological approach. Of these, six are types of future counterfactuals and thus within the scope of this study. The most prominent is narratives regarding future warfare. The journal *International Security*, in particular, has published a large number of analyses of scenarios regarding nuclear war and proliferation and during the 1980s published extensively on what a conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces might look like in Central Europe (Mearsheimer 1982; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl 1997; Batcher 2004). Closely related are political narratives, such as those regarding foreign policy (for example, analyzing futures of an expanded European Union) or domestic politics in a country of foreign policy interest (for example, exploring the circumstances under which China may democratize) (Chen 2002; Ye§ilada, Efird, and Noordijk 2006; Lyn 2007). Third, a small proportion of articles analyzed how scenarios were used historical decision making, but these were not themselves scholarly uses of scenarios (Gansler 1982; Stoddart 2008). Fourth, a popular form of scenario analysis was coded as theory extension, or the use of scenarios to demonstrate how process could unfold (Marchetti 2009). Fifth, a small proportion were theory development, or the use of scenarios to identify and understand causal relationships (Reiter 1995). Finally, scenarios are sometimes using large data sets for quantitative projections of political trend these scenarios, researchers extrapolate historical and contemporary numerical data to create visions of the future and then assess the political implications living in that kind of world (for example, the effect of different rates natural resources, strain on state capacity due to demography or disease, etc.) (McNamara 1977; Browne 20).

This baseline understanding of the use of word "scenario" in the discipline leads to several additional insights. First, few scholars in the discipline are writing about the implications of theory for the future in a methodologically consistent and replicable way. Qualitative methods to develop and validate theories rely almost exclusively on history, for which there is some data, but which will

**[TABLE 1 OMMITTED]**

certainly be different from future political environments. Second, scholars who systematically use future counterfactuals to evaluate theory tend to be from the field of strategic studies. This is visible both from the over-representation of security studies articles in the survey results and the plurality of “future warfare” among types of scenarios. Third, the surveyed literature demonstrated wide variation in the quality of scenarios, and almost none of the articles that use scenarios cite methods articles. Even articles focused on political narratives and theory building generally fail to draw on the nearest companion literature, that of counterfactuals, to improve the quality of futures analysis.

“**Best Practices of Scenario Analysis”** [The bolding is theirs]

A common refrain among scenario methodologists is that the use of scenarios should come naturally to anyone, as it is innate, such as in humans' ability to anticipate and fear their deaths. A reasonable question to ask is, if this evolutionary advantage is omnipresent, and people are thinking about future counterfactuals all the time ("what if I lose my job?" "what if my wife finds out I'm cheating?" "what if I win the lottery?" and so on), then why bother spending time discussing how to do it better? Should not political scientists be able apply the sorts of thought experiments they have in every other boundary of life to their scholarship?

An obvious answer to these challenges is that some scenarios are better done than others, and their quality may be evaluated in the same ways as other qualitative methods. A less obvious answer is that political scientists often actively see to turn off the speculative aspects of their minds, focusing instead on "being taken where the data go." This is an important problem, because data on many important political questions simply do not yet exist, and the state of the field would be rather disappointing if scholars only focused on data-rich topics. This is nowhere more obvious than the study of nuclear weapons; while there are only two observations of nuclear explosions in war, the potential for future uses is of the highest consequence. More specifically, there are zero observations of nuclear war through accident or inadvertent outcomes of bureaucratic processes, but influential works have demonstrated that speculation regarding such outcomes is made plausible through the data that are available (Blair 1993; Saga 1995).

Practically all of the extant literature regarding how to do scenario analysis stems from business literature (Chandler and Cockle 1982; Georgantzas and Acar 1995; Ringland 1998; Ogilvy 2002). The foundational work in the field widely regarded as Peter Schwartz's *The Art of the Long View*. Schwartz wrote this book informed by his career of doing scenario analysis in the private sector. It is assigned in the rare academic courses that invite scenario analysis, given to civil servants being trained on the scenario method, and is cited in the couple of discussions of scenarios in political science (Weber 1996). Schwartz and other authors from the business field have tailored their recommendations to an audience conducting scenario analysis primarily to improve decision making; that is, the authors have oriented themselves to advising readers on how to have the best possible scenario conversations.

In contrast, this article offers best practices for scenarios dedicated to the core interests of political scientists: developing and improving upon theory. Thinking about scenarios in regard to theory building is not entirely distinct from what the business literature seeks to accomplish, but entails a difference in emphasisis. Below, we have drawn on the business literature, counterfactual methods work, and the authors' experiences using scenarios to tailor best practices advice. The core scenario is an adapted version of Peter Schwartz’s, which is also recapitulated by Steve Weber in his related book chapter (Weber 1996:279-284).

*How to Build a Scenario*

**Determine what type of scenario to use** [Emphasis theirs]

As indicated in the preceding section of the article, scenarios are not uniform in their emphasis on theory and empirics. Researchers ought to choose the type of scenario using the scenario/counterfactual characterization schema presented above and based on the research question and dependent variable at hand. A quick rule of thumb is that in the absence of theory, an obvious use of scenarios is to develop theory, or at least to better understand the most important questions to ask. In this regard, scholars may benefit most from idiographic scenario vignettes used to spark a conversation about how the world could have ended up in that place. For instance, a scholar generally interested in space warfare may have few theories to work from, as most relevant thinking has taken place in the policy community, and few in traditional political science departments have considered the unique material context of such competition. The data for studying space warfare do not yet exist in a form usable for social science, and there are no general theories. A researcher, therefore, may wish to write a vignette of a future in which a breakthrough in a new space technology is (i) cheap, (ii) fast, and (iii) on the verge of diffusion from a first mover to the rest of the international system. Thinking through what must have happened to arrive in such a world, and the social and political consequences that follow, would help a scholar to set their research agenda regarding this emergent security environment. For scholars with a theory in mind, the most obvious type of scenario to use is joint idiographic-nomothetic. For instance, an economist seeking to deduce the logical future from current macroeconomic theory would be interested in a narrative that connects theoretical expectations with observed signals in the economy to project a future five years' hence.

**Deduce driving forces from the theory of interest, or in the absence of theory, work backwards from a future story** [Emphasis theirs]

These "drivers" are the independent, intervening, and/or interactive variables of interest to the researcher. The most common drivers in scenario analysis are social, environmental, technological, economic, and political forces. For the purposes of theory building and extension, the drivers should be variables capable of taking on qualitative or quantitative measures. This means that the upper and lower limits of ordinal or continuous variables should be identified, and their maximum and minimum values should be in the same unit. Categorical variables should be clearly defined, exclusive, and finite. In the counterfactual analysis literature, one may think of this as what James Fearon calls a "range of counterfactual variation"; social and material contexts provide boundaries to what alternatives are plausible (Fearon 1991:184).

For example, let us consider relative deprivation theory (in a superficial way, with our apologies to Ted Gurr) (Gurr 1970). This theory suggests that social instability follows from a group's discontent when it wants something another group within the society has (income, status, political access, etc.) and believes access to that good is possible. A scenario that seeks to extend this theory to analyze its implications in a particular society would have the relevant independent variables of interest as key drivers. The most basic key driver would be relative income in the society; the maximal value would be an extremely high discrepancy between Groups A and B (in quantitative terms, a value of 0 for some proportion based on indicators of wealth), while the minimal value would be parity (a value of 1).

**Identify highly probable contextual conditions for the future narrative** [Emphasis theirs]

In short, the contextual conditions are the assumptions and data (both qualitive and quantitative) that are of interest for the scenario, but that are drivers. This part of the scenario process asks researchers to identify the of the social system of interest that they feel reasonably confident about. The explicit identification of contextual conditions usually does not include stating parts of the world that are extremely unlikely to change, such as the existence of the United States, but may well include assigning a value to something like the US force disposition in the world. For instance, in a scenario seeking insight into Middle Eastern politics, a large US military presence in the or a diminished supply of oil may be considered relevant contextual assumptions rather than independent variables. The independent variables, assigned as of step two, might include something like the distribution of democratic dictatorial regimes or binary coding of states' possession of nuclear weapons.

**Identify “critical uncertainties”** [Emphasis theirs]

These are the low-probability, high-impact outcomes that may follow from the theory, independent variables, and context. The idea is to identify outcomes that may be logically deduced from the theory, would have dramatic effects value of the dependent variable of interest, and are plausible. The interest in identifying critical uncertainties is to avoid surprise by anticipating theoretically consistent low-probability outcomes. While critical uncertainties are generally regarded as important for policymaking, we contend they are also import theory building, as they demonstrate logical boundaries for a theory. When outcomes seem highly counterintuitive, they may signal a theory's limit such as within a particular region, or omitted variables.

**Sketch “plot lines”** [Emphasis theirs]

Plot lines develop the central logic of a scenario. They connect the driver theoretical expectations of causation. This may be done one at a time case of particularly important drivers, but most scenarios should explain multiple drivers interact to create plot lines (as in reality, there is no such as only one variable changing at a time in a social system). As Peter Schwartz put it, "in most good scenarios, several plot lines intersect, just as a good film includes several subplots. The scenario planner looks at converging forces and tries to understand how and why they might intersect—then extends that imagination into coherent pictures of alternative futures" (Schwartz 1996:138) devising a plot line comprised of multiple drivers quickly increases the complexity of the scenario, and thus the range of possible futures, the process is nevertheless superior to an attempt to be predictive by focusing on a narrow range of futures. In terms of the counterfactuals literature, one may think of plot the equivalent of "principles," which link antecedents to consequents.

**Write the scenario** [Emphasis theirs]

Scenario methodologists tend to refer to the scenario process as an art, not a science. Although this article seeks to improve the rigor of scenario analysis, there is a basic truth in this statement, as there is not a best way to write the resulting narrative. Scenarios also are not, as mentioned, easy to replicate. In terms of best practices for theory building, it is clear that the scenario should be explicit in its identification of the theoretical expectations of interest, key drivers, relevant contextual conditions, and hypotheses of how those drivers interact to effect outcomes. This approach at least improves the potential for replicating the scenario analysis, or minimally having a clear understanding of points of disagreement should a peer question any aspects of the variable choices, assigned values, or determined probability distribution of possible outcomes.

**Generate a list of evidence and structures of evidence that one might gather to assess the degree to which the social system of interest comports with the scenario-based model, included disconfirming evidence (Shwartz 1996:60).** [Emphasis theirs]

This is, in essence, thinking about what kinds of data (measure of interest) and structures of data would help researchers to understand the probability distribution of generated futures and how the distribution might change over time. It answers such questions as, is one identified more likely due to an increase or decrease in the value of on independent variables? This stage improves (or creates) an empirical framework for analysis of the research question that prompted the scenario analysis.

**Re-evaluate or begin to develop theory** [Emphasis theirs]

Finally, the point of most kinds of scenario analysis is, ultimately cult social questions with better theories and data collection str stage of the scenario process is to re-evaluate what is known about existing theory given the generated scenarios. Is the theory still logically consistent? Is it able to explain the most important possible outcomes in the social system or interest? Are there key drivers of particular importance to the theory, seemed important appear to cause little variation in the scenarios?

*Applying Counterfactual Best Practices to Scenarios*

Tetlock and Belkin offer six criteria for making counterfactuals more rigerous. First, counterfactuals should have "clarity," referring to the specification of the hypothesized antecedent and consequent. Tetlock and Belk manipulating one causal variable at a time, though they recognize it is impossible to hold other factors equal while doing so (Tetlock and Belklin 1996:19). Second, they should possess logical consistency or "cotenability,” specifying cotenable principles that link antecedents with consequents. Third, they should have historical consistency (which they also call the rule"), which suggests the chosen antecedents should alter a few “well-established" historical facts as possible. In terms of future counterfactuals, this is most relevant to the selection of contextual conditions, which should be as uncontroversial to intended audiences as possible. An easy shorthand is to treat contextual conditions as constants and to assign them values that are well demonstrated in the present. Fourth, counterfactuals should be theoretically consistent, meaning that the connecting principles are consistent with theoretical generalizations that lead to the links between antecedents and consequents. Fifth, they should possess statistical consistency or articulating principles that are consistent with "well-established" statistical generalizations. Last, they should have projectability or the identification of implications of connecting principles (hypotheses) that may be tested with new data (Tetlock and Belkin 1996:18-31) (Table 2).

*Avoiding Potential Pitfalls*

The first potential pitfall of scenario analysis is the "garbage in, garbage out" (GIGO) problem. Scenarios are likely to suffer from GIGO problems under several circumstances. First, and most commonly, scenarios are sometimes not used to extend and develop theory, but rather to reinforce the existing views of the author. This may happen should a researcher choose to ignore theoretically relevant values of the independent variables based on a conclusion that such values are "implausible." Another way of conceiving of this problem is whether or not the scenario process is a recapitulation of the "official future," as Schwartz has dubbed it (Schwartz 1996:237). The "official future" is a scenario author's

**[TABLE 2 OMMITTED]**

operating mind-set regarding what they perceive as the most probable future.5 Adherence to beliefs about an "official future" is similar to an "anchoring bias," whereby a subject has difficulty updating original beliefs in the face of new information (discussed further in the next section of this article) Second, the independent variables may be chosen poorly to begin with; this is more of a consequence of not taking the scenario process seriously rather than a cognitive bias toward a particular outcome. Third, in scenarios that use data, the data simply may be bad (for example, pollution projections based on faulty assumptions or bad statistics, bias in a survey design, etc).

The simplest way to correct for GIGO is to have other people involved in the scenario-building process, particularly those from different epistemological and cultural backgrounds. In other words, one should implement a peer review process as part of scenario development. The easiest corrective within reach of political scientists is their students, who are in general less likely to be wedded to particular theoretical/methodological perspectives. Other options include colleagues in other disciplines, who are likely to think about the question of interest in a dramatically different way, thus generating different drivers.

A second possible pitfall of the scenario method is poor replicability, a topic of high importance to positivist approaches to social science. Explaining one's coding and other such relevant aspects of research design has now become standard practice, even for qualitative methods that are difficult to replicate. Scenarios are almost surely less replicable than case studies. While case studies at least have footnotes, only the data/contextual aspect of scenarios is replicable. The identification of key drivers and plotlines is a highly subjective process. The best advice in this regard is that a large degree of subjectivity is inherent in the scenario process, and clarity and transparency are absolute necessities. A reader should be able to follow along when reading the scenario and understand the relationship between assumed contextual data, stipulated values on the independent variables, the interaction of those variables, and the logic of how the interaction effects a value on the dependent variable.

A third pitfall of scenarios is to try to engage with too many causal processes at once. One of Peter Schwartz's important rules regarding scenarios, which Steve Weber echoes, is to limit the complexity of a scenario such that no more than three or four key drivers are subject to change at once (Schwartz 1996:140; Weber 1996:283). While for some kinds of research (particularly the articulation of world views) it is important to look at these critical intersections of trend lines, scenario methodologists persuasively argue that seeking to do too much in one scenario quickly makes the effort futile. The reason for this is simple and2 should be resonant to any scholar: the human mind has difficulty handling a large number of causal processes at once. While it is tempting stylized versions of the future in which many political forces are moving together, a potential problem is to, in Tetlock and Lebow's words “assign too much subjective probability to too many scenarios" (Tetlock and Lebow 2001).

The inability to simultaneously understand many causal processes is a common problem of social science research. Consider, for instance, the dizzying array of causal arguments made regarding the origins of World War bright scholars have argued that the war was instigated by power differentials, alliance systems, the personalities of political leaders at the time, offense dominance, perceptions of offense dominance, rigid military plans, tics in Germany, among others (Lebow 1981; Sagan 1986; Snyder 1994; Evera 1999; Copeland 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Hist credence to each of these arguments, and scholars must make individual judgements regarding how to rank the causes. The *interaction* of these various levels of explanation, unfortunately, has proven overly complex for pol handle. Instead, the discipline offers contrasting perspectives (for example, IR professors often focus on system-level explanations, while historians tend to lean toward individual-level arguments) (Fearon 1991:189-193).6

Finally, in another form of analytic overreach, scenario authors often excitedly focus on highly improbable, high-impact events. Richard Ned Lebow has memorably referred to these as "miracle counterfactuals" (Lebow 2000:565). Correcting for this problem is very difficult, as it involves high degree when estimating the probabilities of many possible outcomes. Another problem is that the very topics the scenario method ought to assist with—those with no data—are often low-probability, high-impact events (for example, nuclear warfare, plagues, large-scale cyber attack [sic], etc.). Consider, for exam to include a highly consequential new technology in a scenario. What makes one technological success more plausible than another? The quickest decision rule is simply to focus on technologies that have a basis in existing materials and understandings of basic sciences and that are presently being researched and developed. For example, a scenario in which humans are able to transport anywhere around the globe would not meet a threshold for plausibility, because there is presently no understanding of physics that would allow for such a feat, and this kind of new understanding would have to precede the development of a teleportation device.

**Advantages of Scenario Analysis for Political Scientists** [Emphasis theirs]

As noted in our discussion of the counterfactuals literature, most scholars about the method focus on history. We argue that future counterfactuals may assist scholars in the same ways as historical ones and offer additional benefits. Scenarios may be useful for theory building and development, ident new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating "world setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching.

*Theory Building and Development*

The structured analysis of future counterfactuals offers a unique approach for the study of causal effects in social systems. The first category, and perhaps most significant, is the ability of researchers to use scenarios to identify variables of interest and consider ways to measure them. This is an approach sometimes recommended for qualitative research; it consists of writing a notional depiction of what a case study might look like. This exercise helps researchers to think through what variables are of greatest interest, what values those variables might take on, and how they interact to cause values of the dependent variable. Scenario analysis is one way in which researchers may conduct such a notional case study. Rather than introduce a timeless or historical vignette regarding fictional circumstances, the researcher may find it beneficial to place their case in the future. This helps orient the research project toward current and anticipated political issues—thus increasing the relevance of the work—even if the actual case studies are historical. Thinking through the causal process in this way helps the researcher to identify a wider range of explanatory variables, including that have not yet occurred or may be of very low probability (but are still consistent with existing or proposed theoretical arguments). Scenario analysis helps the researcher to consider the range of values that the identified independent variables may take on, as exploration of different "worlds" pushes the boundaries of the researcher's predispositions going into the research project. Robust scenario analysis thus helps the researcher to identify the upper and lower bounds of their theory.

Second, a commonly cited advantage of counterfactual reasoning that is useful for this process of theory building is a researcher's attempt to manipulate one variable in a causal process while holding others constant, thus isolating the effects of different values of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Manipulating one variable at a time to do a better job of analyzing processes is often very difficult to do, as, in the real world, interactions variables often lead to unpredictable and nonlinear outcomes (Jervis 1997 60). For instance, a scholar conducting an analysis of tax rates and other tic legislation regarding oil may use a counterfactual of a different average oil price in the 1970s. Such a counterfactual would have some fairly obvious implications for the domestic political question, but a world in which that one variable were manipulated would have a large number of equally plausible second- and third-order consequences for regional politics in the Middle East. Those consequences could conceivably feed back into domestic US politics, thus affecting the social system under analysis in a way the researcher may not have controlled for in the original scenario.

Despite these acknowledged difficulties in using a "manipulate one variable” approach for the purpose of assaying real-world policy options, it is a useful input to the processes of building theory and research design. The best defense of such an approach is that all forms of modeling involve abstractions from reality, and even highly unrealistic models—such as James Fear condition in which war should never occur—are useful for studying real events (Fearon 1995). Furthermore, manipulating one variable at a time is more appropriate to some kinds of counterfactual reasoning than others. Consider the three main categories of scenario use: political narratives, game theory and formal modeling, and experimentation. The "manipulate one variable" approach seems at least useful to political narratives, which often try to tackle such tough questions as "What is the future of the international system?" Although advantages to developing and extending theory in regard to these sorts of questions, particularly in assessing key drivers and articulating world views (discussed in the next subsections), a scientific approach of controlling for various social factors is unlikely to succeed. In these projects, manipulating one variable at a time serves only to develop one of many possible futures in the interest of extending the range of the theory's explanatory power.

On the other hand, the "manipulate one variable" approach of advantages for formal modeling and experimentation. The reasoning for each follows a comment made by Elinor Ostrom in her 1997 American Political Science Association presidential address. Ostrom suggested that "from…scenarios one can proceed to formal models and empirical testing in field settings" (Ostrom 1998). The experimental method with human subjects benefits strongly from the use of scenarios. In one study of how values factor into American’s economic decision making, a team of researchers sought to “attribute significant differences in average responses between conditions to variables manipulated in the hypothetical scenario; that is, to the factors intuitive neorealists should weigh heavily and intuitive economists should weigh lightly” (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001). That is to say, one variable individuals' world views could be manipulated at once in the experiment, and the researcher may test for the significance of variance between the test and control groups.

After using scenarios to better identify variables of interest and the role of their specific values in a causal process, a third category of applications of scenario analysis to theory building is to develop new hypotheses and ways to test them. This follows from using scenarios to identify new independent variables and how their values may effect changes on the dependent variable; each new causal argument may (and should) be expressed as a hypothesis to be tested in the broader research project for which the scenario analysis was developed. Additionally, "day after" scenarios that seek to walk back the causal processes that may have led to a consequential event are particularly well suited to developing hypotheses (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008). By definition, this type of scenario analysis seeks to discover causal pathways. For instance, one might seek to chart various paths by which a particular type of social revolution may occur in a country of interest. Each narrative of how such a revolution could come to pass would result in at least one hypothesis regarding the links between the many variables of interest. These hypotheses may then be tested against historical data or used to develop new kinds of data collection methods (discussed further in the next section).

Finally, scenario analysis helps to explore completely new theoretical projects in a deductive way, whereas a great deal of qualitative work in political science tends to be inductive from the case study method. The use of scenario analysis may help scholars to pursue an "abductive," or hybrid, method of theory building that draws on both deductive reasoning and insights from cases (Mayer and Pirri 1995). For example, a data-poor research subject, such as how states may respond to computer network attack, has few historical precedents (Mahnken 2011; Rid 2012). If a researcher were interested in identifying the circumstances under which states are more likely to resort to violence in response to cyber attack [sic], ~~he~~ [they] would be confounded by the problem that never in history has a state responded with violence to such an attack. Scenario analysis beginning with the value of violent counter-attack on the dependent variable (the DV being a state strategy choice) would help the researcher to deduce likely circumstances under which such an outcome may occur. Historical analysis, such as regarding other kinds of information threats, would be helpful for such a project, but the differences between cyber and other kinds of information transmission would result in an incomplete causal narrative based on inductive reasoning alone.

*Data-Poor Research Topics*

Scenarios are a useful method for theory building and research design for topic that, despite being of high importance, lack an empirical base. The best example of this type of research is scholarship on nuclear warfare. An enormous literature evolved during the Cold War regarding how a nuclear war might be fought and how escalation dynamics might occur (Kahn 1962; Brown and Mahnken 2011). This literature was based almost exclusively on future counterfactuals, as there were no nuclear wars to study and a very low "n"—consisting of the Cuba Missile Crisis and very few other crises—for publicly acknowledged "close calls” (Sagan 1995). Indeed, in our survey of the use of scenarios in the discipline more than 25% were about nuclear warfare. Other topics that are of high importance but have a very low or zero "n" include great-power war, global epidemic climate change, large-scale cyber attack, and weapon of mass destruction terrorism.

The points made earlier regarding the identification of new variables and hypotheses are relevant here. In addition to these advantages to new research topics, scenario analysis helps to identify new sources of data. This is partially because scenarios help to identify new independent variables, thus leading the researcher to think about how to measure their values, but also by helping ~~him~~ [them] to think of proxies for measurement when direct observation is not possible. For instance, a day-after analysis of a scenario of interest would cause the researcher to ask what he [they] would have needed to know to predict the occurrence of the future counterfactuals and in turn help the researcher to think about ways in which the discipline could identify that low-probability process if it begins to happen in the real world.

*Articulation of “World Views”*

In addition to the process of building theory, scenarios are useful in helping to link theories. This is known as the articulation of a "world view," which is a set of guiding logics for how an international system operates, such as realism, constructivism, and neoliberal institutionalism (Doyle 1997). For any world view one may use scenario analysis to narrate what the theory logically dictates ought to happen in the world. Similar to the benefit to theory building, but on a greater scale, this approach offers an opportunity for empirical validation of the world view over time. For instance, a scenario at a high level of abstraction, such as the structure of a political system, allows for the validation or invalidation of multiple theories and interactions of theories. Should behavior in the world fail to conform to the expectations of the world view, this of course offers scholars an opportunity to reconsider the guiding logics of their world view.

In the early 1990s, for example, a team of defense analysts had been tasked with developing a set of scenarios for the post-Cold War security environment (Project 2025 1994). They crafted a scenario of a future world dominated by conflict between radical Islam and the West that resembled in some key respects the current struggle against AI Qaeda and its Associated Movements. The scenario should not be seen as a prediction of current events, however. Rather, the scenario was developed to test whether or not one could plausibly make the case for a global ideological conflict at a time when IR scholars such as Francis Fukuyama were arguing that ideological conflict had become a thing of the past (Fukuyama 1992). Islam appeared to be the most plausible universalist ideology that could trigger widespread conflict.

Another example is that a realist scholar may benefit from a of the likely futures of the European Union. Such an analysis would project different possible outcomes—ranging from dissolution through more coherent foreign policy and security integration—from basic premises consistent with the realist world view pitted against the premises of competing world views. The final section of this article offers an example of when John Mearsheimer conducted such an analysis more than 20 years ago; he developed scenarios future of Europe by comparing the expectations of offensive realism to other theoretical approaches.

*Setting Research Agendas*

The remainder of this section describes ways in which scenarios are useful to political scientists in ways other than developing theory. Scenarios are often used in the business and national security policy communities to have “smarter conversations.” This use of the scenario method differs from positivist social science and instead seeks to improve knowledge through participation in scenario exercises. Such exercises usually involve a facilitated discussion. One way in which scenario conversations may make researchers smarter is to identify new research questions. Thinking about critical drivers of the future may help scholars to understand areas that presently have no useful theories and avoid the tendency of the political science discipline to consistently focus on a small number of questions. For instance, the New Era Foreign Policy Conference, initiated by the University of California, Berkeley, and currently cosponsored by the American University, University of California, Berkeley, and Duke University bring together graduate students of political science to engage in scenario analysis and identify future research to research topics.8

*Avoiding Cognitive Biases*

In a methods book on scenarios, James Ogilvy discussed the inability of extremely bright people to see ahead due to cognitive biases, that is, what people found "unthinkable," though those futures eventually came into being. In the context of discussing the future of US and USSR nuclear arsenals during a 1980s scenario exercise, Ogilvy wrote in hindsight that "two decades later we now take for granted what was then unthinkable to some very good thinkers” (Ogilvy 2002:191). This comment is very similar to an insight by Philip Tetlock that pollical scientists tend to view surprises as overdetermined in hindsight, but as inconceivable ahead of time (Weber 1996:281).

Scenarios, whether formally written or developed for purposes offer a powerful way for researchers to compensate for cognitive biases endemic to any kind of human research. Scenarios do this by forcing researchers to confront their most basic assumptions about how the world operates and by teasing out the logical implications of extreme values on the independent variables of interest. As Peter Schwart put it,

"[Scenario building is] all part of a process of self-reflection: understanding yourself and your biases, identifying what matters to you, and perceiving where to put your attention. It takes persistent work and honesty to penetrate our internal mental defenses. To ensure the success of our efforts, we need a clear understanding of the relationship between our own concerns and the wider world around us. To achieve that, it helps to have a constant stream of rich, diverse, and thought-provoking information" (Schwartz 1996:59)

One of the most common forms of bias that scenarios help to compensate for is an anchoring bias; that is, the tendency to interpret new information in ways that conform with our preexisting beliefs (Jerris 1976:143-202). One might also think about this as a "linear projection" bias; scholars who have a view of how the world is operating in the present (theoretically informed or not) may well project this view into the future. In addition to forcing scholars to explicitly confront these beliefs, the scenario process offers a way to think about sorting new information. A completed scenario project allows a researcher to think about multiple futures (with differing plot lines for how the world arrived there) at once. Thus, new information is not automatically compared against a single linear projection into the future, but rather weighted relative to alternative futures. New information might be consistent with all hypothesized futures, in which case the new information may not lead to a new understanding. An example is the current debate regarding whether China is rising or declining relative to the United States. This literature, despite access to the same data, offers remarkably different projections regarding the future strength of each state and what this portends for the international system (Pape 2005; Layne 2009; Beckley 2011/2012; Subramanian 2011). In many cases, however, new information is likely to favor one trend line over another, thus changing how a researcher assigns probabilities to various futures.

*Pedagogy*

Scenarios offer many of the same benefits as simulations, recently a hot topic in the pedogeological literature, to teaching in political science (Newkirk and Hamilton 1979; Smith and Boyer 1996; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Simpson and Kaussler 2009; Sasley 2010). Indeed, scenarios are often a key part of simulation learning. For instance, in a decision-making simulation in which students are assigned the roles of heads of state, the students are often offered a scenario vignette to respond to with policy choices. The emphasis of scenarios and simulations in pedagogy, however, is different. The literature on simulations tends to focus on experiential learning, but recent scholarship has cast some doubt on whether or not this kind of learning improves students' knowledge of core course concepts (Raymond 2010).

Scenarios offer a way to make classroom exercises more explicitly oriented toward the incorporation of theories. For instance, rather than asking students to take on the roles of the President, National Security Advisor, etc., the students may be presented with a vignette and asked to analyze the strategic implications of the scenario for the United States. Both coauthors of this article have used scenarios in classroom exercises. Tom Mahnken has taught the use of scenarios for strategic planning at the Naval War College. Tim Junio used scenario exercises at the University of Pennsylvania. Students in the class "International Security," having been assigned Thomas Schilling's Arms and Influence and other core readings on strategy, were asked to evaluate a scenario in which the United States had committed itself to military action, but was subsequently held hostage by a foreign power.

In Junio's scenario, a future US President was led to believe that due to an intelligence breakthrough, North Korean nuclear weapon targets were rendered vulnerable to a US first strike with conventional weapons. The United States and close allies saw this as an opportunity for regime change and pre-positioned US forces in the region. The US President then issued an ultimatum Korean regime to vacate the country within 48 hours, akin to the Saddam Hussein in 2003, or face a forceful regime change at the hands of the US-led coalition. To the surprise of US leaders, North Korea's Supreme Leader went on television to announce that an unspecified number of nuclear warheads had been smuggled into the United States as a contingency against such a Supreme Leader then declared that any act of aggression against the North Korean people would be met with retaliation against the US homeland. Students in the class were asked to first discuss the strategic situation for the United States. What mistakes had been made to get the United States into that scenario? What issues were at stake? Then, the students were asked to apply strategic concepts to discuss how the United States might seek to extricate itself from the situation.

The North Korea's blackmail scenario is an example of an extremely low-probability event that almost certainly would not justify much further intelligence and defense policy communities, but is extremely useful for pedagogy. This kind of scenario increases student interest in the material and forces them to engage with the theories and concepts of the course. Rather than focus on policy decisions alone, as simulations are likely to do, student bring deductive logic to bear to assess the boundaries of the scenario.

**Demonstrations of Robust Scenario Analysis** [Emphasis theirs]

*Mearsheimer 1990a,b*

A widely read example of scenario analysis, though one not often considered methodologically interesting, is John Mearsheimer's "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War" (published more accessibly as "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War") (Mearsheimer 1990a,b). Mearsheimer offered several scenarios of what post-Cold War Europe might look like; one he deemed most probable suggested that Germany (and possibly others) would develop nuclear weapons and that European states would resume competition. Mearsheimer contrasted this scenario, driven by expectations of offensive realism, with outcomes predicted by the democratic peace and economic interdependence perspectives.

The dependent variable of interest in Mearsheimer's scenario analysis risk of war in Europe following the end of the Cold War. His primary research question was, "Would the end of the bipolar power structure res or lower risk of war?" He considered several independent variables, including the distribution of military power (possible values: a range along a spectrum from bipolar to multipolar [unipolar perhaps being logically possible, but he does not explicitly include it as a possibility]); the character of military power, defined in terms of the distribution of nuclear weapons (possible values: abolition, sustenance of existing levels, unmitigated proliferation, or mitigated proliferation [current nuclear powers manage their spread]); and domestic politics (possible values: degree of nationalism, ranging from high to low was explicit regarding how he believed these independent variables should effect values on his dependent variable of war proneness. Bipolar power distributions were believed to be more stable than multipolar. Nuclear weapons were expected to increase the probability of war in the first three of his four categorical values. High values of nationalism were expected to increase the risk of war, while low values of nationalism would reduce or keep even the risk of war.

The shortest formulation of Mearsheimer's theory of offensive states seek to maximize their relative power. A relevant aspect of the theory that Mearsheimer articulated is states' perceptions of the costs and risks of going to war; he believed a competitive world under offensive realism still be peaceful if the costs and risks of going to war were perceive high and the benefits of going to war low (Mearsheimer 1990a:12). Mearsheimer also noted competing theoretical approaches regarding how European states were likely to behave during his analyzed time period: an international institutions perspective (IV: the strength of international institutions, ordinal), which Mearsheimer deemed irrelevant as power-seeking behavior should trump institutional concerns; democratic peace theory (IV: joint democracy, binary), which he found unpersuasive for a few reasons, including nationalism, defection, and uneven spread of democracy among post-Soviet states; and pacifism (IV: binary, learned war is bad or did not), which Mearsheimer believed lacks an empirical basis.

Although Mearsheimer discussed these other theoretical perspectives superficially, he developed a detailed account based on how he believed offensive realism would effect [sic] values on his three main independent variables of interest. He believed "it is certain that bipolarity will disappear, and multipolarity will emerge in the new European order" (Mearsheimer 1990a:31). He believed this with the end of the US and Soviet spheres of influence, European states be strongly incentivized by the anarchic character of the international system to provide for their own security. Thus, no two states were likely to emerge as clear poles in the European state system; rather, power would be diffused as many states competed with one other. Mearsheimer was highly confident in this outcome and treated it as more of a background condition than an important determinant of outcomes on his dependent variable.

The second two independent variables were nuclear proliferation and nationalism. Mearsheimer viewed the most critical uncertainty regarding the future of security in Europe as the distribution and deployment patterns of nuclear weapons. He wrote that "the best new order would incorporate the limited, managed proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would be more dangerous than rent order, but considerably safer than 1900-1945. The worst order would be a non-nuclear Europe in which power inequalities emerge between the principal poles of power" (Mearsheimer 1990a:31). Mearsheimer offered scenarios of what it would look like if each of these outcomes resulted. Finally, Mearsheimer considered the future that actually resulted, or the continuation of existing weapon ownership patterns. He argued that his theory predicted this would not come to be, as Germany was expected to desire nuclear weapons so that they would not have to rely on Poland and Czechoslovakia to provide a barrier against a Soviet invasion, and because small East European states would similarly perceive nuclear weapons to be of the highest security interest. Nationalism was less important and factored into Mearsheimer's analysis as an interaction effect between nuclear proliferation and nationalism that may make war likely under some conditions.

In summary, Mearsheimer's article provides an excellent example of scenario analysis being used to extend an existing theory and develop testable hypotheses that were subsequently falsified. His futures also constitute "plot lines" formed by the interaction of multiple variables of interest. Mearsheimer explained why he expected a particular outcome in Western Europe in the 1990s and did not expect other outcomes. The historical record clearly falsifies the hypotheses derived from his theory of offensive realism. Various reasons may explain why his theory was incorrect—such as normative claims, continued reliance on US security guarantees, and so on—but it is at least clear that his scenario approach framed a debate in a rigorous and clearly articulated way and has led to new areas of exploration for the discipline.

*Payne 2001*

A second example of robust scenario analysis is a chapter from Keith Payne's book *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction* (Payne 2001). In this chapter, Payne used a scenario to demonstrate how the assumptions underlying traditional deterrence analysis, which were developed during the Cold War, may not apply to a conflict between the United States and China. Payne also used this scenario to demonstrate why in the theoretical sections of his book he emphasized some variables that traditional deterrence theorists downplay. His self-proclaimed purpose was to use a scenario analysis to test whether a more empirical approach, drawing on cultural and domestic political contexts, is more applicable to future conflicts than the deductive reasoning applied to the Cold War.

The dependent variable in Payne's analysis was whether or not an adversary is deterred. He then took traditional independent variables from the existing deterrence literature and drew on extensive secondary sources to question what relaxing assumptions about the values of those variables would do to the dependent variable. For instance, in deductive reasoning, such factors as a state's cultures (organizational and in the usual sense of tradition) are assumed to be either constant on both sides or irrelevant because other variables matter more. Payne suggested that in a particular context, these variables are not only important, but also may dominate outcomes.

To explain how variation in these independent variables may yield an undeterred adversary, Payne developed an excellent "full" qualitative scenario. His primary interest was Chinese decision making. The context is whether or not the United States could deter China from escalating to violent conflict during a crisis over the status of Taiwan. Rather than assume constant values for China on the independent variables, Payne manipulated these variables (several at once, not a "one variable at a time" approach) to show how China: is more risk tolerant than notional adversaries in the traditional deterrence literature; considers many political issues of lower importance than the status of Taiwan; perceives it has little freedom to back down; and has difficulty understanding US demands and viewing them as credible. Factors that cause them to have these different values are related to the Chinese regime's culture and incentive structures. For instance, Payne focused on how the erosion of communist ideology has led the regime to emphasize national unity and stability as justifications for its continued hold on power, thus making the Taiwan issue of high importance. His points regarding risk tolerance come from Chinese strategic culture; Payne follows analysts who place great meaning in the fact that the Chinese word for "crisis" has connotations of both danger and opportunity. Variation on all of these indepedent variables may, Payne argued, lead to an undeterred China, although traditional deterrence theory would yield a deterred China.

**Conclusion** [Emphasis theirs]

The role of academics in policymaking is a cyclical debate in the IR subfield. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a vocal group has once again elevated the perspective that political science professors should be contributing to these pressing national security problems (Andres and Beecher 1989; George 1993; Putnam 2003; Monroe 2005; Nye 2009; Mead 2010). Nearly all of the discourse on "bridging the gap" between academia and the policy world emphasizes how academics may help policymakers, particularly with rigorous methods for testing social science hypotheses. The scenario method is one way in which political scientists may improve the policy relevance of their work. It also shows that ideas flowing in the other direction are promising: the policy community and other disciplines have potential to improve the quality of political science research. The future counter approach has been used by policymakers and wealth creators to impressions for decades, while our discipline has consistently relied to a great degree on the past. Thinking and writing about the future in a robust way offers political scientists an exciting opportunity to push the boundaries of current and to generate new ones, while also improving the processes of teach theory building.

### Simulation Good—NATO

#### Competitive role playing in the context of NATO is good. It produces an in-depth knowledge of foreign policy, cultural and historical complexity, and international relations.

Meleshevich and Tamashiro 08 – President and Professor of law and politics at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academic; Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Allegheny College. [Andrey A., Howard. “Learning to Learn; Learning to Win: How to Succeed in the Simulated World of Model NATO.” Cambridge University Press: Political Science and Politics. Oct 1, 2008.]

Academic Merits of Model NATO

What scholastic benefits accrue from the Model NATO simulation? Student role playing in a competitive context encourages participants to make connections and develop a depth of understanding that are not usually the focus of standard class lectures (Hertel and Millis Reference Hertel and Millis2002).

Over the past five years, Model NATO agenda items have reflected five broad themes: (1) new adjustment challenges and commitments facing NATO in the post-Cold War era's shifting nature of the alliance; (2) NATO enlargement and its geopolitical consequences; (3) the proper role of the U.S. within NATO (sometimes referred to as the “Atlanticist-Continentalist” debate); (4) NATO/European Union relations; and (5) international crisis management and peace-support operations.

As suggested by this thematic list, Model NATO is not a narrow military competition. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO's agenda has broadened significantly, so that a surprisingly increasing number of NATO programs are largely nonmilitary in character (e.g., the Istanbul Initiative, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). This means students must study and be well versed in a wide array of political, diplomatic, and economic issues that extend beyond traditional military alliance concerns. For example, the 2005 Model NATO agenda included such topics as European Union-NATO relations, NATO-Russia relations, and NATO-Ukraine cooperation, as well as more traditional military subjects like WMD nonproliferation programs and global terrorism. If students fail to develop this breadth of knowledge, they risk being dominated or marginalized in the Model NATO competition.

Further, many NATO agenda items are connected to specific programs. For example, European-NATO relations are increasingly influenced by the European Union's European Security and Defense Program (ESDP) and NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). In order to compete successfully, students need both broad issue area understanding and specific programmatic knowledge in order to negotiate agreements consistent with the interests of other NATO members. Allegheny students have won the Model NATO competition by integrating their expertise across different issues to elaborate broad team strategies and objectives that are realized through the creating and negotiating of concrete policy proposals. These proposals emerge in the form of communiqués, drafted by the students. Pedagogically, the breadth and depth of knowledge promoted by Model NATO make it an excellent vehicle for studying European security, broadly defined.

Besides mastering NATO-related issues and programs, students must know the country they represent and learn its policy-relevant characteristics. Examples may include the following:

•How internal political issues influence foreign policy in one's assigned country. For instance, when representing France in the Model NATO competition, students learned the policy implications of presidential-prime minister splits during the cohabitation period from 1997–2002.

•How foreign policy country profiles influence national perceptions and behavior. For example, Greece has a reputation as a spoiler country in NATO because it frequently uses its veto power for bargaining purposes. Or Canada's peacekeeping reputation, which, over time, has seriously degraded Canadian combat capabilities.

•How certain issues and geographic proximity produce alliance patterns (e.g., the Spain-France-Italy axis on Mediterranean issues; Visegrad countries in Eastern Europe). In Model NATO, sometimes even committee seating arrangements can influence cooperation patterns among student delegations—students sitting together may be more likely to cooperate than when they are seated apart.

•How power differentials might be exploited in NATO politics. For instance, on certain issues, small countries might be mobilized against large ones.

In the competitive, role-playing context of Model NATO, students learn quickly that pursuing narrow, personal agendas almost always fail. Seeing international problems from multiple viewpoints and fashioning consensus agreements are the keys to success. Knowledge of issues, programs, and country characteristics make the negotiating of common group agendas and agreements possible.

Shifting our focus from the inner workings of Model NATO to broader scholastic issues, we note that the simulation can satisfy a curriculum-enhancing function in at least three important ways. First, because of Model NATO's issue-area breadth, it can serve as a capstone experience for the international relations and comparative politics subfields in most political science curricula. For example, Model NATO is a natural arena for students seeking to apply their knowledge of national security and foreign policy courses on one hand, or European and post-Soviet courses on the other. Second, because of Model NATO's emphasis on writing, negotiating, and debating, it can serve as a culminating experience in an applied communications program. Finally, Model NATO's academic rigor makes it suitable to be the centerpiece of an honors seminar for advanced political science or international studies students.

#### Simulation model-based learning in the context of NATO produces active student learning. That forces in depth research and broad educational improvements.

Dunn 19 – Professor and Chair of History and Politics at Converse University. [ Joe P., “A ‘Model’ for Active Learning and Leadership Development: International Model NATO.” Reflections on Teaching and the Academy, pgs 528-534. Jan 09, 2019.]

Abstract

This article discusses international simulation “models” as vehicles for active student learning and leadership development. Drawing on his role as the faculty sponsor of his school’s delegation and managing director of the overall conference, the author details the structure, workings, and benefits of International Model NATO as well as “best practices” for success. With some personal testimonies, he concludes that the results demonstrate that this is “what a teaching career is all about.”

As the Farmer’s Insurance television commercial proclaims: “We know a thing or two because we have seen a thing or two.” In 48 years as a college professor, I have seen a thing or two, and I believe that I may know a thing or two about teaching. A wall full of teaching awards and citations, including one of the highest national teaching awards in the country, might attest to the proposition, but what I know for certain is that the best learning experiences have been “active learning” simulations beyond the regular classroom. The “thing or two” that I will highlight here are simulated Model activities.

Most people know Model United Nations (see Hazen 2018), but fewer have experienced the other “models.” Howard University’s Dr. Michael Nwanze created several international model simulations that include Arab League, NATO, African Union, and Organization of American States. Some operate today under different sponsors, but he continues to administer Model NATO and Model African Union. These programs are his life’s passion, a labor of love. I have done Model UN and can attest to its value, but my 32 years in Model Arab League (MAL) and 15 years in International Model NATO provide, in my opinion, far superior student learning experiences. I have written about MAL in the past (Dunn 1990; 1994; 2002); here I address International Model NATO.

In the large Model UNs, it is possible for a student to be passive or minimally engaged. That is not an option in the constant debate and negotiating in International Model NATO. The delegate is that country’s sole voice in a particular committee and all decisions demand unanimity. One must perform one’s duty every minute. Also, the more focused agenda topics allow for and demand greater expertise by each delegate.

Model NATO imitates the 29-nation collective security alliance, headquartered in Brussels. The Model convenes for 4 days annually in February at a downtown Washington, DC hotel. Participating universities come from across the United States, Canada, and Europe (in recent years from Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden). Each institution represents a member country in the several committees that the Model simulates.

The directors’ strive to maintain a proper balance between reflecting the actual functioning of the NATO alliance and the adjustments necessary to maximize the participatory learning experience for all students. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), the policy center of NATO, is the heart of International Model NATO, and the conference replicates five other committees. Despite an organized agenda for debate prepared months in advance, world crises erupt in the real world and also at the Model. Intensity peaks when the directors at various points interject a crisis or multiple ones which require the delegates to respond. Often these incidents come out of the daily newspaper.

A skilled Secretariat, which includes the Security-General and the committee chairs, conduct the student-led activity. Preparation to fulfill these leadership roles begins a year in advance. The simulation operates formally within the committees during the designated hours and informally after the days’ sessions end. Committees often go to lunch and dinner together. After the conclusion of the formal committee sessions on Saturday afternoon, the Secretariat spends hours compiling from the several committee resolutions the final communique, which must be adopted unanimously at the NAC Summit on Sunday morning.

Students on the North Atlantic Council meet informally Saturday evening, often well into the morning hours, to negotiate consensus on issues still in dispute. This practice started years ago when some of the most committed students at the Model picked up the draft copy of the communique as soon as it was released and met for dinner to discuss it. Over time, more and more individuals joined the group. What began casually is now routine practice. Today most NAC members voluntarily assemble in a large hallway, sitting on the floor dressed in jeans and sweats. The activity occurs outside the structures and committee rooms without members of the Secretariat in attendance. A different kind of grassroots leadership emerges in this casual setting without formal procedures and posturing for recognition in the committee rooms. Consensus is the goal.

This level of student engagement, which developed spontaneously, represents one of the most impressive expansions of the Model. The voting for awards by judges and peers is over at this point. Most faculty members are out to dinner and off to bed while these sessions continue well into the night. While their friends and peers may be socializing or sleeping, the NAC members, who tend to be among the most dedicated and talented individuals on each school’s delegation, are hard at work. Students participate because they care. Several confess that this is their favorite activity of the entire Model. The level of talent, commitment, leadership that I have witnessed in these sessions encourages me about future national and world leaders, and indeed many past participants are well on their way to significant careers.

The NAC Summit is the culminating event with the delegates enthusiastically representing their adopted country’s interests while engaging in compromise and seeking consensus. The Secretary General who oversees this hard-fought process must be a leader of considerable talent. I am impressed by how a young student can conduct 3 or 4 hours of fast-paced activity that includes managing hundreds of amendments, negotiating compromise, and maintaining proper protocol at every point. Every year I witness leaders who make constant split-second organizational decisions and adroitly manage a room of Type A and challenging personalities.

Model NATO fosters learning about the culture, policies, security interests, and diplomacy of nations that many students know little about. Embassy visits and briefings by top diplomats are popular opportunities. The last 2 years, my students represented Slovenia and Lithuania, and in 2019 will represent Montenegro. I doubt that many of them knew much about these countries prior to the assignment. But intense research, meeting the ambassadors themselves at the respective embassies, and a serious effort to act as the country’s voice is the objective. Delegates must represent the country’s view, not an American interpretation of what the nation’s policy should be.

Learning the ways and means of diplomacy and practicing the arts of negotiation and persuasion are valuable skills. Meeting individuals from across the country and globe, several of whom will be world movers in future years, cannot help but enhance a student’s development. Our two Model involvements have been the beginning of careers in diplomacy and international security for a number of my students, including several foreign service officers, and some have already risen to important ranks. I will cite only three examples whose careers were directly grounded in their Model experiences. One came to college to be a high school music teacher but instead became a U.S. Air Force officer who served three tours in Iraq, including working with the development of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Another intended to be a junior high school band director, but through Model involvement came to teach in Morocco and then joined the Air Force to become an intelligence officer. Another is a State Department officer who was in Libya at the time of the Benghazi crisis and presently serves in a national security role in Turkey. I have hopes for her to become my first U.S. ambassador. All three were from tiny South Carolina towns and had virtually no experience with the larger world until they joined the Model Programs delegations in their respective freshmen years. I could cite dozens more as well, and each school has its anecdotal stories. College should be transformative. For these young women, clearly it was.

Delegations arrive at Model NATO with various levels of expertise, but most are well prepared. Within my delegation, senior peer leaders prepare more junior students for participation. Our delegation leaders train the neophytes in research skills, policy papers, parliamentary procedure, debate and diplomatic techniques, and proper protocol. Considerable thought goes into the matchups of peer mentors for each individual 1st-year delegate. The single most rewarding experience for me is watching the growth of mentors who take very seriously their responsibility for the care of younger members in their charge. Our delegation practices diligently for the event. The team is extracurricular and entirely student-led by aspirant leaders who exercise a level of commitment that one can see why they will be successful in life. To employ a sports metaphor, our goal is not to have a good team in a given year because we have particularly able talent that year but to ensure that with protocols of expectations, practices, and infrastructure, we will perform at the highest level every year. We enjoy the luxury that are delegates participate for multiple years so we can witness a continuing process of development. Maximizing student development makes this, as I have said, the best learning laboratory that I am able to provide my students.

Assessment is integral to all activities today. We have several practices to enhance the experience for future years. The Office of Public Diplomacy, at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, which provides some financial support for the Model, has required procedures, including a survey monkey for all participants. The Model directors also convene student focus groups at the close of proceedings to provide feedback and to compile suggestions. The directors discuss the findings at a later date through emails and meetings. The Secretariat conducts its own internal assessment about the management of the event. These assessment activities will result in some substantiate changes in the 2019 Model.

In the important realm of student learning outcomes, different participating schools have their own procedures. I can and will speak only to our school’s practices. Each student receives continuous feedback about performance, by me as the sponsor and by our delegation leadership team. First-year delegates meet weekly with their peer mentor for advice and assistance. The prime learning objective is to develop confidence in speaking and negotiation. These skills are grounded in a knowledge base acquired from research. Whatever rubrics or tools one could develop pale in comparison to the simple observation of the enhancement of confidence and skills through practice and participation. To invoke another sports metaphor, “how one practices determines how one performs.” Possibly the best indication that participation makes a difference is that my faculty colleagues remark that they can recognize “Model people” instantly in their classes no matter what the discipline. The authority, leadership, and polish show. These students demonstrate a passion to present, whether a chemistry project, business proposal, or book analysis. Obviously, this is not the only way to achieve these skills, but in my experience it is a proven one.

The majority of our delegation members are not political science or history majors, although we win some “converts” through their participation. We draw from every major on campus from the sciences to business to the arts, with a large number of our delegation from the School of Music, one of our institution’s highest profile programs. I am often asked what kind of background I prefer for Model participants. I remark that I like athletes and music and theater people. They understand the need for practice and at the proper time one must step up and perform. No excuses just perform whatever the circumstances. At heart this activity provides domestic and global citizen training. While I am proud that we can boast music, art, biology, and accounting majors (among others) who are now foreign service officers, I am equally gratified that students whose careers are far removed from the political realm are better informed citizens through their experience in our program. I will add at this late point that we are a women’s college and I have devoted over 40 years intensely to developing women leaders. The Models have done that.

A brief word about expense. This activity is not cost free. For International Model NATO, travel and hotel costs are not inexpensive. Delegation fees, however, are considerably less than Model UN delegate fees. The travel and hotel costs for most regional models are much less expensive than in Washington, DC. Each participating school has differing funding means. Bringing home awards and resultant publicity does tend to appeal to deans. The issue of academic credit is another matter. It varies by institution from academic courses, extracurricular credit, club activity without credit, etc.; and funding sources are often determined by the nature of where the delegation resides at any given institution. I will add only this personal remark, which some may consider heretical, that I closed down our Model UN to devote the money to Model Arab League and International Model NATO, because I discerned far more value for the expenditure. Finally, for those contemplating venturing into this kind of teaching exercise, it is possible to enact many of the practices of Model active learning within a classroom or on one’s home campus.

If you believe in active learning, in students asserting control of their own education, and in maximum development of skills that translate into career success, you should give serious attention to the power of Models as a learning venue. As I observe my own students in action, I often remember when the individual first joined the program, and as I reflect on what she has become and will be, I cannot help but say to myself, “This is what a teaching career is all about.”

### Simulation Good—Policy

#### Simulations of political decision making increase contextual education, increase analytical skills, and boost self-efficacy -- that’s key to long term skills and political engagement.

Duchatelet et al 21 – Professor in the Department of Training and Educational Sciences at the University of Antwerp and in the Department of Child Development and Education at the University of Amsterdam. [Dorothy., Peter Spooren, Peter Bursens, David Gijbels, Vincent Donche. “Explaining self-efficacy development in an authentic higher education learning context of role-play simulations.” Studies in Educational Evaluation, Vol 68, March 2021. Nov 11, 2020.]

1. Introduction

Simulation-based learning environments mirror real-world complexity and limitations by including realistic conditions such as environmental distractions, stress and time pressure (Aldrich, 2006; Beaubien & Baker, 2004; Herrington & Oliver, 2000). Such learning environments are appreciated for their richness and authenticity (Breckwoldt, Gruber, & Wittman, 2014; Chernikova et al., 2020; Duchatelet, Gijbels, Bursens, Donche, & Spooren, 2019). Role-play simulations are a specific type of simulation in which participants represent a specific actor in a predefined situation, while following a set of rules and interacting with other participants (Lean, Moizer, Towler, & Abbey, 2006). Such simulations are the most commonly used active learning method to teach about complex, dynamic political processes in several higher education programmes, such as law or political science education (Ishiyama, 2013; Smith & Boyer, 1996). Students learn about political decision-making by acting out the role of a real political actor within socio-political processes on the regional (e.g. city council), national (e.g. national parliament) or international level (e.g. European Parliament) (Boyer & Smith, 2015; Duchatelet et al., 2019). Such role-play simulations of political decision-making are highly valued by students and lecturers because they seem to foster student learning (Baranowski & Weir, 2015; Bruce, 1988; Giovanello, Kirk, & Kromer, 2013; Schech, Kelton, Carati, & Kingsmill, 2017; Smith & Boyer, 1996; Van Dyke, DeClair, & Loedel, 2000). For example, research in the context of Model United Nations (MUN) simulations – which simulate existing UN bodies such as the Security Council – has shown that they enhance student knowledge and improve specific skills (Crossley-Frolick, 2010; Obendorf & Randerson, 2013).

However, recent reviews about student learning in role-play simulations of political decision-making point to the complexity of these learning environments and the related difficulty faced by the field to capture the simulation’s contribution to student learning (Baranowski & Weir, 2015; Duchatelet et al., 2019). In addition to a certain real-world dimension, simulations are characterized by human agency and dynamism (Duchatelet et al., 2019; Wright-Maley, 2015). As such, teachers who have been using simulations for some time have experienced students initiating different interactions and behaviour each time they engage in the same kind of simulation, which usually generates different processes and simulation outcomes (Usherwood, 2015). To date, our understanding of why there is student variation in learning outcomes during the simulation process is limited (Duchatelet et al., 2019).

Focusing on the simulation process, this study focuses on the learning outcome of self-efficacy in negotiating. Self-efficacy is known to be a dynamic motivational construct that is susceptible to change and that fluctuates over time (Cassidy & Eachus, 2002; Schunk & DiBenedetto, 2016; Tang, Addison, LaSure-Bryant, & Norman, 2004). This makes it a suitable learning outcome for exploring the simulation process. Within role-play simulations of political decision-making, negotiating skills are often seen as the key skills required by participants to be able to engage in the simulation (McIntosh, 2001; Obendorf & Randerson, 2013). Negotiating processes can lead to positive sum outcomes but also to deadlocks. When strategies have been attempted and rejected, negotiators might experience difficulties, and negotiations might lead to no outcome at all. In such cases, resilience and the ability to bounce back from impasses become crucial (Spector, 2006).

Previous research has shown that self-efficacy contributes to persistence, resilience and the overcoming of difficulties (Bandura, 1997; Cassidy, 2015; Pajares, 1996), which are needed during negotiations (Spector, 2006). This makes self-efficacy in negotiating a relevant outcome on which to focus. Inherently, student agency shapes the simulation dynamics, in which social processes emerge that compel students to choose actions, such as to strive for a coalition or minority block (Duchatelet et al., 2019). The simulation process is thus heavily shaped by social features, which have also been known to influence self-efficacy development (Bandura, 1997). Therefore, this study includes perceived student cohesiveness – the extent to which students know, help and support one another (Fraser, 1998) – as a potentially important explanatory factor.

In summary, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it enhances our understanding of the simulation process by studying how self-efficacy in negotiating develops over the period of a four-day MUN simulation. Secondly, it focuses on explaining student variation in self-efficacy development, with this study including perceived student cohesiveness as a social characteristic, alongside individual characteristics. The next section introduces the outcome of self-efficacy in greater detail, and presents the potential factors contributing to variation in the development of self-efficacy in negotiating.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Self-efficacy in higher education

Over the past three decades, educational research on self-efficacy has substantially increased. Research interests have been driven by findings that consistently point to the importance of self-efficacy, which is considered a significant affective learning outcome (Pintrich, 1994; Vermunt & Donche, 2017). The concept of self-efficacy can be defined as an individual’s belief that they are capable of learning and performing actions at designated levels (Bandura, 1997). In an educational context, research generally focuses on academic self-efficacy, which refers to student beliefs in their academic capabilities (Metcalf & Wiener, 2018; Zimmerman, 2000). In addition, self-efficacy can apply to specific skills, such as writing skills (e.g. Pajares, 2003), or subjects such as the natural sciences or mathematics (e.g. Chen & Usher, 2013; Usher & Pajares, 2009). As self-efficacy refers to self-evaluating one’s own abilities, it plays a key role in motivating students to improve their competences and future actions. It is also associated with student success, positively influencing academic achievement, student motivation and regulative learning outcomes (Bandura, 1997; Pajares, 1996; Richardson, Abraham, & Bond, 2012; Robbins et al., 2004; Schunk & Pajares, 2005; van Dinther, Dochy, & Segers, 2011; Vermunt & Donche, 2017; Zimmerman, 2000).

In general, high levels of self-efficacy promote future skill development, as it helps students to engage in tasks, to work harder and to persist longer, especially when encountering difficulties (Bandura, 1997; Bouffard-Bouchard, Parent, & Larivée, 1991; Zepke, Leach, & Butler, 2010). Less self-efficacious students, on the contrary, may procrastinate and not initiate the effort required to achieve certain goals (Honicke & Broadbent, 2016; Komarraju & Nadler, 2013; Vogel & Human-Vogel, 2016; Wäschle, Allgaier, Lachner, Fink, & Nückles, 2014). Resilience has also been related to a higher degree of self-efficacy (Cassidy, 2015; Lee et al., 2013). Behaviours such as engagement and persistence, both related to self-efficacy, also contribute to student negotiating behaviour. They are manifest in resilience in pursuing outcomes and perseverance despite the impasses which may arise during negotiations, both of which are important (Spector, 2006).

In the political decision-making literature, the following skills are implicitly connected to negotiating: oral communication skills and public speaking, as well as more complex negotiation skills such as arguing and debating issues, coalition formation and the art of diplomacy (Crossley-Frolick, 2010; Elias, 2014; Obendorf & Randerson, 2013). Considering the importance of self-efficacy and the need to use negotiation skills when engaging in a simulation (Honicke & Broadbent, 2016; McIntosh, 2001; Obendorf & Randerson, 2013), self-efficacy in negotiating can be seen as an important learning outcome in negotiation-based simulations such as role-play simulations of political decision-making.

2.2. Explaining the development of self-efficacy in negotiating

According to the present knowledge base, students develop self-efficacy by interpreting information from four primary sources: by evaluating previous experiences (mastery experience); by observing, evaluating and comparing other students’ performances to their own (vicarious experience); by appraising verbal judgements given by others, such as feedback (social persuasion); and by interpreting their own emotional responses and physical arousal as a confidence signal when contemplating action (physical/emotional state) (Bandura, 1997). Overall, the research on teaching political decision-making has paid limited attention to self-efficacy as an important learning outcome. Self-efficacy research is elaborated more in the field of role-play simulations used in medical and nursing education, the findings of which point to the presence of several sources of self-efficacy that contribute to its development (Egenberg, Øian, Eggebø, Arsenovic, & Bru, 2016; Stroben et al., 2016; Watters et al., 2015).

#### Self-efficacy is the only portable outcome. It increases motivation, learning goals, and critical skills. Simulating political processes is a prerequisite to developing it.

Duchatelet et al 21 – Professor in the Department of Training and Educational Sciences at the University of Antwerp and in the Department of Child Development and Education at the University of Amsterdam. [Dorothy., Peter Spooren, Peter Bursens, David Gijbels, Vincent Donche. “Explaining self-efficacy development in an authentic higher education learning context of role-play simulations.” Studies in Educational Evaluation, Vol 68, March 2021. Nov 11, 2020.]

5. Discussion and conclusion

Role-play simulations of political decision-making are the most common active learning method used for teaching about complex, dynamic political processes (Ishiyama, 2013; Smith & Boyer, 1996). To date, research has tentatively shown that simulations, including MUN simulations, are beneficial for student learning (Baranowski & Weir, 2015; Crossley-Frolick, 2010; Obendorf & Randerson, 2013; Schech et al., 2017). We consider self-efficacy to be an important learning outcome because it plays a key role in motivating students to improve their competences and future actions, and because it is associated with student success, as it positively influences academic achievement, student motivation and regulative learning outcomes (Bandura, 1997; Pajares, 1996; Richardson et al., 2012; Robbins et al., 2004; Schunk & Pajares, 2005; van Dinther et al., 2011; Vermunt & Donche, 2017; Zimmerman, 2000). Since self-efficacy contributes to persistence, resilience and the overcoming of difficulties (Bandura, 1997; Cassidy, 2015; Pajares, 1996), all of which are required during the negotiation process (Spector, 2006), self-efficacy in negotiating is a relevant outcome on which to focus. Because of the complexity of factors that come into play during such simulations, research should take the simulation process into account more often (Duchatelet et al., 2019; Usherwood, 2015). This study contributes to disentangling the simulation process by investigating how student variation in the development of self-efficacy in negotiating can be explained over the time period of a four-day simulation. Moreover, it is innovative as it includes social aspects of the simulation as explanatory factors, alongside other individual characteristics.

As expected, self-efficacy in negotiating increased as the simulation process progressed (Hypothesis 1) (Duchatelet, 2018; Cassidy & Eachus, 2002; Tang et al., 2004). However, the level of development can be considered minor and tentative. In this respect, we should take into account that four days is a relatively short period of time, and that the measurements followed each other after relatively short periods, sometimes with only two hours between them. Nevertheless, the results thereby indicate the dynamic feature of self-efficacy development, which can change within a few hours. The findings revealed that time does not extensively contribute to explaining variation in self-efficacy development, while individual student characteristics more substantially predicted variation in self-efficacy development.

Notably, the amount of perceived student cohesiveness significantly explained variation in self-efficacy development – even to the largest extent (Hypothesis 2a). This confirms the importance of the social dimension in self-efficacy development in role-play simulations (e.g. Egenberg et al., 2016). The results also confirmed that male students report higher self-efficacy (Hypothesis 2b), similar to previous research findings (e.g. Duchatelet et al., 2018; Schunk & Pajares, 2008). Surprisingly, the analysis showed that the participants’ level of MUN experience did not relate to the amount of reported self-efficacy in negotiating (Hypothesis 2c). How might this be explained? Firstly, it might be related to the measures used. Self-efficacy beliefs are not so much shaped by the experience itself but rather by how students perceived the experience (Usher & Pajares, 2008). However, when asking students about previous MUN experience in this study, only the quantity (how many times) and not the quality (success or failure) of previous experiences was taken into account. Secondly, contextual conditions could complicate the transfer of self-efficacy beliefs from one simulation to another. Students usually act out different roles in different simulations, each simulation focuses on a different topic, and students have to collaborate with different students each time. Finally, the amount of time that had passed between MUN experiences might also have had an effect on student self-efficacy beliefs.

When interpreting our findings, some limitations must be taken into account. Firstly, although a linear model best fit the data, individual plots did not show clear upward linear trends. In this quantitative study, the concept of self-efficacy in negotiating was measured using a five-point Likert scale. To capture even smaller changes when looking for trends in self-efficacy development, it might be beneficial for future quantitative research to use a seven-point or even nine-point Likert scale. Secondly, a recent review study by Duchatelet et al. (2019), points to contextual conditions of role-play simulations of political decision-making that vary to a large extent. Simulations over several days are often characterized by both formal and informal negotiations. Formal committee meetings usually include chaired debates, speechmaking, committee work and amendments, while informal negotiations take place in and around the simulation setting in the form of caucusing, the use of chat platforms and discussions over meals/coffee breaks and between days.

Collecting data after each committee meeting hindered us from distinguishing the contribution of different types of negotiation setting to the development of self-efficacy. This distinction might be helpful when further exploring gender differences. For example, Rosenthal et al. (2001) showed that male MUN participants reported significantly more enjoyment of the individual activities of debate, passage and/or defeat of resolutions than female MUN participants, who take considerably fewer speaking turns. Is it possible that female students rely more extensively on sources of self-efficacy in negotiating that are present in informal negotiation settings?

Finally, due to the informal gathering, students tended to participate in the simulation in varying ways. For example, our response rate was the lowest at Time Point 7, which was scheduled after the morning session on the third day, which had been preceded by a pub crawl and quiz on the previous evenings. Despite the fact that this aspect complicates longitudinal data collection, it also raises the question of the extent to which fatigue might influence the development of self-efficacy in negotiating in simulations over several days.

With respect to further research, as the results point to variation in the development of self-efficacy over time and individuals, it would be useful to conduct further longitudinal research. For example, latent class growth modelling might reveal clearer trends and allow the detection of groups of students that follow similar growth trajectories in self-efficacy development (Jung & Wickrama, 2008; Muthén & Muthén, 2000). This study showed that gender is a personal characteristic that should be taken into account. Other personal features that might come into play could be related to the level of ethnic and linguistic diversity of simulation participants. It would be interesting, for example, to investigate whether the availability and use of simultaneous translation (as in the real world) contributes to student self-efficacy in negotiating when participating as a non-native English speaker in a simulation conducted in English. In addition, considering the large contribution of perceived student cohesiveness found in this study, we would suggest that this aspect is also measured longitudinally to increase our understanding of its interplay with self-efficacy development. Finally, a more person-centred approached is needed to unravel the interplay of factors that influence self-efficacy development; for example, by means of in-depth qualitative or mixed methods research.

As a first practical implication, this study showed that self-efficacy in negotiating is fostered in role-play simulations of political decision-making, and thus it is a meaningful learning outcome on which to focus. By definition, self-efficacy includes the capacity to self-evaluate one’s own abilities (Bandura, 1997), which means that students are able to monitor and evaluate their own progress. One way to support the development of self-efficacy skills is self-assessment (Panadero, Jonsson, & Botolla, 2017). Teachers could implement self-assessment in the design of a simulation which aims to promote the development of self-efficacy skills, for example by using diaries that encourage students to reflect on their negotiating. Assessing their own negotiation progress would provide students with insights into their own performance, which in turn would strengthen their self-efficacy and positively influence their performance (Brown & Harris, 2013; Panadero et al., 2017).

As a second practical implication, the findings clearly point to the importance of the social dimension of role-play simulations of political decision-making. Students who knew other students better, or who perceived other students as being more helpful and supportive, had significantly greater development in self-efficacy. Consequently, teachers might take the student group composition into account more explicitly. Also, teachers might choose for a longer/more intense preparation phase in order for students to get to know each other better. Student groups that are more familiar with each other and that have already created a safe and supportive atmosphere might be more beneficial to the development of self-efficacy in negotiating during role-play simulations of political decision-making.

Being in a group of students who feel they have a lot in common with each other might have a more powerful effect on a student’s self-efficacy beliefs through vicarious experience; for example, when observing fellow delegates and evaluating their performance compared to one’s own. A group in which students are familiar with each other, and/or in which other students are perceived as more experienced, might help to shape self-efficacy through social persuasion, such as when receiving compliments and feedback from other students. In this regard, a third element that needs further consideration is the role of the teacher during the simulation. Teacher feedback (feedback from an expert) might significantly contribute to how self-efficacy in negotiating develops during the simulation process and needs further exploration.

As a fourth practical implication, the findings raise questions about performance assessment in role-play simulations of political decision-making. As self-efficacy is related to performance (Richardson et al., 2012), how might the group composition influence student negotiation performance? This study focused on an extracurricular simulation, but many practical learning tasks are course-based (Duchatelet et al., 2019). If the group composition influences student negotiation performance, how should it ideally be assessed? Should a simulation approach focus on conducting several simulations in different student groups to create equal opportunities for all students before assessing their negotiation performance? Or should teachers strive for an optimal group composition? Moreover, which elements would define such an ‘optimal’ group, and for which students and which learning outcomes?

Overall, this study increased insight into the simulation process by mapping how self-efficacy in negotiating developed over the period of a four-day MUN simulation. Moreover, it showed how perceived student cohesiveness, as a social factor, should be taken into account when focusing on the development of self-efficacy in negotiating. Finally, this social factor might also contribute to student negotiation performance, which needs to be explored in future research about performance assessment in role-play simulations of political decision-making.

### Simulation Good—Decisionmaking Skills

#### Simulation based learning develops complex problem solving skills and allows students to engage with real world complexities. And, preparation and research improve results!

Chernikova et al 20 – research fellow at the College of Educational Psychology and Educational Sciences at LMU Munich, PhD In learning sciences from LMU Munich. [Olga, Nicole Heitzmann, Matthias Stadler, Doris Holzberger, Tina Seidel, Frank Fisher. “Simulation-Based Learning in Higher Education: A Meta-Analysis.” Review of Educational Research, Vol 90, Issue 4, August 2020, pages 499-541. June 15, 2020.]

Knowledge application in more or less realistic situations has been shown to be important for the development of complex skills (e.g., Kolodner, 1992). Expertise development theories (e.g., Van Lehn, 1996) suggest that learners acquire high levels of expertise in complex problem-solving tasks if they dispose of sufficient prior knowledge and engage in a large amount of practice. Practice opportunities ideally include authentic problems related to a professional field (e.g., Barab et al., 2000). However, in higher and further education programs, the opportunity to engage in real-life problem solving is limited. In addition, practice in real-life situations without systematic guidance can be overtaxing for students and come with risks and ethical issues—for example, when working with real students or patients without being systematically prepared. Moreover, real-life situations do not always provide enough practice opportunities as, for example, critical situations appear less frequently or require a lot of time before decisions lead to observable consequences. These limitations make practice in real-life situations a somewhat inaccessible and sometimes suboptimal learning space, particularly for novice learners. Therefore, approximations of practice in which the complexity is reduced (Grossman et al., 2009) can help engage learners in specific aspects of professional practice and are promising in order to avoid confusion and efficiently use resources for learning and instruction. These approximations of practice can be realized in higher education with simulations, which allow students to use authentic problems and also to create a learning environment to practice and facilitate the acquisition of target complex skills (e.g., Cook, 2014).

Simulations are increasingly often used in higher education settings. In STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education (e.g., D’Angelo et al., 2014; Wu & Anderson, 2015), they are used to facilitate a deeper understanding of concepts and relationships between them, advance inquiry, problem solving, and decision making. A lot of research has been done in the field of medical education (Cook, 2014; Cook et al., 2013; Hegland et al., 2017), where simulations are used to advance diagnostic competences and motor and technical skills of prospective doctors, nurses, and emergency teams. Simulation-based learning also occurs in other fields, such as teacher education, engineering, and management (e.g., Alfred & Chung, 2011; Brubacher et al., 2015). The present meta-analysis focuses on higher education and, more specifically, on fields that strongly rely on interaction with other people at different levels (physical, cognitive, social, etc.)—for example, medicine, nursing, psychological counseling, management, teacher education, particular areas of engineering, and economics. Regarding this area of interest, little is known about for whom simulations are particularly helpful, what scenarios are effective, and what additional instructional support makes them effective for learners with different learning prerequisites. Synthesized results on the role of different features of simulations (e.g., duration, technology use) and instructional support (e.g., scaffolding) are lacking, especially with regard to effective support for learners with different levels of prior knowledge. This meta-analysis summarizes the effects of scaffolding and technology use in simulation-based learning environments on facilitating a range of complex skills across domains (e.g., medical and teacher education, psychological counseling, care). In a previous meta-analysis, it has been found that the effects of instruction across domains of medical and teacher education have similar magnitude for a certain set of skills related to diagnosing; the effects increase in magnitude with the proper use of scaffolding (Chernikova et al., 2019). Other meta-analyses in the field of medical education (e.g., Cook, 2014) support the idea that simulations can be highly effective for advancing specific motor and technical skills. However, knowledge is still scarce with regard to the effective support to advance a variety of complex skills for learners with different levels of prior knowledge. The present meta-analysis aims at advancing this research by summarizing the effects of simulation-based learning on complex skills—going beyond understanding the subject matter and performing technical tasks. In addition, this meta-analysis aims at differentiating the effects for learners on different levels of prior knowledge.

To assess the effects of instructional support, this meta-analysis adopts a scaffolding framework suggested by Chernikova et al. (2019). The framework relies on defining scaffolding as support during working on a task connected with a temporary shift of control over the learning process from a learner to a teacher or learning environment (e.g., Tabak & Kyza, 2018). The framework suggests that learners with different levels of prior knowledge would benefit from different types of scaffolding. More specifically, learners with high levels of prior knowledge would benefit more from scaffolding that affords and requires more self-regulation (e.g., inducing reflection phases), whereas learners with a low level of prior knowledge would rather benefit from more guidance (e.g., through examples).

Complex Skills in Higher Education

In higher education, students need to be prepared for their future profession, and their professional competences should involve a range of complex skills. The importance of 21st-century skills goes beyond secondary education and is also often addressed during higher and further education (e.g., P21, 2019). Critical thinking, problem solving, communication, and collaboration seem to be the most relevant skills that students should acquire during their education in addition to domain-specific knowledge and skills to be able to make professional decisions and implement solutions.

According to Mayer (1992), problem solving in a broader sense is cognitive processing aimed at achieving a goal when no solution path or method is obvious. It involves critical thinking, monitoring, and experimental interactions with the environment (Raven, 2000), as well as directed application of knowledge to the case or problem. Shin et al. (2003) emphasize the differences between well- and ill-structured problems. Well-structured problems present all elements of the problem, engage the application of a limited number of rules and principles and possess correct, convergent answers. A good example of such problems would be finding the predicate in a sentence, calculating drug dosage based on a patient’s weight, and so on. However, the real-world problems that professionals across domains deal with are usually ill structured. In turn, they fail to present one or more of the problem elements; might have unclear goals; possess multiple solutions, solution paths, or sometimes no solutions at all; or represent uncertainty about which concepts, rules, and principles are necessary for the solution or how they are organized (Funke, 2006; Shin et al., 2003). Problem solving in this case might involve not only diagnosing but also managing critical situations. By diagnosing, we understand collecting case-specific information to reduce uncertainty (Heitzmann et al., 2019), such as diagnosing learning difficulties, identifying the cause of a health problem, or developing a course of action. By managing critical situations we understand using the set of skills required to behave in situations of emergency or uncertainty, such as classroom management skills or emergency help with disasters or accidents.

If the solution path is already known (e.g., a complex procedure with a set of required steps needed to collect information or make a decision) and needs to be accurately followed, we would rather address it as technical/manual performance (an example from medical education would be completing an examination or operation, in teacher education—carrying out lesson activities according to a plan prepared in advance).

To implement the decisions and solutions to problems as well as to collect missing information, one also needs communication skills (e.g., to persuade others to help or to collect missing information from other people; Raven, 2000). If multiple professionals are involved in the situation and need to collaborate to solve the problem, make the decision, or take action (e.g., an emergency team), we see it as collaboration/teamwork skills.

To sum up, different professional domains require specific professional knowledge as a prerequisite to enable the implementation of complex skills; however, the complex skills required appear to be similar across domains. One should be able to identify the problem, analyze the context, and apply professional and experiential knowledge to make practical decisions. Fischer et al. (2014) suggested a framework of epistemic activities that is relevant to a broad range of problem-solving and decision-making procedures across domains: identifying the problem, questioning, generating hypotheses, constructing artifacts, generalizing and evaluating evidence, drawing conclusions, and communicating processes and results. In this meta-analysis, focus on learning outcomes that involve these epistemic activities, critical thinking, and problem solving are among the most important eligibility criteria.

Simulations in Educational Contexts

Simulation-based learning offers learning with approximation of practice, allows limitations of learning in real-life situations to be overcome, and can be an effective approach to develop complex skills. Beaubien and Baker (2004) define a simulation as a tool that reproduces the real-life characteristics of an event or situation. A more specific definition suggested by Cook et al. (2013) stated that simulation is an “educational tool or device with which the learner physically interacts to mimic real life” and in which they emphasize “the necessity of interacting with authentic objects” (p. 876).

What makes simulations educational tools is the opportunity to alter and adjust some aspects of reality in a way that facilitates learning and practicing (e.g., they address less frequent events, shorten response time, provide immediate feedback to the learner, etc.). Although feedback, as providing information about discrepancy of current state (or behavior) and a desired goal stat (Hattie & Timperley, 2007), plays an important role in designing simulation, there are much more opportunities for instructional support. The present research aims at exploring opportunities to provide additional information and scaffolding to the learner in detail.

The operational definition of simulation includes interaction with a real or virtual object, device, or person and the opportunity to alter the flow of this interaction with the decisions and actions made by learners (Heitzmann et al., 2019). Thus, all types of interaction, from role plays and standardized patients to highly immersive interactions with virtual objects, can be considered simulations.

The operational definition of simulation also implies that there is critical thinking and a kind of problem solving that is present during learning and learners take an active role in the skill development processes. Simulations have many features to address the complexity of real-world situations (Davidsson & Verhagen, 2017); for example, they can involve technology aids to better resemble reality or to provide more practice or learning opportunities. However, the idea of simulation tends to focus on the reconstruction of realistic situations and the genuine interactions that participants can participate in. According to Grossman et al. (2009), simulation can be viewed as a simplified version of practice and be used to engage novices in practices that are more or less proximal to the practices of a profession. Therefore, it seems reasonable to additionally focus on the duration of simulation and authenticity in order to determine how realistic the learning environment was and how long the learners were exposed to it.

Another aspect that needs to be considered is the type of simulation, which can be categorized according to what or who learners interact with (real or virtual object or person). The type of simulation is related to the concept of information base (e.g., where the information for decisions comes from) as a context variable (Chernikova et al., 2019; Heitzmann et al., 2019) but provides a further categorization into real or virtual object (e.g., document, tool, model) and real or virtual person (e.g., standardized patients).

Technology use refers to the application of digital media (hardware and software) to establish a learning environment. In class, role plays, simulated discussions, and communication with standardized patients can be seen as simulations without technology use, as no software or hardware is necessary to initiate the interaction (e.g., Davidsson & Verhagen, 2017). Screen-based simulations require computer-supported interfaces and some software, which allows the interaction (e.g., Biese et al., 2009). Another type is interaction supported by combining some hardware with software, such as in a programmed mannequin (Liaw et al., 2014). One more type that requires complex technology is virtual reality, which is likely to facilitate immersion (e.g., Ahlberg et al., 2007). Empirical research on the effects of technology use on learning (comparing the use of computers in the classroom with no technology) provides some supportive evidence of small to moderate positive effects of technology use on learning and achievement (Hattie, 2003; Tamim et al., 2011). Some evidence of no particular effects of technology use comes from medical education comparing high- and low-fidelity simulations for learning (e.g., Ahad et al., 2013). Systematic empirical evidence of the effects of virtual reality is lacking due to the fact that virtual reality is rather new technology and is not yet broadly implemented in classrooms. The aim of this meta-analysis is to summarize the effects of different technologies on acquiring complex skills.

Duration of simulation refers to the time of exposure to a learning environment. In their meta-analysis, Cook et al. (2013) provided supportive evidence of the effectiveness of distributed and repetitive practice (effects above .60) in the acquisition of complex skills in medical education. However, they only focused on comparing simulations with a duration of more than 1 day with simulations of less than 1 day. Therefore, as a next step a meta-analysis might be aimed at capturing the effects of the duration of simulations on a more detailed scale (including simulations lasting for several minutes, hours, days, weeks, or semesters).

Simulation-based learning allows reality to be brought closer into schools and universities. Learners can take over certain roles and act in a hands-on (and heads-on) way in a simulated professional context. Research has shown that full authenticity is not always beneficial for learning (e.g., Henninger & Mandl, 2000). Researchers therefore typically emphasize the opportunity to modify reality for learning purposes with simulated environments. Therefore, it is important to consider the extent to which simulation represents the actual practice in terms of demands set on the learner, the nature of the simulated situation, and the environment and/or the participants involved (e.g., Allen et al., 1991). Sometimes this relationship is addressed as fidelity of the simulation. However, a recent review by Hamstra et al. (2014) emphasized that there are severe inconsistencies in using this term in different research areas. In line with recommendations given by this group of authors (Hamstra et al., 2014), we focus on functional correspondence between a simulated scenario or the simulator itself and the context of real situations. We address this correspondence by estimating the degree of authenticity, and in this way, we avoid the term fidelity and the uncertainty related with it.

Prior Knowledge and Professional Development

Prior knowledge is an important predictor of learning success (e.g., Ausubel, 1968); it can also define the ability of learners to learn from particular materials, and use learning strategies. There are considerations suggesting that including simulations in a later phase of a higher education program after students already know theoretical concepts is promising in order to not overwhelm learners and block too much of their cognitive capacity for solving a problem in a simulation (e.g., Kirschner et al., 2006). Other considerations suggest including simulations at a very early point because this supports the process of restructuring knowledge into higher order concepts that can be used directly to solve problems (e.g., Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008; Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993; Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). Thus, a theoretical knowledge base would be stored in a more effective way that is directly linked to cases of application (e.g., Kolodner, 1992). Nonetheless, it seems rather obvious that learners with less theoretical prior knowledge may need more instructional guidance than more advanced learners in order to still possess enough cognitive resources for learning (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2007).

#### Using simulations increases authentic education and critical thinking skills -- even if the scenarios are not entirely realistic.

Chernikova et al 20 – research fellow at the College of Educational Psychology and Educational Sciences at LMU Munich, PhD In learning sciences from LMU Munich. [Olga, Nicole Heitzmann, Matthias Stadler, Doris Holzberger, Tina Seidel, Frank Fisher. “Simulation-Based Learning in Higher Education: A Meta-Analysis.” Review of Educational Research, Vol 90, Issue 4, August 2020, pages 499-541. June 15, 2020.]

Discussion

The results of this meta-analysis show that simulation-based learning has large positive overall effects on the advancement of a broad range of complex skills and across a broad range of different domains in higher education. The size of the effect of simulations on learning even exceeds the expectedly large influence of the learners’ prior knowledge. The effect size is still very large when simulation-based learning is compared with different kinds of instruction instead of “real” control groups, including waiting controls. There is only a very small number of instructional methods for which these relations hold true. These include feedback and formative assessment (see Hattie, 2003; Hattie & Timperley, 2007), which already point to possible interpretations of effects that large. One of the issues in higher education is the lack of feedback in the context of complex authentic activities. Simulations typically address exactly this issue. They often entail providing information to the learner on the discrepancy of currently observable competence indicators and a desired competence goal, which is one of the most common definitions of feedback in the context of learning (Hattie & Timperley, 2007). The potential of simulations for learning has been known for a while in medical education (e.g., Cook, 2014) but is now increasingly transferred (and sometimes reinvented) to other domains of higher education (see Heitzmann et al., 2019). This meta-analysis provides supportive evidence that the large effects of simulation-based learning found for medical knowledge and skills do generalize across domains.

But simulations are more than just feedback as they provide opportunities for meaningful applications of knowledge to professional problems (Grossman et al., 2009). Simulated problems may be tailored to the needs of learners as an approximation of practice and are thus probably often more effective than real practice.

With regard to types of simulation, the analysis shows that combining several types of simulation over the treatment time—for example, role play with practice on a model (Dumont et al., 2016) or virtual reality (Lehmann et al., 2013)—might have greater effects on learning. We have also identified that some types of simulation are more frequently used to target particular complex skills. For example, communication skills are frequently facilitated through role plays, whereas technical performance is frequently addressed by using a simulator or virtual reality. Therefore, we would like to emphasize that the simulation type should not be viewed independently of target skills and instructional support quality. The type of simulation depends a lot on the learning context (e.g., radiologists have to work with images, teachers with students’ tests), but providing different types of simulations can be beneficial across domains.

The present meta-analysis included different types of complex skills as outcome measures. The analysis yielded evidence of differences with respect to facilitating effects that are considerably bigger than the differences between the effects of the domains involved. The biggest effect sizes were obtained for tasks related to technical performance that mainly come from medicine (Araújo et al., 2014; Banks et al., 2007), followed by problem-solving and -diagnosing skills. These findings emphasize that if the simulation requires the coordinated use of different mental modes and abilities—for example, motor and sensory skills together with reasoning—the learning gains are larger than for simulations that require the involvement of fewer skills. Despite these differences, simulations had effects that can be categorized as large positive effects for all but one type of skill. The exception is teamwork, where the meta-analysis found a medium positive effect only. This in turn may be due to the high complexity in the case of real team training. Another explanation of low effects is that it might be difficult to find ways to further improve social skills, as they are by far the most trained skills we possess.

There has been a long debate on political and societal levels around the question of an added value of technologies for learning (cf. Rogers, 2001). According to this meta-analysis, simulations still have substantial effects if no digital technology is used at all. Typical computer-and-screen-based simulations do not outperform well-organized no-tech role plays and simulated patients or simulated students. Both of them, the technology-enhanced and the no-tech variants do have large effects. However, some more recent technologies that enhance sensory perception (e.g., virtual reality, full-scale simulators) seem to make a difference. With more studies and better theory, it will be possible to identify features and dimensions of these technologies that are responsible for greater learning gains.

Another main finding of this meta-analysis is certainly that simulations with an overall high authenticity do have greater effects than simulations with a lower authenticity. However, it is also very interesting that even simulations with low authenticity still have large effect sizes, exceeding those of many other forms of instruction. This is encouraging for higher education practice as high-authenticity simulations are sometimes very expensive and time-consuming to build. At least for learners with some experience of the real situation, a reduced version might do just as well in low- as in high-authenticity simulations. Moreover, simulations aimed at high authenticity for only one or a small number of objects and processes are associated with effects similar to the effects of simulations aimed at high authenticity with respect to all situational parameters. This can be taken as supportive evidence of the approximation-of-practice approach (Grossman et al., 2009), claiming that the real advantage in simulations is the reduction of task complexity to levels a learner can handle.

## Anti-Blackness

### Clash Turns Case—Vanguard Thought—1NC

#### Switch-side debates over hypothetical political action is key to cultivate vanguard thought. Prioritizing ideological consistency in debate fractures revolutionary intercommunalism by encouraging dogmatic abstraction, which is colonial and anti-Black.

Vernon, 21—Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, York University (Jim, “Huey Newton’s Lessons for the Academic Left,” Theory, Culture & Society, Vol 38, Issue 7-8, 2021, dml) [brackets in original]

In short, Newton and Seale found that their ‘hook-up with white radicals did not give [them] access to the white community because they did not guide the white community’ outside the university (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 51), just as they had ‘problems with black students sometimes because they tend to have a detached understanding of the realities in the black community’ off campus (Seale, 1991: 211). Their continual and withering critique of ‘intellectual jivers … who sit in a fucking armchair and try to articulate the revolution while black people are dying in the streets’ at times appears as a standard call by grassroots activists to place the pressing needs of concrete praxis before the leisurely pursuit of abstract theory (Seale, 1991: 119, 33); and, indeed, Newton claims ‘when Bobby and I left Merritt College to organize brothers on the block we did so because the college students were too content to sit around and analyze without acting’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 99). However, Newton was far from opposed to even highly speculative theorizing; he would, after all, routinely open talks by asking his audience ‘to assume that an external world exists’ before they could procced (Hilliard and Weise, 2002: 162).4 His disillusionment with academic activists was not due to the complexity or abstraction necessary for theoretical debate; on the contrary, it was grounded in his experience that ‘when I speak on college campuses … I try to lead an audience into rational and logical discussions, but many students are looking for rhetoric and phrasemongering’ instead, which he felt indicated in his audiences not only an evasion of potentially valid, and thus needed, criticism of their own views, but an implicit elitism concerning off-campus participants in political discourse; as he put it, the students ‘either do not want to learn or they do not believe that I can think’ (Newton, 2009: 68).

Of course, Newton agreed with the white mother country radicals that the fight for black liberation was ‘in essence … not at all a race struggle [but a] struggle between the massive proletarian working class and the small, minority ruling class’ (Seale, 1991: 72); simultaneously, because that class remained internally divided by race and racism, he also held that ‘nationalism is recognized by many who think in a revolutionary manner as a distinct and natural stage through which one proceeds’, explaining, among other things, the Party’s anti-integrationist stance (Harrison, 1970: 151). He thus affirmed the necessity of developing a discourse that would ‘not only … make Blacks more proud but … make whites question and even reject concepts they had always unthinkingly accepted’ (Newton, 2009: 175), which required synthesizing race- and class-based theories of the numerous contradictions that structured social life. His experience with campus radicals, however, led him to believe that their goal, by contrast, was to find ‘a set of actions and a set of principles that are easy to identify and are absolute’ (Newton et al., 2004: 84), which not only deepened the distance between progressive theorists and those most in need of emancipatory thought, but encouraged those in elite positions to instruct, rather than to engage with and listen to, those in whose name they purportedly spoke. For Newton, to ‘attempt to explain phenomena … by taking [them] out of [their concrete] environment, [and] putting them into a category … without understanding everything else related to them’ was to ‘transform’ material, lived realities into reified abstractions that inevitably produced forms of praxis that imposed demands for an impossible ideological purity on a suffering populace living in a nest of economic, biological, psychological, and social contradictions (Hilliard and Weise, 2002: 163). This is why Newton ‘tried not to speak in such absolute … terms’ and emphasized the need for theorists to ‘analyse each instance’, rather than subsuming them under an abstract and rigid model treated as ‘an infallible guide in all cases’ (Newton et al., 2004: 26); as his thinking developed, he increasingly cautioned against theorizing that ‘does not apply to the present set of conditions [because it is] tied to a set of thoughts that approaches dogma – what we call flunkeyism’ (Hilliard and Weise, 2002: 165).

In fact, while it may seem counterintuitive given the militant positions the Panthers routinely struck in public, for Newton, the tendency among activists emerging from the academy to rigidly ‘draw … the line of demarcation, saying you are on this side and I am on the other … shows a lack of consciousness’ of the situation to be theorized (Newton, 2009: 62); not least because it is grounded in the same sort of absolute distinction between the ‘good’ human beings, cultures, and values and their ‘evil’ inversion or absence that defined the colonial mindset that black power and socialist internationalism were each formed to oppose. He reminds us that:

The African gods south of the Sahara always had at least two heads, one for good and one for evil. Now people make gods in their own image … So the African said, in effect, I am both good and evil; good and evil are the two parts of the thing that is me. This is an example of an internal contradiction.

Western societies split up good and evil, placing God up in heaven and the devil down below. Good and evil fight for control over people in Western religions, but they are two entirely different entities. (Newton et al., 2004: 24)

While the Manichean politics he encountered from both white and black campus-based activists resonates strongly with the struggle of the Good to control, instruct, or conquer the Evil, Newton’s own theorizing was based on the recognition ‘that all things are in a constant state of change, transformation, or flux’ (Hilliard and Weise, 2002: 163), because of ‘the internal contradictions in all things’, including the people themselves (Newton et al., 2004: 108). It is precisely for this reason that Newton, above all, endorses a dialectical5 understanding of social change:

This struggle of mutually exclusive opposing tendencies within everything that exists explains the observable fact that all things … are in a constant state of transformation. Things transform themselves because while one tendency or force is more dominating than another, change is nonetheless a constant, and at some point the balance will alter and there will be a new qualitative development … Now, because things do not stay the same we can be sure of one thing: the owner will not stay the owner, and the people who are dominated will not stay dominated. We don’t know exactly how this will happen, but … we can be sure that if we increase the intensity of the struggle (which is already underway), we will reach a point where the equilibrium of forces will change and there will be a qualitative leap into a new situation with a new social equilibrium. (pp. 25–26)

Thus, above all, what Newton wanted to teach the academic-led Left, is that a genuine vanguard does not reprovingly instruct the people as to what they should will, how they should struggle, or what their personal shortcomings are in the light of externally developed, inflexible, and absolute models or principles; it must proceed, rather, from a ‘great compassion for people’ (Newton et al., 2004: 54), or an understanding of, and empathy with, their inherently conflicted lives and communities. As he puts it, ‘the Black Panther Party is not based upon hate. We feel that [a] revolutionary program must be guided by a feeling of love – armed love we sometimes call it’, premised upon the ‘involvement and acceptance’ of the people not only at every stage, but more importantly ‘as they are’ in their flawed, internally contradictory state (Newton et al., 2004: 50). It is thus as much, and perhaps even more, the academic Left as the administrative Right that Newton has in mind when he laments that:

I don’t think students are taught dialectically, and one of the reasons they are not is that it would be detrimental to the bourgeois educational system to do so. I think that it is a fair statement to say that the schools are agencies of the status quo: … it would be detrimental to them to give students the tools to show [the people] that the status quo cannot stand and [thus] to analyze them out of existence. (Newton et al., 2004: 87)

Thus, while affirming the need for radical thought to emerge from spaces like the university, which can help clarify and guide the people in their ongoing efforts to resolve the contradictions of their lives, he simultaneously and strenuously warns that when radical theorists distance themselves from the community and begin to traffic in moral and political absolutes, they can easily slip into what he called ‘revolutionary cultism’; a temptation into which he admits he fell at various points in the Party’s development.

The revolutionary cultist uses the words of social change … but his actions are so far divorced from the process of revolution and organizing the community that he is living in a fantasy world. So we talk to each other on campuses … thinking these things will produce change without the people themselves. Of course people do courageous things and call themselves the vanguard, but … vanguard means spearhead, and the spearhead has to spearhead something. If nothing is behind it, then it is divorced from the masses and is not the vanguard. (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 70–71)6

What was required, then, was not so much an emphasis on praxis over theory, but a specifically dialectical mode of synthesizing theory and practice that ‘emphasizes a concrete analysis of conditions’ within actual communities and which might help lay the foundation for ‘an appropriate response to these conditions as a way of mobilizing the people and leading them to higher levels of consciousness’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 49). As he puts it toward the end of his statement expelling Eldridge Cleaver from the Party for

influencing us to isolate ourselves from the Black community so that it was war between the oppressor and the Black Panther Party, not war between the oppressor and the oppressed community … Our dialectical ideology and our analysis of concrete conditions indicate that declaring a spontaneous revolution is a fantasy. The people are not at that point now. This contradiction and conflict may seem unfortunate to some, but it is part of the dialectical process. (pp. 51, 53)

For Newton, the structural oppression that communities endure necessitates both that the people are driven to resist and transform their suppressed circumstances (which we can call their ‘good’) and that ‘the opinions of the people have … been molded and directed against their true interests by slick politicians and exploitative educators [whose] diversion tactics often lead the people down blind alleys or onto tangents that take them away from their true goals’ (which thus reflects their ‘evil’) (p. 57, emphasis added); and it is these internally contradictory people – not reified abstractions of them – whose situation requires concrete analysis and to whom this theorizing must ultimately be directed. This, of course, retains radical theory’s traditional goal of providing a compelling critique of the structures which have distorted the lives and opinions of the people; but such critiques can only be both accurate to the community at issue, and more importantly relevant to emancipatory praxis, if they simultaneously learn from the people so as not to impose upon them externally developed, inflexibly applied, and thus elite demands, leaving them prey to organizing by reactionary leaders who speak more directly to their flawed lives and immediate needs.

Newton’s Conception of a Theoretical Vanguard

Vanguard theory, Newton argues, must therefore proceed from the recognition that ‘revolution is a process’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 57, emphasis in original), one which unfolds progressively over an extended period of time as the people themselves come to increasingly identify and struggle for their true interests. Theorists, he therefore argued, can offer essential aid in guiding this process of collective self-determination, but in order to do so, they ‘cannot offer the people conclusions’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 57, emphasis added) regarding the utopian state to be achieved, the form of subjectivity, culture, or contribution required to pursue it, or the absolute principles upon which progressive change rests, for ‘when the revolutionary begins to indulge in … final conclusions, the people do not relate to him. Therefore he is no longer a revolutionary’ (p. 47); because the ‘only time an action is revolutionary is when the people relate to it in a revolutionary way’, theorists ‘must be ready to respond creatively to new conditions and new understandings’ that emerge from the people themselves as they progressively struggle to determine their own destiny (pp. 48, 57).

Theorizing thus remains necessary because revolutionary struggle requires the critical determination and articulation of the contradictions that dominate social relations, as well as the development of speculative forms of praxis directed at their resolution; but Newton reminds us that ‘these contradictions should be resolved in the community’, rather than by purported experts or representatives, for only this makes social change genuinely progressive by grounding it in the actualized will of the people (Newton et al., 2004: 47). Thus as it ‘tries to show the people the way to resolve these problems … the vanguard has to include all the people’, and the people as internally contradictory, in both their theoretical analysis and practical recommendations. Because, as he laments, ‘it will take time to resolve the contradictions of racism and all kinds of chauvinism’ (p. 33), and because only the people themselves can genuinely resolve them, Newton believed the vanguard’s essential task was to determine, articulate, and help build political programs that ‘increase the positive qualities [or ‘good’]’ in the people ‘until they dominate the negative [or ‘evil’] and therefore transform the situation’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 101).

Of course, because the people are not only externally manipulated, but internally enmeshed in varied contradictions, those working to determine these programs often benefit from a partial remove from the circumstances they seek to study. While the university is not the only institution that can fulfil the role, spaces like it, where speculative thought, grounded in even quite esoteric research, can be both developed and forwarded for vigorous and rigorous debate, are needed so that a vanguard thought – one ahead of the people in its vision and thus which may help intensify and further the people’s struggle for their own liberation – can be developed. Thus, what we typically (perhaps crudely) call ‘critical theory’ is perennially required because, as Newton puts it, if there is no-one to ‘make the people aware of the tools and methods of liberation, there will be no means by which the people can mobilize’ for their interests (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 15); however, such critical theorizing will only be ‘accepted as valid’ by its ultimate target if it not only ‘delivers a true understanding of the phenomena which affect the lives of the people’, but moreover reflects and nurtures what the people as they currently are, are currently willing to contribute to the practical resolution of social contradictions; only this marks a truly vanguard thinking, or what Newton calls a ‘philosophy which will help orient us toward goals which are in the true interests of the people’ (pp. 58–59).

One might say, then, that what Newton is suggesting is that ‘critical theory’ is in fact better understood as a collection of competing hypotheses concerning both the contradictions that determine social life and the modes of their redress. As in empirical science, such hypotheses are developed out of limited evidence, and thus are often highly speculative or diverge in sharply contrasting ways, and before confirmation have the tendency of forming into competing, sometimes quite rigid and dogmatic schools of thought; consequently, these hypotheses, much like scientific ones, can only really become theories by testing them against the relevant data set, which in the case of revolutionary or emancipatory thought can only be the people themselves, who will decide whether it reflects or guides their struggle to collectively determine their own interests by mobilizing themselves to transform their immediately lived situation. While he does not quite put things this bluntly, this is one way of grasping the following passage from his famous speech on BPP ideology delivered to students at Boston College:

I would like to give you a framework or a process of thinking that might help us solve the problems and the contradictions that exist today. Before we approach the problem we must get a clear picture of what is really going on; a clear image divorced from the attitudes and emotions that we usually project into a situation. We must be as objective as possible without accepting dogma, letting the facts speak for themselves. But we will not remain totally objective; we will become subjective in the application of the knowledge received from the external world. We will use the scientific method to acquire this knowledge, but we will openly acknowledge our ultimate subjectivity. Once we apply knowledge in order to will a certain outcome our objectivity ends and our subjectivity begins. We call this integrating theory and practice, and this is what the Black Panther Party is all about. (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 23)

This suggests that, if the goal of political theorizing is, as Newton suggests, ‘to increase our [collective] ability to deal with [the real] world and shape its development’ in a progressive manner (Newton et al., 2004: 26), then it must be as open to critique, challenge, and revision in the light of its social reception as work in the empirical sciences is in light of experimental evidence. This, at least, seems to be how Chicago chapter Chairman Fred Hampton understood the nature of the BPP’s legendary breakfast program:

Our Breakfast for Children program is feeding a lot of children and [so] the people understand our Breakfast for Children program. We sayin’ something like this – we sayin’ that theory’s cool, but theory with no practice ain’t shit. You’ve got to have both of them – the two go together. We have a theory about feeding kids free. What’d we do? We put it into practice. That’s how people learn. A lot of people don’t know how serious this thing is … What are we doing? … we are running it in a socialistic manner. People came and took our program, saw it in a socialistic fashion not even knowing it was socialism. People are gonna take our program and tell us to go on to a higher level. They gonna take the program and work it in a socialistic manner … We been educating [them], not by reading matter, but through observation and participation. By letting [them] come and work in our program. Not theory and theory alone, but theory and practice. The two go together … This is what the Black Panther Party is about. (Hampton, 1970: 139, emphases added)

Theorizing the emancipation of the people is thus incompatible with the cultist drive to compel them – say, through the pressures of social shame or physical threat – to accept independently developed conclusions, for this effectively amounts to replacing their current masters with self-proclaimed superior ones; as Newton continually reminds us, ‘this is something we have to make quite clear: eliminating the controller and assuming the place of the controller are two different things’ (Newton et al., 2004: 101). While theorists from the academy and elsewhere can and should play a vital role in both social critique and pragmatic organizing, they can do so only if they accept that ‘we can’t jump from A to Z, we have to go through all of the development [because] the people tend not to take [even] one step higher; they take half a step higher … this is how we move to higher levels’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 71). The job of vanguard theory, then, is essentially to ‘find out what the people will do and [determine ways to] get them to do that much’ (p. 141).

Newton’s own concept of ‘revolutionary intercommunalism’ arose from his conviction that sweeping technological change and global economic integration have ensured that ‘nations no longer exist. Nor … will they ever exist again’ (Newton et al., 2004: 31). This, he hypothesized, necessitated a break with the cultural revolution favoured by the nationalists, because it is no longer possible for Europe’s former ‘colonies [to] decolonize and return to their original existence as nations’; it also meant abandoning the revolutionary internationalism favoured by the socialists because, in his view, American empire had ‘transformed itself into a power controlling all the lands and people’ across the globe. Because nations had effectively been rendered obsolete, Newton argued that ‘the world today is [best understood as] a dispersed collection of communities’, which he defined as ‘a small unit with a comprehensive collection of institutions that exist to serve a small group of people’, although the enduring influence of varied forms of chauvinism ensured that such communities typically (although not exclusively or essentially) were often differentiated and/or interconnected by ethnic or racial identity. Newton’s hypothesis, then, implied an experimental practice of ‘organizing … Black and [other] oppressed communities’, both along and across communal lines, with an eye towards the progressive seizure of local political institutions, as well as the creation of independently organized and staffed ‘people’s institutions’ in order to ‘meet the needs of the community until we can all move to change the social conditions that make it impossible for the people to afford the things they need and desire’ (Hilliard, 2008: 3). The BPP’s famous ‘service to the people’ programs can thus be read as Newton’s own efforts to confirm his intercommunal hypothesis, with the most forceful evidence arising in the incredibly potent Rainbow Coalition formed by the Chicago chapter along with the Puerto Rican Young Lords, the white ‘hillbilly’ Young Patriots, and other community-specific vanguard parties.7

While Newton’s central theoretical concept has recently begun to attract the attention of sympathetic scholars (e.g. Narayan, 2019), a critical assessment of it obviously lies outside the purview of this article; as does a response to the numerous critiques of the BPP’s lapses in translating intercommunal theory into organizational practice made not only by scholars both hostile (Pearson, 1996) and sympathetic (Henderson, 1997), but by some rank and file Panthers, as well (Shakur, 1987). It is worth emphasizing, however, that, despite Newton’s own confidence in his hypothesis and bold predictions regarding the future its embrace might produce, he also intentionally and explicitly ‘left [his own political] program open-ended so that it could develop and people could identify with it’, as evinced by the fact that he began with very local, piecemeal, seemingly reformist actions that could only be sustained and directed through community involvement, thereby allowing the people in distinct communities to challenge, alter, or clarify his theses in an ongoing way (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 47). Intercommunalism was thus ‘not offered to them as a conclusion’ they must accept, but as a theoretical ‘vehicle to move them to a higher level’ of consciousness and action; one that was to be as informed by the theoretical vanguard as it was by their communal constituencies, as they mutually and continuously revised their shared theory and practice. Thus, while he frequently made clear that he did not like the internally contradictory reality of things, the slow development of progress, and the need for continual self-criticism of his ideas in light of their popular reception any better than his Leftist opponents, Newton argued that we ‘have to understand that most of the people are not ready for many of the things we talk about now’; consequently, even as they speculatively theorize in advance of the people, Newton – effectively summarizing his essential lesson for the academic Left – argues that the vanguard must strive to ensure that their work is never ‘too far ahead of the masses of people, too far ahead of their thinking’, so as not to alienate them from what is, of necessity, their own struggle (Newton et al., 2004: 46).

Conclusion: The Enduring Relevance of Newton’s Lessons for the Academic Left

My aim in this article has primarily been to highlight and justify the emphasis that Newton’s BPP placed on the need for would-be vanguard intellectuals to be continually and meaningfully responsible, precisely by being directly responsive, to a concrete and engaged constituency seeking its own emancipation: an emphasis, I would like to suggest briefly in closing, that actually aligns Newton with some recent critiques of the Panthers primarily grounded in the very different conception of the vanguard embraced by groups often understood to be furthering their legacy.

Adolph Reed has long argued that the

oppositional tendency in post-segregation black politics was hampered by its origin in black power ideology. Radicals – all along the spectrum, ranging from cultural nationalist to Stalinist Marxist – began from a stance that took the ‘black community’ as the central configuration of political interest and the source of critical agency … This formulation [presumes] the existence of a racial population that is organically integrated and that operates as a collective subject in pursuit of unitary interests [and thus treats] leaders or spokespersons … not so much representatives as pure embodiments of collective aspirations. (Reed, 1999: 134)

Effectively echoing Newton’s critiques of both black nationalists and white socialists for imposing their conceptions of authentic black interests onto an un-consulted populace – often grounded in a quite distinct and essentialist conception of ‘community’ – Reed claims that many contemporary radical thinkers and activists ‘simply do not see political differences among black people’ as being relevant to the analysis of, or struggle against, racial capitalism (Reed, 2000: 72). Guided more by the judgment of peers than by a confrontation with the conflicted, messier, and more pressing concerns and interests expressed by the actual consistencies under discussion, ‘the substance of [such] political theorizing [has become] a hermetic exercise in sketching a utopian alternative to current social relations’ reflective of the distance theorists enjoy from them; the result, Reed argues, has been an often hostile and demobilizing ‘debate within and between these tendencies’ that ‘centred more on … internal consistency than on apparent fit with the facts of an external, lived world or verifiably demonstrable capacities for intervening in it’ in ways that either further the interests or increase the political capacity of the actual and diverse communities meant to be liberated through them (Reed, 1999: 7).

Recent work by Cedric Johnson traces with exacting historical detail how ‘the ‘two line struggle’ between black nationalists and Marxists descended into parochialism’ (Johnson, 2007: 155) as the 1960s passed into the era of reaction, bolstering Reed’s (1999: 136) claim that for ‘both camps [it was] concern with the internal consistency of the global narrative [that] drove the elaboration of ideological positions’ regarding a presumed black community, ensuring that ‘neither Marxists nor nationalists offered programs with demonstrable payoffs comparable to those promised by mainstream politicians’ to the communities in whose name both camps claimed to speak. This tendency, Johnson (2007) claims, led theorists and many activists away from the kind of responsive social organizing which I have tried to show was key to the BPP’s theory and praxis, and into a ‘mid-seventies turn to ideological education’ based on the ‘detrimental assumption that ideological clarity must precede political work and that familiarity with the radical canon’ of texts and/or correct ideas ‘is a prerequisite to meaningful participation in social life’; and, as Johnson notes, ‘such education programs … tend … to privilege intellectuals in relation to nonelite participants’, replacing a vanguard answerable to a specific constituency with varied forms of brokerage politics where (largely self-proclaimed) elite representatives of subaltern groups speak in their name, rather than helping to facilitate the economic and political self-determination of marginalized communities (p. 163, emphases added).

As ‘radical theory’ has become increasingly ‘disconnected from positive social action’, both Johnson and Reed suggest that ‘radical imagery [has been] cut loose from standards of success or failure’ (Reed, 1999: 141) that tie it to the world of concrete organizing, leading to a kind of retreat into ‘slogans and anachronistic analogies’, or ‘potted rhetoric that asserts [the activists’] bona fides, without concern for communicating outside the ranks of believers’ (Reed, 2000: 194–195); that is, the post-1960s trends in theorizing about economically and socially marginalized constituencies have effectively removed any material

restraint on those radical tendencies’ flight into idealism because claiming [to know, speak for, or distantly support] such a base obviated two key practical tests of theories and strategies as explanations and mechanisms of mobilization: (1) whether they can persuade a significant number of actual members of specific populations targeted for mobilization, and (2) whether they can guide action efficaciously. (Reed, 1999: 17–18)

Conversely, because they have become disconnected from a genuine vanguard, long-suffering communities have become increasingly less engaged with progressive politics, strategic coalitions, and mass mobilization, and increasingly resign themselves to the limited options for advancement that remain within the current alignment, alternately embracing neoliberal or Right-populist solutions to the enduring problems of racial and economic inequality. Both Reed and Johnson have thus been sharply critical of modes of ‘contemporary organizing’ grounded in ‘the notion of black exceptionalism’, or the ‘insistence upon the uniqueness of the black predicament and on the need for race-specific remedies’ (Johnson, 2017), and have criticized, for example, the hegemonic role played by the Black Lives Matter organization on the contemporary Left, for ‘assuming a rather simplistic view of black people’s ambitions and interests and drawing a false dividing line between the interests of black and non-blacks’.

However, despite the obvious resonances between their shared critique of intellectual vanguards and the one explicated above, because both theorists hold that this view ‘descends from Black Power thinking [in that it] presumes a commonality of interest among blacks and claims [elite] authority to speak on behalf of those interests’, both credit Newton and the BPP with inspiring this transition, rather than – as we have seen above – presciently warning against its omnipresent danger and deleterious consequences. While Johnson acknowledges that the BPP ‘represented a more revolutionary alternative to the more conservative black ethnic politics’ of cultural nationalism, he nevertheless holds that their ‘embrace … of black exceptionalism abided by [many of] the same logics’ that dominate current theorizing and activism surrounding black liberation; thus, in challenging the hegemonic discourse of racial exceptionalism, he simultaneously calls for a turn away from the BPP model of organizing and from a ‘nostalgia’ for their era of influence, most vociferously in an article entitled ‘The Panthers Can’t Save Us Now’ (Johnson, 2017). Reed is even less sympathetic with Newton’s legacy, for he sees the (as we have seen above, quite fraught) example of ‘the Students for a Democratic Society’s 1969 proclamation of the Black Panther party as the “vanguard of the black revolution”’ as reflective of the ‘distortion of political judgment into a search for authenticity, hauntingly like white youth’s quest in the 1960s for the most “authentic” blues’; on the largely white, academic-led Left, he identifies a longstanding trend towards political ‘exoticism’ that eschews concrete political analysis and organizing in favor of ‘thin and simplistic definitions of good guys and bad, “true” leaders and false’ (Reed, 2000: 71–73), with ‘approved’ black spokespersons featuring prominently in the former role. It is thus in large measure the white Left’s ongoing embrace of ‘Pantherphile exoticism’ (p. 71) that grounds Reed’s dismissive view that the BPP ‘added [little more than] props and uniforms to make radical politics entirely a show business proposition’ (Reed, 1999: 72). Neither theorist, however, attends to the strong tensions between the BPP and the purported vanguards of black culturalist and white socialist resistance of their time; tensions that ultimately and tragically revealed the dangers inherent in their divergent, but similarly Manichean, worldviews.

While the BPP faced surveillance, harassment arrests, and other forms of police brutality from their inception, the first lethal violence they suffered came in early 1969, when cultural nationalists from the US organization8 (most likely at the instigation of the FBI, but in direct response to Newton’s harsh criticisms of their political program) murdered Panther representatives Bunchy Carter and John Huggins during a conflict over the newly created University of California Black Studies program, in which US sought to control the program’s hires and content, while the Panthers pushed for involving the local, off-campus community at all stages of decision-making.9 Shortly thereafter, an SDS splinter group that called itself the Weather Underground – once again, over the strenuous objections of local Panther leadership – staged the ‘Days of Rage’, which mainly consisted of vandalizing lower-middle-class areas of Chicago in an effort to ‘bring the war home’; an action that was exploited by local police to help secure the warrant that led to the state assassination of Rainbow Coalition founder Fred Hampton.10 There could hardly be starker demonstrations of the intrinsic dangers of the flunkeyism that always arises when one seeks to instruct, rather than serve the people, or confuses one’s own speculative theorizing for their authentic will.

An assessment of their critique of the contemporary Left obviously lies beyond the scope of this article; however, if Johnson is correct to claim not only that ‘black ethnic politics has reached its ends or limits as an effective set of political practices’, but, moreover, ‘that the ends or aims of contemporary African American politics must become radically democratic in form and aspirations’ (Johnson, 2007: 218), and if Reed (1999: 50–51) is correct in arguing that

encouraging popular participation is the only effective possibility for reinvigorating a progressive movement in black political life because people respond by organizing themselves when offered concrete visions that connect with their lives as they experience them, not to ideological abstractions or generic agendas that perfume narrow class programs,

then the problem is how we move from a political landscape fragmented by both the rhetoric and reality of racial division into a coalition of movements capable of effecting the transformations necessary to overcome such division, as well as the class repression that requires it; this is, of course, the very problem with which Newton struggled throughout his active career, and while his answers remain somewhat speculative, his practical efforts to confirm them through the BPP’s service programs and unique brand of coalition politics bore undeniable, considerable, and suggestive fruit. Revolutionary intercommunalism may thus be of great aid in theorizing and organizing our way through the current impasse, and remains, in my view, a hypothesis deserving of further testing; but, regardless, I hope to have shown that Newton and the BPP should be grasped as essential resources as we seek to close the seemingly widening gap between theory and practice, or more precisely, between theorists and the people. At the very least, their history and legacy serve as stark reminders of the need to continually work to ground our necessary – but necessarily speculative – theorizing in the understanding that ‘dropouts understand things students don’t’ (Newton et al., 2004: 85).

### Clash Turns Case—Meliorism—1NC

#### We should debate about the practical consequences of accepting ontological truths, not just their descriptive validity. Pre-supposing metaphysical truths makes debates about “where do we go from here” intellectually undecideable. Prefer a meliorist position that assumes improvements are contingently possible—antiblackness is not ontologically locked-in.

Pappas, 18—Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, Distinguished Research Fellow for the Latino Research Initiative at The University of Texas at Austin, not Alexander Diamond (Gregory Fernando, “What Is Going On?: Where Do We Go from Here? Should the Souls of White Folks Be Saved?,” The Pluralist, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2018, pp. 67-80, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

There is a long history of pessimists in African American thought that would today, more than ever, hold that we just need to give up on the idea that whites can be saved. Scholars like Thandeka must then face these skeptical challenges that use history, sociology, and law to support their pessimistic stance in regard to where we go from here. They have claimed that all the historical evidence warrants giving up on waiting for whites to be reformed. From Frederick Douglass to Tommy Curry, there have been pessimistic critics of “the Black philosopher’s obsessive hope in the redemptive character of white innocence.”11 The stronger pessimists’ challenge argues that historically, groups in power are not likely to give up power easily and the lives of black people are at stake; therefore, we cannot wait until whites have some affective transformation as suggested by Thandeka. Only some political radical action has a chance of bringing about genuine change.

Thandeka is by no means alone in the hope that whites can change. In fact, there is plenty of new and exciting research in support of her side. In her most recent publication, The Future of Whiteness, Linda Alcoff argues that whiteness is not inextricably tied to white supremacy. There are no fixed social categories and therefore no grounds for fatalism. There is hope that white people will face the truths of who they are and how they got here, and will push back on the seductions of white supremacy.12

I am not going to pretend to solve this long-standing debate but will critique the assumption that proper appeal to facts and reason will settle the issue. Often both sides think their side is empirically grounded and the other is ideological. Because of the predominance of white supremacy in US history, the pessimist’s side is the one that usually feels more secure that the facts are on her [their] side. They thus portray those with some hope, like Thandeka, as committed to some value-ethical commitments that blinds one to [obscures] the facts and what they call for. From the pessimist’s standpoint, someone who brings value considerations is another case of moral rhetoric that ends up masking the reality of exploitation, mass incarceration, poverty, and militarized police murdering unarmed black men. For them, it is obvious that efforts to save the whites or forgive them are not warranted by the evidence. However, as sympathetic as I sometimes am to their side, it is clear to me that none of the pessimist’s postures in regard to whites follow from a mere empirical study of the facts (e.g., history, sociology). The notion that the pessimist is the one who is adopting an objective “valueless” Archimedean standpoint in this debate is false. Any posture or resolution such as revenge, separation, resistance, or killing presupposes a value standpoint that goes beyond the facts.

Thandeka and the pessimist may agree about all the historical evidence against whites and still reasonably disagree about where we go from here. If evidence alone does not determine the issue, then what reasons account for the disagreements? Here is my hypothesis: the issue of “Where do we go from here” is one of those “intellectually undecidable” issues presented by William James in The Will to Believe. Even when there is a preponderance of evidence on one side, it cannot be decided on only empirical-theoretical grounds. More importantly, our metaphysical and value-affective commitments play a key role. Let me explain.

In a discussion-debate about where we go from here, we must lay out all the facts or evidence that supports our belief, but we rarely lay out all the operative background assumptions or “put all the cards on the table.” For instance, both sides may appeal to historical evidence, but history is after all just that, history. The issue is about what should be done today, where we should put our hopes, or what we should try now. For instance, at this point in history, should we trust “white” people? “Hope” and “trust” presuppose risk, and the issue of whether something is worth the risk or not is not totally decided by adopting some theoretically detached “objective” study of the facts or history. In disagreements about this sort of issue or belief, there is a lot going on in the background that has nothing to do with the empirical evidence or “facts.”

The Role of Metaphysical13 Assumptions in “Where Do We Go from Here?”

The issue of where we go from here cannot be addressed without assumptions about the reality of the temporal or history. In deciding where we go, one must presuppose a view about the “here” (the present) and how in general it relates to the past and the future. Let me return to debates among black intellectuals to illustrate the profound difference one’s metaphysical beliefs about history make, and in particular black history, in figuring out where we go from here.

A good place to start is a statement by James Baldwin that has received much attention since the release of the film I Am Not Your Negro: “History is not the past. History is the present. We carry our history with us. To think otherwise is criminal.”14 Baldwin is raising a criticism of a certain view of history, one in which the past atrocities suffered by blacks can be forgotten because in reality they do not exist anymore. White ignorance or amnesia may be self-serving and have different causes, but Baldwin is correcting a metaphysical assumption about the past and history here. However, Baldwin’s assertion is ambiguous or can be subjected to different views of history. In a recent article in Slate, 15 Ismail Muhammad notices this ambiguity and argues that we have misunderstood the importance of James Baldwin for today’s black writers. The statement that “we carry history with us” can be interpreted in different ways depending on our views of the past and history (our metaphysics of time).

What is the alternative to the sort of presentism where the past just drops from existence as we move forward in time? What does “we carry our history with us” mean, and what weight does this have for blacks in deciding where we go from here? Muhammad is critical of interpretations of Baldwin and black history that assume that “[b]lack people are merely living through endless repetitions of slavery and Jim Crow, which white supremacists massaged into subtler forms of control. According to this thesis, black Americans exist in a moment of foundational violence—slavery—that repeats ad infinitum.”16 Hence, distinct historical moments can be collapsed into one; Jesmyn Ward, among other African American intellectuals, sees “Trayvon Martin’s death as the latest episode of a recurrent nightmare. Replace ropes with bullets. . . . Nothing is new. . . . [E]very aspect of contemporary life has a corollary in the Jim Crow past. . . . White supremacy might have swapped guises, but its power remains interminable and total.”17 This take on black history cannot help but result in the more pessimistic answers to “Where do we go from here?,” but for Muhammad, this is not Baldwin. On the contrary, Baldwin should be used today to challenge this “logic of perpetual trauma.”18 It is true that “we carry history with us” implies “history’s inescapable purchase upon black life,” but “history is not immutable; . . . it is a practice we always conduct in the present tense, reshaping the past in order to imagine desired futures.”19 This way of understanding black history acknowledges that black history has been traumatic, but also acknowledges “the long shadows that slavery and Jim Crow cast on our present without standing in them.”20 According to this metaphysics or history, racist violence persists, regularity exists, but it is not cyclical. There are no historical necessities and immutable truths. White supremacy continues to generate anxiety, fear, and anger (i.e., it persists), but it makes little sense to claim it is perpetual or has such a grip that there are no felt possibilities beyond it.

Muhammad is pointing to important assumptions that have received little attention in discussions about white supremacy. Scholars like Charles W. Mills have alerted us about not being blind to the legacy of white supremacy in our present society.21 The way he understands the phrase “We carry our history with us” presupposes a historical perspective in which the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. There is nothing problematic about this historical perspective, but is it one that is adopted in the present (as the locus of reality) or from an Archimedean or God’s-eye view of history (in which the past and the present can be gazed upon)? Muhammad interprets Baldwin as assuming the former; when Baldwin says “History is the present” and “We carry our history with us,” he means that to be in history is to be in a present and open situation that is continuous with previous ones and where structures that have persisted weigh heavily in our present memories, bodies, habits, and communities. We can say that the reality of exploitation, mass incarceration, poverty, and militarized police murdering unarmed black men is continuous with previous forms of, or is the legacy of, “white supremacy,” but there is really no white supremacy as a single and fixed evil across history. This is basic to understanding why there is some hope in Baldwin.

Whether Muhammad is correct about Baldwin is secondary to my main point: the role of metaphysical assumptions in debates about where we go from here. Pessimists and optimists have these assumptions, and making them explicit in debates may advance communal inquiry more than pretending that the issue can be decided by being “empirical” and objective about black history. Many blacks would agree that “history is the present” and “we carry our history with us,” but exactly how the horrendous past of whites bears on the present depends in part on the extent to which we believe that what anchors all historical accounts of the past is the present, or if we see the present as just the effect of the past. How open-endedly we conceive the universe bears on having some hope. The Role of Affective-Value Reasons in “Where Do We Go from Here?” There is no sense in denying that personal-idiosyncratic reasons may play a role in deciding where to take a stand on where we go from here, whether we are aware of them or not. What I have in mind are personal experiences or the possible slant or bias as a result of being a member of some social group (class, gender, etc.). However, here, I wish to highlight the role of the affectivevalue dimension in the sense that is emphasized by Thandeka. The fact is that a value slant seems unavoidable since people come from different moral sensitivities and value commitments. James calls some of these hidden reasons “the passional.” This is important in understanding disagreements among thinkers in the black intellectual tradition. The disagreement between Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X cannot be understood unless we consider, for example, the religious-moral background and values that informed each side. Thandeka shares the same Christian value-laden slant of Martin Luther King, Jr., when she proposes to “save” whites. There is nothing inherently problematic about this value commitment, but it needs to be made explicit. Again, not even the most rigorous empirical-scientific pessimist can avoid taking a value standpoint on where we go from here. I can easily imagine someone being in total agreement with Thandeka’s diagnosis of whites in America and still disagree that whites are capable of being saved or that we should try to do something about it. How Should We Approach “Where Do We Go from Here?”: A Proposal

If I am correct, does it mean that discussion on this issue is a waste of time since at the end of the day, it is undecidable, and all a matter of people’s subjectivevalue commitments?22 Does it mean there is just no way to determine better from worse positions in regard to where we go from here? Not at all. Not all views are equally supported or reasonable. Moreover, the lesson of James in regard to genuine options that are “intellectually undecidable” is not to stop serious inquiry about facts and history or the appeal to them as the basis for justification from our stance.23 We should continue to aim at engaging in an open and inclusive communal inquiry about this issue, but ideally all parties must make an honest effort to put all the cards on the table in the discussion. The acknowledgment that there are “affective” commitments that guide our most factual-empirical inquiries is an important step; the alternative is a repression that does not work.

This last proposal is not easy. Our intellectual arrogance often gets in the way, and even under ideal conditions, most of us are not even aware of our deepest affective-value reasons that guide our inquiries. In other words, we resist or are incapable of putting all the cards on the table. However, this is not a good reason to not try, and it points to the importance of trying to have the most inclusive community of inquiry. Finding out what “our cards” are is not a matter of self-introspection of our beliefs or in our minds; it is a matter of social interaction, of being confronted by others. The best way to find out our slant, bias, and blindness is via communication, especially with those we disagree with. There is no Archimedean standpoint that we can appeal to in deciding who is right in the disagreements about where we go from here. The lack of such a standpoint should not be a source of despair. There are better and worse understandings of others and the possibility of learning from them.

More importantly, especially in regard to issues such as where we go from here, all the options on the table have their own risk; there is no certainty or way of really knowing beforehand which is correct. This requires a lot of epistemic humility. All parties should be fully committed to taking a stand, but should be aware of their fallibility. This demands adopting an experimental attitude that is nowhere to be found today in public discourse. The source of this proposal is the shared insights of the American melioristic democratic philosophical tradition—James, Du Bois, Baldwin, Addams, Dewey, Locke. There are important differences between these thinkers, and they do not share a particular answer to the question “Where do we go from here?” that we can recover for today. In fact, if there is one, it is that different times (and contexts) call for us to revisit the question in light of all of the best present intellectual resources we can muster. An intelligent stance requires a serious inquiry into the diagnosis about the proper means relative to the present context. Even if we come to agree that a revolution is called for today, there is still the issue of what particular sort of revolution and what means are needed. To be sure, some of these thinkers defended prima facie reasons for preferring democratic means, but in principle, they are open to any particular means, even killing. I would not be honest or be putting all the cards on the table if I did not disclose the common metaphysical beliefs and the melioristic affective backbone that animate this tradition. This is consistent with my previous analysis on what is operative in the background of “Where do we go from here?” Let me elaborate.

In regard to “Where do we go from here?,” this philosophical tradition resists or is critical of both the optimism of white denial and the pessimism of black despair. Insofar as both assume we live in a “block universe,” there is no basis for such determinism in reality. This philosophical tradition assumes an open nature of a pluralistic cosmos, and this makes a difference in how American philosophers think about and confront evils-injustices as events in life as a present process. For them, the comfort from the certainty of both optimism and pessimism seem shallow and usually lead to total passivity in the form of either waiting for the unavoidable progress to come or pessimistic resignation, despair, and cynism. Injustices are usually events with a history, but in an open and unfinished horizon of a world still in the making; therefore, where we have been does not determine where we should go. More importantly, even our best-grounded optimistic or pessimistic stances are likely to be mistaken and corrected by unexpected events.

The second “metaphysical” background belief or reason that guides this philosophical tradition in answering “where do we go from here?” is that according to their view of reality as lived experience, the stable and the precarious are inseparable aspects.24 This warrants an initial skepticism about any story about events, people, or about entire countries (like the United States) that overaccentuate or eliminate one element over the other. In other words, both a wholesale idealistic optimism and a realistic pessimism about the past and the present have no basis in reality. They are both forms of “blindness” if their position is a result of denying either the stable or the precarious, or the good and the bad of existence. This is not to deny that sometimes evil and precariousness can so pronounced (in comparison to stability, good things, and possibilities) as to make one’s existence unbearable.

While the above metaphysical beliefs are important to understanding the particular stance of this particular American philosophical tradition, it is not sufficient to appreciate where they stand in regard to “Where do we go from here?” What needs to be made explicit is its meliorism. James and Dewey tried to define meliorism. James writes: “Meliorism treats salvation as neither inevitable nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become.”25 However, most definitions have fallen short in describing how meliorism operates. It is neither an idea nor a theory; instead, it has been described as an orientation, a posture or a faith toward the self and the world. This seems correct, but I think it is also an affective orientation toward evil. It is a unique and strange form of sensibility from the point of view of those who do not have it, since it combines what seems to be contradictory or in tension. Melioristic people want to better the world even if it is a matter of degree and even if at the end of the day, there is no final salvation and tragedy is unavoidable. For them, evil must not be forgotten even if it is no longer suffered. Tragic sensibility is not incompatible with present possibilities and ideals.

In the context of the United States, this tradition is an alternative to the optimistic blindness [ignorance] that still operates in regard to the greatness of its past, about living in a democracy, or about the lives of the oppressed. In Damn Great Empires: William James and the Politics of Pragmatism, Alexander Livingston recently argued that in the American philosophical tradition (James, Du Bois, Baldwin, Addams, Dewey, Locke), we find a “meliorism that bears witness to the difference between the ideal and the real” and “may itself be the greatest defense against the deceptive craving for the false and moralistic history of American hope that holds us captive.”26 I agree with Livingston that the best way to understand and reconstruct this tradition today is by appreciating how each of these thinkers has contributed something different to the melioristic philosophy. There are important differences among these thinkers; for instance, some had a more acute tragic sensibility and others were more perceptive about the importance of ideals, but they are all meliorists.

Du Bois is very important in revealing the particular optimistic blindness that has historically been the most common problem in the United States with its exceptionalist narrative myth of the nation’s perpetual progress and the amnesia concerning the nation’s past.27 However, Du Bois, at least in his early works, can also be read as calling for a hope that embraces the history and unavoidable elements of suffering, disappointment, and uncertainty— grief without denial. We must be critical of narratives about perpetual and linear progress in race relations, and not be blind about the darker realities behind our rhetoric of freedom and equality. However, we must also not be blind [ignorant] about present unique possibilities of amelioration and must avoid presupposing essentialist or fixed meaning to “whiteness.”

In sum, if the issue “Where do we go from here?” depends on taking a stand on “Can white souls be saved?,” then the melioristic tradition would take their “salvation as neither inevitable nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become.” This sounds to me like an affective impulse to get to work and try to inquire into the conditions that would improve the souls of whites and, in the process, those of blacks. Meliorism is an affective stance that embraces evil and contingency in an open and pluralistic universe. It is a strange combination of courage and humility. For some, it is too demanding; for others, it is not enough. If I am correct and understand Thandeka’s project, it is consonant with this philosophical tradition.

### AT: Testing=Antiblack

#### They put the cart before the horse—even if testing is implicated in antiblackness, that doesn’t imply throwing it out

Randolph, et al, 18—Department of Behavioral Sciences, Winston-Salem State University (Antonia, with Victor Erik Ray, Megan Underhill, and David Luke, “Response to Weddington: More Lessons from Afro-Pessimism,” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, November 1, 2018, dml) [inserted the word “to” for grammatical integrity—insertion denoted by brackets]

Perhaps most perplexing, Weddington seems to at once abandon the empirical project of sociology and simultaneously claim an empirical mantle. Paraphrasing Wilderson (2010), Weddington (2018) argues that

a reliance on “facts” places a false burden on the project of Afro-pessimism, such that the reliance on empirical analysis of black populations exists to inaugurate an ongoing but ultimately futile industry of applying faulty theories and concepts to populations of black slaves. (p. 6)

To our knowledge, however, the only way to decide if a theory is faulty is to test it. It is a basic assumption of social science that theories are incomplete and we are attempting [to] refine, through repeated testing, better theories that explain more about social life. Indeed, our tools are imperfect and sometimes implicated in constructing the very racial structures we hope to turn them against (Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008). The answer to these problems is not the rejection, a priori, of the possibility of testing. Rather, we should search for better tools. Sociology as a knowledge project loses tremendously if we refuse to examine the empirical status of theoretical ideas.

## High Theory

### AT: Info Dissuasion

#### Debate is effective at discerning contingent truths—their framework is the style of argumentation that enables post-truth by mooting the burden of rejoinder—voting against them has unique value as a form of deontic scorekeeping that bolsters collective faith in debate’s process.

Quirk, 17—The New School, Information Technology Manager (Michael, “The Resuscitation of Truth,” <http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/05/the-resuscitation-of-truth/#.WWK-7xMrK8U>, dml)

Being indignant about a “post-truth” world is entirely justifiable. But I am not sure that grumbling about a widely distributed oblivion toward the true, the factual, and the objective accomplishes anything other than frustration and anxiety. Railing about facts rarely convinces anyone predisposed toward ignoring them, and this is not exactly news. As Upton Sinclair put it: “it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” What goes for salaries goes double for worldviews and triple for satisfying pipedreams.

While there may seem to be something quixotic about persuading the stubborn, it is timid to avoid that task, however fruitless it might turn out to be. Maybe, as the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre once quipped, the only thing that works with persistent skeptics or relativists is to tell them “go away.” But that reply is understandable only as a last resort, because I think a solid, pragmatic case can be made that objectivity, fact, and truth are live, forced, and momentous options that can be given a successful defense. Because the defense is pragmatic, rather than theoretical, it is an argument that works because it can be defended on the same grounds as the nihilist’s, even if they are armed with “alternative facts” tailored to their worldview. Thus if this defense fails to persuade them, it is no fault of yours. Rather, skeptics, relativists, and nihilists don’t and can’t really believe what they say they believe, because what they do puts the lie to it. They fail to practice what they preach, and they cannot but fail given the constraints of human discursive conduct.

Pragmatists are often caricatured as being indifferent toward objectivity and relativistic about truth, but unlike their postmodernist cousins they are supposedly “cheerful nihilists.” Most pragmatists are widely thought to affirm Richard Rorty’s offhand (and incautious) remarks like “truth is what our peers will let us get away with saying”, or that we would do well to “reduce objectivity to solidarity.” Rorty seemed at times to place everything in the hands of the local, cultural beliefs of a given epistemic community, which is the first and final court of appeal for what counts as “fact.” If this is what Rorty believes (I think there is ample textual evidence that it is not) then all facts are “alternative facts,” indexed to the actual assertions of a given community. It is therefore inevitable that Trump’s base and his fiercest critics will simply talk past each other. Persuasion implies enough common ground to agree on certain key premises of argument, and since this is precisely what is lacking, quibbling about truth and objectivity is pointless. Does this torpedo any conception of truth and objectivity that is not, in Swain’s words, “rhetorical or rooted in perspective”?

Robert Brandom, is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and was a student of Rorty’s at Princeton. He shares Rorty’s antifoundationalism and also self-identifies as a pragmatist. Nevertheless, he believes that Rorty’s views do not support the sort of “post-truth” philosophy he is often accused of having, and which he unwittingly supports when he tries to shock rather than patiently construct persuasive arguments. Brandom’s philosophical project, in his magnum opus Making It Explicit and other works, can be seen as an attempt to knock off the rough edges of Rorty’s pragmatism and to refashion it as a systematic philosophy of language that makes sense of truth and objectivity, and not just an “edifying” philosophy that provides groundless epistemic hope without “metaphysical comfort.” Any post-truth regime would be over before it starts.

Making It Explicit contains over 700 pages of dense, complex prose written in an intensely technical analytic style. (If you can imagine the late modal logician David Lewis rewriting Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, you might have some idea of how Making It Explicit reads.) But there are two strands that can be teased out of Brandom’s reflections on language that are directly relevant to contemporary Trumpian politics and its oblivion of truth and objectivity.

First, Brandom follows C.S. Peirce and Donald Davidson in drawing a sharp distinction between truth and justification. This distinction is rooted in our practices of making claims, defending them with reasons, and withdrawing those claims when evidence or argument shows them to be baseless. To use the most common example: I would be justified, if I were an 11th century cloistered monk, in believing that the earth was at the center of the universe. I could cite many reasons for this belief that could support this belief and command assent: the best available astronomical science of the day, scriptural testimony, and the ordinary experience of watching the sun, stars, and planets rise in the east and set in the west. The belief is held to be true, and the monk is justified in believing it true, but as a matter of fact, it is false. The relationship between justification and truth is a complicated and important one, but neither concept can be reduced to the other. I could be justified in believing X which turns out not to be true, and for that matter I can believe Y, which is true, without being justified in believing it — my facts could be wrong, my reasoning could be off. What Brandom is drawing our attention to is the sound linguistic practice involved in the giving and assessing of reasons. What we call “rational discourse” will involve weighing and evaluating our own reasons and that of others, responding to challenges and revising or even dropping our own convictions. There is no foggy metaphysical speculation or transcendental deduction behind Brandom’s truth/justification distinction. It is simply an unavoidable part of human sapience as expressed in our discursive practices.

Second, sapient human discourse invariably involves norms, elements of discursive practice that distinguish valid from invalid “moves”, and that enable participants in the practice to both track and evaluate those moves as better or worse. “Moves” in discursive practices are usually inferences: I draw conclusions from premises to which I am committed, and therefore are committed to the conclusions as well; I track the claims and inferences of other participants in the dialogue, and gauge whether (or to what extent) they too are entitled to their own commitments. So rational discourse centers around the inferences we draw, inferences that emerge from the sapient social practice of making claims and engaging in what Brandom calls “deontic scorekeeping”, employing shared practical norms to assess entitlements and commitments of fellow participants, and ourselves.

Meaningful human discourse, then, is a) constrained by shared norms that b) guide inferences articulating one’s commitments that c) one may or may not be entitled to hold. Our judgment of how well we, and our conversation partners, avoid error or get things right is what Brandom calls a “normative status” — a judgment that someone is entitled to believe or assert something. Those beliefs to which one is committed one takes to be true (what sense does it make to say “I believe X but it’s false”?), but I am entitled to those beliefs only to the extent that I can justify them. In discursive practices, we hold ourselves and others responsible for the commitments we hold by determining whether we are entitled to them, whether the inferential moves made in the linguistic social practice pass muster with the norms that make the social practice what it is.

There is, of course, something going on in discourse besides inference: there are also what Brandom dubs “discursive entry” and “discursive departure” moves. We are causally affected by non-linguistic beings, which cause not just sensations but perceptions, which give non-inferential access to the world but are possible only for sapient beings that are capable of drawing inferences from them and engaging in deontic scorekeeping. “Discursive entry/departure” moves anchor us to a world external to language, but it is the normative activity of holding ourselves responsible to the inferences drawn from these moves that constitutes “objectivity.”

Brandom was deeply influenced by many other philosophers in developing this “social practice” conception of objectivity: Wittgenstein’s “meaning-as-use” trope, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as “Being-in-the-world,” Sellars’s rejection of “the Myth of the Given” and his epistemology of “the logical space of reasons.” Brandom leverages this account of the primacy of social practice into a comprehensive theory of meaning, where pragmatic ideas like “inference”, “commitment” and “entitlement” are primary, and semantic notions like “truth” and “reference” are derived from them, rather than the other way around, where meaning depends on a general theory of representation. For Brandom, we do not start out with a distinction between “subjectivity” and “objectivity” and then proceed to show how the objective world is correctly (and incorrectly) represented in subjective knowers, a path that has generated all manner of aporiae since Descartes and Locke. Rather, we establish the ebb and flow of human, sapient social practices, of assertion and reason-giving, and articulate “objectivity”, “fact”, and “truth” from there.

This is obviously just a thumbnail sketch of a few main ideas in Making It Explicit. It is a book of many virtues: clarity and ease of expression is not one of them, however. Brandom is a philosopher’s philosopher: his work is crammed with philosophical “shop talk”, and it is difficult to show how this might be relevant to what another pragmatist, John Dewey, called “the problems of men” [sic] that philosophy must address if it is to remain a worthwhile endeavor. But I do not think the connection between Brandom’s musings and constructing an escape-route past “post-truth politics” is farfetched, and I do think there are several political lessons to be teased out of Brandom’s “inferentialism.” One of Brandom’s obsessive points about inference is the inescapable normativity of human discourse, and that such norms, like “holding oneself and others responsible for commitments made” are built-into discourse and shared in common. Put in the vernacular: if you want to talk politics and make sense, you have to recognize and honor these shared norms. You can’t just do or say whatever you want. You can’t just make shit up.

The first political lesson to learn is: don’t let them gaslight you. By “them” I mean Trump and his base, their right-wing media enablers, and those critics like Barton Swain who give the former far too much credit for ushering in a supposedly postmodern “post-truth” regime. This is no time to get all wobbly about “truth”, “fact”, and “objectivity.” They are still meaningful, because discourse does not get off the ground without them. The post-truth regime is a mirage. The emperor has no clothes, so do not give him more power by fearing that the concept of truth has lost its resonance.

The second lesson is to view objectivity not as something given, as something obvious, but as something one must achieve in social practices that involve the giving and taking of reasons. One of the many shortcomings of Hillary Clinton’s hapless campaign was her assumption that facts speak for themselves and that truth follows on their heels. This would be fine if this were a campaign like any other, where everybody is on the same page when it comes to holding both others in the dialogue and oneself responsible for commitments by appealing to shared norms. There has to be an attunement to the context of discussion. No attunement, no background norms, and no compelling appeals to facts. Dropping facts as if they were truth-bombs will not work if your adversaries are unwilling to recognize their force. Decontextualized facts convince no one, certainly not anyone spoon-fed by Fox and Breitbart and the right-wing echo chamber. Little truths are no match for “the big lie”.

Third, what needs to be cultivated is not appeal to “the obvious”, but the disposition to take normative scorekeeping seriously — to hold every foot to the fire of showing one is entitled to the beliefs one claims to be true — and to make this manifest to others who might have lost their way. I think this is the most important lesson to be learned from Brandom’s magnum opus: that ultimately discourse is guided by a kind of ethical constraint, the need for both inferential consistency and inferential relevance, and a sort of guilt or shame when one deliberately fails to honor that constraint.

So when Trump claims that he would have won the vote had there not been “millions of cases of voter fraud” in California, he needs to be able to back that commitment up in order to be entitled to it, and not just any reason will suffice given the nature of the norms guiding that kind of public discourse. Appealing to “alternative facts” as if they were givens, or insinuating “Lots of people said they witnessed voter fraud,” without saying who or citing sources, don’t cut the mustard, not so much because they “fly in the face of the facts” as that they betray a mammoth irresponsibility toward the norm-governed practice of justifying whatever one claims to be true in a manner consistent with shared standards of evidence and inference. There is something worthy of guilt and shame to fail to follow these norms. If Trump has no shame, which I think clearly is the case, one cannot assume that everyone in his base lacks it as well.

It is thus wrong and counterproductive to accuse avid Trump supporters of stupidity. Partly because “Trump supporters” are a heterogeneous lot, and no one should assume that they all have the same axe to grind or the same sociopolitical agenda, and therefore can be dismissed in the manner of, say, a Bill Maher as a collection of Yahoos. But stupidity is not what is at stake here. A kind of irresponsibility is, though. For to talk of “alternative facts,” as Kellyanne Conway did, or to unthinkingly accept them as gospel, without acknowledging the social requirement of putting up good public reasons or shutting up, is to admit that either one does not mean what one says, or does not care one way or the other. It is not to play the game of political discourse by different rules. It is to refuse to play it at all. Some Trumpians fall into that category, I think. And that is a kind of ethical failure.

### AT: “Reasonability”

#### Their model of reasonability is untenable—it amounts to “our interps are reasonable if we say so,” which makes the topic an unlimited free-for-all and solves neither side’s offense. Competing interpretations is the best guide to making a fair decision with incomplete information.

Hansen, 18—Senior Associate Professor, Danish School of Media and Journalism (Ejvind, “Aporias of courage and the freedom of expression,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol 44, Issue 1, 2018, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

In order for a practice to be courageous there needs to be some kind of goal, and, furthermore, some kind of connection between the goal and the practice. This is admittedly still pretty vague. Insofar as we define courage as a challenging practice in which we risk our lives in order to reasonably further some kind of goal, we have reached a definition with elements (‘risk’, ‘lives’, ‘reasonably’ ‘further’, ‘some kind of goal’) that are very open to differing views.

On the one hand, this is certainly as it has to be. If we are to articulate a positive supplement to the negative definitions of the freedom of expression, it must be very open, because it should be open to the improvisational and disruptive impulses of courage. As soon as we start to define the goals and the ways of reaching them too strictly, these very definitions might themselves become objects of challenge through the aporias of courage.

On the other hand, even though the positive freedom we are seeking to instantiate is open to differing views, this does not mean that we might as well do without it – especially not when we are talking about communicative expressions. It draws on the intuition that life at the outset is the prime value, and if you risk your life you are thus expected to be able to say something about why this sacrifice is necessary. The agent who risks her or his life always has the burden of proof.

Certainly, what is taken to be necessary may vary almost endlessly. That cannot be determined in advance, once and for all. But an agent who risks her or his life without being able to give some account of why, is foolhardy – and the chances that she or he [they] in some sense will be taken seriously is minimal.

With this last move, we are, as premised above, closing in on a deliberative approach (as articulated in Cohen, 1989, 1997; Habermas, 1981, 1992, 1996; Rawls, 1999[1971]), something that may seem surprising given the French inspiration of the previous sections. Knowing Habermas’ hostility towards the anti-rational impulses in these positions (Habermas, 1985) on the one hand, and Derrida’s hesitation on linguistic generality (cf. the previous sections) on the other hand, this calls for some comments.

We are not going to claim that the Habermasian and Derridean approaches could be reconciled. In previous writings we have, however, argued that Habermas’ deliberative approach and the world-disclosing approaches (in this article: Foucault and Derrida) articulate two different (and to some extent opposing) impulses in our social, political and communicative practices: the impulses of systematicity (attempting to bring together seemingly disparate phenomena) and the quest for adequacy (attempting to understand phenomena in their entire diversity) (e.g. in Hansen, 2005a, 2005b, 2013).

As shown above, Derrida’s deconstructive approach can certainly be seen as an attempt to reveal the necessary gaps and aporias embodied in the generalizing aspects in argumentative deliberation. At the same time, however, the findings of his analyses do not lead to a refusal of the generalizing approaches as such:

The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions; it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged – it is of obligation that we must speak – to give itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules. (Derrida, 1994: 539; emphases added)

Even though Derrida in the above quote is reflecting upon the undecidable and the moment of freedom he still acknowledges that the resulting decision needs to take account of laws and rules. Derrida is very clear that true decisions are not determined by existing rules and laws, but at the same time, however, neither are they entirely independent of rules and laws.

Habermas and Derrida certainly disagree in their analyses of how rules and laws are (should be) established – Derrida focusing on emergence through continuous challenges, Habermas focusing on the deliberative and argumentative trying to overcome mutual disagreements. Habermas’ account has its limits when it comes to articulating reasonable resentments towards existing discursive structures (this is an often raised criticism of Habermas’ approach – see, for example, in Thomassen, 2007), Derrida’s approach is lacking in reflections on the forces or mechanisms that bring back new accounts of the general: how and why do new rules, laws and accounts of courage come about?

Both positions are (if not in their full articulations then at least in their founding intuitions) in fact right. In order for deconstruction not to become merely destructive, we need to understand how reason in communication plays the role of helping agents to reach reasonably towards each other. Otherwise public discussions will tend to dissolve into an infinite ocean of unconnected conversations; any point of view will appear as equally valid; any decision will be prevented by the persistent possibility of raising counter-voices by minority groups. Deliberation is the responsibility of trying to reach common understandings in spite of initial disagreements. This is where Habermas is right. On the other hand, in order for such reasonable accounts not to freeze into dogma, we need (courageous) challenges of the very accounts of reasonability. This is where world-disclosing approaches as suggested by Foucault and Derrida are at their strongest.

However, having seen that every human practice is embedded in aporetic paradoxes, it should not come as a surprise that even reason is aporetically structured: seeking deliberative consensus is a legitimate aim only insofar as the exchanged arguments seek to include courageous challenges (possible disturbances of consensus) of the discursive horizons, just as we have seen that notions of courage make sense only through some deliberative reflections of our means and goals.

VII

The quest for a reasonable account of the necessity of change does not imply that (1) an act without such accounts is by itself illegitimate – sometimes we do things without any reason or clear ideas of what we try to accomplish that turn out to be of value nevertheless. But in public exchanges where we want to affect others, the others should in some way come to understand why change is necessary.

Neither do we want to imply that (2) changes may never come about without agents being able themselves to give an account of why this is necessary. Quite often actions and events are conceived in ways that the initiators did not foresee.

What we are trying to argue here is thus not that the suggested reflections on positive freedom of expression should replace prevailing accounts of negative freedom. It may be argued that a freedom of expression that is only thought through negative accounts of freedom is problematic, but that is quite another argument and it is not implied by the above reflections. The reflections merely suggest that in evaluations of actual public spheres it is inadequate merely to consider the plurality of voices (as suggested in the negatively conceived accounts of the freedom of expression).

This is where we suggest turning our attention towards notions of courage. If our bandwidth of attention is limited, it is important that we in our engagements in the public spheres are not overwhelmed by insignificant utterances that merely affirm existing states of affairs. For public deliberation to become democratically fruitful it is important that we are attentive to courageously challenging statements; challenges that are, certainly, made comprehensible to us by the speakers’ attempts to convince us of the underlying goals and means.

Certainly, if these reflections are to gain any real relevance they will need to be further articulated, and in such articulations it will be necessary to substantiate notions of ‘life’, ‘reasonably’, ‘some kind of goal’, etc. And these substantiations might narrow the plurality of voices heard in the public.

As demonstrated in the previous sections the alternative to doing this is, however, not to make every voice visible in the public spheres. Even though they may exist in the public sphere, it is not certain that the limited bandwidth of attention leaves room for their actually being heard by any critical mass.

Insofar as we consider the public spheres not merely as spheres in which voices should be uttered but also as spheres in which voices should be heard, we need some way to select out those voices from the chorus that are significant in relation to some given context. Unlimited plurality is not an option. The question thus becomes how plurality should be limited. Should plurality be limited according to explicitly articulated rules and norms, rules and norms that can, due to their explicit articulations, themselves become subjects of dispute? Or should plurality be limited according to unconscious power structures, the rules of the strongest?

### AT: USFG=Assemblage

#### Defining the USFG as an assemblage does not mean that it does not require government action

Vanhanen 10 , Janne Vanhanen PhD in Philosophy from Univ of Helsinki, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE VIRTUAL The Experience of Art in Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy , https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/19376/encounte.pdf?sequence=1

To characterise the mode of being of the assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish two axes in it: material and expressive components, and processes that can be either stabilising (territorializing) or destabilising (deterritorializing). The material and expressive components can be roughly categorised as falling under the axis between “machinic assemblage of bodies” (affective materiality) and “collective assemblage of enunciation” (language, semiotics, “incorporeal transformations”).371 This can be schematised as follows: ASSEMBLAGE Material components (“states of bodies”) Territorializing processes Deterritorializing processes Expressive components (“incorporeal transformations”) An assemblage is, then, “an intermingling of bodies”, material and semiotic, which undergoes processes of strengthening or disassembling its current identity.372 An archetypal example of an assemblage would, thus, seem to be a social formation of some kind, such as a political party or an institution of state.373 These clearly consist of material conditions (workers, material assets, et cetera) and expressive components (rules and regulations, statements, symbolisations, et cetera) and they undergo phases of stabilisation and change. A forceful instance of this is the juridical system. It is composed of buildings, clerks, officials and judges, as well as semiotic components such as laws, conducts and practices. It effects corporeal transformations, producing prisoners and enclosing them in special quarters and, in addition, incorporeal transformations such as declaring people guilty or not guilty. Yet, despite the examples traversing the social field, it must be kept in mind that Deleuze and Guattari nominate every single thing as an assemblage. The world is constituted of affects: parts within parts, affecting one another. Phenomena-as-assemblages exist as “boxes” within boxes, or a set of Russian dolls, qualified according to spatio-temporal scale and perspective. There are components great and small, mountains and molecules, and likewise assemblages. I am an assemblage of myriads of parts: physico-chemical, biological, cultural, technical. The parts I consist of are assemblages, too, on their respective levels. The hands that I type this text with consist of formations of flesh, sinew, bones, nerves, arteries and so forth. They have an individual history as “my” hands, and a structural history of the assemblage of human hand evolving through generations of ancestors, as the hand is a deterritorialized paw. My fingertips, pressing the keys, are made of biological cells, which, in turn, consist of molecules which are aggregates of atoms. We can continue into the sub-atomic level and never encounter the foundational stratum of reality which would act as a strictly determining foundation for the “higher” levels.374 Likewise, there are many assemblages of which I am a part of. My family, my university department, my neighbourhood, my nationality, humankind, the whole animal kingdom, planetary organic matter, Earth, the stellar system, Milky Way, the local system of galaxies and so forth into massive scale cosmic structures. At any level of consideration we are dealing with populations, 375 not species, and with relations of parts to a (relative) whole. And, as mentioned above, there is also the question of emergence where different entities and attributes emerge not causally but statistically out of smaller-scale parts, without the larger-scale entities being reducible to their constitutive parts, as well as the wider assemblages affecting their components. As DeLanda phrases it, the world is composed of “nested” sets of individuals of different spatial and temporal scales.376

#### Do not meet their own interpretation because they do not act through the government as an assemblage—A government as an assemblage means it is an enduring institutional structure with the power to effect all of its parts—They only act through individual parts which is not acting as an assemblage

Vanhanen 10 , Janne Vanhanen PhD in Philosophy from Univ of Helsinki, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE VIRTUAL The Experience of Art in Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy , https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/19376/encounte.pdf?sequence=1

The fact that everything is an assemblage does not mean that anything can become one: there are some criteria to ascertain that a certain assemblage is a real and functioning entity and not merely a random aggregate of parts. First, an assemblage has to possess the power to affect its constituent parts.377 The ability to do this functions as the criterion of the assemblage’s reality. In theory, any two – or more – entities can be viewed as belonging to a same assemblage, but only those instances of co-existence which bring about a change in their parts can be considered as really forming an assemblage. For instance, I might concoct a relation between myself, the dark side of the moon and every phonograph record released in June 1958. Clearly, those parts listed are not affected by any super-individual unifying assemblage, however strongly I wished to believe in it. There has to be consistency for the assemblage to remain over time as the parts are able to reproduce the assemblage in repetition or retention. Then again, the assemblage of my university department is very much real, according to the effects it can have on me, my colleagues, my office furniture, my computer, et cetera. The appearance of emergent properties is the second criterion for assemblages.378 To continue the example of a university department, it can bring forth effects that its constituent parts cannot evoke in isolation. Likewise, the department fulfils the third feature of an assemblage, that of redundant causation. A university department is not the “sum” of the histories of its parts. In a way, a significant number of its sub-individual parts are interchangeable, and this is the reason for the power of its continuity through the years. Professors, lecturers, students and administrative staff can come and go, yet the department stays. Yet, the Simondonian point of the relationality of individuation must be brought up as a reminder: the department can, in turn, function as a sub-individual part in another assemblage, such as the university faculty or a certain professional sector.

#### This is offense—their conflation of individual action with broader action by the USFG-assemblage makes it impossible to point out and resist the worst excesses of power.

Dean and Villadsen, 16—Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School (Mitchell and Kaspar, *State Phobia and Civil Society: The Political Legacy of Michel Foucault* pg 131-132, dml)

It may be argued that the rendering of the state as a virtual structure does not merely have effects in terms of what is left out of view, such as legality and legitimacy, the organization and coordination of the state and its agencies through law, the state and sovereign capacities, and coercive instruments and social conditions. According to Žižek, there is a particular performativity in postmodern representations of the world as a “permanent becoming,” as deeply heterogeneous, fragmented, and intersected by webs of micropower whose effects and social value cannot be decided. This “extremely suspect rhetoric of complexity,” championed by Foucault and his followers, portrays power as an “intricate network of lateral links, left and right, up and down . . . a clear case of patching up, since one can never arrive at Power this way” (Žižek 1999, 66). The rhetoric of complexity—itself mirroring the use of complexity theory by those such as Friedrich Hayek (1967)—separates the microprocedures of power from any overall system or structure. The concrete effect renders it impossible to point out someone as power-holder, to perceive some structures as primary to others, or to conceive of some form of cultural, social, political, or economic dominance. Taking aim at institutional analysis, it can be argued that to introduce an ontology of becoming, productive differences, and free-ﬂowing process easily conveys the image of a withdrawal of power and control. Thus the play of differences is set free to unfold in its natural and creative form. No structural measures of equalization and no major dispositif of power are needed for such virtuality to thrive and unfold on the newfound planes of immanence.

We wonder whether, by such means, this immanence perspective has not systematically occluded key problems inherent to the analysis of the state, that is, of a historically speciﬁc set of institutions separate from rulers and ruled, organized through law, and claiming a centralization of power and supremacy or transcendence within a given domain or territory. This ﬁgure disappears in the optics of dispositifs, diagrams and practices, multiplicity and immanence. Not only does the possibility of the use of sovereign violence recede, but other sovereign rights and capacities do so as well: the monopoly of the ﬁnal decision, of taxation, of lawmaking and law enforcement, to declare war, to make treaties with other states, and so on. One may speculate, what civil chaos would ensue, were the state and its agents to take seriously this ﬁeld of virtuality and plane of immanence?

# Other Off-Case Arguments

## Scalar Competition FW

### Notes (Please Read!)

This is my attempt to reconcile the problem of whether or not kritikal affs get perms against negative kritiks. I have written some all-purpose shells for an argument about what perms are and are not legitimate with K affs without trying to limit out their ability to make perms entirely, which I am calling “scalar competition.” It is not very developed as of yet, partially because it has not been field-tested in order to see what people say against it, but also because I haven’t had as much time to write stuff out for it. I encourage you to rework it and research it yourself!

Scalar competition starts from the premise that the vast majority of K affs operates at multiple *scales*. “Scale,” broadly defined, simply refers to a *frame of reference*—various parts of the world, society, etc are or are not relevant to the aff’s lens of analysis. For example, an aff that is about racism both in NATO and in debate is making arguments at the geopolitical scale and at the scale of debate, an aff that’s just about racism in debate and doesn’t talk about any violence outside of debate is *only* making arguments at the scale of debate, but neither of those affs are making arguments at the intergalactic scale, nor are they making arguments at the microbiological scale. Most K affs look like the first example insofar as they discuss multiple scales—they make impact arguments about broader social structures, but have a method that starts at the level of debate.

Following from the idea that K affs generally operate at multiple scales, scalar competition is the argument that the negative should get to disprove the aff at any given scale at which the aff’s arguments operate without having to disprove them at *all* scales at which the aff operates. The reason that this matters is that it sets a clear standard for what permutations are and are not legitimate—if the negative’s alternative operates at a different scale than the aff’s method, but at the same scale as the aff’s impact, then the aff *cannot legitimately permute* the alternative without first explaining what their method looks like at the scale of their impact. The burden of proof is on the affirmative to explain how their method functions at the scale of their impacts (and thus at the scale of the alternative) before they can permute it.

There are two shells included. **You should not read both in any given debate! The 2NC shell is NOT an extension of the 1NC!** Here are notes on both:

--1NC: The 1NC shell is intended for teams who want a way to get the aff to clarify what they defend without reading T-USFG, and/or for teams who want to separate out the “no perms in a method debate” out onto a different flow and develop it earlier rather than later. It’s a bigger time investment, and makes the debate a bit weird organizationally, but it does help you explain your arguments more, which may be worth the cost for a framework argument like this that’s very explicitly not about rejecting them, but simply about what perms they get.

--2NC: The 2NC shell is the more all-purpose shell; you can add it to pretty much any perm block in a 2NC/1NR extension of a K vs a K aff (as long as it makes sense with your alt, obviously!). It’s shorter and will make the debate less developed, so you have to make sure the judge is following along when you’re explaining in the 2NR, but it certainly has more general utility than the 1NC shell.

Again, please feel free to develop this argument yourself—I think “scale” is a really useful concept in K debates broadly. For example, I think this could be a specification argument rather than a competition/perm framework argument—make it your own!

-DML

### Shell—1NC

#### Interpretation: The aff should be responsible for defending the application of their method at the scale of their impacts. Evaluate links and alts based on scalar competition; the neg gets to choose the scale of comparison, and the aff may only permute within scales, not across them.

#### Prefer this framework:

#### Prior question. Scalar clarity is a necessary accompaniment to any mode of inquiry.

DiCaglio, 21—Assistant Professor of English, Texas A&M University (Joshua, “Learning to Scale,” *Scale Theory: A Nondisciplinary Inquiry*, Introduction, 6-9, dml)

This book traces out the conceptual, perceptual, and discursive aspects of scale writ large, including how we find ourselves with scale as a notion, the conditions under which it operates, and the difficulties it presents for human knowledge built largely on nonscalar experience. It tries, first and foremost, to highlight scale as a certain way of thinking and speaking, and to train the reader in this way of thinking. I hope to demonstrate that the longer you dwell with scale, the more fundamental it appears.

There are three foundational philosophical concepts that scale indelibly alters. First, scale deals with the delineation of objects, transforming one field of objects into others depending on the scale of inquiry. Scale suggests that any object appears different—or does not even exist at all—if you change the scale of perception. As two ecologists note, “If you move far enough across scales, the dominant processes change. It is not just that things get bigger or smaller, but the phenomena themselves change.”3 In a framework of scale, objects are no longer clearly separate, apparent, and self-contained entities “in themselves,” since changes in scale reveal that the same thing also exists differently. All objects, therefore, must be defined via their scale of interaction and perception. In short, scale changes everything because it changes what every thing means.

Second, because scale deals with perspective, it is intertwined with notions of the subject, experience, consciousness, and interpretation. In applying scale to the body you call “mine” you find yourself looped into a disorienting question: whose body is it? The atoms’? The cells’? The planets’? The galaxies’? While this may seem absurd, this conundrum is already necessitated by scale and is, I argue, the most fundamental challenge presented by scale. We can only pretend that objects and relations exist “in themselves” and apart from these scalar delineations if we leave our conception of ourselves intact. Doing so makes scale inevitably abstract; it permits us to treat scalar objects as just any other objects and scalar relations as just more relations. But scale ties those relations back to our usual experience, saying that what I am is already atoms, cells, planets, galaxies. But then who is scaling?

Finally, scale reworks our notions of process, relation, and organization. Scale presents not only new objects but a tangle of new relations in two senses: first, scale reveals relationships that were previously not apparent simply because they were not discernible; and in turn, scale provides new possibilities for comprehending these aggregates and relations. Schemes of control and force—whether called “top-down,” “bottom-up,” the “great chain of being,” or hierarchy of things—contain presumptions about scale that are revised when we carefully examine this apparatus.

The center of this book (Part II) directly addresses these reconfigurations, with a chapter devoted to each. But because scale entails a particular, counterintuitive way of thinking, we must first experiment with this way of thinking and attempt to make this term “scale” clear. Thus, Part I provides a series of thought experiments that define the parameters of scale as I am using it here and train the reader in thinking in terms of scale.

The Philosophical Status of Scale

Before we begin these experiments, I want to highlight a few ways that scale has been positioned in theoretical conversations. In discussions of the “ontological status of scale,” scholars tend to be critical of the concept partially because it is unclear what scale is.4 Even in accounts favorable to scale, scale is said to be an “arbitrary mental device which allows us to make sense of our existence.”5 Or perhaps, “merely a way for humans to perceive and comprehend the world.”6 Or, as one geographer put it, “there is no such thing as scale.”7 Stripped of their diminutive qualities, these statements are partially correct: scale is a conceptual device that allows us to make sense of our existence, but not one which is entirely arbitrary. Scale provides a way for humans to perceive and comprehend the world, but one that is essential and not necessarily tied to humans. Finally, scale does not exist, in the sense that “scale” itself is not an entity but a reference for the structure of phenomena. The diminutive qualities of each of these statements relegates scale in relation to the social, the epistemological, and the ontological, respectively. But scale is not quite any of these.

To say that scale is ontological would imply that scale exists already as a kind of entity or fact of the world. To say that scale is epistemological would imply that it is a way of learning about or accessing the world. To say that scale is a social structure would imply that scale is one among many conceptual frameworks that society has built for mapping the world. And yet, scale relies both on the “being” of phenomena and a reference to the one who is measuring as a means of coming to know being. If we take the whole scaling process into account, considering whether scale is an epistemological, ontological, or social construct has less meaning. Rather, scale functions at a level above ontology and epistemology: scale is a means of orienting yourself both to experience and to the being of things. It is a metaphenomenal structure that makes use of a consistent measure to compare and calibrate ourselves to phenomena. Scale does not arise solely from beings (the ontological) or our mode of accessing beings (epistemology), but rather is a way of systematically organizing and comparing phenomena as they appear. Scale is an addendum and a reflecting back on what is discovered phenomenologically, first through attending to the presentation of the world and then systematically extending this presentation using a defined measure. In turn, the consistency of this defined measure then accounts for the way we are dividing reality, which means that scale cannot be solely a social construct.

Once discovered, scale becomes a necessary conceptual adjunct to any mode of inquiry—whether we want to speak of objects (ontology), our learning about objects (epistemology), or our way of organizing, speaking about, and distributing reality (sociality)—since the objects in question are only understood through the reorientation mapped by scale. Studying a cell only becomes possible once we extend our perceptual apparatus to sufficient resolution to identify cells, but it only becomes coherent when scale orients us to this perception. Regardless of the ontology of the cell (whether it actually exists), its epistemological status (how we find out about it), or the social aspects that go into its discovery (the training required to use a microscope), scale is required to understand what we mean by “cell.”

Scale provides us with a reference point to take note of how any phenomenon compares to any other. Doing so permits us to systematically attend to how what is is revised and structured as beings dissolve, shift, combine, layer, and relate to each other differently depending on the scale of examination. Scale does not mediate our access to the world; it permits us to make sense of mediated, extended, and projected experience. This status makes the scalar relation unlike any other kind of relation we find ourselves in. When we say that the Earth is made of rocks and the rocks are made of atoms, we are suggesting that the very being of each phenomenon is made up of, contained by, and holds reference to the others.

#### Ground. Allowing the aff to pick and choose the scale of comparison is unpredictable and non-reciprocal because they can defend impacts and methods that operate at different scales.

#### Critical rigor. Scalar competition ensures that critical debates generate new forms of life instead of self-righteous skeptics.

DiCaglio, 21—Assistant Professor of English, Texas A&M University (Joshua, “Mapping the Vast Unknowing: The Science of Scale, the Scale of Science,” *Scale Theory: A Nondisciplinary Inquiry*, Chapter 10, 202-207, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

This last option is not readily apparent in Latour’s philosophy, even as he moves from “critique to concern” in his reckoning with the science wars. This simple question—what are we talking about?—points us to the ways that scientific descriptions pull us out of the scale at which we live and require that we adjust our this-scale behavior on the basis of this reconfiguring of reality. On the one hand, this is all the more reason we need to figure out new ways to keep intact these matters of fact, so that we can make these extensions with some degree of confidence. On the other hand, these matters of fact are not enough. They become matters of concern not because they are constructed equally by other actants but because they run into tension with a this-scale, human way of understanding reality—when I have to reconcile the struggles of my life (paying rent, keeping a job, raising my kids) with the confusing scalar implications that connect together one scalar object (economics) with another (ecology) in a way that is not immediately apparent and easy to grasp.

In this light, we can wonder about Latour’s move to concern. While I am sympathetic with his echoing of Haraway’s aim for a discourse designed “to protect and to care,” “matters of concern” seems to also imply an overbearing scrutiny regardless of whether or not the thing is clearly understood—or even if we’re certain that we’re talking about the same thing.35 Is this not already what happens when science becomes entangled in a concern—about vaccines, climate change, women’s bodies, health-care systems, fracking sites, clean water, or mask mandates? Latour argues that facts are closed while points of concern are open, ready to be composed and recomposed. Yet both facts and these points of concern run into the problem of doxa, the marriage of opinion with social expectation, where everyone proceeds as if the issues at hand are clear and the points of concern are shared. In addition, we can follow Latour’s concern about critique and consider the affect here: does concern not imply worry, of being concerned about your neighbor, certain that something is wrong, that I must get involved and intervene? Is this not the unfortunate result of this insistent sociality? Like parents concerned about their teenager who has been staying out late—and have you seen what he’s been wearing? (and he spends so much time alone)—we find ourselves plagued with an excess of concern as we contemplate our scalar entanglements. Is this the attitude with which we will approach our dear Gaia or our fellow actants?

In this light, we can further reposition the idea of critique and push against Latour’s critique of critique in order to rediscover this more strictly critical maneuver: discovering what is not understood in what we think we understand. Latour’s characterization of critique is both egoic and suspicious, as if the critical move is inherently (1) about me, the critic, getting the upper hand, being more informed, and less naive, and (2) wary or even disdainful of the thing that is being critiqued. Certainly, there is a real target here (Latour puts his early work among them), and we need to scrub criticism of this attitude.36 But Latour uses that characterization to throw out what remains an essential move: attending to the conditions, parameters, limits, and implications of a mode of knowledge. Critique does not have to be suspicious; it does not need to reduce an object to something else (e.g., your distress to a death drive); it does not need to be an ego trip where you are the enlightened one bearing the truth to the ignorant. Latour mixes up the general tenor of “being critical” with the Kantian operation he insists that we get beyond: the task of observing how, within any particular experience, there are conditions, assumptions, and components that we may not be aware of but that can and should be examined.

It simply is not true that “what performs a critique cannot also compose.”37 Criticism is needed because we already suppose too much about reality. There are already social practices, languages, cultural regulations, personal sentiments, technological infrastructures, genetic inheritances, energy grids, oil sources, residual wastes slowly dissolving in the ocean—all of which must be examined and reopened for us to forge new forms of existence. Is it not strange that Latour would say that “With a hammer . . . you can do a lot of things . . . but you cannot repair, take care, assemble, reassemble, stitch together”?38 Need I point out that people do all kinds of repairs and assembling with a hammer? Surely Latour, who would so readily have us rethink our conception of science, politics, and things, understands that if you’re going to repave a road, you must first dig it up?

How bewildering! Do we know what we are haggling about? This, it seems to me, is the fundamental question brought on by a basic critical impulse: what is it that we are talking about? Is it as clear as it seems to be? I’m not taking the strategy shared by Bloor and Sokal and simply accusing Latour of obscurantism; rather, I am pointing to a set of more basic questions prompted by a different affect meant to set stage for a different conversation. What is Latour referring to, for instance, by “nature” when he insists that “ecology seals the end of nature”?39 When he says “all the various notions of nature” does he mean Emerson’s nature and the one that evolved in frontier America, and the national parks movement, and the one assumed by physicists, and the one environmentalists are trying to save? No. In Latour’s own work he means particular notions and stances tied to this term “nature,” such as the world conceived as a place apart or an object to be dominated by a knowing subject. Such aspects, uncovered by critique, do not themselves totalize “nature” in a way that warrants such strong dismissals.

In their deconstructive form, these questions arise from bewilderment, in the not-understanding and confusion that is taken as neither mine (my inability to understand, my not being properly trained in your discipline) nor yours (your obscurantism) but as a way past pretending to understand or that there is only one way that descriptions work, experiences are configured, or actions are performed. What are we even talking about? To what does it apply? How might that be understood? How do we know it? What is not accounted for in this articulation or mode of knowing? How can we work with it? In their most productive forms, these questions hinge on wonder: I wonder what X is? What if we try X? How does X relate to Y? Can there be something else here? Bewilderment is the feeling one gets in a tangle, the “confusion arising from losing one’s way”; it is the acknowledgment of the labyrinthine form of our attempt to understand where we are, what we are doing, and what we are saying (OED). Wonder arises from the astonishment with objects, things, ideas. The two affects are complementary, both moving us to appreciate anew and ask again, more carefully, with less certainty and more interest.40

The same questions could be asked of skeptical scientists such as Sokal when they adopt the same strong modes of rhetoric, which assume too much common ground in the understanding of the terms and acceptable forms of proof. Skepticism is the counterpart to critical suspicion; it risks hiding the need to specify, trace conditions, and withhold certainty behind an egoic, superior affect. In this form, as Latour fairly notes, skepticism has been excellent for “debunking quite a lot of beliefs, powers, and illusions,” but it is also reaching its limits.41 The problem arises when scientists make skepticism into an attitude based in authority and mistake their highly regimented mode of specification for the only mode of parsing the world.42

By way of illustration, one can wonder what would have happened if Carl Sagan had taken a different approach in the conversation he recounts at the beginning of Demon-Haunted World. There, he finds himself in the car with a driver who, upon finding out that he’s “that scientist guy,” begins to question him about “frozen extraterrestrials languishing in an Air Force base near San Antonio, ‘channeling’ . . . , crystals, the prophecies of Nostradamus, astrology, the shroud of Turin.” With each new topic, says Sagan, “I had to disappoint him. ‘The evidence is crummy,’ I kept saying. ‘There’s a much simpler explanation.’”43 Instead of being skeptical, assuming the role as the arbiter of truth, and simply recounting the evidence for and against such things, Sagan could have asked something different: to what is he referring? I’ve wondered about channeling . . . what is it describing? Why are we so certain these are spirits? What do we mean by that? Undoubtedly these questions can be disarming, and they probably would have confused the driver. But, if done with more nuance and less ego, this approach can respect that there is some configuration toward reality being expressed here. What is it? These questions, if adequately shared, can induce a mutual bewilderment from which we can start to have a conversation about these different kinds of questions, what they apply to, why we hold to them, and what they serve to do.

It certainly is harder to have this kind of conversation with ideas like Atlantis. But many of the things described by science are closer to Atlantis than they are to the immediacies of one’s life—and harder to wrap one’s head around. In science, bewilderment is thus the first step toward working with these broader difficulties and reorientations. This is the method of the current project: it began with a bewilderment (how is it possible that I am simultaneously atoms, cells, quarks, ecologies, galaxies?) and a wondering (how does this apparatus function? Why does it show up in everything from descriptions of mystical union with God to descriptions of ecological entrainment? But also: have you seen the “Inner Life of the Cell”?!).44 The method then proceeded by criticism—a tracing of the conditions under which scale can be articulated—but also through other methods of textual exegesis, historical questioning, comparative analysis, and thought experiment. In many ways, I can hardly get past the first detail, the basic structure of scale; I keep unfolding more considerations out of this fractal question that might simply be reduced to a word, with an affect: scale?!

Yet as the breadth of this inquiry implies, such bewilderment can be productive of new avenues of discussion as we unfold a simple point in the many contexts in which it inevitably applies. It is an invitation to step back from the things assumed (the critical maneuver, but here performed mutually, starting first with the critic’s confusion and willingness to admit an impasse) but also to specify (Say more about what you mean by that? I’m not sure that we’re talking about the same thing. I’ve often wondered . . .). Perhaps such an affect and intellectual stance are difficult to maintain. But I wonder if this is only because we get so involved in the matter, concerned about its implications, its problematic uses, its terrible associations, its naïveté. My experience is that such conversations end in discord primarily because someone, at some point, invokes authority, insists on his [their] understanding, or simply runs out of energy (pick it up again tomorrow?). Is this not a practice for humanists to take up: helping ourselves and others step back from this insistent sense of knowing, to trace these disjunctures, and help ourselves navigate these bewildering transformations of our existence?45

### Shell—2NC

#### Framework:

#### Evaluate perms through scalar competition. The aff should be responsible for defending the application of their method at scale, and the neg should get to choose the scale of comparison.

#### That means they only get perms within scales, not across them. Scalar clarity is a prior question to any mode of inquiry.

DiCaglio, 21—Assistant Professor of English, Texas A&M University (Joshua, “Learning to Scale,” *Scale Theory: A Nondisciplinary Inquiry*, Introduction, 6-9, dml)

This book traces out the conceptual, perceptual, and discursive aspects of scale writ large, including how we find ourselves with scale as a notion, the conditions under which it operates, and the difficulties it presents for human knowledge built largely on nonscalar experience. It tries, first and foremost, to highlight scale as a certain way of thinking and speaking, and to train the reader in this way of thinking. I hope to demonstrate that the longer you dwell with scale, the more fundamental it appears.

There are three foundational philosophical concepts that scale indelibly alters. First, scale deals with the delineation of objects, transforming one field of objects into others depending on the scale of inquiry. Scale suggests that any object appears different—or does not even exist at all—if you change the scale of perception. As two ecologists note, “If you move far enough across scales, the dominant processes change. It is not just that things get bigger or smaller, but the phenomena themselves change.”3 In a framework of scale, objects are no longer clearly separate, apparent, and self-contained entities “in themselves,” since changes in scale reveal that the same thing also exists differently. All objects, therefore, must be defined via their scale of interaction and perception. In short, scale changes everything because it changes what every thing means.

Second, because scale deals with perspective, it is intertwined with notions of the subject, experience, consciousness, and interpretation. In applying scale to the body you call “mine” you find yourself looped into a disorienting question: whose body is it? The atoms’? The cells’? The planets’? The galaxies’? While this may seem absurd, this conundrum is already necessitated by scale and is, I argue, the most fundamental challenge presented by scale. We can only pretend that objects and relations exist “in themselves” and apart from these scalar delineations if we leave our conception of ourselves intact. Doing so makes scale inevitably abstract; it permits us to treat scalar objects as just any other objects and scalar relations as just more relations. But scale ties those relations back to our usual experience, saying that what I am is already atoms, cells, planets, galaxies. But then who is scaling?

Finally, scale reworks our notions of process, relation, and organization. Scale presents not only new objects but a tangle of new relations in two senses: first, scale reveals relationships that were previously not apparent simply because they were not discernible; and in turn, scale provides new possibilities for comprehending these aggregates and relations. Schemes of control and force—whether called “top-down,” “bottom-up,” the “great chain of being,” or hierarchy of things—contain presumptions about scale that are revised when we carefully examine this apparatus.

The center of this book (Part II) directly addresses these reconfigurations, with a chapter devoted to each. But because scale entails a particular, counterintuitive way of thinking, we must first experiment with this way of thinking and attempt to make this term “scale” clear. Thus, Part I provides a series of thought experiments that define the parameters of scale as I am using it here and train the reader in thinking in terms of scale.

The Philosophical Status of Scale

Before we begin these experiments, I want to highlight a few ways that scale has been positioned in theoretical conversations. In discussions of the “ontological status of scale,” scholars tend to be critical of the concept partially because it is unclear what scale is.4 Even in accounts favorable to scale, scale is said to be an “arbitrary mental device which allows us to make sense of our existence.”5 Or perhaps, “merely a way for humans to perceive and comprehend the world.”6 Or, as one geographer put it, “there is no such thing as scale.”7 Stripped of their diminutive qualities, these statements are partially correct: scale is a conceptual device that allows us to make sense of our existence, but not one which is entirely arbitrary. Scale provides a way for humans to perceive and comprehend the world, but one that is essential and not necessarily tied to humans. Finally, scale does not exist, in the sense that “scale” itself is not an entity but a reference for the structure of phenomena. The diminutive qualities of each of these statements relegates scale in relation to the social, the epistemological, and the ontological, respectively. But scale is not quite any of these.

To say that scale is ontological would imply that scale exists already as a kind of entity or fact of the world. To say that scale is epistemological would imply that it is a way of learning about or accessing the world. To say that scale is a social structure would imply that scale is one among many conceptual frameworks that society has built for mapping the world. And yet, scale relies both on the “being” of phenomena and a reference to the one who is measuring as a means of coming to know being. If we take the whole scaling process into account, considering whether scale is an epistemological, ontological, or social construct has less meaning. Rather, scale functions at a level above ontology and epistemology: scale is a means of orienting yourself both to experience and to the being of things. It is a metaphenomenal structure that makes use of a consistent measure to compare and calibrate ourselves to phenomena. Scale does not arise solely from beings (the ontological) or our mode of accessing beings (epistemology), but rather is a way of systematically organizing and comparing phenomena as they appear. Scale is an addendum and a reflecting back on what is discovered phenomenologically, first through attending to the presentation of the world and then systematically extending this presentation using a defined measure. In turn, the consistency of this defined measure then accounts for the way we are dividing reality, which means that scale cannot be solely a social construct.

Once discovered, scale becomes a necessary conceptual adjunct to any mode of inquiry—whether we want to speak of objects (ontology), our learning about objects (epistemology), or our way of organizing, speaking about, and distributing reality (sociality)—since the objects in question are only understood through the reorientation mapped by scale. Studying a cell only becomes possible once we extend our perceptual apparatus to sufficient resolution to identify cells, but it only becomes coherent when scale orients us to this perception. Regardless of the ontology of the cell (whether it actually exists), its epistemological status (how we find out about it), or the social aspects that go into its discovery (the training required to use a microscope), scale is required to understand what we mean by “cell.”

Scale provides us with a reference point to take note of how any phenomenon compares to any other. Doing so permits us to systematically attend to how what is is revised and structured as beings dissolve, shift, combine, layer, and relate to each other differently depending on the scale of examination. Scale does not mediate our access to the world; it permits us to make sense of mediated, extended, and projected experience. This status makes the scalar relation unlike any other kind of relation we find ourselves in. When we say that the Earth is made of rocks and the rocks are made of atoms, we are suggesting that the very being of each phenomenon is made up of, contained by, and holds reference to the others.

### AT: Cross-Scale Perms Good

#### Cross-scalar permutations distort critique and preclude actualizing their method—four warrants. They ignore scalar thresholds, overlay scales without identifying connections and differences, obscure scalar origins, and overwrite scalar concerns with their own priorities.

DiCaglio, 21—Assistant Professor of English, Texas A&M University (Joshua, “The Cosmos Seeing Itself: Representations of Scale, Scales of Representation,” *Scale Theory: A Nondisciplinary Inquiry*, Chapter 11, 228-231, dml)

Because scalar perspectives can only be encountered through some representation, and because they are so counter to our usual way of experiencing the world, we find ourselves with all kinds of distortions, tricks, and erroneous depictions of scale. I want to pause here to discuss four kinds of scale tricks that lay the groundwork for what Derek Woods has already named “scale critique.”15

The first is the assumption that something might get larger or smaller indefinitely. It is partially to target this kind of distortion that we, at 1.31, separated Gulliver’s scaling from the kind of scaling we are dealing with here. The essential difference is that Gulliver’s scaling takes given objects and makes them larger or smaller, whether in actual scaling of operations (the growth of an elephant, tree, or business) or in representations (e.g., Godzilla or King Kong). These kinds of scale are usually conflated, because discussions of scale often start with an object in view; we then consider how such things get larger or smaller. The distinction highlights the limits to this scaling of objects, particularly for living systems (see 3.29). Distortions of these limits can be relatively harmless and even educational (e.g., the classic trope of shrinking small enough to go into the body). However, they do not provide good training in scalar thinking. More importantly, they indulge the tendency to think of things as capable of extending their reach indefinitely despite the inevitability of scalar thresholds.

This notion that growth might expand indefinitely, especially in an economic sense, has been extensively critiqued, most recently by the anthropologist Anna Tsing.16 Tsing notes that the “term ‘scalability’ had its original home not in technology but in business. Scalability in business is the ability of a firm to expand without changing the nature of what it does.”17 Tsing rightly examines the tension between ecological constraints and economic fantasies of unlimited expansion, which she situates in the unintended effects of agricultural expansion.18 At the same time, her arguments about nonscalability misrepresent the problem as an issue with the precision of scale itself. The problem is not the “precision-nested scales” but rather a fantasy about the indefinite scaling of objects that is itself undone by carefully attending to scale (3.29).19

The second scale trick is the overlaying of two very different perspectives without a scalar notation marking this difference. In 2.19 we noted that one way of making these distortions in film is to overlay two perspectives in the same field of vision. This creates a distortion, since the eye does not have a way to distinguish the two perspectives and therefore treats them as one. In this technique we have a clear image of how we perform this overlaying in many images, descriptions, and terms, particularly those that bridge two scale domains. For instance, in 3.32–33 we noted that “all humans” is a term that bridges two scales; humans are only visible at the meter scale, yet this grouping pulls our perspective to the ecological. As we noted at 3.24, these maneuvers are not always a problem. The problem arises when the connection between scale domains is forgotten. For example, take the term Anthropocene, which has recently become a rallying point for thinking about the effect of humans on the planet: like the conflated perspectives in film, this term wraps together a this-scale object (humans) with a planet-scale one (geological patterns) in both space and time. Many writers on the Anthropocene are attempting to productively separate these two notions of the human. Thus, Dipesh Chakrabarty’s four theses on the Anthropocene clarify the scalar nature of this term:

We can become geological agents only historically and collectively, that is, when we have reached numbers and invented technologies that are on a scale large enough to have an impact on the planet itself. To call ourselves geological agents is to attribute to us a force on the same scale as that released at other times when there has been a mass extinction of species.20

Chakrabarty acknowledges the differences in scale that make planetary effects possible. The tie between “Anthropocene” and the human is thus essential for highlighting the relation between the two different scales of interaction.21 At the same time, the ambiguity of the “us” for the attribution of agency and the work performed “historically and collectively” creates a potential scalar conflation that manifests as the double binds of environmentalism that we noted in chapter 9: we both are and are not the agents. But this is also why Woods has highlighted scale variance—the way objects change across scales—as essential for scale critique: to get from humans to the Anthropocene, one must first cross a scale domain where this phenomenon “human” now becomes something different.22

The third scale trick is forgetting the scale you (or any given action) are on. As we saw in 1.14, the human body does not change scales even in scalar perceptions such as the view from space. In a more general sense, we always risk mistaking these scalar extensions and perceptions as a displacement of the capacities tied to these bodies. We generalized this in 3.34 in the phrase “one can only act on the scale on which one exists.” We have seen a potent conceptual version of this in Thomas Nagel’s distorted view from nowhere in chapter 8. Likewise, in chapter 9 we discussed Erik Drexler’s fantasies of extension as an example of misplacing the scale of the engineer. These problems naturally arise as we learn to develop and work with scalar extensions and scalar relations. We can follow Timothy Clarke and Joanna Zylinska in calling these “scalar derangements,” since they are distorted fantasies of extension to and intervention on other scales, while forgetting both where one is acting from and what scale requires for such action. Thus Clarke’s examples of derangements of scale include the “you control climate change” trope.23 Such rhetoric avoids the most difficult aspect of ecology: the need to rethink the here in relation to new data about collective endeavors without reducing one to the other.24

A fourth object of scale critique is scalar overwriting, in which concerns from one scale (usually the meter scale and filtered according to human needs) are mapped onto another scale. We are familiar with this overwriting in mapping software such as Google Earth, which makes it easy to draw human points of interest onto the surface of the Earth. This operation is standard practice in mapmaking; this is one reason why we distinguished cartographic scales from scale itself at 1.32. The major risk here is that such overwriting permits you to retain the priorities and points of interest from another scale. Doing so can be essential for scalar reorientation, since it assists us in tracing elements relevant for another scale, such as describing DNA in terms of what it might produce at the level of the body or when a particular bacteria or toxin produces organism-level effects (as was performed in 6.14–17). However, in such overwriting we need to attend to which terms apply to which scale and how; otherwise we end up with one of the distortions just discussed.

Combining this mapping with the above scalar distortions, critiques of satellite imagery and similar scalar cartographies bring our attention to how views of different scales can be accompanied by attempts to overwrite and claim such scales. For example, the architect Laura Kurgan’s extensive critique of satellite imagery traces the way that such devices are put into service for various ends, from the domestic to the military.25 Such critiques trace out the conditions for the use and production of these images so that we can test claims such as whether “high-resolution satellites . . . signify global transparency.”26 Importantly, the abuses of this ability to visualize are often a result of exaggerated claims reliant on scale tricks and distortions. Thus, Kurgan notes, in a way that mirrors discussions of visualizing nanotechnology or microbiology, that “no satellite image presents a simple, unambiguous picture of the Earth, and a visit to the site itself can often raise more questions than it answers.”27

In all four instances, scale critique would be the process of comparing these representations of scale with how scale functions in practice. The notion of scale tricks or distortions requires (1) scale as a consistent standard, (2) tying together the two perceptions, and (3) locating the perspectives, including the one that is hidden (usually in the viewer). However, this operation conflicts with a common tenet of cultural criticism, since it requires a reference to a standard. Thus, Tsing and Woods both take issue with the notion of consistency and precision in scale. To be clear, scale does not require a return to a truth standard of representation for a world taken as given in itself, nor is it a tyranny of precision. The precision here is based on the standard implemented by scale, which produces a consistent means of accounting for our observational shifts. Because scale is about observation, the standard of scale is a holding ourselves accountable for these shifts in observation (2.20). This is why scale is so powerful for critique: scale’s simple yet precise accounting for these changes in observation provides a standard for critiquing distortions in our perception of reality and the way we impose on scalar views assumptions derived from a nonscalar, human-based lifeworld.

### AT: View From Nowhere

#### Scalar comparison is the opposite of a view from nowhere, it’s a recognition that our perspectives are invariably limited by our scalar experience!

DiCaglio, 21—Assistant Professor of English, Texas A&M University (Joshua, “Transformations by Involution: The Contemplative Practices of Scale, Scaling Contemplation,” *Scale Theory: A Nondisciplinary Inquiry*, Chapter 12, 251-254, dml)

The academic argument around mysticism provides a site where this tension has played out, beginning in a debate between the philosophers W. T. Stace and Steven T. Katz.27 Stace sought a basis for mysticism by defining features of what Robert K. C. Forman later called the “pure consciousness event.” Stace claims that this experience is shared by all mystics but is articulated differently depending on the cultural and linguistic tools available.28 In response, Katz argued, in a move recognizable after the linguistic turn, that all mystical experience must be inseparable from language and therefore reliant on the historical and cultural milieu.29 Grace Jantzen later combined Katz’s position with the articulation we saw from Haraway in chapter 8, arguing that “there are no views from nowhere, and there are no views from everywhere. There are only views from somewhere, and the particular place will have an inescapable effect on what can be seen.”30 Similarly, Richard King, invoking Hans-Georg Gadamer’s argument that interpretation is foundational to being and that prejudice in interpretation is inevitable, claims that “there is no possibility of a universally applicable metanarrative or bird’s-eye view of reality.”31 Further, King states that “the process of interpreting a text, then . . . inevitably involves the projections of one’s own values, interest, and agenda onto the text.”32

Our discussion of scalar experience presents three problems for this critique. First, scalar experience suggests a potential explanation for a pure consciousness event: it is a moment of moving past what one thinks one is and one’s exclusive reliance on the reality of human-bound concepts. It is the brain realizing that it solidifies its own divisions— especially this division called the “self.” As we saw throughout Part II, this reorientation is the arrival at the open position beyond a given set of divisions and values, the position from which new positions, judgments, and scales might emerge. To deny this possible state and to insist on the inevitable hold of language is to bind ourselves in the shadowy, ill-defined domain of the “human.” But even scientific descriptions of scale indicate that this is not our situation. Second, this attempt to indelibly tie language or culture to experience is another example of a social counterpart to the physical claim that neuronal configurations cause experience. Third, and most importantly, if contemplative practice is already about examining structures of judgment—and pure consciousness events only manifest in or as this movement—then how can we ascribe the experience to these very things being looked at, given up, and transformed? We are thus led not to prejudice (in the sense of pre-given judgments) but to the resistance to examining prejudice that prevents us from rescaling our linguistic and social reference points. When we insist that linguistic and cultural aspects are inevitable and inescapable, we impose a content of the brain, a human conceptual framework, and a scalar delimitation of objects and identity back onto the experience that is about the undermining of these very contents. Content and prejudices are not left out of the account; they themselves are transformed in the process. Is this not the transformation needed as we recognize engrained structures of prejudice?

This maneuver of looking back at one’s judgments is a persistent trope in contemplative rhetoric. For example, Augustine’s transformation is described in terms of a scalar reflection with the major obstacle being his preexisting cognitive preferences. The whole operation required that he take into account his own mind: “Because I could not perceive them in the mind, I thought that I could not perceive my mind itself.”33 The problem is that Augustine does not know what his own psychical prejudices are: “I had no clear idea,” he states again and again, “even of my own self ” (119). The shape of this breaking down required a turning back upon his desires and thoughts. This turn back upon oneself is an essential trope—the Greek tropos itself meaning “turn”—by which the experience or realization is made possible. Thus, Augustine, upon hearing a story of another’s conversion, states:

As he spoke, you, O Lord, turned me back upon myself. You took me from behind my own back, where I had placed myself because I did not wish to look upon myself. . . . I looked, and I was filled with horror, but there was no place for me to flee to away from myself. If I tried to turn my gaze from myself . . . once again you placed me in front of myself, and thrust me before my own eyes. (156)

Augustine actively resists looking back at the aspects of himself that would become implicated in the conversion being demanded. Rather than a result of his prejudice or predisposition, this prejudice has to come into view as the very thing to be transformed.

The same applies with the scalar visions we have seen throughout this work. Because the vision is about what I think I am, I must allow this prejudice to come into view and have it reworked by this new perspective. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to implicate oneself into the scalar loop, to place one’s prized conceptions, preferences, and prejudices within this extended measure. Given this difficulty, we can say that excessive skepticism tends to prevent individuals from allowing their attention to dwell on the scalar relationship long enough to process their own place in it. Augustine himself was, prior to conversion, one such skeptic. The difference hinges not on how critical or objective a person is but rather what one is critical and objective about: the structures of thought and habit within oneself. Augustine resists this whole operation: “I knew what it was, but I pretended not to; I refused to look at it and put it out of my memory” (156). This is a failure of being critical that masquerades as a criticism: the unwillingness to face his own structure of mind leads him to push it away, to suspect the apparent shift before him.

From this perspective, contemplative rhetoric often describes the operation of looking back at calcified cognitive structures as a surrender or realignment of will. Augustine, for instance, uses the language of linking formed by the investments of this body: “For in truth lust is made out of a perverse will, and when lust is served, it becomes habit, and when habit is not resisted, it becomes necessity. But such links, joined one to another, as it were—for this reason I have called it a chain—a harsh bondage held me fast” (151). We can read “lusts” here as the psychical investment in the things around us, the normal objects of value and importance, and the bodily needs that demand attention and addressing. Their importance becomes engrained in the scalar configuration of neurons, social mores, and conceptions of need that leads us to persistently reaffirm their structure and power in our everyday engagement with them. A different scale view contradicts, reworks, or reorients these linkages. Thus, Augustine is able to discern these two kinds of belief and emotional investment: those derived from the normalized human-confined structure and the larger, transformed values. Yet in this inward looking the conflict is only perpetuated by associating the difference with an ego structure: “It was by me that this habit had been made so warlike against me, since I had come willingly to this point where I now willed not” (151). When this war between the wills is released, the links themselves can be dissolved of their power. It was, however, not the belief that did so, but the surrender of it: “This was the sum of it: not to will what I willed and to will what you willed” (167).34 The persistent surrender and transformation of one’s beliefs, will, and prejudice are thus necessary to create a sustained transformation. An event of the sort exemplified by Taylor may start this process but be insufficient for a complete and ongoing reconfiguration of such engrained linkages.

Apart from this question about mystical experience, this account of prejudice is a way of rethinking the function of cultural theory more generally. Outside of the critical attitude diagnosed by Bruno Latour (see chapter 10), cultural critique can be seen as one means of tracing out the possibilities of humans configuring themselves in relation to reality. The purpose of such critique cannot be simply diagnostic but must become transformative: we must grapple with these remnants of erroneous and harmful ideas and confusions such as those called prejudice. To simply find these linkages in others, to identify them in our cultural narratives, or to say that we are bound by them risks voiding the whole operation from the start. Crucially, this is the whole terrain already mapped by contemplative rhetoric: contemplative rhetoric begins with the assumption that examining and transforming one’s structure of mind is not some trivial endeavor but rather a difficult yet worthwhile process.

## Ruptural Politics K

### K—1NC

#### Voting affirmative uses the ballot to position the 1AC as an emancipatory rupture that rescues political agency from metaphysical subjugation.

Nayar, 17—associate professor and director of the International Development Law and Human Rights LLM Program at the School of Law, University of Warwick (Jayan, “Some Thoughts on the “(Extra)Ordinary”: Philosophy, Coloniality, and Being Otherwise,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol 42, Issue 1, 2017, dml)

Aside from the dire actualities of the biopolitics of “populationization,” the effects of “individualization” that has ensnared the subject perhaps pose a greater disappointment to the philosopher. The problem, simply put, is a crisis of the “present”: the apparent complacent condition of being that has come to define the settled present of a domesticated subject. As Zygmunt Bauman observed, the “imagination” that underpins the “postpolitical,” “postmodern” consensus of neoliberal “liquid modernity,” the result of the global consolidation of capitalism, is one whereby the much vaunted subject is concerned more with the “mining” of “disengaged” happiness and less with any historic mission for an enlightened humanity.25 It would appear, the enticements of consumerism and entrepreneurism, more than some resurrection of a political subject into history defines the (post)modern condition of being. And the consequence of this emptying out of “the political” from the subject? Precarious beingness and being “precariat” now are now recognised as the “normal” conditions of modern subjectivity.26

Through all this, the philosopher, it would appear, stands abandoned by her subject. The abdication by the subject of her “historic” responsibility of becoming-being-in-the-political is an ongoing disappointment for any critical political–legal philosopher who takes the universal promise of the “Enlightenment” seriously; it is after all the repudiation, by embodied actual beings, of the philosophically ascribed role of the political subject to be the maker of history. Rescue is necessary therefore; recovery of the foundational promise of the Enlightenment is, for the philosopher of rupture, imperative. And so, we understand the reasons for the following refinements to the original birth story of the political subject that we find in much current critical thinking:

That to be denied being-(in the) political, is to be either in abjection or in stupor, in ontological nothingness as inexistent, or meaninglessness as a commodity, a thing not worthy of the legacy of the idea of Europe. The former is the state of “rightless” exclusion that concerned Arendt and her philosophical progeny, it is the condition of abandonment that preoccupies post-Agambenian philosophers of biopolitical sovereignty. The latter is the perceived condition of the contemporary biopolitical subject object of governmentality—the “counted” and the “accounted-for,” self-disciplining, held docile, and domesticated to be nothing useful other than as “entrepreneurial citizen consumers”—that is the object of disappointment if not contempt. And so, the crisis of the present necessitates efforts to revive, if not rescue, even resurrect, the political subject from either abandoned deprivations or hedonistic automatonity and consumptive banality.

That becoming subject, therefore, is the continuing ontological potentiality of ruptural emancipation. Becoming subject, thus, is an ever incomplete project of becoming–being in history.

With this critical reformulation of the idea, we arrive at the present problem to “invent,” as Badiou put it, the “problem of the present”;27 it becomes the task of the philosopher to identify the critical moments whereupon might history be glimpsed in events of rupture, of becomings. We see variously therefore that the intention to reclaim some presumed emancipatory content to these related foundational assumptions of human beingness permeate through the vast majority of critical thinking on the subject of the subject in the political. The question that is addressed in such contemplations of the present is: how to rescue the emancipatory potentiality of the subject from the normalizations, and banalizations, of the present?28 As Badiou poses it,

“How are we to be faithful to changing the world within the world itself?” This becomes: How are we to weave in the world the political truth whose historic condition of possibility was the event, without it being able to be the realization of this possibility? How are we to inscribe politically, as active materiality under the sign of the Idea, a reawakening of History?29

And so we understand the particular preoccupation of the contemporary critical philosopher with the street.

We witness the incessant search by philosophers of radical hope for such evental and heroic happenings; so is the world scoured for ruptural articulations, so are peoples’ struggles ascribed meaning vis-a-vis the constitutive categories of modern political–legal philosophy. From the past are the French and American Revolutions (and their enunciations of universal subject beingness) tracked through to the Russian and Chinese Revolutions (less so the Haitian and Mexican), the revolts of 1968, and now (jumping a few decades) to the antiglobalization movements post Seattle, the Occupy movements, the “Arab Spring,” all grist to the mill of the philosopher in search of signs that faith in the subject of the political may be redeemed, that history itself may be reawakened. For the purpose of the Idea, therefore, are the instances of irruptions sought to be revisited, read repeatedly, and referred to in their many and varied interpretations as (potential) instances of becoming—as Badiouian event, as Rancieriean “dissensus,” as Zizekian “truth–event/act,” as Douzinasian “resistance/insurrection.”30 The extraordinary is a constant preoccupation, we see.

Yet, notwithstanding the philosophical investment in the event, life, when viewed through the lens of the heroic, inevitably disappoints. The event, in its materiality, is never quite as pure as its philosophical version, never quite enough to transform “History” sufficient for the philosopher’s satisfaction;31 moments of exalted extraordinary emancipation seemingly tire into languid returns to imperfection and corruption, domesticity, even “failure.” Zizek, for example, is quite clear:

[W]e should avoid the temptation simply to admire the sublime beauty of uprisings that are doomed to fail.… What new positive order should replace the old one, once the sublime enthusiasm of the uprising has waned? It is here that we encounter the fatal weakness of the current protests. They express an authentic rage that remains unable to transform itself into even a minimal positive programme for socio-political change. They express a spirit of revolt without revolution.32

If only people who struggle, erupt, and promise such excitement to the philosopher could be truer to their calling, possess greater fidelity to their evental cause, be firmer in their resolve to fulfil the revolution. Still, despite the many inadequacies and failures of these uprisings, as Zizek judges them, the “radical emancipatory core” of such expressions of irruption is affirmed.33 Indeed for the Eurocentric “secular” philosopher, this fidelity to the idea is a matter of philosophical salvation/damnation. Without the extraordinary resurrection of some mythologized subject birthed through the extraordinary event, the post-Enlightenment philosopher of (becoming-)being is left devoid,34 absent a cosmology of human beingness that is able to withstand the abandonment of God, that makes such “degodding” meaningful. And so we witness: a foundational ontology of abandonment and resurrection informs the philosophical “discoveries” of critical post-Enlightenment philosophers of the street.

#### That reifies Eurocentric models of thought and invisibilizes rich histories of everyday resistance that don’t fit within their structural paradigm.

Nayar, 17—associate professor and director of the International Development Law and Human Rights LLM Program at the School of Law, University of Warwick (Jayan, “Some Thoughts on the “(Extra)Ordinary”: Philosophy, Coloniality, and Being Otherwise,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol 42, Issue 1, 2017, dml)

Unintended it might be, but radical readings of spectacular extraordinary becoming are premised still on prior constructions of human beingness based on a colonial-modern ontologic-epistemology of being/nonbeing. For the post-Enlightenment philosopher—Badiou is exemplary—what is assumed is that to “be” outside the political is to be abandoned to inexistence, whereby the political has come to be the ontological standard of a postdivine, secular normality of human beingness proper, a life desired, a life full; as such “inexistence” (nonbeing) in political subjectivity is the underlying abandonment that defines the condition of the captured present that requires recovery and rescue.35 The recovery and rescue of Eurocentric philosophy, that is, the ascription of extraordinary becoming to events of irruption serves precisely, it appears to me, to enable such a rescue, whereby the philosopher assumes that what is witnessed in these instances is the extraordinary ruptural assertion of the idea, of the subject, claiming a belonging in the political, out of absence, out of inexistence, out of nothingness, into (extraordinary-)being, a “liberated” entity—the subject—as the new in history. Badiou, again, is illustrative: “We shall then say that a change of world is real when an inexistent of the world starts to exist in this same world with maximum intensity.”36 The emergence of a new out of inexistence is the heroic core of post-Enlightenment political–legal philosophy.

A simple counteraffirmation serves as our point of departure for a decolonial correction to “white ignorance.”37 We can state it simply thus: prior to the apparent extraordinary moment which draws the (critical) philosopher’s gaze to rest upon the manifestations and expressions of rebellious life, persists the daily maneuvrings of communities in struggle in their encounters with the totalizing desires of appropriative power. In this view, what is witnessed as the extraordinary becoming of the new into the world is but the material and exigent appearance of persistent, if largely “invisible” being(-otherwise) whose everyday is the ordinary struggle against extant orders of asserted normalities. It is this that I here term already-(other-)being that underpins a decolonial philosophy. And it is this presence, and persistence that is lost to critical Eurocentric philosophers of rupture; we see this, for example, in the philosopher’s apparent discovery of dissensus.

We observe the following: the critical philosopher’s discoveries of ruptural becomings is informed repeatedly, to use Santiago-Gomez’s phrase, of a “point-zero” perspective on human life worlds.38 By this is meant a perspective whereby it is the “discovery” of the “other” (as imagined) by the philosopher that begets the worlds of meaning from whence history, as a projection of the idea, marches on. This we observe is commonplace in much recent thinking and writing on resistance and dissensus. For example, in concluding his analysis of the Tunisian uprisings which marked the start of the so-called Arab Spring, Illan Wall reflects thus:

In terms of strategies of resistance then, I want to underline the importance of learning to live together without loyalty, without the everyday presupposition that the state is naturally and inexorably there. It is the interruption of everyday authority that is crucial.…this inoperativity is already there.…Let me suggest then, that the point of articulation between the critical legal theory of dissensus and the Tunisian events is the question: how to unwork sovereign power on an everyday basis, without reinstituting the same logics once more?39

Wall’s is a thoughtful, and respectful reading of resistance, rooted and influenced by Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of “inoperativity”; indeed, he is mindful not to “appropriate the politics of the “postcolony” and put it to work for some “European” project.”40 However, as with all Eurocentric viewings of the worlds of “rupture/resistance,” the point-zero perspective is marked here. What I mean by this is that the analysis assumes a (dissensual) moment, an event, from which the extraordinary emergence/becoming of a new is discovered; a perspective that identifies dissensus in moments of “emergence” out of perceived absence or inexistence after all is one which assumes a prior “consensus,” a normality from which then the “interruption” is thought to be witnessed. From this point zero, then are “strategies of resistance” postulated, futures anticipated, as a new in the world.

But let us pause. For whom this normality of consensus from which dissensus is celebrated? From whose location of thought this reading of the new of interruption? For whom, and from which moment on, the novelty of this discovery? Even as Wall’s account of the Ben Ali regime is nuanced, an assumption of a prior normality of the political as a consensus still persists here. A decolonial view instead, I suggest, begins precisely from a demystification of that assumption of consensus and a recognition of the many undersides of persistent refusal against such presumptions of normality. I explain below.

Wall’s view and imagination suffers from a common inability of the well-intentioned Eurocentric philosopher to see a different normality when gazing upon the world, to comprehend that the “interruptions of everyday authority,” and the nonreification of the state, are perhaps, for social majorities the world over, the persistent everyday unsentimental normalities of their ordinary being even as they appear subservient; for them, the “importance of learning to live together without loyalty, without the everyday presupposition that the state is naturally and inexorably there” may rather be better understood and realized than assumed by the critical philosopher who earnestly exhorts such rupture based on some discovery of the extraordinary event. Indeed, such exuberance at fixing a meaning of extraordinariness to the eruptional manifestation of persistent refusals, however, “incompletely” as Wall claims to do, might well be to impoverish rather than enrich understandings of the extraordinariness of the normalities of resistance, it might continue invisibilizing the rich tapestry of actually present consciousness and experiences of (already-)being that refuse the consensus of the present as assumed by the critical post-Enlightenment philosopher. Let us be frank. Nothing is added to the actualities or the materialities of life and struggle by the philosophical naming of an eruption of anger or refusal as event or dissensus, neither are extant orderings of the political as bordered normalities of governmentality challenged by the invented duality of consensus/dissensus; all such ascriptions do is to attach to a given time and place particular abstracted categories based on presumed universal truths of beingness. In doing so, the pasts, presents, and infinite futures that define the materialities of life and struggle are conveniently subsumed under the celebratory reification of an instant that is read as “evental,” marking a progressive node in history as promised by the heroic mythology of the European Enlightenment; in this, Wall does not escape from the “appropriation” of the postcolony for the European project.

#### Vote negative for critical unlearning—reject the 1AC as a decolonial corrective. Before developing theories or tactics for resistance “out there,” we must interrogate the necessity and sufficiency of our actions “in here.”

Nayar, 17—associate professor and director of the International Development Law and Human Rights LLM Program at the School of Law, University of Warwick (Jayan, “Some Thoughts on the “(Extra)Ordinary”: Philosophy, Coloniality, and Being Otherwise,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol 42, Issue 1, 2017, dml)

No wonder then that critical philosophers of the street find themselves constantly oscillating between hope and disappointment with every perceived evental occurring, “chasing after their own tails” as it were. But more than this, I suggest, is that such a philosophy does precisely the opposite of rupturing the present; in all its bravado in proclaiming the next resurrection of history’s mandate, it is irrelevant to the actual workings of coloniality which continues untouched by the radical posturings of heroic philosophers, as it is to the politics of dismay and disavowal as witnessed by recent resurgences of nationalistic populisms as well as to the manifold experiments with decolonial being that enrich the geographies of being otherwise to Europe. We remember Franz Fanon’s advice from long ago, that humanity is better served by leaving behind the idea of Europe, to abandon its precepts and promises: “where they were never done talking of Man…today we know with what sufferings humanity has paid for every one of their triumphs of mind.”75 “Leaving behind the idea of Europe”: for this, we must begin to learn from outside and beyond the assumptions of the categories of normality and exceptionality of human beingness that underpin European civilization. Instead, we might begin by thinking “critically” in the sense suggested by Hage (as he considers the lessons of “critical anthropology”) to “reflexively move outside of ourselves such that we can start seeing ourselves in ways we could not have possibly seen ourselves, our culture or our society before.”76 Then might we understand that,

we can be radically other than what we are. Our otherness is always dwelling within us: there is always more to us than we think, so to speak.…Critical anthropology, appropriately enough, is more akin to the shamanic act of inducing a haunting: indeed it encourages us to feel haunted at every moment of our lives by what we are/could be that we are not.77

The dual responsibility to be haunted by the radical other as possibility and to serve as the shaman to induce such a haunting, usefully describes the decolonial philosophical labor. Rather than seeking out life (in its extraordinariness) to conform to some prefigured philosophical category of extraordinary subject becoming/being, a decolonial perspective would learn from the (extra)ordinary experiences of struggle of peoples from which to demythologize the ontologic-epistemologies of Europe as a colonial invention. Two simultaneous tasks are urgent, both pertaining to a rupture of philosophy. Firstly, a dismantling of the philosophical (European) self that has hitherto cast its defining gaze upon the world, so that we might better see and sense the haunting of the radical other upon ourselves, and following from this, secondly, a dismantling of the substantive foundational categories of post-Enlightenment philosophical structures, and thus of the technologies of naming and emplacing bordered subject beingness that normalize the coloniality of power.

With respect the former, we begin by critical self-cognition. We, philosophers of rupture, are so easy in our conjuring up of philosophical engagements with the extraordinary. This, we think, the role of the insurrectionary intellectual. But this is a deflection of the “critical question” of what it means to be human being. The thinker thinks the world out there, projecting thoughts and imaginations for liberated futures to an external realm of the ‘problem’, for a ‘liberation’ of the other. Thus is the event spoken of and the extraordinary read in certain moments, thus are “epistemic insurrections” and strategies of resistance envisioned to transform the world, while the ordinary moments and the locations of the thinker in the world – of the existential implicatedness of the professional(ised) philosopher of liberation – are excused the urgency of liberation, absented the ontology of colonization and subjugation, and denied the embodiment of subjugation itself. Jose Medina exemplifies such a position of deflection:

The critical task of the scholar and the activist is to resurrect subjugated knowledges – that is, to revive hidden or forgotten bodies of experiences and memories – and to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges…. Such insurrections involve the difficult labor of mobilizing scattered, marginalized publics and of tapping into the critical potential of their dejected experiences and memories.…those subjects by themselves may not be able to destabilize the epistemic status quo until they are given a voice at the epistemic table…78

These are noble intentions but how different this from the “critical thinking” of Hage? The clear demarcation of an “us” and “them” in Medina’s “difficult labors” of insurrectionary thinking involves no process of being “haunted” by they who are the other who require rediscovery and salvation. The “scholar and the activist” appear not subject to the critical insurrections envisaged; in this, neither the “self” nor the “office” of the “critical thinker” factor as being constituent of the world as worlds of resistance and liberation are thought and proffered, the thinker–thinking–liberation is the one subject in and of the world that figures little in critical theories of subjugation/liberation, whose everyday ordinary world does not confront the demands of rupture. Thinking the extraordinary enables precisely such deflection.

Instead, we might think critically differently: to see coloniality as it is imprinted upon our worlds, to see ourselves differently. Perhaps we might then see that it is us who are the ones utterly colonized even as we pride ourselves with our endeavors of “thinking” critically; our radical outpourings being just another commodity in a system of exchange where anything can be so. Through this other view, we might begin to learn that, the world over, communities in struggle within the social majorities, in their being already and other, do indeed live out “actual revolutions,” before, through, and after the revolutions of philosophers, theirs being lives nontransfixed to the colonial–modern mythologies of the Enlightenment, their time not defined by the before and after of abandonments by history and resurrections of events, even as the events of refusals, celebrations, resistance, and reaffirmations, when these so unpredictably occur, are significant expressions of their beingness. The stuff of decolonial struggle, in this understanding, is precisely the work to be otherwise in the face of the normalities of coloniality, and this indeed is extraordinary. The question is whether “we” have the capacity so to be decolonial nonsubjects, to ourselves rupture from the normalities that secures us our “places” in this world of rewards (and punishments) and care? Can we, in other words, contemplate that (extra)ordinary possibility of being ourselves otherwise? For then might we share in the struggle to imagine the substantive rupture of coloniality.

The philosophical task for the “Europeanized”79 philosopher becoming otherwise then would be to dereify the invention of the foundational categories of post-Enlightenment ontologic–epistemology; this includes such sacraments as sovereignty, the subject, the political, and with it, the underlying conception of a (propertied-)self that serves as the ontological foundation of colonial–modern political–legal philosophy. The result of such a correction might be that we neither seek to reclaim some lost humanity from discredited (Enlightenment) institutions of the state (as liberal “reformers” are inclined to do) nor to reclaim some evental truth of mythologized becomings that would transform/return “political sovereignty” and subjectivity (as are the inclinations of so-called radicals) but rather to dename the very assumed ontological categories themselves. This is a lot more than a philosophical exercise. The rupture of categories in this way entails the material encounter with the structures of power, of the state, of the market, of the purported subject, in order that what is understood as the givenness of human beingness is interrupted. The point is this: a decolonial correction would begin the critical task of thinking against “norm-ality” by taking, as the philosophical point of departure, the (extra)ordinary refusals of the “social majorities” to be subject. Thus, the task of the critical philosopher is less one to educate them, out there, with our insurrectionary wisdom but more, first and foremost, to enable an unlearning, ours included.80 This is perhaps a somewhat more discomforting a burden for the heroic philosopher than it is to pontificate upon the ruptures of the street, but what better reason than this to think the (extra)ordinary?

### Alt—2NC

#### The alt is critical unlearning—vote negative on presumption. This is a K of your capacity to render a decision for them—when evaluating whether they’ve met their burden of proving the 1AC was sufficient for a ballot, you should first ask yourself what voting for them would do that isn’t happening in the status quo, and critically examine your ability to answer that question and how you have learned the knowledge that lets you do so.

#### Reject the aff as a decolonial corrective. You should presume against totalizing theories of power and resistance and in favor of assuming that resistance exists everywhere around us in forms that are far more effective than anything you can do by casting an aff ballot. Refusing this framing, or voting aff despite it, posits the ballot as a uniquely emancipatory event which uniquely reifies domination by forwarding a totalizing, Eurocentric notion of resistance.

Nayar, 17—associate professor and director of the International Development Law and Human Rights LLM Program at the School of Law, University of Warwick (Jayan, “Some Thoughts on the “(Extra)Ordinary”: Philosophy, Coloniality, and Being Otherwise,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol 42, Issue 1, 2017, dml)

We see, therefore, with Scott, that it is not nothingness, nor nonbeing, nor inexistence in abject abandonment, that defines the “excluded” when viewed through a decolonial lens. Rather, prior to, and concurrent with, the colonizing and totalizing advent of the subject are already vibrant presences in the world that are cosmologically rich and vital, and various and diverse. Beingness in this sense remains present, even in the face of colonizing violence, both corporeal and philosophical, invisibilized and silenced perhaps, silent often, made subaltern no doubt, even self-doubting as it may be, yet tenacious in its perseverance and creativity. Understood in this light, it is less the heroic, extraordinary advent of the resurrected subject than the ordinary resilience and creativity of (already-)being that defines decoloniality.46

But there is nothing exceptional, nothing out of the ordinary, that is being described in these observations. In contrast to thinking that originates from (Eurocentric) exceptionalism, this is a thinking which seeks no “historical moment” to beckon the extraordinariness of human fortitude and creativity against the desires of colonizing appropriation, either of bodies or of minds. Life, we learn, is simply not that spectacular in its infinite unfolding. History as a philosophical idea and ideal of the “European Enlightenment” is not the concern here; the decolonial philosopher is not so obsessed with recovering such a faith. Rather, what is of concern is the everyday resilience of struggle against coloniality, both material and philosophical. As Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash remind us,

For the most part,…the main actors of the unfolding epic remain unknown to the world created by modern media; thereby still protected or sheltered from the forces that co-opt, tempt, or seduce those suddenly blinded by overnight fame and “front-page” limelight. In many cases, people’s reactions to the “Global Project” have not yet taken the shape of “a movement”: they have not a specific name or label with which they identify themselves or are identified by others. Their informal condition as the unnamed and the unidentified is an important aspect of their politics, often offering them the camouflage essential to their survival; as is their “failure” to adopt any “institutional structure.”47

Obviously, “they” do surface from time to time, unleashing their anger, their refusal, their expression of being (already and other) against continued attempts to make them compliantly subject; the “subaltern” indeed does speak, even if otherwise than the comprehensible frames of speech that make them audible to colonial listeners!48 This is to say that it really does not matter to the actual worlds of everyday resistance and inoperativity whether or not philosophers of rupture ascribe meaning and significance to the infinite ways of (already-)being that constitute human beingness. Such is the persistent truth of the ordinary: the “slave”—the ontological nonsubject that has fixated many a critical thinker—for all the philosophical negation that purportedly constructs the nonbeingness of slave, still, as already being other than slave, unceasingly rises up against the “master”; repeatedly and everywhere, thus are lived out the extraordinariness of the ordinary truth wherein the negated continue to negate the negater! The following two declarations are illustrative:

Our autonomy doesn’t need permission from the government: it already exists.49

What do we have to ask forgiveness for? What are they to “pardon” us?…Who should ask for forgiveness and who can grant it?50

Examples abound where the subjugated refuses to be subsumed within the consensus, remembering and dreaming a life otherwise; the “negro” articulates the radical power of “black skins”; the women who were invisible stand at the forefront of a march; the indigenous refuses to be decimated by “civilization” through the simple refusal “Ya Basta”; the “alien” affirms that “no one is illegal”; the economically superfluous and disposable self-names “indignados.” All of these are significant not for any evental becoming into the world—such would be the heroic reading that fixes and thereby perverts the moments of the (extra)ordinary in reified moments of purported before and after—rather, in that they voice the extraordinariness of ordinary refusal and affirmation of an ever-present being-otherwise. Ordinary being in ways otherwise than prescribed and assigned by “sovereign” assertions of authority and prescriptions of names and placements already contain within them not the nothingness of inexistence or nonbeing but the rich tapestry of existing social and philosophical resources of being, of refusal, and of desubjectification, even as these might largely be invisible, silent, and compliant.

None of this is new to philosophers less fixated with the extraordinary promises of the European Enlightenment for the extraordinary subject of history. Many have variously described the persistence of decolonial refusal: Mignolo, as the material and psychosocial formations of “border thinking”;51 Chatterjee, as the maneuvrings and calculated negotiations of life that define the “politics of the governed”;52 Satrin, as the revolutions of creativity and resilience in reclaiming horizontalidad and autonomy by community and worker organizations;53 de Sousa Santos, as the living pluriverse of the ecologies of knowledges and the epistemologies of the south.54 Tempting as it is to focus our critical philosophical attention on spectacular events (of perceived rupture), the everydayness that originates such visible and public enactments and enunciations, and the untamed consciousness of insubordination, disobedience, and rebellion that nourishes and informs these journeys of hope, remind us that the sovereign assertion of totality and normality are less successful in constructing identities of subject-beingness than either the masters of the universe or critical philosophers of rupture might assume.

Let me be clear. This distinction I am drawing between the notions of extraordinary evental rupture, on the one hand, and the ordinariness of the extraordinary, on the other, would matter little if all that is at stake here is a matter of philosophical wordplay. I am suggesting, however, that the distinction is critical to a decolonial correction of the way we read resistance and envisage other possibilities to the problem of the present. The recognition and reintroduction of ordinary already-being to philosophy return the extraordinary back to the materiality of the everyday. Importantly, such a deprivileging of the constitutive categories of Eurocentrism returns attention to the invisibilized and silenced truths (of consciousness and imagination) that define the persistence of struggles (and of hope) in the everyday. It is here, in this everyday of the ordinary materialities of living life, wherein the extraordinariness of decoloniality resides.

### AT: Perm

#### The perm fails. The alt isn’t a decolonial correction of the aff, but of your own subconscious assumptions that persuade you to determine that they have met their burden of proof. No part of our argument is compatible with an aff ballot because our K is a refusal of the premise of voting aff itself!

Nayar, 17—associate professor and director of the International Development Law and Human Rights LLM Program at the School of Law, University of Warwick (Jayan, “Some Thoughts on the “(Extra)Ordinary”: Philosophy, Coloniality, and Being Otherwise,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol 42, Issue 1, 2017, dml) [brackets in original]

In contrast to Zizek’s preoccupation with the “actual political revolution,” we consider rather the path of “living” (rather than death) that was chosen by the communities of the “Zapatistas” (and the very many actual communities around the world that live their struggles for life). Here, we see the essence of the “alternative geographies” of resistance that Dabashi speaks of, of the ordinary that is the radical decolonial rupture rooted in the materialities of life (and death) of embodied beings as opposed to those of reified (universal) subjects:

rather than dedicating ourselves to training guerrillas, soldiers, and squadrons, we developed education and health promoters, who went about building the foundations of autonomy that today amaze the world.

Instead of constructing barracks, improving our weapons, building walls and trenches, we built schools, hospitals and health centers; improving our living conditions.

Instead of fighting for a place in the Pantheon of individualized deaths of those from below, we chose to construct life.68

This is a concise articulation of the everyday of convivial and socially rooted beings being in the world. In these everyday actions of “choosing life” (not in some beautiful future to come but in the very uncertainties and struggles in the present) at the same time is expressed the most profound substance of decoloniality; Subcomandante Marcos continued, in his “final communique” to stress this, the ordinary, its radicality rooted in the lives of the ordinary:

And the most important [change]: the change in thinking: from revolutionary vanguardism to “rule by obeying”; from taking Power Above to the creation of power below; from professional politics to everyday politics; from the leaders to the people; from the marginalisation of gender to the direct participation of women; from the mocking of other to the celebration of difference.…Personally, I don’t understand why thinking people who affirm history is made by the people get so frightened in the face of an existing government of the people where “specialists” are nowhere to be seen.69

Thus is the extraordinary work of decoloniality in all its messy, mundane materiality: to choose life over death, to regenerate socialities and cultures of being, and to remember what human beingness means and involves. And here lies the radicality of decolonial thinking and being. In these already present struggles of the social majorities are ways of being-otherwise the living experiments of actual rupture, not of reified philosophical categories but of material lifeworlds. As other to Zizek’s actual political revolution, as an alter-politics that ruptures the dispositive of colonial–modernity, the Zapatista’s experiments with choosing life correspond to what Eduardo Viveiros de Castro described as the lifeworlds of “primitive societies” existing as exterior to the state,

as the force of anti-production permanently haunting the productive forces, and as the conceptual embodiments of the thesis that another world is possible: that there is life beyond capitalism, as there is society outside of the State.70

In such ‘primitive societies’ are the actual ‘hard work’ of creating new forms of organisations (Zizek), and the daily manoeuvres of unworking sovereign power (Wall), the normal and (extra)ordinary matters of survival, solidarity and regeneration. What this struggle involves in the everyday is the very material and existential matters of eating, learning, healing, playing, dreaming, dancing, even shitting, in other words, of living, in living communities of solidarity and hope.71 Understood in this light, the work of a decolonial correction pertains to the refusal precisely to be subject to what Wynter terms the Eurocentric “descriptive statement” of the human—the very ontological assumptions of human beingness—that informs post-Enlightenment, colonial-modern subject beingness.72 To speak rupture in philosophy as particular Events are named and heralded is no difficult task; it is quite something else to insert the struggles to transform the material conditions of coloniality, as they persist in the everyday, into philosophical registers of “meanings.” In this connection, the philosophical work of the decolonial pertains to the tasks of denaming the normalities of beingness in the world as inscribed by colonial philosophies of being-becoming.

There is little here that might appear as satisfactory to the gaze of the post-Enlightenment philosopher concerned with the heroic politics of rupture; the material organization, for example, of shitting—the “economies” of shit as it were—after all is not quite as spectacular as the “politics” of riots and street occupations.73 And yet, this is precisely the necessary correction in my view that might be rightfully regarded as “decoloniality”; in the materiality of the ordinary lies the extraordinary decolonial imagination and practical resilience of communities who, regardless of the presumed totality of colonial philosophical-political construction of (b)ordered subjectification past and present, built, and continue to build “schools, hospitals, and health centers” to improve their living conditions, “chose to construct life,” outside of the embrace of “biopolitical care,” refused to be what they were assigned to be in spaces, both geographical and cosmophilosophical, remaining otherwise than ascribed and enforced. Simply put, this is how, although largely invisible and in the margins, actual revolutions are lived, how “horizontal” and autonomous lives are regenerated in ways that are resistant and creative.74 Once we understand this (extra)ordinary wisdom of being-otherwise, then we might begin seeing, and learning, ourselves, from the extraordinariness of ordinary being that define the decolonial actualities of the world’s social majorities. The question then is what do we make of such a realization as we philosophize rupture.

### Link—Anti-Blackness—Abstraction

#### Ideological abstracting Blackness cedes political terrain to elites.

Reed, 21—Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania (Adolph, interviewed by Jason Myles and Pascal Robert, “Adolph Reed Jr. on race reductionism and liberational politics,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvYcl7xkD70>, 1:14:05-1:19:22, dml)

Well, there is no Black community. I mean, not like that. Not that comes fully formed and whole with an interest that can be imputed or that overrides all the discrete interests that are at play. And I think this is one of the problems with notions like Black freedom struggle and stuff like that, that there’s a lack of historical specificity that leads the radicals to posit the ideal constituency at a level of abstraction that doesn’t help you connect with actual people’s actual concerns.

And this is, I think, perfectly demonstrated in how radicals moved from generic Black Power radicalism and the warrants, like putting Black faces in previously all-white places and Black economic development stuff, to construct these three different variants of what I would argue are the same ontological fantasy. That’s why it’s called an ideology. Pan-Africanism, culturalism, and the scientific socialism that the new communists embraced.

Because in each case, the move was to withdraw from – And there was a comparable thing going on in SDS too, by the way, or coming out of SDS – But to withdraw from the plane of mundane struggle where people’s lives were played out. To go into the closet, basically, or the sanctuary, and develop some abstraction called an ideology, that in each case was understood to be like an internally consistent belief system. Like a religion, basically. That’s what they all were. And the politics that was warranted from each of these ideologies was in some way apocalyptic. So, when people used to talk about shit like when the revolution comes. Well, in the first place, that’s not the way stuff works. And granted, I was the last [inaudible] so what the hell, right, because they weren’t the only ones doing it.

So, what radicals saw was… We hit the streets like moonies, basically, or Jehovah’s Witnesses, or whoever the people are who go around and ring your doorbell. And by the way, it used to work back in the day, a long time ago, that when they rang your doorbell you’d just say, I’m Catholic, and they’d run away like they’d just seen Satan. But that apparently doesn’t work anymore.

But anyway. So what political action was considered to be was proselytizing the ideology, not trying to organize around concrete programs and undertakings that would make people’s lives better. And that brings us back into the thin and abstract character of the symbols of new radicalism. Like, you knew that you were a Panther because you had that beret and that jacket. You knew you were a Nationalist because you had the dashiki and a beard like Maulana Karenga, and you knew you were Pan-Africanist because you dressed like a loser.

But none of those had any concrete content. I know it felt like it to the radicals. The radicals felt that all this stuff was deeply meaningful. But only to congregants in the church and to competitors from those other two churches. And again, bourgeois politicians, both the elected type and the war on poverty type, or the rest of them, were able just to take advantage of that stuff because they had an institutional program to offer people.

So, I think, yeah. I think it’s correct that the radicals weren’t able to overcome the class character or the class forces that were shaping Black politics, but they weren’t able to overcome it because they never engaged with it. Because part of the deal was denying their existence. And see, that’s when you get constructs like, or odd notions of what class meant. It had more to do with behavioral and consumption preferences than with… And see, this takes back to the notion of racial authenticity as the basis for politics. Right?

### Link—Anti-Blackness—Extinction

#### Disregarding the destruction of the planet is antithetical to the purpose of radical Black scholarship.

Moten and Kelley, 17—professor of Performance Studies at New York University AND Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Fred and Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE>, 31:49-55:57, dml)

MOTEN: Well, first of all, I just want to say how much I appreciate having a chance to be here with all of you tonight, and thank you, Rinaldo, and, uh, Alicia, and Afua, of course. Robin, as always, uh, an honor to be, have a chance to hang out with you, and uh, and to learn from you, and um, let me see. Um, well, I tend to think of Black studies not so much as an academic discipline or confluence of disciplines but as the atmosphere in which I grew up, and so, and I love that, that atmosphere. I love the way that it felt, and I love the way that it smelled, and I love the flavors, and I love the sounds, and I love the movements. Um, and so, it is, again, something that I think has a certain place, maybe, in the university, and what it meant, what it has meant for Black studies to take that place in the university has had both, has been both good and bad. I think it’s probably done much more for the university than it has for Black studies, and, and that’s something worth thinking about. And I don’t say that because I’m trying to advocate some withdrawal from the university of Black studies, but I’m thinking that, you know, that at this stage of the game in having done the work of attempting to actually bring, um, the university into some sense of its own, of what ought to be its own intellectual mission, Black studies has the right to look out for itself now, for a little bit, um, and I think it’s worth it to do that. And insofar as Black studies has earned a right to look out for itself, what that really means, I think, is that Black studies has earned the right to try again to take its fundamental responsibility, which is to be, uh, a place where we can look out for the Earth. Um, I think that Black studies has a fundamental and specific, though not necessarily exclusive mission, and that mission is to try to save the Earth, or at least to try to save, not, well, on the most fundamental level to save the Earth, and on a secondary level, to try to save the possibility of human existence on the Earth. Um, and I know that’s a big statement, and I don’t wanna take up all the time, but I’m happy to try to say more about what I think I mean by that later on, but, um, but I think maybe it’s important just to leave that big statement out there for a minute, and just to make sure that you know that I knew that I said it when I said it.

KELLEY: Okay, well, actually I wanna echo, uh, Fred’s sentiments, that it’s really an honor to be here, in this space. Um, this is the second time that we’ve had kind of a public conversation, and it’s always packed, you know, and it’s always a lot of people, and expectations are always high, and one of my favorite things on the planet, besides just talking to my daughters, talking to Fred Moten, um, you know, and it’s just really, you know, I learn so much from it, and in fact, let me just begin by saying that one of the pieces that Rinaldo was referring to was an essay I wrote called, uh, “Black Study, Black Struggle,” which was entirely inspired by, uh, Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s, uh, book, “The Undercommons.” It was a way of the application of the notion of the undercommons to understanding what was happening at that moment, which in, in the fall of 2015, there was like an explosion of, um, Black protests on, on campus, and, you know, I won’t repeat what’s in the article, uh, but it, it’s not an accident that some of those struggles, uh, were products of what was happening in the streets. In other words, what happened in Ferguson, and what happened in Baltimore, what happened all over the country, and what happened in places like here in Toronto, were the catalyst for, um, a kind of explosion on campuses, where, uh, students were trying to figure out their place in the university. They’re dealing with racism, and microaggressions on university campuses, uh, they’re dealing with a, a kind of deracinated, you know, curriculum where ethnic studies wasn’t what it was, in its inception. Um, and, I was also dealing with, or many of us were also dealing with, uh, a culture of, and I hate to put it this way, but a culture of anti-intellectualism in, in a different sort of way. I mean, universities are often anti-intellectual, in that they actually disavow certain forms of knowledge and put other knowledge above that, which is an anti-intellectual position by the way. Um, but then when you’re assaulted by that all the time, uh, sometimes you end up mirroring that culture. And you’re saying “well I’m not gonna read this, I’m not gonna read that, because so-and-so wrote it,” as opposed to saying that there’s nothing off the table, uh, that Black studies, and Fred knows this ‘cause he repeats it more than I do, that our mutual, uh, teacher, Cedric Robinson, who paraphrased C. L. R. James, said you know, Black studies is a critique of Western civilization, and if that is the case, then we both have to dismantle it, recognize the weak edifice upon which it’s built, but also know everything that’s happening within it. But anyway, let me just back up, um, so, I just, so the three points I wanna make in reference to the question, one is that, uh, social movements have always been the catalyst for Black studies. When Fred was talking about, you know, Black studies as, as, uh, kinda, kinda like a way of life, as an atmosphere in which he grew up and which I grew up and many of us grew up, that’s so true. I never thought about it that way, but, you know, that’s so true. And in fact, um, if anything, Black Studies is not a multidiscipline but a project, a project for liberation, whatever that means, and liberation is an ongoing project. Um, Ruthie Gilmore, uh, who was at USC, uh, with me and Fred, had come up with this idea of renaming ethnic studies “liberation studies.” And, you know, we were actually serious about that, we were like, trying to figure out how to do that, and never filled it, but it reminds us that, you know, it’s not about, um, it’s not about a body. It’s not about bodies. It’s about ideas, and about the future, you know. It’s about recognizing the past and the construction of a new future. And so I think, in that respect, in order to understand the future of Black studies, we gotta understand the movements that produced it—that, that the Movement for Black Lives, that, um, uh, We Charge Genocide, that Black Youth Projects 100—all these struggles that erupted have, in fact, uh, pointed the way for Black Studies. The problem is, is that what gets constituted as the institutional space of Black studies, in many cases, isn’t really that. And I hate to bring people down, because we’re supposed to be up, right? But there are a lot of departments that I wouldn't call Black studies departments that have that name, you know, there are a lot of, there's a lot of scholarship that goes on that has no relationship at all to the project of transformation, or to people, to actual people in community. And one of the important things to always remember is that, um, we wouldn't have Black studies if it wasn't—in the United States, that is, I'm talking about the US—if it wasn't for Watts, if it wasn't for Detroit in 67, and if it wasn't for those kinds of urban rebellions, if it wasn't for the struggles in the South, that's where Black studies comes from. Uh, and so it moves into the university as a, as a transformative project. Um, it's not—and that's why I think there was a disconnect between some of the, the protests and what was happening in the academy. Finally, there’s this question of, of ethnic studies versus, or against, or for, or within or bedded in Black studies. And one of the things that, that I think a lot of us are trying to figure out is to deepen the relationship between indigenous studies and Black studies. Um, to understand that this was what I call second wave ethnic studies in the 1990s was itself a project that was, believe it or not, in a, a response to neoliberalism. And I think we don't always see that because we, we tend to read backwards in the 1990s and 1980s as, like, ethnic studies as identity politics in the narrowest sense of the word, that somehow this was about producing a sense of, of pride and a sense of identity devoid of the question of power. But if you actually look at the struggles for ethnic studies in the 80s and 90s, it was all about power. That, that what we think of as comparative or critical ethnic studies was, wasn't about the celebration of difference. It wasn't liberal multiculturalism. It was an assault on a neoliberal turn. And we, we sometimes forget that and, and, and then we write the history. And so I think I want to at some point talk more about that, but I think that's something to remember, because, right now, if we don't have Black studies as a critique in response to the neoliberal neofascist turn, then it's sort of worthless. You know, it's going to continue to exist. Maybe not in the academy though. So I'll just stop there.

WALCOTT: So, um, Robin, where you ended, and, and where Fred began, it’s a, is a good segue into getting you, both of you, to talk about the work that you've been doing around questions of Palestinian struggle and freedom. Fred, the work that, the tremendous work that you did in the ASA, um, American Studies Association, for which the Association is still living true, and, and Robin the work that you continue to do with um, um, with faculty for Palestine. But I'm thinking about Fred's provocation here that Black studies about saving the Earth and if Black studies is indeed about saving the Earth, which I'm very willing to fall right into right now, you know, first to kind of maybe think about this relationship between the struggle and, and freedom of Palestine and the relationship between ongoing settler colonialisms globally, because it seems to me that one of the most powerful things that, um, the kind of Black studies that has taken to the streets recently has done is to make those kinds of concerns present, right? BLM visits to Palestine, BLM in Toronto, always making sure that the invocation of the politics of settler colonialism is a part of a political organizing, and, um, their intimate relations with indigenous communities. So maybe this is a way for us to begin to talk about what's really at stake in this contemporary political moment where, um, or, or a radical politics, a politics that wants to think a different kind of future formation, is grappling with, um, settler colonialism in various kinds of ways. But Palestine being central to that, given that we know as we sit in this university is that often, um, what we call our senior administrators have an entirely different relationship with the question of freedom for Palestine.

MOTEN: Well, um, first, I mean, the work I did around, um, you know, the ASA’s, um, you know, decision to endorse the academic and cultural boycott of Israel was really minimal and minor compared to a lot of other people who were really out front, um, and, and have been working tirelessly for that for many, many years. Um, and I think, you know, the, my contribution was more, you know, rhetorical in many ways in, in, in, and, and maybe, maybe theoretical only in the most minimal sense, in the sense that what I wanted to do was a couple of things. First, to recognize that, um, you know, let's say that the conditions of what people call modernity, um, in, in, in, in, or global modernity, that the fundamental conditions that make that up are, you know, settler colonialism. And I think we can talk about settler colonialism in ways that are broader than the normal way that we usually think of them as a set of violent and brutal relations between Europe and the rest of the world. Because I think it's really important. And, and, and again, our, our mutual friend and mentor Cedric Robinson, pointed this out emphatically, and in brilliant ways early on, that settler colonialism is also an intra-European affair. Um, and it's important to understand that. It's important to understand this historic relationship between settler colonialism in the enclosure of the commons, um, which is part and, part of the origins of, of what we now know or understand as capitalism. But if we understand that settler colonialism, that the transatlantic slave trade, um, and that, you know, the emergence of a set of philosophical formulations that essentially provide for us some modern conception of self that has as its basis a kind of possessive, heteronormative, patriarchal individuation, right? That's what it is to be yourself on the most fundamental level. You know, and if you ask anybody in the philosophy department, they'll tell you that that's true, you know, and they won’t be joking, right, that, um, that, these, that these constitute the basis of, of our modernity. But for most of the people who live in the world, actually for everybody who lives in the world, although most of the people in live in the world are actually able to both recognize this and say this, that modernity is a social and ecological disaster that we live, that we now attempt to survive. Okay? And if we take that up, then part of what's at stake is that we recognize that feminist and queer interventions against heteronormative patriarchy, that Black interventions against the theory and practice of slavery, which is ongoing, that indigenous interventions against settler colonialism constitute the general both practical and intellectual basis for not only our attempts to survive, but also our attempts to, as I said before, save the Earth. And, and I put it in terms that the great poet Ed Roberson puts it; not just to save the Earth, but to see the Earth before the end of the world. And this is an emergency that we're in now and it's urgent. Um, and I believe that there’s a specific convergence of black thought and indigenous thought that situates itself precisely in relation to, and is articulated through, the interventions of queer thought and feminist thought that we want to take up. And, and it, and it strikes me as, for me at least, it's, it's a way of taking up a kind an—it's, it’s a way of imagining how one might be able to, how we might be able to walk more lightly on the Earth. To honor the Earth as we walk on it, as we stand on it. To not stomp on it, to not stomp all over it, where every step you take is a claim of ownership. And, and this is one way to put it, would be to not so presumptuously imagine that the Earth can be reduced to something so paltry and so viciously understood as what we usually call home. This is part of the reason why the queer and the feminist critique is so important. It's a critique of a general problematic notion of domesticity. It's like another way of being on the Earth that doesn't allow you in some vicious and brutal way to claim that it is yours, right? Um, this is important and this is so, you know, often the methods that we use to claim the Earth as ours involved fences, borders. This manifests itself on a private level from household to household, but it also manifests itself on a national level, and at the level of the nation state, and it's not an accident that settler colonial states take it upon themselves to imagine themselves to be the living embodiment of the legitimacy of the nation state as a political and social form. For me, there's two reasons to be in solidarity with the people of Palestine. One is because they're human beings and they're being treated with absolute brutality, but the other is that there's a specific resistance to Israel as a nation state. And for my money, to be perfectly clear about this, I believe that this nation state of Israel is itself an artifact of antisemitism. If we thought about Israel and Zionism, not just as a form of racism that results in the displacement of Palestinians, but if we also think about them as artifacts of the historic displacement of Jews from Europe, right, in the same way that we might think of, let's say Sierra Leone or Liberia as artifacts of racist displacement, okay. If we think about it that way, okay, and another, and the reason I'm saying this is just to make sure that you know that there's a possible argument against the formulation that criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic when we know that Donald Trump is a staunch supporter, that people like Pat Robertson in the United States are staunch supporters that help us to the fact that you can be deeply anti-Semitic and support the state of Israel. These things go together. They're not antithetical to one another. So that it becomes important for us to be able to suggest that resistance to the state of Israel is also resistance to the idea of the legitimacy of the nation state. It's not an accident that Israel has taken upon itself, that when Israel takes upon itself, when the defense of Israel manifests itself as a defense of its right to exist, this is important. It's a defense, not just of Israel's right to exist, but of the nation state as a political form’s right to exist. And nation states don't have rights. What they're supposed to be are mechanisms to protect the rights of the people who live in them, and that has almost never been the case, and to the extent that they do protect the rights of the people who live in them, it's in the expense, it's at the expense of the people who don't, okay. So part of what's at stake, one of the reasons why it's at, it's important to pay particular attention to this issue, why we ought to resist the ridiculous formulation that singling out Israel at this moment is itself anti-Semitic is because it's important to recognize that Israel is the state. [KELLEY: Right.] MOTEN: For reasons that I think are totally bound up with antisemitism, right? Israel is the state that, insofar as it makes the claim about its right to exist, is also making the claim about the nation state’s right to exist as such. It's this, it's that same kind of argument that, I remembered the—and I'm sorry to keep going on so long, but there's—there's those formulations that people often make about Black people in it or indigenous people as if they were the essence of the human, right, so that every time Black people or indigenous people do something that supposedly we're not supposed to do, it constitutes a violation to the very idea of the human. Right, because somehow as a function of the nobility of our suffering, we constitute the very idea of humanity, right? And there's nothing more brutal, right? Nothing more vicious than having been being consigned to that position. Similarly, Israel as a function of anti-Semitism has now been placed in the position of protecting the very idea of the nation state. So for me, first and foremost, it's important to have solidarity with the Palestinian people, but second of all, it's important to actually have some solidarity with the Jewish people insofar as they can and must be separated from the Israeli state because ultimately the fate of the Jewish people, if it is tied to this, to the nation state of Israel, will be more brutal than anything that has yet been done or can be imagined, and I mean everything that you think I mean when I say that.

### Link—Anti-Blackness—Fungibility

#### Antiblackness isn’t historically calcified and their reading runs counter to the Black radical tradition.

Kelley, 17—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE>, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

### Link—Anti-Blackness—Mbembe

#### The aff mythologizes whiteness, which denies the history of Black radical activism in favor of violent reactionary tendencies. This replicates anti-Black violence and shuts down communal existence.

Mbembe 15. Achille Mbembe, “Achille Mbembe on The State of South African Political Life,” Africa As A Country, September 19, 2015, http://africasacountry.com/2015/09/achille-mbembe-on-the-state-of-south-african-politics/

The old politics of waiting is therefore gradually replaced by a new politics of impatience and, if necessary, of disruption. Brashness, disruption and a new anti-decorum ethos are meant to bring down the pretence of normality and the logics of normalization in this most “abnormal” society.  Steve Biko, Frantz Fanon and a plethora of black feminist, queer, postcolonial, decolonial and critical race theorists are being reloaded in the service of a new form of militancy less accommodationist and more trenchant both in form and content.

The age of impatience is an age when a lot is said – all sorts of things we had hardly heard about during the last twenty years; some ugly, outrageous, toxic things, including calls for murder, atrocious things that speak to everything except to the project of freedom, in this age of fantasy and hysteria, when the gap between psychic realities and actual material realities has never been so wide, and the digital world only serves as an amplifier of every single moment, event and accident.

The age of urgency is also an age when new wounded bodies erupt and undertake to actually occupy spaces they used to simply haunt. They are now piling up, swearing and cursing, speaking with excrements, asking to be heard.

They speak in allegories and analogies – the “colony”, the “plantation”, the “house Negro”, the “field Negro”, blurring all boundaries, embracing confusion, mixing times and spaces, at the risk of anachronism.

They are claiming all kinds of rights – the right to violence; the right to disrupt and jam that which is parading as normal; the right to insult, intimidate and bully those who do not agree with them; the right to be angry, enraged; the right to go to war in the hope of recovering what was lost through conquest; the right to hate, to wreak vengeance, to smash something, it doesn’t matter what, as long as it looks “white”.

All these new “rights” are supposed to achieve one thing we are told the 1994 “peaceful settlement” did not achieve – decolonization and retributive justice, the only way to restore a  modicum of dignity to victims of the injuries of yesterday and today.

Demythologizing whiteness

And yet, some hard questions must be asked.

Why are we invested in turning whiteness, pain and suffering into such erotogenic objects?

Could it be that the concentration of our libido on whiteness, pain and suffering is after all typical of the narcissistic investments so privileged by this neoliberal age?

To frame the issues in these terms does not mean embracing a position of moral relativism. How could it be? After all, in relation to our history, too many lives were destroyed in the name of whiteness. Furthermore, the structural repetition of past sufferings in the present is beyond any reasonable doubt.  Whiteness as a necrophiliac power structure and a primary shaper of a global system of unequal redistribution of life chances will not die a natural death.

But to properly engineer its death – and thus the end of the nightmare it has been for a large portion of the humanity – we urgently need to demythologize it.

If we fail to properly demythologize whiteness, whiteness – as the machine in which a huge portion of the humanity has become entangled in spite of itself – will end up claiming us.

As a result of whiteness having claimed us; as a result of having let ourselves be possessed by it in the manner of an evil spirit, we will inflict upon ourselves injuries of which whiteness, at its most ferocious, would scarcely have been capable.

Indeed for whiteness to properly operate as the destructive force it is in the material sphere, it needs to capture its victim’s imagination and turn it into a poison well of hatred.

For victims of white racism to hold on to the things that truly matter, they must incessantly fight against the kind of hatred which never fails to destroy, in the first instance, the man or woman who hates while leaving the structure of whiteness itself intact.

As a poisonous fiction that passes for a fact, whiteness seeks to institutionalize itself as an event by any means necessary. This it does by colonizing the entire realms of desire and of the imagination.

To demythologize whiteness, it will not be enough to force “bad whites” into silence or into confessing guilt and/or complicity. This is too cheap.

To puncture and deflate the fictions of whiteness will require an entirely different regime of desire, new approaches in the constitution of material, aesthetic and symbolic capital, another discourse on value, on what matters and why.

The demythologization of whiteness also requires that we develop a more complex understanding of South African versions of whiteness here and now.

This is the only country on Earth in which a revolution took place which resulted in not one single former oppressor losing anything. In order to keep its privileges intact in the post-1994 era, South African whiteness has sought to intensify its capacity to invest in what we should call the resources of the offshore.  It has attempted to fence itself off, to re-maximize its privileges through self-enclaving and the logics of privatization.  These logics of offshoring and self-enclaving are typical of this neoliberal age.

The unfolding new/old trial of whiteness won’t produce much if whites are forced into a position in which the only thing they are ever allowed to say in our public sphere is: “Look, I am so sorry”.

It won’t produce much if through our actions and modes of thinking, we end up forcing back into the white ghetto those whites who have spent most of their lives trying to fight against the dominant versions of whiteness we so abhor.

Furthermore, we must take seriously the fact that “to be black” in South Africa now is not exactly the same as “to be black” in Europe or in the Americas.

After all, we are the majority here. Of course to be a majority is a bit more than the simple expression of numbers. But surely something has to be made out of this sheer weight of numbers. We can use this numerical force to create different dominant standards by which our society live; paradigms of what truly matters and why; entirely new social forms; new imaginaries of interior life and the life of the mind.

We are also in control of arguably the most powerful State on the African Continent. This is a State that wields enormous financial and economic power. In theory, not much prevents it from redirecting the flows of wealth in its hands in entirely new trajectories. As it has been done in places such as Malaysia or Singapore, something has to be made out of this sheer amount of wealth – something more creative and more decisive than our hapless “black economic empowerment” schemes the main function of which is to sustain the lifestyles of the new élite.

The neurotic misery of our age

Finally, it is crucial for us to understand that we are a bit more than just “suffering subjects”. “Social death” is not the defining feature of our history. The fact is that we are still here – of course at a very high price and most likely in a terrible state, but we are here.

We are here – and hopefully we will be here for a very long time – not as anybody else’s creation, but as our own-creation.

To demythologize whiteness is to dry up the mythic, symbolic and immaterial resources without which it can no longer dabble in self-righteousness or in the morbid delight with which, as James Baldwin put it, it contemplates “the extent and power of its own wickedness.” It is to not be put in a position in which we die hating somebody else.

On the other hand, politicizing pain is not the same thing as advocating dolorism. In fact, it must be galling to put ourselves in a position such that those who look at us cannot but pity us victims.

One way of destroying white racism is to prevent whiteness from becoming a deep fantasmatic object of our unconscious.

We need to let go off our libidinal investments in whiteness if we are to squarely confront the dilemmas of white privilege. Baldwin understood this better than any other thinker. “In order really to hate white people”, he wrote, “one has to blot so much out of the mind – and the heart – that this hatred itself becomes an exhausting and self-destructive pose” (Notes of a Native Son, 112).

This is what we have to find out for ourselves – in a black majority country in which blacks are in power, what is the cost of our attachment to whiteness, this mirror object of our fear and our envy, our hate and our attraction, our repulsion and our aspirations?

Part of what racism has always tried to do is to damage its victims’ capacity to help themselves. For instance, racism has encouraged its victims to perceive themselves as powerless, that is, as victims even when they were actively engaged in myriad acts of self-assertion.

Ironically among the emerging black middle class, current narratives of selfhood and identity are saturated by the tropes of pain and suffering. The latter have become the register through which many now represent themselves to themselves and to the world. To give account of who they are, or to explain themselves and their behavior to others, they increasingly tend to frame their life stories in terms of how much they have been injured by the forces of racism, bigotry and patriarchy.

Often under the pretext that the personal is political, this type of autobiographical and at times self-indulgent “petit bourgeois” discourse has replaced structural analysis. Personal feelings now suffice. There is no need to mount a proper argument.  Not only wounds and injuries can’t they be shared, their interpretation  cannot be challenged by any known rational discourse. Why? Because, it is alleged, black experience transcends human vocabulary to the point where it cannot be named.

This kind of argument is dangerous.

The self is made at the point of encounter with an Other. There is no self that is limited to itself.

The Other is our origin by definition.

What makes us human is our capacity to share our condition – including our wounds and injuries – with others.

Anticipatory politics – as opposed to retrospective politics – is about reaching out to others. It is never about self-enclosure.

The best of black radical thought has been about how we make sure that in the work of repair, certain compensations do not become pathological phenomena.

It has been about nurturing the capacity to resume a human life in the aftermath of irreparable loss.

Invoking Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko and countless others will come to nothing if this ethics of becoming-with-others is not the cornerstone of the new cycle of struggles.

There will be no plausible critique of whiteness, white privilege, white monopoly capitalism that does not start from the assumption that whiteness has become this accursed part of ourselves we are deeply attached to, in spite of it threatening our own very future well-being.

### Link—Black Disability

#### Their overly metaphysical reading of Black disability precludes the opportunity for reclamation of human categories.

Goodley, et al, 20—iHuman, School of Education, UK (Dan, with Rebecca Lawthom, Kirsty Liddiard, and Katherine Runswick-Cole, “The Desire for New Humanisms,” Journal of Disability Studies in Education, July 29, 2020, dml)

Humanness is already brutally defined in white, male, Eurocentric terms that are optimally middle-class (see also Greene Wade, 2017). The clash of the anti-colonial struggle is, for Wynter, the desire to challenge the belief system on which our societies are founded; the belief that ‘the fact of blackness is a fact of inferiority and that of whiteness a fact of superiority’ (Wynter quoted in Scott, 2000: 132). The Other – the jobless, poor and Black (and to which we would add disabled) – are afforded a ‘narratively condemned status’ (Wynter, 1992: 18). The normative order of what it is to be human – this is the normalcy of the human category – is defined through whiteness and coloniality. And the Other to this normative sameness is not simply a passive opposite, a benign hidden referent nor powerless empty identity position. And, just as importantly, those that sit in the gaps left by binaries live as liminal identities (ones associated with deviance) and hold promise – as ‘existential liminalities’ that speak from the margins (Wynter, in Scott, 2000: 149) … to create new imaginaries (Ibid:153) and new humanisms. For Gilroy (2018: 7) this reclaiming of humanness from colonial humanist moorings (that frame and misrecognise blackness in decidedly infrahuman ways) is one significant postcolonial imperative (Gilroy, 2018: 7). In other words, ‘how might we become more comprehensively estranged from the Anthropos in the Anthropocene in order to salvage a different, and perhaps re-enchanted human?’ (Gilroy, 2018: 12)? How might we, following Wynter, secure ‘the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves’? (Wynter, 2003: 260). The answer offered is a productive one ‘a cautious, post-humanist humanism capable of grasping the relationship between human and non-human is beginning to take shape’ (Gilroy, 2018: 16). And this politicisation struggles ‘to endow a sense of reciprocal humanity in Europe’s proliferating encounters with vulnerable otherness’ (Gilroy, 2018: 19) in the search for new humanisms in ‘the ongoing work of salvaging imperilled humanity from the mounting wreckage’ (20).

We share this ambition to seek out new humanisms in our posthuman times. This might involve us rethinking traditional or normative idealisations of politics, resistance and activism. And it should definitely start from the premise that Black, postcolonial and Critical Disability Studies are already working the edges of the posthuman condition. The work of Greene-Wade (2017) is useful here as it draws attention to the workings of virtual-physical assemblages found in the Twitter activism associated with. Green-Wade (2017) explains #Blacklivesmatter as an example of viral blackness. This she argues provides one example of a new genre of being human that challenges hegemonic technologies of the self. The potency of #Blacklivesmatter was its ability to disrupt the notion of humans as purely organic/genetic content and, instead, reboot Black humanities through the practices of virtual-physical assemblages that subverted social hierarchies and placed the needs and desires of Black bodies at the centre of this twitter activism. Viral Blackness is but one example of new humanisms being refashioned in the posthuman circulations of social media.

Just as Black Studies and activism should inspire us to reach out for new human relations and formations of the human then we should also draw in the contributions of critical disability studies. Questions of the human have always been central to the politics of disability. And we write this observation at a poignant time in the history of critical disability studies. The death of one of the founding fathers of the social model of disability – Professor Mike Oliver – in 2019 has inevitably unleashed numerous obituaries and declarations of gratitude to his important work. Like the postcolonial scholarship of writers such as Fanon and Wynter, Oliver’s work can be historically judged as a defining moment in critical writing by disabled people, for disabled people, in social, economic and cultural conditions that denigrated and threatened to erase the lives, contributions and ontologies of disabled people. Oliver was a Marxist but also drew upon Neo-Marxist theories such as Gramsci and Althusser in order to interrogate the normative hegemony of capitalist society that upheld the dominance of non-disabled people and pathologised the lives of disabled people (Oliver, 1990, 1992. 1993a, 1993b, 1996). Just as Wynter and Fanon demanded us to consider the ways in which Black humanness is forced to misrecognise itself as not fully human in the (post) colonial registers of contemporary normative culture, so Oliver (1990) illuminated the alienation experienced by disabled people as a consequence of ideologies of individualism associated with non-disabled ontologies and ways of life. In his 1990 book Politics of Disablement Oliver described the physical, economic and material barriers to normative citizenship experienced by disabled people in education, work and their communities. People with physical, sensory and cognitive impairments are disabled – not by their bodies or minds – but by a capitalist society that excludes them from its labour and consumption. Moreover, disabled people become essential objects of normative human welfare services and systems: creating an industry of professionals (including psychologists, special educators, social workers, rehabilitative consultants, counsellors) whose main role is the restoration of normality (to get disabled people as near to normal as possible). Oliver’s work built upon the intellectual legacy left by disabled activists such as Paul Hunt. In A Critical Condition, Hunt’s famous chapter in his acclaimed edited book Stigma (1966), he writes:

An impaired and deformed body is a ‘difference’ that hits everyone hard at first. Inevitably it produces an instinctive revulsion, has a disturbing effect … The disabled person’s ‘strangeness’ can manifest and symbolize all differences between human beings … for the able-bodied, normal world we are representatives of many of the things they most fear – tragedy, loss, dark and the unknown. Involuntarily, we walk – or more often sit – in the valley of the shadow of death … a deformed and paralysed body attacks everyone’s sense of well-being and invincibility. Hunt, 1966: 151–156

Like Blackness, disability is understood in terms of the failings and failures of humanist humanity. But what is so enthralling to us is the idea that these failings can be rewritten as a politicised gift, as evidenced by the quotations from Hunt and Fanon that we present together below:

For the disabled person with a fair intelligence or other gifts, perhaps the greatest temptation is to try to use them just to escape from his disabledness, to buy himself a place in the sun, a share in the illusory normal world where all is light and pleasure and happiness … But if we deny our special relation to the dark in this way, we shall have ceased to recognise our most important asset as disabled people in society – the uncomfortable, subversive position from which we act as a living reproach to any scale of values that puts attributes or possessions beyond the person. Hunt, 1966: 158–159

Black consciousness is immanent in its own eyes. I am not a potentiality of something. I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the universal … My negro consciousness does not hold itself out as lack. It is. Fanon, 1993: 135

How might we reclaim new humanisms in these posthuman times that celebrate and harness the politics of Blackness and disability? What social models of disability can be developed that build on disability’s ‘special relation to the dark’ shadows of normative humanism? In what ways can education, educators, teachers and learners engage together in new humanist projects that foreground the aspirations of those human beings who are often negated by ethno-class able-bodied-and-minded man?

3 Six New Humanist Projects for Disability Studies and Education

Thus far we have exposed the problematics inherent within normative conceptions of the humanist human and have provided critical responses from the fields. We have broadly conceived of these fields as postcolonial and critical disability studies. Like Erevelles (2012) we are encouraged by the offerings of these perspectives; especially when they are brought together for generative reasons. We want to now consider the implications and applications of our analyses for research, scholarship and engagement in the areas of (critical) disability studies and education: the very focus of this journal. We posit six new humanist projects. We are taken with the possibilities of thinking through, with and across postcolonial and critical disability studies. Like Titchkosky (2015) we are excited by the possibilities of bringing together these potentially radical and disruptive modes of transformational thinking but, at the same time, are conscious of the frictional demands of each approach. It would be a mistake to assume that postcolonial and critical disability studies do not create fits of pique within one another. Moreover, one might argue that studies of disability have lacked racialised analyses – assuming whiteness (Miles et al., 2017) – while postcolonial scholarship continues to unproblematically draw on a host of disabling metaphors (Titchkosky, 2015). We acknowledge these limitations at the same time as we propose six new humanist intersectional projects.

The first project relates to subjecting the normative, the hegemonic and the taken-for-granted to sustained analysis and critique. Following Wynter (2006: 112), just as there is a need to exoticize Western thought – to render the familiar strange – so there is an urgent need to exoticize normative humanistic conceptions of valued humanness. This means, then, exoticizing the educational status quo. It means gathering penetrating insights gained from a ‘wide range of globally subordinated peoples’ (Wynter, 2006: 112). We would want to ask: what is this strange, freakish, normative education system that upholds the authority of a certain kind of learner; the white, middle class, heterosexual, reasonable, speaking-a-standard language, living in towns, Western European, settler subject with a deep rooted colonial ancestry (following Braidotti, 2002, 2013; Slater, 2015)?

The second project: endlessly acknowledge and address the ways in which educational systems impose a collective ontological sense of ‘wrongness of being’ (Wynter, 2006) upon disabled children and young people. When kindergartens, schools, colleges and universities are designed with non-disabled, autonomous, independent, white, capable, isolated, self-sufficient learners in mind then there is a risk that such normative conceptions of the human rewrite their hidden referents associated with disabled, dependent, non-white, incapable, reliant Human Others. How often do we hear from disabled children and young people that they ‘do not belong’ in educational settings? These are not simply calls for recognition. They are calling out the alienating tendencies of educational institutions that actively resist the contributions of students who fail to fit the normative human that is implicitly centred in those institutions as the kinds of human beings we deal with here.

The third project is: promote the sociogeny of disability and education. Sociogeny is a concept developed by Fanon (1993) – and one elaborated by Wynter (2003) – that refers to the study of the development of a social phenomenon. In counter-distinction to phylogeny (the study of evolution of the species) and ontogeny (the biological development of an individual organism) – a sociogeny unpacks the social, historical and cultural constitution of race and humanness (see Gagne, 2007 for a helpful overview). Do not assume that education nor disability nor Blackness are pre-social, apolitical, objective, independent, universal phenomena. They are anything but this. When we read disability in through the methodologies of phylogeny or ontogeny we reduce disability to stories of evolution or biology.1 Disability is fundamentally a social, cultural, political and psycho-social phenomenon through and through; and requires, therefore, sociogeny as a response.

### Link—Black Feminism

#### Prioritizing theoretical parochialism over material activism aligns more with misogynoir than with the historical tradiction of Black women’s activism.

Harvell, 10—Professor in the theology department at Pennsylvania State University, Abington College (Valeria, “Afrocentric Humanism and African American Women’s Humanizing Activism,” Journal of Black Studies, Volume 40, Number 6, July 2010, 1052-1074, dml)

Delores Williams (1997) is correct when she asserts that African American women “[struggled] along with Black men and children for the liberation, survival and positive quality of life for our entire oppressed Black community” (p. 97). But Black women’s liberation-humanization struggles did not always follow the same pathways as those travelled by Black men: always the same destination, perhaps but, at times, by a different route. Tiyi Morris (2003) captures what made Black women’s activism distinctive when she notes that it was based on their “experiences as women and mothers in their families and communities” and that it “[evolved] from a perspective that [recognized] the multiple oppressions” they faced as Black women (p. 49). Through the simultaneous interaction of gender, race, and class, Black women have acquired what has been termed a “multiple consciousness,” a triad of cognitive processing skills based on experience, from which has emerged a multifaceted critique of oppression and, in turn, a multidimensional view of liberation and humanization (Collins, 1990, 1998; Joseph, 1995; King, 1988/1990; Riggs, 1994).

To illustrate, Harding’s (1983) narration of the “Great Tradition of Black Protest” is brimming with examples of how Black men, both in word and deed, defended such principles as the rights of self-determination and dignity, presumably on behalf of all African Americans. There are other historical studies (e.g., Adler, 1992; Austin, 2006; Carby, 1998; Collins, 1992; Dubey, 1994; Gaines, 1996; Giddings, 1984; Jordan-Zachery, 2007; Ling & Monteith, 1999), however, that indicate that the men from this “Great Tradition” fought for Blacks’ rights, needs, and interests, to be sure, but mainly in terms of patriarchal prerogatives alone.

In contrast, African American women declared that the rights of all of human beings were “sacred and inviolable,” regardless of the person’s sex, race, country, or condition (Cooper, 1893/1976, p. 330). Some of the earliest examples on record of how African Americans, in general, used the “power of Word” to guide and justify their quest for liberation, in fact, came from religious Black women who denounced efforts to make God’s graces selective. Beginning in the 19th century, there were Black women who, in the midst of fierce opposition and with “heavenly zeal” (Elizabeth, 1863/1988, p. 11), preached an egalitarian Gospel, with emphasis on the belief that “the Saviour died for the woman as well as the man” (Lee, 1836/1986, p. 36). Historian Betty Collier-Thomas’s (1998) analysis of sermons by African American women preachers of the 19th and 20th centuries highlights the fact that some of these women attempted to demonstrate that neither the Gospel nor the Holy Spirit showed any race or gender partiality.

Relying on “a plethora of supernatural abilities as sources of their spiritual and social empowerment,” Gayle Tate (2003, p. 172) claims that these early 19th century Black women evangelists went forth “with the dual mission of converting souls and spearheading a new social consciousness” (p. 177). Through their “proselytizing and protest in the larger society,” these Black women evangelists challenged both racial and gender oppression (p. 177), and they were “openly combative in challenging... ecclesiastical sexism” (p. 181).

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Black women continued to challenge those religious institutions where, purportedly, the equality, uniqueness, and worthiness of each individual were considered sacred (Mitchell & Lewter, 1986, pp. 93, 112).4 In studies of Black Baptist churchwomen during this period, Evelyn Higginbotham (1993, p. 120) reports that they developed an inclusive theology that stressed equal gender participation. They attempted to apply the “principle of human equality and dignity under God” to encompass both racial and gender concerns (Higginbotham, 1996, p. 150). Moreover, these women “found scriptural precedents for expanding women’s rights” in both the secular and sacred arenas (Higginbotham, 1993, p. 120). Similar trends have been found in other denominations as well (e.g., Dodson, 1988; Gilkes, 2001, chaps. 3 to 5), all of which reflect not only the influence of religion on Black women’s unique interpretation of the liberation-humanization central theme but also the specific forms of political activism aimed at transforming one institution—the church.

Black women have well understood that the liberation of the whole person and the humanization of the entire society require the transformation of institutions and the elimination of race and sex discrimination. Writes Rossetta Ross (1997), they relied

on what they understood as God’s provisions in their lives, the women demonstrated fidelity to God by routinely working hard and taking risks as they sought to change repressive traditions, institutions and social conventions that generally hampered the well-being of African Americans. (p. 41)

Beyond the mere rhetoric of inclusiveness, however, Black women’s clubs, societies, associations, and auxiliaries usually reflected in fact both a “race conscious and gender-centered” approach to community service. “For club women, race and women’s rights were one issue” (D. G. White, 1999, p. 68). They insisted on a more holistic interpretation and application of “liberation,” one that included men, women, and children (e.g., Gilkes, 2001; Higginbotham, 1993; Riggs, 1994; Springer, 1999). As activist Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin, a national leader of the 19th century Black women’s club movement, declared, “Our woman’s movement is a woman’s movement in that it is led and directed by women for the good of women and men, for the benefit of all humanity [italics added]” (quoted in Carby, 1987, p. 117).

Examples abound which show that Ruffin was expressing a general sentiment felt and acted on by most Black women club participants. For instance, according to author Lillian Williams (1995), the Black women’s clubs operating in Buffalo, New York, between 1900 and 1940

addressed the subordinate status to which blacks, especially women and children, had been consigned and so they worked with black men to redress their grievances as blacks and women. These women saw themselves as critical links in a social movement designed to liberate the black community from second-class citizenship. Their participation in community liberation struggles was a means of empowerment for them as individuals. (p. 521, italics added)

Speaking on the roles of the Independent Order of Saint Luke women of Richmond, Virginia—a group spearheaded by Maggie Walker—Elsa Brown (1989/1990) noted that they “challenged notions in the black community about the proper role of women; they challenged notions in the white community about the proper place of blacks” (p. 194). Most importantly, they “strove to create an equalitarian organization” (p. 193), one that emphasized “collective consciousness and collective responsibility” to the family and community (p. 182).

Among the first and most significant contributions African American women made to the humanistic motif was their enduring effort to reclaim and reassert its holistic meaning, one that resonated with the original equalitarian principles and social inclusivity of African humanism. Jacqueline Royster (2000) contends that Black women were also able to sustain a “wholeness”—“a psychic wholeness forged at great cost but in the interest of the health and prosperity of community for which they felt responsible. Hard-won strengths of spirit became a well-spring for activism, advocacy, and action” (p. 113). Inclusivity of vision and practical activities were their hallmarks of the past and their bountiful legacy for the future.

Analyzing the ethical teachings from several worldwide religions but with a particular emphasis on the meaning of the “ethical practice of service” as presented in the sacred writings from Africa, Karenga (2008) draws several noteworthy conclusions. He opines that the ethics of service means bringing, sustaining, and increasing the good in the world and the “building and maintaining of structures” or frameworks that advance “the practice of service, especially to the poor, less powerful, the ill, the aged, the disabled and those disadvantaged by a system of oppression in the world” (pp. 34-35, 45). No other group in America has had less of the material world but worked harder at fulfilling these imperatives than African American women. As Fannie Williams (1896-1897/1997a) makes abundantly clear, Black women were “bent on making their goodness felt wherever good influence is needed” (p. 114):

Benevolence [was] the essence of most of the colored women’s organizations. The humane side of their natures has been cultivated to recognize the duties they owe to the sick, the indigent and ill-fortuned. No church, school, or charitable institution for the special use of colored people has been allowed to languish or fail when the associated efforts of the women could save it. (F. B. Williams, 1893/1976, pp. 273-274, italics added)

Writing on “The Awakening of [Black] Women” to the “their importance in all things” pertaining to “the social betterment of the Negro race,” F. B. Williams (1896-1897/1997a) explains the attitudes and beliefs that guided their service to the race:

The supreme thing is the spirit of duty, the enthusiasm for action, and the untrammeled sympathy. By sympathy is not meant that far-away, kid-gloved and formal something that enables women merely to know of those who need them, but that deeper more spiritual impulse to helpfulness that will enable them to find delight in working with, rather than for, the unfortunate of their sex. In social reforms we must see but one thing, and that is the vivid soul of humanity—that divinity which neither rags, dirt nor immoralities can entirely obscure. (p. 114)

F. B. Williams (1900/1997b) also vividly details the inhumane conditions visited on the poor, the weak, and the most vulnerable, which, in fact, propelled Black women into action:

The incentive [to organize] in most cases was quite simple and direct. How to help and protect some defenseless and tempted young women; how to aid some poor boy to complete a much-coveted education; how to lengthen the short school term in some improvised school district; how to instruct and interest deficient mothers in the difficulties of child training are some of the motives that led to the formation of the great majority of these clubs. These were the first out-reachings of sympathy and fellowship felt by women whose lives had been narrowed by the petty concerns of the struggle for existence and removed by human cruelty from all the harmonies of freedom, love and aspiration. (p. 121)

After examining a host of Black women’s clubs and voluntary associations that developed at the local, state, and national levels, Gerda Lerner (1974) summarizes,

The impulse for organizing arose wherever an urgent social need remained unmet [italics added]. Most frequently, women’s clubs were formed in order to provide kindergartens, nursery schools or day care centers for black children. The virtual absence of social welfare institutions in many Southern communities, and the frequent exclusion of Blacks from those that existed, led black women to found orphanages, old folks’ homes and similar institutions. (p. 159)

What Lerner describes was characteristic of the type of broad-based humanistic activities in which Black women frequently engaged during the 19th and 20th centuries, an important part of Black history that has been well documented for decades. Darlene Clarke Hine (1994) notes,

In virtually every city and rural community in the twentieth-century America there existed an organized grouping of black women, often led by a cadre of elite educated black middle-class matrons. . . . Almost every black women’s club, regardless of who founded it or the ostensible reason for its establishment, focused to some extent on alleviating one or more of the many social problems afflicting an increasingly urban, impoverished, politically powerless, and segregated black population. (p. 15)

Hine (1994) goes on to conclude that the “philanthropic work of nineteenthand early-twentieth-century African American women ensured the survival of many of the most vulnerable members of the black population” (p. 109).

Although many African America women’s clubs and associations frequently framed their raison d’être around home and family, they were equally involved waging broader battles for political and economic justice on behalf of the entire Black community. Among the prominent issues undertaken were economic exploitation, political disenfranchisement, segregation, lynching, educational inequities, slum landlords, rent gouging, deficient sanitation systems, and inadequate health facilities (e.g., A. D. Gordon, 1997; Hine, 1994; Hodges, 2000; Perkins, 1981; Scott, 1990; Springer, 1999). Any new development or event with the potential of alternately improving or adversely affecting the quality of life for Blacks became an area of concern and an arena of activism for African American women. Paradoxically, these early reform initiatives designed and intended to help the Black community later proved beneficial and supportive to poor and working-class White families as well.

The wide-ranging, ever-expanding record of activities of the African American woman—to labor both within the home and without, to educate, to nurture, to empower, transcending adversity and improving, with limited resources, her environment and community—is unmatched in history. Jualyne Dodson and Cheryl Gilkes (1986) argue convincingly,

The ties that bind the black community together exist primarily because of the vigilant action of black women. . . . The overwhelming importance and pivotal position of black women in all aspects of community organization— education, civil rights, organized labor, business, politics, religion, the professions, and club work—earned them the greatest accolades and the most pernicious stereotypes. . . . [The] black women of the twentieth century were the source of community endurance—“the something within that holdeth the reins”—enabling black people to resist and to hope. (p. 81)

By combining the communal and humanistic ethos from their African past with their own interpretation of the Scriptures, African American women were able to fashioned that “something within” that fueled their zeal to serve and uplift the community. Dodson and Gilkes (1986) reinforce this point well when they state,

If anything characterizes the role of black women in religion in America, it is the successful extension of their individual sense of regeneration, release, redemption, and spiritual liberation to a collective ethos of struggle for and with the entire black community. (p. 81)

African American women saw themselves in relationship to the whole community and directed their sociopolitical activities accordingly. They created countless organizations and religious associations committed to the collective survival of Black people, including willy-nilly their families, their children, their men, and their neighbors. In their role as caretaker of the home, family, church, school, and community, African American women were the ones who nurtured the race and helped build life itself in the mist of bondage, Jim and Jane Crowism, lynching, chronic unemployment, poverty, rape, assaults, insults, and rampant discrimination. Perhaps better than their brethren, they understood that “if survival were to be on a human and not merely an animal level” (Harding, 1983, p. 51), then life must be adorned and infused with integrity, love, hope, dreams, and joy, in spite of the despotic system and cruel conditions they confronted. They labored not only to sustain but also to embellish life with whatever meager resources they had at their disposal or could wrest from a selfish “land of plenty.” They also labored mightily to bestow on their families and race hope, dignity, and pride and to preserve and transmit the same life-affirming values to the next generation.

### Link—Framework

#### The only role of the ballot is to signify the winner of the game—using it for other purposes, or creatively bending the rules to re-orient pedagogy, fails and reproduces the failures of modernity in comparatively more insidious ways as long as it’s tied to competitive incentives—the system may be unsustainable but we shouldn’t uncritically hasten its demise—you should err towards learning from the shortcomings of debate while recuperating the tools of self-reflection and alternative-building that it can still provide us.

**Andreotti, et al, 15**—University of British Columbia (Vanessa de Oliviera, with Sharon Stein, Cash Ahenakew, and Dallas Hunt, “Mapping interpretations of decolonization in the context of higher education,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 4, No. 1, 2015, pp. 21-40 2015, dml)

System walk out (alternatives ‘with guarantees’) **enunciates a commitment to develop alternatives** to modernity that **will not reproduce its violences**. Alternative communities and epistemologies are **developed** or **reclaimed in spaces** that may be **external** or **marginal** to mainstream institutions, either as **supplementary**, **transitional**, or **wholesale alternatives**. While ‘walking out’ often leads to remarkably creative and generative spaces, these spaces **may nonetheless reproduce** at least some of the **same problems as modernity**, as they are **still broadly situated within its teleological grammar**, particularly in its **dialectically structured desire for an uncontaminated ‘outside’**. This focus on alternatives ‘with guarantees’ tends to **support the same affective investments** (e.g. in **fixed teleologies**, **normativity**, **consensus**, and **innocence**) and can lead to the **foreclosure of the complexities** and **complicities** that arise in the **making of alternatives**.

System hacking involves **creating spaces within the system**, **using its resources**, where people can be **educated about the violences of the system** and **have their desires re-oriented away from it**. This requires ‘**playing the game**’ of institutions at the same time that **rules are bent to generate alternative outcomes**. This strategy can also be remarkably creative and generative; however, it can be **difficult to recognize** when one is ‘**hacking**’ the system or ‘**being hacked**’ by it. In addition, like system walk outs, the **risk of reproducing modernity’s violence precisely when one is trying to move beyond it remains high** as the success of initiatives is **measured in identifiable outcomes**, and identities may become **scripted around vanguardist heroism** that **inadvertently recentres individuals**.

In contrast to system walk out, system ‘hospicing’ recognizes that although ultimately new systems are necessary, alternatives articulated from within modernity’s frames will tend to reproduce it. In identifying modernity’s metaphysical enclosures, hospicing problematizes the desire to embrace or reject modernity as a form of desire where modern subjects demand the world conform to our will (Silva, 2014). Instead, **hospicing** would entail **sitting with a system in decline**, **learning from its history**, **offering palliative care**, **seeing oneself in that which is dying**, **attending to the integrity of the process**, dealing with tantrums, incontinence, anger and hopelessness, ‘cleaning up’, and **clearing the space for something new**. This is unlikely to be a glamorous process; it will entail many frustrations, an uncertain timeline, and unforeseeable outcomes without guarantees.

Our definition of hospicing entails three different insights. One, that the modern global capitalist system is **unsustainable**, and that it is **already collapsing**. Two, that our **current languages**, **identities** and **sense-making** are **inescapably historically connected** to it. Three, that we need to be **properly taught by the system’s successes** and **failures** by **facing its death** and **attending to its affliction** rather than **turning our back** or **attempting to murder it before it is ready to go**. Hospicing enacts a **willingness to learn enough** from the **(re)current mistakes of the current system** in order to **make different mistakes** in **caring for the arrival of something new**. Going through the pains of this death, and **recognizing we have been both bewildered** and **enchanted** by the mythology of the Enlightenment, may be the **only way we can really understand** the depth of modernity’s limits (within us) and **recognize its real gifts**.

Hospicing demands a critique that is **self-implicated rather than heroic**, **vanguardist** or ‘**innocent**’. It demands a kind of courage that is un-neurotic (**not invested in self-affirmation**): a kind of courage that helps us to **look the bull in the eye**, to **recognize ourselves in the bull**, and to **see the bull as a teacher**, **precisely when it is trying to kill us**. In practice, this means that **experimenting with alternatives** is perceived as **important not for generating predetermined solutions**, but rather as a **means to be taught by the successes** and **failures of the experimentation process**. These teachings are **indispensible** for **exploring the depths** of the existing system, and for **learning to discern between its poisons** and its **medicines**. In this space, the effects of violence and pain are attended to; at the same time that there is also an acute attention to the roots and mechanisms of the disease so that its death **leaves a legacy of prudence** that **grounds the emergence of something radically new** and **potentially wiser**. We represent this possibility as a question mark in our forth space where other modes of existence grounded on different cosmologies operate. The question mark indicates that these are **unintelligible** to those **entrapped in the metaphysics of modernity** (which **does not mean** they are **separate from our experience**, or **beyond meaning** and **understanding**).

### Link—Futurity

#### Organizing around futurity is important in order to create opportunities for marginalized communities to flourish.

Kuttner, 17—Education Partnership Manager & Director for Community Engaged Scholarship, University Neighborhood Partners, University of Utah (Paul, “Futurism, Futurity, and the Importance of the Existential Imagination,” <http://culturalorganizing.org/futurism-futurity/>, dml)

Organizers and activists also seem to be taking an increased interest in the future. In 2015, the Movement for Black Lives and Huffington Post launched an annual celebration of Black Futures Month, a remixing of Black History Month that calls on people to “seize the opportunity to change the course of history by shaping our future.” That same year, AK press put out Octavia’s Brood, an engrossing collection of SF short stories written by activists and organizers. Of course, social justice organizing is often driven by a vision of a future better than the one we live in. But something deeper is going on here: a recognition that the future, despite its intangibility, is directly impacting us today. Take US politics. The election campaign that lifted 45 to the presidency was premised largely on fear of the future. In his speeches and tweets, 45 conjured an imagined future in which the US is overrun by “terrorists,” “rapists,” and “criminals” from across our borders. In this racist, dystopian future, white people sacrifice power and safety amid hostile aliens. This future is not real in any concrete sense. And yet, it affects the present in multiple ways — increasing support for racist policies, emboldening white supremacist organizations, and igniting hate crimes, just to name a few. In this sense, the future is what Andrew Baldwin calls a “permanent virtuality,” unreal and yet ever-present.6 Scholars have taken to using the term futurity to explore these interactions between past, present, and future. From my reading, futurity refers to three main dynamics: The ways that the future is defined (or “rendered knowable”) through practices such as prediction, projection, imagination, prefiguration, and prophecy;7 The ways that the future impacts the present, for example through fear, hope, preparation, and preemption;8and The ways that our thoughts and actions in reference to the future make some futures more likely, and others less likely, to come about.9 In his book Cruising Utopia, José Esteban Muñoz proposes that queerness is a kind of futurity. “Queerness,” he writes in the book’s introduction, “is not yet here…Put another way, we are not yet queer.”10 Instead, he explains, queerness is an ideal. It is a utopian vision that can help us to see beyond our everyday restrictions toward new possibilities. We cannot touch queerness with our hands, or claim to fully know what it is. We can, however, get glimpses of it, particularly in the realm of cultural production. Through poems, plays, visual art, dance, and other types of performance, artists can step away from what Munoz calls “straight time” — that sense that the present is natural and enduring — to suggest alternative futurities. The concept of futurity seems to have been most fully developed by Indigenous scholars and activists. As Native scholars have shown, settler colonialism (the kind of colonialism we have in the US, where the colonizer comes to stay) involves an ongoing project of erasure and replacement.11 After all, settler claims to the land in the Americas, the Pacific Islands, and elsewhere only make sense if the original inhabitants are gone. And, despite centuries of genocide, they are not. Part of the modern settler project, then, is to erase Indigenous peoples — if not physically (through policies that deny land, health care, etc.) or culturally (through blood quantum tests or the forced removal of children), then at least from popular consciousness. Movies, television shows, school curricula, political speeches, news reports, and other media relegate “the Indian” to our past — a sad chapter in history, perhaps, but nothing to concern ourselves with as we dream of the future. By erasing Indigenous people from the present and the future, these discourses advance the cause of what scholars like Eve Tuck call settler futurity. In other words, these discourses are premised on, and help to bring about, a future of endless settler dominance over the land and all that is on/of it.12 Indigenous communities, though, are (re)claiming the future — opening up space for indigenous futurities to flourish.13 To advance indigenous futurity is to assert, and takes steps to make possible, futures outside of settler colonialism. We can get glimpses of indigenous futurities in the social movement organizing of Idle No More, among the water protectors at Standing Rock, in the Indigenous media production of Indian and Cowboy, and in everyday assertions of Native culture and sovereignty. Noelani Goodyear-Kaʻōpua writes that, although they are often framed as relics of the past, Indigenous communities are actually at the front lines of the struggle to protect the future. Writing about Native Hawaiian efforts to defend cultural and natural resources, she notes that “When colonial discourses frame blockades at Newcastle or on Mauna a Wākea as obstructions on a march to “the future,” they miss the ways this kind of activism is actually protecting the possibilities of multiple futures.”14 This work is rooted deeply in Indigenous cultural practices and epistemologies, which, according to Hawaiian activist and blogger Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada, have always attended to both the past and the future. “The future is a realm we have inhabited for thousands of years. You cannot do otherwise when you rely on the land and sea to survive. All of our gathering practices and agricultural techniques, the patterned mat of loʻi kalo, the breath passing in and out of the loko iʻa, the Kū and Hina of picking plants are predicated on looking ahead. This ensures that the land is productive into the future, that the sea will still be abundant into the future, and that our people will still thrive into the future.”15 A Final Note When I was coming up in the world of social justice arts and organizing, much of the focus was on history. We studied how injustices like racism and colonialism were historically constructed. We learned how histories of activism and rebellion had been hidden, rewritten, and co-opted to reinforce the right of those in power to rule. We supported youth as they came to see themselves as part of long social movement traditions. This focus on the past was, and is, terribly important. At the same time, I am energized by what I see as a growing emphasis on the future as an arena of active struggle. Because that’s certainly how those in power see it. Wall street traders are gambling on our futures. Tech companies are redesigning our futures. Hollywood is whitewashing our futures. And all the while, unfettered capitalism is foreclosing so many healthy futures for this planet. Imagining alternative futures is, quite literally, a matter of life and death. The struggle for futurity is on, and as artists and cultural workers we are right in the middle of it, whether we know it or not. It’s time to accept the invitation of Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada: “We live in the future,” he writes. “Come join us.”16

### Link—Law

#### Legal institutions can be turned against violent power relations despite their repressive history. Rejecting them wholesale dooms radical social change.

McCann and Lovell, 18—Gordon Hirabayashi Professor for the Advancement of Citizenship at the University of Washington AND professor of political science, department chair, and the Harry Bridges Endowed Chair in Labor Studies at the University of Washington (Michael and George, “Toward a Radical Politics of Rights: Lessons about Legal Leveraging and Its Limitations,” *From the Streets to the State: Changing the World by Taking Power*, Chapter 7, 139-141, dml)

In our aspirations for progressive change, engaging with the law is not a free choice among tactics. It is a necessity. Egalitarian activists are routinely forced into legal engagement by the omnipresence of law as a violent force imposing hierarchical order and harsh punitive constraints on oppressed populations. Although activists are often motivated by the quest for legal recognition of rights claims, offensively mobilizing law to support egalitarian struggles is only a small part of movement appeals to law. Defensive actions to evade law’s repressive force or to protect previous gains are often much more significant. In our view, there is surprisingly little rigorous theorizing about the different types of struggles on the terrain of law, the most useful indicators of effective legal action, and especially the measures of egalitarian or inclusionary change.1

Law is an enduring site for progressive democratic contestation. Although official law is often a tool of repression, legal norms and institutions can also be resources for egalitarian rights claims, and, at certain historical moments, even social transformation. No matter how radical one’s political aspirations, the necessarily long-run character of revolutionary social transformation requires a series of intermediate steps, including those on the terrain of law. As the British socialist E. P. Thompson (1975) asserts,

Most [people] have a strong sense of justice, at least with regard to their own interests. If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class’s hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. . . . The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal more than sham. In the same moment they may modify, in profound ways, the behavior of the powerful, and mystify the powerless. They may disguise the true realities of power, but, at the same time, they may curb that power and check its intrusions. . . . And it is often from within that very rhetoric that a radical critique of the practice of the society is developed. (436–39)

In this chapter, we describe legal mobilization as the articulation of a social interest, general policy, or a societal vision in terms of legal entitlement. As Frances Kahn Zemans (1983) famously put it, legal mobilization entails that “a desire or want . . . is translated into a demand as an assertion of one’s rights” (3). Since legal language is indeterminate and polyvalent, it is contestable. Dominant legal norms are incomplete and rife with tensions, and they adapt as the perceived interests of dominant groups respond to, or occasionally converge with, the demands of oppressed groups (Bell 1980). Although much legal contestation occurs between recognized rights-bearing subjects over the authoritative meaning of clashing liberal legal principles, legal mobilization also involves oppressed groups mobilizing liberal principles against illiberal, repressive modes of social control. These contests over ascribed race, gender, sexual, immigrant, and other marginalized identities often expand the rule of liberal legalism (Smith 1997; Orren 1992). More importantly, struggles by progressive activists can use the liberal principle of equal citizenship to counter the property- and contract-based principles of capitalism, thereby challenging unequal resource distribution and class exploitation (Brown 2003; Smith 1997). As Stuart Scheingold (1974) argues, “law cuts both ways,” both for and against egalitarian social justice (91; see also McCann 1994).

When, how, and to what degree legal discourse and institutions provide resources for oppressed groups depends largely on the mix of legal and especially extralegal factors in a given historical context. Our research devotes considerable attention to the changing features of the cultural and institutional terrain that delimit the possibilities and forms of contestation within and against law. Of course, fighting for control of legal institutions and principles does not guarantee radical social change. But succumbing to anti-legalism cedes control over the terms of institutional organization, instrumental rule, and regime legitimation to dominant forces propelling capitalism and other hierarchies.

We recognize that our approach is at odds with some important recent movements and their interpreters. Arguably, the Occupy movements in and beyond the United States expressed a notable disdain for legal rights claiming, litigation strategies, and general appeals to legal strategies (Almog and Barzilai 2014). This disenchantment with law, legal processes, and lawyers is understandable in the post-civil rights era and the immediate post-recession moment. Indeed, wariness about law is always sound. Moreover, Occupy did profoundly reorient the dominant agenda in many parts of the global North. It put “deficit and debt hawks” on the defense and elevated concerns about economic fairness and the political accountability of private financial managers. At the same time, Occupy espoused and enacted little in the way of institutional changes within government and capitalist society. By shedding any reliance on discourses of rights, Occupy arguably limited its use of important ideological resources in the neoliberal context (Brown 2003; Obando 2014).

It is noteworthy that many movements inspired by the Occupy movement— especially among low-wage workers and advocates for corporate accountability— have recovered and prominently invoked rights claims and legal resources. Indeed, there has been a recent convergence around rights-based claims by campaigns for a minimum wage and sick pay, for immigrant rights and support, for LBGTQ rights, for the Black Lives Matter movement, and for other progressive and radical causes in the United States. Their reliance on lawyers and litigation has varied widely, but none of these movements discount them as much as did the earlier Occupy movement. Furthermore, many grassroots struggles in both the global North and South—against apartheid; for indigenous people’s sovereignty; for socioeconomic entitlements to housing, health-care, education, and minimum income—also appeal to legal or human rights and rely in part on national or transnational courts (Haglund and Stryker 2015; Rodriguez-Garavito 2011).

### Link—Liberalism

#### Liberalism is redeemable and an efficacious tool for change; rejecting it wholesale is ivory tower elitism.

Mills, 21—former Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, City University of New York (Charles, interviewed by Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, “Charles Mills Thinks Liberalism Still Has a Chance,” <https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/charles-mills-thinks-theres-still-time-to-rescue-liberalism/>, dml)

CM: Liberalism is attractive on both principled and strategic grounds. You’re completely right, of course, about the failures of actual historical liberalism, which are manifest, indeed ubiquitous, all around us. But what is the source of these failures? If liberalism has never lived up to its ostensible principles and values, that goes no way in proving that the principles and values are themselves unattractive ones. The illuminating way to understand these violations of (ideal) liberal norms, I suggest in the book, is not as the consequence of an intrinsically self-undermining “illiberalizing” dynamic within liberalism but rather as a manifestation of the corrupting results of group power, whether of the privileged classes, men, or the dominant race, for liberal theory and practice. Hence the creation of a bourgeois, patriarchal, or racial liberalism (usually all three combined, of course).

But we can appeal to the idealized, non-group-restricted versions of liberal principles and values to critique the exclusionary versions—indeed, that is precisely what most American progressive social movements have historically done. Particularly at the present time of authoritarian ethnonationalism’s attack on liberal norms, it is all the more reason to affirm them. Moreover, liberalism as I understand it is certainly not committed to an opposition to socialism in the social democratic sense—arguably, that’s just left-liberalism. And any other variety of hypothetical socialism—market socialism, workers’ democracy—would presumably strive to sell itself by promising a deeper and more extensive realization of liberal values, not their abandonment. So I would claim that the socialist case can indeed be made within a liberal framework. It’s noteworthy that Rawls—surely a respectable liberal!—says explicitly in A Theory of Justice that his theory “includes no natural right of private property in the means of production.”

As for the strategic reasons: Liberalism (in the broad-spectrum sense that includes right-wing “classical” liberals) has uncontroversially been the dominant political ideology in US history, albeit in the restrictive incarnations just delineated. So in trying to win over a broad political audience rather than preach to the choir, as I presume progressives want to do, one immediately has the immense advantage of invoking the political ideology nominally endorsed by the majority. You don’t have to require them to first convert to Marxism or Foucauldian-ism or whatever; you can just say, “If you’re a good liberal, you should support this.” That doesn’t mean that you can’t get valuable insights from Marx or Foucault, of course, but they are ultimately going to have to be “translated” into a liberal framework.

And insofar as legal change will be crucial for progressive structural reform—necessary if not sufficient—need I make the obvious point that the American and broader Western juridical systems are founded on liberal principles and assumptions? The “Black radical liberalism” I am advocating will thus be able to engage directly with its conservative juristic opponents in a way that nonliberal political ideologies will not. The Republicans generally, and the Federalist Society specifically, are certainly in no doubt themselves about the importance of fighting for particular interpretations of the Constitution and the law, which is precisely why they set out years ago to gain control of the courts. Black rights, and nonwhite rights in general, will have to be advanced by liberal arguments and liberal jurisprudence in this liberal (in the broad sense) arena.

DSJ: In a retrospective 2015 forum devoted to The Racial Contract in the journal Politics, Groups, and Identities, you issued a response to your critics which you entitled “The Racial Contract revisited: still unbroken after all these years.” What do you see as remaining fundamentally unbroken, and given your commitment to liberalism, what, if anything, has changed? What gives you hope?

CM: What I saw as unbroken at the time was the continuing reality of unjust structural white domination and unjust structural white advantage, even in the final years of the Obama presidency. The racial contract can survive such changes of personnel in governing circles; what counts, as I’ve emphasized throughout, are the structures and institutions. And I should stress that liberalism is not, in my reading, committed to the optimistic Whig progressivism traditionally ascribed to it, especially when we need to think of it as predominantly a racialized liberalism historically.

In my 2015 response, I cited a statistic mentioned by New York Times columnist Charles Blow that a 2011 survey had revealed that a majority of white Americans saw themselves as the primary victims of racial discrimination. Not an encouraging figure! But even before the Floyd killing, and before last summer’s huge multiracial demonstrations, such white racial attitudes had shifted. So that is the kind of development that gives me hope, along with the potentiality for the huge wealth disparities of the “New Gilded Age” to create the objective basis for a transracial class alliance of the socially disadvantaged. But a nonzero chance of positive racial change, however small, is obviously going to be diminished even further if one adopts a political quietism predicated on assuming its hopelessness in advance.

### Link—Non-Subject

#### Their embrace of the position of the unthought creates a philosophical trap where all revolutionary politics appears equally suspect because it maintains some idea of a coherent subject---this makes it impossible to develop radical political communities

Bruno Bosteels 10, Professor of Romance Studies at Cornell, “Politics, Infrapolitics, and the Impolitical: Notes on the Thought of Roberto Esposito and Alberto Moreiras,” *CR: The New Centennial Review*, Volume 10, Number 2, Fall 2010, pp. 205-238

Already toward the end of Categorie dell'impolitico , Esposito had arrived at the conclusion that only a nonsubjective understanding of politics could keep one at a distance from what Simone Weil would call "idolatry." This is because the subject as such is through and through marked by power, or by a will to power in its common pejorative sense. "There is no real alternative to power, no subject of antipower, for the basic reason that the subject is already constitutively power. Or, in other words, because power is by nature inherent in the dimension of the subject in the sense that power is precisely its verb," writes Esposito, playing on the active verbal sense of potere or posse as a power to act, as the capacity of the subject the conclusion to be extracted from this not only according to Canetti but according to the whole tradition of impolitical thought, from Broch to Kafka and Simone Weil- the latter with a blinding clarity- is that the only mode of containing power is by reducing the subjecť (1999» 20-21; see also 189). Moreirass proposal for thinking the political on the basis of what he calls the "nonsubject," then, renders explicit what is already understood to lie at the core of Categorie dell'impolitico. The fact that Moreiras recently (2008) devoted a lengthy essay to Espositos book Terza persona : Politica della vita e filosofia dell'impersonale (Third Person: Politics of Life and Philosophy of the Impersonal) only further highlights this confluence of interest around the issues of subjectivity and personhood, which these thinkers seek to de construct in the name of the nonsubject and the impersonal. Referring more specifically to Žižek and Badious notion of subjectivization as fidelity to the event, as in the case of Saint Paul s proposition of love, faith, and hope as the principal virtues of the militant Christian subject, Moreiras raises the question of the sacrificial cost of all such processes of fidelity: "How does an event of truth relate to that which it leaves behind? If the political is based on the event, what happens with what is not tied to the event, with the neu tral, without the nonsubject?" (2006, 115). The question of the nonsubject, in other words, is not a search for an alternative- marginal, minoritarian, or counterhegemonic- subject but an attempt to unravel the very logic of all subject-based politics from the point of view of the enigmatic remainder that it necessarily produces and excludes at the same time.

Once again, we end up with a topology of the constitutive outside, of the excluded other that is inherent in the subjects self-identity. "The permanence of the nonsubject within the subject (the nonsubject: all that which struggles in fidelity against fidelity, all that which resists conviction, certainty, love)" is how Moreiras summarizes his topic of interest. "The nonsubject is that which the subject must constantly subtract in a kind of self-foundation that extends into virtue (a virtue that the catechism not coincidentally names or named 'théologal': faith, love, and hope are the necessary and sufficient conditions of the absolute subject of political life, which is also the absolute subject of spiritual life)," so that the task of infrapolitics would amount to a thorough detheologization of politics. "In other words, what is at stake is the radical possibility of a detheologized theory of the political" (2006, 134). The real difficulty of this task, however, stems from the fact that the nonsubject is not an alternative entity that can be made to appear; it is not a remainder or leftover waiting to be embraced and incorporated into a new collective identity. Only negatively, or by way of oblique figures, can the remainder of all militant subjectivism be brought to bear upon the definition of the political. "Such a thinking, merely indicative with regard to the notion of the enigmatic remainder, is both deconstructive and subalternist: that is to say, its conflictive and polemical virtuality cannot give itself in the positivity of a new proposal of community, no new proposal of translative mediation, no new proposal of hegemonic or counterhegemonic articulation' (2006, 150). Through the notion of the nonsubject, infrapolitics thus puts us on the threshold of a nonhegemonic perspective whose line of shadow necessarily falls over all subjectivized politics.

The ultimate target of infrapolitics, thus, is the subject as the foundation for a politics of militancy. Both communism and liberalism, as dominant ideologies of the past century and a half, are here considered mere variants of one and the same politics of subjectivization. "The promise of liberalism is the promise of the antipolitical constitution of a full subject of humanity, without enemies. Such is also the promise of communism, as the historical extension of liberalism. The unlimited continuum of modern temporality closes in on the fissureless constitution of a unique subject- the subject" (Moreiras 2006, 76-77). To this metaphysical understanding of the subject as appropriating plenitude, it is not enough to oppose even a Derridean politics of friendship. "Thus, a politics of the nonsubject, of the enigmatic remainder, committed to the redemption of the part of those who have no part, is no longer a politics of friendship, which is only another name for a politics of hegemony" (2006, 84; see also Esposito 1999, xxix). Rather and more unexpectedly, given the radical critique of subjectivization, infrapolitics claims to be compatible with the kind of politics that no longer requires any prefixes in the eyes of Rancière: "The part of those who have no part, the part that is not, is always the enigmatic remainder, the radical outside of every possible subject of humanity or for humanity, and thus the very possibility of a politics beyond the subject- a politics of the nonsubject that is, perhaps even for Rancière though not explicitly, the only possible formulation proper to politics" (Moreiras 2006, 63).

5.wer

I remain convinced that every philosophy that eliminates the category of the subject becomes unable to serve a political process. (Badiou 2007, 88)

Before an effective politics- and nothing is more irrevocably effective than a triumphant revolution- which must betray its own idea of justice, the only possible solution is protected by the ineffective incorruptibility of the impo litical. (Esposito 1999, 155-56).

We can thus come back to the questions raised in the context of our read ing of Rancière s Disagreement and ask ourselves in the first place whether infrapolitics and the impolitical mark- or open the path to- new forms of politics, or if they rather constitute new perspectives, new frames of thought, to approach the definition of the political. In other words, are we dealing with new historical forms of politics or with new attempts to think the essence of politics? If the latter, then which historical lessons are taken into account in such attempts? And do the new frames or perspectives also pretend to open up new forms of politics to come? Or is the radicalism of the step back toward the political with its prefixes what guarantees that any actual form of politics will be judged a subjectivist illusion, a case of idolatry, or worse, a hoax? In the end, what possibilities remain open when we must at all cost avoid the sacrificial price of politics as subjective militancy?

To respond to these questions, we can turn to a recent essay on the Span ish philosopher Maria Zambrano in which Moreiras appears to extrapolate the infrapolitical conclusions of his book Línea de sombra into a truly dev astating judgment upon the entire spectrum of political possibilities from the present and recent past. The article distinguishes between two types of subjectivity, both of them considered equally treacherous and metaphysical. The first type is a militancy of immanence and plenitude, which in turns includes two versions, one liberal and the other communist:

Subjective militancy is onto theological militancy. There are two primary ways of it in modernity. In the first way, the militant- formal subject of a practice of the will- seeks the exhaustive exploitation of being, the thorough appropriation of being to militant practice. The subject, as a singular absolute, works on the remainder of its autistic immanence, thinks of the world as the infinitely reducible, and affirms its own apotheosis in the closure of world into subject and subject into world. This is the figure of the liberal subject, which is also the communist subject: a progressive subject, a subject beyond the shadow of its own impossibility. (Moreiras 2009, 181).

With the second type of subjectivized politics, on the other hand, we would seem to be approaching a partial self-criticism, since here notions of lack, loss, and even, at least implicitly, subalternity are addressed in ways that seem to refer back to earlier writings by the same author, even though all such notions are now equated with identity politics:

In the second way of ontotheological militancy, the militant emphasizes distance, dwells on the loss through which the subject finds its bliss through open, painful deconstitution. The subject is here pierced by its own insufficiency, and must affirm a blind transcendence from that which, upon giving itself, is lost: from that which gives itself as loss. This is the reactionary subject, which is also the subject of personal identity. (Moreiras 2009, 181)

Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, both types of militancy, the liberal-communist and the reactionary-identitarian, are considered paradigmatic cases of a subjectivist tradition of political theology, from which the infrapolitical orientation seeks to subtract itself. To do so, however, infrapolitics obviously cannot claim to have access to a more resolute or originary subject, since this would put us back in the midst of political theology. In this sense, we might also say that what Moreiras proposes is a political atheology, which is not the same as a negative or reactive political theology, as Esposito also explains in a different context:

In both cases, through both ways, the ontotheological ground of militancy is a ground because the world appears as an entity regarding which one must either insist or resist. Through the first militancy, insistence is a will for saturation: the world will reach proper totality, will be the One-All as it coalesces with a subject only upon which a world is possible. In the second militancy, the world is always already One- All, and the subject experiences it as it experiences its own expulsion towards nothingness. The world is experienced as possible through its very withdrawal, appears as an always vanishing horizon, and it is through this very vanishing that the subject can exercise its own overwhelming presence: the subject is nothing but a resistance against nothing, hence the subject is all. (Moreiras 2009, 181-82; compare Esposito 1999, 298-99)

Infrapolitics and the impolitical in sum propose a double distancing: both from political theology with its transcendent norm for representation and from the full immanentism of the subject in the total biopolitical administration of social identities and their excluded others, the victims and vanquished of history. "Double distance- a distance from reactionary militancy, and a distance from progressive militantism, a distance from the insistence of subject/world and resistance to its loss," writes Moreiras, "cannot form a new subject of the political, but it is the site for the appearance of that which dwells in the unthought of modern subjectivity. It is the promise of another constitution of the political" (2009, 182): the promise, that is, of a constitution of the political, or of a thinking of the political, which at last would no longer be sacrificial, militant, identitarian, subjectivized, or partisan.

6.

Disgraceful is not the priest, but the priest who states that his kingdom is of this world. If our announcement proclaims values, let our kingdom not be of this world. If our kingdom is nothing but this world, then let our language be that of politics without foundation. (Cacciari 2009, 102)

If it is difficult to conceive of the passage from the philosophical orientations of the impolitical and infrapolitics toward a new constitution of politics, this is because it seems that all the really existing and presently imaginable historical modalities remain locked within the horizon of categories marked by subjectivization, militancy, decisionism, or representation. This is at the same time the strength and the weakness of the orientations in question. If I may be allowed to play on the last names of Esposito and Moreiras, we could say that infrapolitics and the impolitical leave politics "exposed" to its own finitude while letting the subject "die" or "dwell" in its mortality. By contrast, any attempt actually to transform what is thus exposed and delimited falls necessarily in the trap of a metaphysical illusion of the infinite powers of the subject. What is more, any objection against the limited projectuality of the respective proposals of infrapolitics and the impolitical is always already preemptively taken into account and refuted, insofar as the aim of these proposals is precisely to render inoperative all such criteria of projectuality, regardless of their ideological orientation. In L origine della politica ( lhe Origin of Politics), Esposito draws a fine distinction in this respect between Arendt and Weil. Whereas the former still hopes to revitalize an alternative origin for politics, other than its perceived enmeshment with the factuality of power and war, for the latter politics and war are inseparable so that the thing to do is not dialectically to overcome war by means of a regrounded politics but rather to reinterpret politics from the impolitical perspective of its shadowy reverse. "No longer to reconstruct the devastated space of politics but to uncover its hidden 'impolitical’ soul," suggests Esposito. If Weil on rare occasions seems to be optimistic about the possibility of an alternative art of the political, this does not mean that the impolitical perspective becomes practicable: "Even in these cases, however, the positive evaluation of politics is always conditioned by its being rooted in a point that is external and transcendent to it - thus altogether inoperative " (1996, 16).

And yet, curiously enough, the arguments for thinking the inoperativity of the political in the name of finitude, even if the latter does not amount to a new value and despite the apparent reserve in the style of argumentation, never cease to invoke the proximity with the Nietzschean idea of a “grand politics” or with an almost “ultrapolitical” radicalism. This is the case, most obviously, in Cacciari’s original essay on “Nietzsche and the Unpolitical,” but Esposito, too, not only in Categorie dell’impolitico but also and even more explicitly so in Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy, offers what we might call an impolitical transvaluation of “grand politics” in the direction of the paradigm of autoimmunity (2008, 78–109), just as Moreiras, in the announcement for the conference “New Paths in Political Philosophy” where I first presented some of the ideas for these notes, expresses the hope that “the notion of a ‘grand’ academic politics in the Nietzschean sense might be allowed here.” How then do we move from infrapolitics and the impolitical to die grosse Politik in Nietzsche’s sense? Or, conversely, how can a Nietzschean-styled grand politics possibly be read as being already impolitical or infrapolitical rather than ultra- or overpolitical, as after all we might have expected coming from the philosopher of the Uebermensch?

The key to understanding this move consists in grasping the point at which Nietzsche’s radical critique of all hitherto existing politics, far from implying the affirmation of an alternative value, actually presupposes the complete emptying of all political valorization. As Cacciari writes:

The unpolitical does not represent the value that frees itself from the nonvalue of the political, but the radical critique of the political as invested with value. The unpolitical is the reversal of value. And only this reversal can liberate the will to power in the direction of politics on a grand scale. Grand politics are not possible there where the critique of the unpolitical is limited to affirming the necessity of politicization. This affirmation is still historicism, tradition. Grand politics is a critique of the values that still form the basis of this politicization. (2009, 95)

Nietzsche’s grand politics is not the heroic moment after the nihilistic disenchantment of all hitherto existing values, but the moment of nihilistic destruction already coincides with grand politics once the latter is read in an unpolitical or impolitical key: “The unpolitical brings the political back to the acknowledgement of its intrinsic nihilism. This key direction opens up, above all, by attacking the concepts, the forms, and the conducts that are the substance of the political as value. But this very same pars destruens is already a construction of grand politics insofar as it is a nihilistic devaluation” (2009, 96). Paradoxically, therefore, it is not so much the will to power or the affirmation of the eternal return but a certain measure of inaction that defines Nietzsche as an impolitical philosopher. “If it turns out to be impossible to interpret Nietzsche because his primary feature is precisely to deground or make flounder any possible hermeneutic in its own subtraction from all meaning, it is much more unthinkable to attempt a ‘realization’ of his thought, because he contains no theory of action whatsoever and even presents himself provocatively as a theory or rather a practice of inaction,” writes Esposito. “Nietzsche the philosopher of inaction is the philosopher of the impolitical” (1999, 282).

Badiou, interestingly enough, offers a very different reading of Nietzsche’s grand politics, one that can furthermore serve as a useful contrast for the framing of our overarching questions about the relation between politics and thought and between philosophy and history. Badiou first of all proposes to link the idea of grand politics to concrete historico-political events such as the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. Nietzsche relates to these events according to a logic of rivalry and mimeticism. To be more precise, he absorbs the explosive energy of the historico-political revolution into the realm of the philosophical act. “The philosophical act is in fact represented by Nietzsche as an amplified mimetics of the revolutionary event,” Badiou claims. “Nietzsche adopts with regard to the revolutionary act a rapport of formal fascination and substantive repulsion. He proposes for himself to render formally equivalent the philosophical act as an act of thought and the apparent explosive power of the politico-historical revolution” (1994, 10–11). The result is a philosophical appropriation of the revolutionary act, which can present itself not only as capable of breaking the history of the world in two, like dynamite with a before and an after, but also as being far more radical than any really existing revolutionary process. Th is is why Nietzsche’s grand politics, rather than receiving an impolitical or unpolitical slant, can be seen as an example of what Badiou calls “archipolitics,” which is also diff erent from the way this term is defined in Rancière. “The philosophical act is, I would say, archipolitical, in that it proposes itself to revolutionize all of humanity on a more radical level than that of the calculations of politics,” Badiou explains. “It is the philosophical act itself that is archipolitical, in the sense that its historical explosion will show, retroactively, that the political revolution properly speaking has not been truthful, or has not been authentic” (1994, 11). Badiou’s reading of Nietzsche thus restores not only a certain historicity but also a profound ambivalence to the peculiar articulation of thought and politics that goes by the name of “grand politics.” Far from merely devaluing politics, this articulation both validates and depreciates what we have come to understand under this term. Most importantly, by absorbing the violent break of revolutionary politics into the characterization of the philosophical act proper, archipolitics allows the philosopher of the overman to portray himself as infinitely more radical than any existing politics.

Could we not conclude that the points of view of infrapolitics and the impolitical are also archipolitical in the sense outlined in Badiou’s reading of Nietzsche? This would be confirmed by a long quotation attributed to Karl Jaspers via Georges Bataille in Esposito’s Categorie dell’impolitico, according to which Nietzsche’s interest in grand politics, though inspired and conditioned by concrete empirical activities, at the same time can claim to operate at an ontological level that will always be more originary than any given political event. Th is is because the explosive event produced by politics in the grand style is aimed at the totality of being, and not just at the mere administration of public affairs. Quoting Jaspers in a French translation most likely made by Pierre Klossowski, Bataille writes the following about Nietzsche:

He establishes the origin of the political event, without plunging methodically into the concrete particular realities of political activity, such as it manifests itself every day in the struggle among powers and peoples. He wants to engender a movement that would awaken the last foundations (the final causes) of the human being and with his thinking force those who listen and understand him to enter into this movement, without the content of this movement having received any statist, populist or sociological determination whatsoever. The content that determines all judgments is rather for Nietzsche the “integral” attitude with regard to the totality of being; it is no longer only politics but philosophy by means of which, in the abundance of the possible and without rational principle, the contrary and contradictory can be attempted—in an attempt that obeys only the principle of salvation and gradation of the human condition. (quoted in Esposito 1999, 283–84)

Similarly, I would argue, infrapolitics and the impolitical can lay claims to being forms of grand politics because they too absorb the radicality of the historico-political break, now rendered inoperative, into the realm of philosophy—into the thought of the political. In fact, the very impossibility of the dialogue between politics and philosophy, or between the real and the thought of the real, which is due to the unrepresentability of conflict within political philosophy, seems to take the place otherwise occupied by conflict as it traditionally operates in the realm of politics. What such a substitution gains in terms of philosophical radicality, it gives up in terms of political effectiveness. For Esposito and Moreiras, however, this does not signal a loss or a defeat so much as it is the inevitable outcome of a willful act of renunciation: a will not to will. In the end, theirs is a strange kind of passive decision, or a decision in favor of passivity and inaction, this being the only remedy against the deafening calls for political activism and operativity.

### Link—Posthumanism

#### Their ethical openness actively sanctifies violence

Emden, 17—Professor of German Intellectual History and Political Thought at Rice University (Christian, “Normativity Matters: Philosophical Naturalism and Political Theory,” *The New Politics of Materialism: History, Philosophy, Science*, Chapter 12, google books, no page numbers, dml)

Braidotti’s account highlights the political pitfalls of a posthumanist ethics that pays little heed to the problem of normativity and even less attention to questions of justiﬁcation. The ethical stance adopted by a broad range of posthumanist interventions—from new materialism to the farthest reaches of speculative realism, or object-oriented ontology—is either unsurprising or banal: human exceptionalism is overrated, indeed, and the arbitrary exploitation of both human and nonhuman animals is questionable on several fronts.22 Few will disagree with such claims, but relegating the question of normativity into the background also leads to a conception of ethics, and politics, that is devoid of any real normative import. On such an account, something simply becomes ethical as soon as it becomes a subject of concern, and while our environment—from genes to entire habitats—certainly can be an ethical concern, not everything that can become a concern raises questions of an ethical nature.23 While it is certainly the case that our ethical responsibilities—as far as we can still speak of the latter in consequentialist terms as real responsibilities—cannot seriously be limited to other human animals, it is not entirely unproblematic to reduce the question of ethics to the simple experience of an encounter with others, human and nonhuman alike, that highlights to us nothing more than the “subtle involvements and relations between more-than-just-human beings” (Smith 2011, xviii). If ethics is really supposed to consist in an activist and creative interaction with others that precludes moral judgment, it does become devoid of any normative relevance and tends toward a romanticizing aestheticization of the other.24 Such a romanticizing stance particularly comes to the fore when posthumanism takes on environmentalist concerns but replaces, for instance, arguments about marine pollution with a poetic description of deep-sea life whose main contention is that, somehow, we are all of oceanic origins.25 Real and justiﬁed concerns about global warming are another prominent example for such an ethical stance, but if the posthumanist thesis of a ﬂat monist ontology does indeed hold water, there is no reason to assume that global warming is not simply part of the system, as it were.26

From a political perspective, ﬂat monist ontologies lead to a diffusion of responsibility which ultimately turns against those posthumanist interventions that, in the name of emancipation, seek to hold a modern, humanist subjectivity responsible for gender inequality, factory livestock farming, global warming, and the ills of neoliberal capitalism.27 In the end, it might even be the case, as Bennett (2015) suggested most recently, that new materialism would have “to forego the category of the political as such” (84). Although this might be pressing the point too far, it might not be possible anymore to differentiate between, say, the production of udon noodles and presidential elections, and if that should really be the case, then the demands of posthumanism and new materialism might neither be ethically, nor politicially, relevant.

While the consequences of posthumanism’s and new materialism’s ethical stance thus appear questionable by their own standards, what is at stake is not simply a lack of theoretical coherence. Rather, in the background of political pitfalls and ethical vagueness stands a more serious philosophical problem, that of the naturalistic fallacy. For any posthumanist or new materialist ethics, the naturalistic fallacy proves fatal. This problem becomes particularly obvious in a central claim—summarized in exemplary fashion by Karen Barad—that shapes the ethical and political outlook of posthumanism and new materialism at large. Relating the agency of matter directly to the question of ethics, Barad draws on Emmanuel Levinas’ understanding of ethics as a ﬁrst philosophy grounded in the immediate phenomenological experience of encountering “the other.” The other, Levinas (1969) argues, is revealed in its “alterity” to the “I” and thus creates an “irreducible relationship” that is centered on our immediate response to the other, which he understands as the basis of ethical responsibility (150 and 7980). While Levinas is far from being a materialist philosopher, he does suggest that our relationship to the “material world” can, in principle, repeat the structural logic of “I” and “the other”: “The primordial relation of man with the material world is not negativity, but enjoyment and agreeableness of life,” and it is this move that allows Barad (1996) to translate Levinas’ theologically oriented assumptions into her account of an “ethics of mattering”(Levinas 1969, 49; and Barad 1996, 391—96). Ethics emerges in the agential dynamics inherent in matter, which includes the human subject as constituted by its material agency. As a consequence, “the human subject is not the locus of ethicality,” but ethical relationships are always part of the agency of matter. Ethics, then, is not really concerned with norms but rather with the “relationalities of becoming of which we are a part” (Barad 1996, 393). While it might certainly be possible to describe the emergence of normativity along these lines, Barad goes much further, concluding that all material agency is essentially of an ethical kind, since “[m]atter itself is always already open to, or rather entangled with, the ‘Other”’ (393). Since all material agency is reciprocal, in one way or another, it does “respond” to other kinds of agency, and since agency thus entails “the ability to respond to the other,” Barad deﬁnes “responsibility” in terms of responsiveness (392).

Short-circuiting Levinas’ theological ethics of the other with the monist ontology of new materialism ultimately gives rise to metaphysical claims that withdraw from justiﬁcation: “A delicate tissue of ethicality runs through the marrow of being. There is no getting away from ethics—mattering is an integral part of the ontology of the world in its dynamic presencing” (Barad 1996, 396). Of course, if everything is somehow ethical as long as it is concerned with material agency, then any ethical claim could potentially be accepted: human cruelty might just be an agential manifestation “intrinsic to the world’s vitality,” and the agents of cruelty might very well merely be “responsive to the possibilities that might help [them] ﬂourish,” since they are, after all, “alive to the possibilities of becoming” (396).

### Link—Queerness—Assemblages

#### Their totalizing rejection of identity prevents collective solidarity based on ideas of a common human subject.

**Latchford, 14**—Associate Professor in the School of Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies at York University in Toronto (Frances, “Unidentified Remains: The Impolitics of Non-Identity”, Atlantis 36.2, 2014, dml)

Just like Michel Foucault, queer theory has always regarded identity with deep suspicion and it upholds this aversion as an antidote that redresses the constraints posed by the subject, ones that various feminist, critical race, and lesbian and gay identity politics are said to leave intact (Ryan 2001, 325-326; Ford 2007, 479-482).2 Queer theory enlists Foucault’s politics of non-identity, and variations thereof, to ferret out and undo the limits of the subject so that you might “cease to be imprisoned in your own face, in your own past, in your own identity” (Miller 1993, 264). The distrust of identity that drives queer theory is so ingrained that it often turns its suspicion back in on itself in that even “queer anti-identity narratives” are now located, for instance by Jasbir Puar (2007), on the same “continuum that privileges the pole of identity as the evolved form of Western modernity” (222). Queer practices of non-identity, it turns out, are just as vulnerable to (re) presenting the subject through homonationalist re-territorializations that institute queer non-identity as an identity politic after all.3 Turned back on itself, queer theory’s mistrust of identity politics has lead it to take up the politics of assemblage and to pursue identity’s collapse: with a “cacophony of informational flows, energetic intensities, bodies, and practices that undermine coherent identity and even queer anti-identity narratives” (222), “to conceive the pure experience, event and dramatization of many sexes without falling back onto the ontological constitution of queer sexuality” (Parisi 2009, 72), by “opening up to the fantastical wonders of futurity” and affect to resist forces that rationalize identities into finite and narrow existence (Puar 2007, 222), and to evade “singularity” in favour of “collectivity, imagination and a kind of situationist commitment to surprise and shock” (Halberstam 2011, 29).4 As a result, queer Deluezean approaches also demonstrate the deep suspicion of identity that reverberates throughout queer theory and Foucauldian approaches; as Chrysanthi Nigianni and Merl Storr (2009) explain, Deleuzean approaches set out to “queer the queer” by circumventing the question of (non-)identity, because they are “not just against this or that particular identity as not being politically useful, but against the very concept of identity and the thinking it engenders” (5).5

Where queer theory more recently engages Gilles Delueze to undercut the influence of Foucault’s politics of non-identity, as an identity politic, the similarity of purpose to which both philosophers have been put is uncanny, because it was always with “flows,” “intensities,” “bodies,” “practices,” and new “pleasures,” or affect, that queer theories set out, originally with Foucault, to disrupt the trap of identity. To this extent, the suspicion of identity with which queer theory, like a reflex, turns on itself again and again, must also demand, if it hasn’t already, this inevitable conclusion: the queer politics of assemblage recreates the same problems of (non-)identity that Deleuze is used to dodge, for instance, via the claim that queer non-identity is penetrated by the pole of identity.

To illustrate, consider for a moment that the opposition of queer assemblages against queer non-identity to reduce the latter to identity politics, by virtue of being a non-identity politics, really is a (queer) critique to which assemblage is susceptible too. Queer assemblage politics sets out to “escape[s] the traditional strategy of negation (queer as the non-, anti-, contra-)” and thereby avert the binary thought it locates in queer non-identity politics; it claims to do so because it avoids questions of (non-)identity altogether (Nigianni and Storr 2009, 2). This is the appeal of Deleuzian approaches to queer theory: they appear to avoid the binary thinking that anti-identity politics, as such, find unavoidable. The logic behind a queer move to avoidance, Margaret Shildrick (2009) explains, is that it is only when “queer theory explicitly intervenes in the parameters of social exclusion,” for instance, as anti-identity politics must, that queer theory “to an extent must always reiterate binary thinking in order to contest it” (129; emphasis added).6

However, the strategic avoidance of identity can be exposed as just as much of a negation as any explicit rejection of identity because queer theorists, like myself, are groomed from the outset to be on the lookout for identity everywhere; the only difference between the two is that an avoidance is a covert mode of rejection that is implicit, subterranean, and passive—like centers and margins, the explicit and implicit are extant co-operatives in negation, even if they “cannot be naturalised as ‘having always existed’” (Deleuze qtd. in Conley 2009, 26). So regardless of the opacity of its anti-identity strategy, queer assemblage politics can also be placed on a continuum with queer non-identity politics; it is just as buggered by the pole of identity if and when queer theory renders it suspect, as I have here. Moreover, as long as the suspicion of identity is allowed to remain totalizing in queer theory, queer theory is going to eat its tail. All of which causes me to say that queer theory really needs to ask a different question: is identity precisely the problem that faces queer theory or is it the rejection of identity, as queer reflex, that poses today’s greatest threat to queers?

This paper responds to what I think is the largely uncritical belief that operates implicitly and explicitly throughout queer theory: it is the belief that identity politics must always be rejected. As Hiram Perez (2005) observes, “a great deal of queer theorizing has sought to displace identity politics with an alternative anti-identitarian model,” one he also challenges, because it conflates queerness uncritically and too often with a “race-neutral objectivity” (172). The central claim in this paper is that queer theory’s totalizing rejection of identity is socially and politically incautious; and since queer praxes of non-identity and assemblage are on a continuum in that both are suspicious of identity politics, this essay makes no attempt to differentiate between them—they are equally anti-identitarian.7 It argues that it is a mistake to think that either identity or anti-identity politics, solely, is fitting in every context that demands a social-political response. It also demonstrates that a balance must be struck between identity politics and queer politics that intends to interrupt the subject and visibility politics.

### Link—Queerness—State-Phobia

#### The aff’s state-phobia destroys their attempt at radical politics – their critique of white homonormativity devolves into a flippant rejection of all legal protections, taking the subject position of the European queer as a presumed universal and reifying the worst Eurocentric violence. Instead, we should move against state-phobia while remaining wary of the anti-racist critique of legal recognition, producing a superior politics able to contingently engage with legal and policy reform without sacrificing the radicality of the 1AC.

Dhawan 15. Nikita Dhawan, professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck (Austria), “Homonationalism and state-phobia: The post-colonial predicament of queering modernities, publication forthcoming, available via Academia.edu, 62

One of my main difficulties with current politics of anti-homonationalism and pink-watching is their rejection of any engagement with the state, which is censured as a form of co-option and appeasement. They almost seem to oppose the political agenda of providing non-normative sexualities with social recognition and legal protection through rights and policies, because this would mean acknowledging the existence of other forms of violence that are not reducible to Western racism and imperialism even as they are not entirely disconnected from them. This form of anti-statism denies others some of the protections postcolonial queers enjoy on the privileged side of transnationality, who live in states where homosexuality has been decriminalized. Anyone who addresses the issue of homophobia in minority cultures is simply racist and any talk of homophobic violence causes trouble for sexual minorities in their communities or countries. Anyone who supports ideals of equality, freedom, or emancipation is labeled ‘Western’ or functions as a trophy for liberal and conservative forces. My response to this position is that they do not take the consequences of colonialism seriously if they think decolonization is simply circumventing the legacies of modernity and the language of rights, equality, freedom and emancipation.

While theorists like Puar rightly draw on Foucault to unpack how non-normative sexualities are deployed in the biopolitical production of different populations in relation to one another, namely, how European queers are constituted in terms of requiring protection from the threat of homophobic migrants at home and regressive Muslim cultures elsewhere. At the same time, one of my primary objects against Puar and the politics of anti-homonationalism is that they tend to dehistoricize, demonize and essentialize the state reducing it to its penal functions. In her discussions of Israeli ‘pink-washing’ or decriminalization of homosexuality in India, Puar gives the impression ‘as if ’ there is no difference between the US and Germany, or between Israel and India. This dangerously disregards Foucault’s critique of state-phobia in his governmentality lectures, where he simultaneously targets Marxists, ultra-left radicals, liberals, neo-liberals, which consider the state as predator that must be contained and ‘defanged’ (refer to Dhawan 2013). Rejecting Nietzsche’s image of the state as the ‘coldest of all cold monsters’, Foucault views the state an effect rather than cause of governmental practices and rationalities.

Foucault’s historical investigations unfold how the experience with fascism und totalitarianism during National Socialism and Stalinism led to the rise of state-phobia in Europe. In order to reconfigure the relation between government and society, the subsequent efforts sought to replace the despotic state or police state through rule of law and constitutional state. According to Foucault, since the late 1970s anti-statism rapidly became the basis of liberal and left politics in the form of critique of securitization and repressive apparatus. This translated for instance into uncritical solidarity with soviet dissidents. Both amongst the liberals as well as amongst the left, the idea of state as threat gained traction, particularly in the context of fear of atomic war. Foucault problematizes the state-phobia of liberal as well as left politics, in that they fail to distinguish between administrative state, welfare state, bureaucratic state, fascist state and totalitarian state. He distances himself from such an inflationary form of liberal and left state- phobia. In contrast Foucault understands the state as ‘the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ that overlap, but also contradict each other (2008: 77).

This dynamic and ambivalent function of the state is dangerously ignored by scholars like Puar, whose critique of the state gravitates towards state-phobia in that every attempt by queer individuals and groups to negotiate with the state is denounced as homonationalism. One must bear in mind that there is a very fine line between critique of the state and state- phobia and anti-statism. The latter is marked by a deep distrust of state institutions per se. As Foucault compellingly argues, state-phobia forms a foundational premise for the emergence of neoliberal governmentality and conflates critique of state and critique of domination, with the state being characterized as the origin of all violence.

The challenge for postcolonial queer theory is to formulate critique of the state and critique of hegemonic heteronormativity without reproducing state-phobia. Finally liberal and left state-phobia is informed by a Eurocentrism, in that a particular, specific European experience with fascism is universalized thereby erasing different historical processes of state-formation and state-building in postcolonial contexts. Puars critique of USA, Israel und India homogenizes very diverse anti-discrimination policies and laws simply as politics of appeasement. This approach is risky in its simplicity. Interestingly states like Saudi Arabia or Mauritania, where homosexual acts are punishable with death penalty are spared in Puar’s writings. Moreover, she equates the provisional decriminalization of same sex acts in India and invalidation of sodomy laws in USA as examples of homonationalism, discounting the differences between two very different historical and regional contexts. The two legal reforms are a result of complex social and legal struggles that produce ambivalent and diverse effects, which are questionably disregarded. If Europe universalized its norms and epistemologies through colonialism, then decolonization is incomplete without the deuniversalization and provincialization of Euro-American experiences and politics. This would entail a nuanced historical analysis of diverse configurations. In this context the specific German experience with fascism and totalitarianism must not be imposed seamlessly on post- colonial contexts to promote a transnational state-phobic queer politics. This would be disastrous.

### Link—Racial Capitalism

#### The history of organizing against racial capitalism proves the necessity of advocating for pragmatic reform and concrete gains through institutions.

Mishler, 20—Assistant Professor of History at the University of Toronto (Max, “Thomas G. Young, Black Pragmatism, and the Routes of Social Democracy in New York City,” Social History, Volume 53, Number 108, October 2020, pp. 223-255, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

For nearly 45 years, Young cultivated a pragmatic approach to the trade union and civil rights movements. He coordinated general strikes and occasionally endorsed armed self-defence among workers, but he refused to reify radical tactics and believed passionately in the power of reform-oriented bureaucratic institutions like Local 32B to improve the lives of working people. Indeed, he concluded that trade unions were one of the few organizations capable of sustaining long-term progressive social movements and alleviating the miseries of capitalism. Young’s lifelong, unequivocal loyalty to Local 32B reflected a unique political outlook that was cultivated in response to contingent historical events and an ever-changing balance of forces. The long arc of his career vividly illustrates the dialectical relationship between moral principles and institutional power that animates the history of many social movements.5

Thomas Young’s “elastic” approach to the class struggle exemplifies an important strain of American pragmatism, a distinct mode of Black politics forged out of quotidian struggles against racial capitalism during the 1930s and 1940s.6 There was, of course, a long tradition of pragmatism in the labour movement associated with Samuel Gompers and Adolph Strasser, who once told a Congressional committee, “We have no ultimate ends ... we fight only for immediate objects, objects that can be realized in a few years.7 ” There was also a vibrant socialist tendency that renounced revolution in favour of using the tools of liberal democracy to rein in the power of capital. Though less developed in the United States, democratic socialism won many converts at the turn of the twentieth century.8 An alternate, Black radical tradition preceded both Gompers and Eugene V. Debs. Since at least the eighteenth century, African Americans developed a range of political practices conducive to survival, self-determination, and social mobility in societies where White supremacy rendered Black insurrection suicidal [untenable].9 Following the Civil War and Reconstruction, Booker T. Washington, Ida B. Wells, and W. E. B. DuBois, among many others, sought practical solutions to the problems of racial terror, poverty, and second-class citizenship.10 A diverse array of African American activists took up the mantle of pragmatism during the twentieth century.11

Gomperism, democratic socialism, and Black realpolitik all informed Young’s political philosophy. His early activism revolved around the Socialist Party and grassroots efforts to organize building service workers into Local 32B. Like other Black socialists, Young believed that Black workers would find deliverance through interracial trade unions because these were the only institutions capable of constraining the power of capital, eroding American racism and delivering human emancipation.12 His experience as an organizer and trade-union leader, however, led him to prioritize short-term, concrete victories over revolutionary transformation. The point of militant collective action, Young concluded, was to build institutions capable of wrenching concessions from wealthy employers at the bargaining table and powerful enough to pressure politicians into supporting workers on the picket line or passing nondiscrimination legislation. A champion of gradual “economic and political advancement” over what he perceived to be radical “rabble rousing,” he was nevertheless in the vanguard of “civil rights unionism.”13

Young’s political evolution corresponded with the rise of a New Deal order that legitimated trade unions and introduced the idea of social citizenship into American politics.14 He was one among many activists who turned to President FranklinD. Roosevelt’s administration and the New Deal state to solve the problems of entrenched economic and racial inequality. By the late 1930s, Young’s pragmatic, state-centered approach to the labour and civil rights movements epitomized what I call Black social democracy.15 This political project offered a trenchant critique of racial capitalism that eschewed both communist internationalism and Black nationalist programs. Black social democrats embraced the New Deal despite its many shortcomings and exclusions because it opened up a new terrain of struggle and established novel institutional mechanisms, such as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), that bolstered the power of organized labour. While no social-democratic party similar to those in England or Canada emerged in the United States, the New Deal represented a distinctly American social democratic horizon of possibility for nearly two decades. In this context, “socialism” receded from Young’s political vocabulary amid a new confidence in the redistributive possibilities of American politics. Two signature victories in 1945 cemented his faith in the radical potential of liberal democracy.

The nascent Cold War, however, soon curtailed the expansive vision of social citizenship articulated during the New Deal and blunted the power of organized labour. Both communist and non-communist labour leaders found themselves in the cross-hairs of conservative political opponents, and even those trade unions that purged Communists from their ranks and supported US foreign policy had to adopt to a repressive political context. Young’s metamorphosis into a “militant mediator” during the 1950s reflected a pragmatic response to political repression and an acute awareness of liberalism’s redistributive, progressive possibilities.16 He never abandoned a social-democratic vision rooted in the labour movement, however, and continued to win tangible benefits for thousands of working-class New Yorkers. The scope of his activism even expanded beyond the trade union movement to encompass affordable housing, quality health care, and penal reform. Young’s trajectory in the arena of electoral politics, however, started to diverge sharply from that of fellow Black social democrats such as A. Phillip Randolph or Maida Springer. While many of his comrades remained firmly embedded in the Democratic Party, Young found a political home in the liberal wing of the Republican Party for over two decades.

My aim in this article is to explain how a Black socialist became a Black Republican while remaining a lifelong trade union and civil rights activist. The answer lies in Young’s distinguished career as an organizer dedicated to building 32B into a powerful trade union.17 Rather than tell Young’s story as a declension narrative from socialist militant to reactionary comprador, I show how his lifelong struggle to improve the lives of working people within the confines of racial capitalism produced a pragmatic praxis worthy of a place in the pantheon of Black political strategies. Indeed, institutions that provide material relief and a platform for sustained struggle are an integral part of the Black radical tradition, even if they are not insurrectionary or millenarian.18 Thomas Young’s politics fit squarely within the broader history of twentieth-century Black radicalism.19 Ultimately, the story of Black social democracy in New York City offers instructive lessons for contemporary activists eager to translate protest into power.20

### Link—Radical Subjectivity

#### Using debate to generate new revolutionary subjectivities Eurocentrically devalues the revolutions happening every day.

Nayar, 17—associate professor and director of the International Development Law and Human Rights LLM Program at the School of Law, University of Warwick (Jayan, “Some Thoughts on the “(Extra)Ordinary”: Philosophy, Coloniality, and Being Otherwise,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol 42, Issue 1, 2017, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Eruptions of anger and refusal, of bodies emergent onto the street, of voice and song and chants, and of dreams articulated against the decadent normalities of the present, these indeed are important occasions of celebration which remind History of the utter unpredictability of futures regardless of presents however seemingly entrenched they might be. These are thrilling events no doubt; they portend passage often, and importantly so at that. But this said, the significant pathways of decoloniality are not charted by these moments of the street, they are laid before and travelled hence, after the thrill has gone, so to speak,56 in the everyday revolutions “to create new social relationships, as Raul Zibech reminds us.” I argue that it is precisely this necessary actuality of being-otherwise that is missed by Eurocentric philosophers in their quests for the extraordinary resurrection of the reified subject of history. To put it bluntly, such inability, or refusal, to “see” beyond the European frame of the world of being is to perpetuate a colonial philosophy of Eurocentric arrogance. Before I explain my meaning of the extraordinariness of the ordinary, it is worth demonstrating the continuing coloniality of such purportedly radical post-Enlightenment thought; Zizek serves as an example.

Zizek’s anguish, frustration, and impatience, with the state of the world and its thinking in the present, are constantly repeated. In this, he is utterly dismissive of the “left liberal morons” in Europe and contemptuous of their self-flagellation in “confessing Europe’s own sins” and in “humbly accepting the limitations of the European legacy”; for Zizek, it is precisely a fervent fidelity to the ideas and ideals of Europe that is necessary to overcome the problems of the present.57 While disdainful of “reformists,” Zizek is also dismissive of the many expressions of peoples’ anger that have so excited other philosophers of ruptural hope; Zizek explains:

It is not enough, then, to reject the depoliticized rule of the experts; one must also begin to think seriously about what to propose in place of the predominant economic organization, to imagine and experiment with alternative forms of organization, to search for the germs of the new in the present. Communism is not just or predominantly a carnival of mass protest…it is also and above all a new form of organization, discipline and hard work.58

This perceived carnivalistic tendency, this lack of substantive organization toward “communism,” is for Zizek unsatisfactory. This said, Zizek then cautions against any such attempt to actualize such alternatives:

However, following a properly dialectical necessity, this urge to invent new forms of organization should simultaneously be kept at a distance. What should be resisted at this stage is any hasty translation of the energy of the protest into a set of concrete demands. The protests have created a vacuum—a vacuum in the field of hegemonic ideology, and time is needed to fill this space in a positive fashion.59

These two apparently contradictory wisdoms can only be reconciled perhaps if we understand that herein is the space reserved for the ilk of Zizek to do the work of searching for the “germs of the new in the present,” to criticize, to think, to dismiss, to fill that space, that “vacuum,” with “positive content”; the radical philosopher emerges as the contemporary priest, if not oracle, to serve as the heroic arbiter of the true path:

The only way out of this dilemma is to abandon the entire paradigm of “resistance to a dispositive”…The task of emancipatory politics lies elsewhere: not in elaborating a proliferation of strategies of “resisting” the dominant dispositif from marginal subjective positions, but in thinking about the modalities of a possible radical rupture in the dominant dispositif itself.60

Thus, the Zizekian assumption of judgment—of the good, the bad, and the pointless of “revolt” qua revolution.61

But a series of issues arise from Zizek’s impatience and irritation with nonrevolutionary revolt. It is unclear who it is to be charged with the responsibility to “[think] about the modalities of a possible radical rupture in the dominant dispositif itself”; no explanation of what it means to think and act a radical rupture of the “dominant dispositif,” or when such truths may be known as truth, is provided. All that is known is that thus spoke Zizek. There is no equivocation here, no doubt of judgment and proclamation. For Zizek, nothing but an absolute fidelity to the idea that is Europe, rebirthed by revolutionary terror ala the French Revolution, would satisfy. Therefore, it is not just the “moronic” dispositions of the European reformists that find no accommodation in Zizekian visions of the communist revolution, but no dilution of the essential “core” of the European legacy as might be suggested by other wisdoms of being can be tolerated.62 Zizek’s reading of the “ambiguous” nature of the rebellion of the Zapatista communities in Chiapas, Mexico, illustrates this well:

we encounter here the same ambiguity: are these autonomous spaces [reclaimed by the Zapatista communities] germs of the organization-to-come of the entire society, or just phenomena emerging in the crevices and gaps in the social order? Marcos’s formulation that the Zapatistas are not interested in the Revolution but, rather, in a revolution that makes revolution possible is deeply true, but nonetheless profoundly ambiguous. Does this mean that the Zapatistas are a “Cultural Revolution” laying the foundation for the actual political revolution…or does it mean that they should remain merely a site of resistance, a corrective to the existing power (not only without the aim to replace it but without the aim to organize conditions in which this power will disappear)?63

What is here revealed is the inherent colonial tendencies that persist. While Zizek calls for a “radical rupture” of the dominant dispositif, he cannot accept that it might be precisely the assumptions of the idea of Europe that requires rupturing; in this connection, Zizek’s Eurocentrism disables [prevents] him from envisaging what Ghassan Hage terms an “alter-politics,” that is “a politics aimed at providing an alternative to the political order,” as opposed to “antipolitics” that is an “oppositional politics aimed at resisting and defeating the existing order.”64 That perhaps it is precisely an alternative to the Eurocentric imagination of the political order (as rupture of the dispositif) that is at the heart of the Zapatista’s “theoretical revolution”65 appears to be lost on Zizek as he sits in judgment on the future of revolution. And as Zizek waits, so must we wait, and trust, or so appears to be the prescription for the “future.”66 Seen from a decolonial perspective which does not still cling on fervently to a faith in the “lost causes” of a mythical “European legacy”, however, Zizek’s Eurocentrism results in a negation of imagination itself; being fixed on some fantastical truth-event, such Eurocentric readings of the world are incapable precisely to see beyond the coloniality of post-Enlightenment categories. Hamid Dabashi provides a scathing response:

Zizek and his fellow philosophers are oblivious to those [other decolonial] geographies because they cannot read any other script, any other map, than the colonial script and the colonial map with which Europeans have read and navigated the world; conversely they cannot read any other script or map because they are blinded to alternative geographies that resistance to that colonialism had written and navigated. There is a new condition beyond postcoloniality that these Europeans cannot read, hard as they try to assimilate it back into the condition of coloniality.…European philosophers chase after their own tails.67

### Link—Refusal

#### Refusal trades off with collective organization.

Shulman, 21—teaches political theory at The Gallatin School of New York University (George, “Fred Moten’s Refusals and Consents: The Politics of Fugitivity,” Political Theory, Vol. 49(2), 272–313, dml) [inserted “when” for grammatical integrity—insertion denoted by brackets]

In turn, radical democrats may refuse his reduction of politics to sovereignty, but if we then identify the properly political as nonsovereign action, as nonrule or (fugitive) refusal to be governed, we remain captive to this demonic picture of power and its idealized other. By affirming only the “power to” of solidarity and action in concert, we risk disavowing power “over,” as participation in rule, as explicit rule-making, and as “ruling out” antidemocratic interests and practices. Do we imagine that generativity thrives only by refusing rule, and not also through forms of structure and even imposition, as parents and teachers know? As Prospero, a personification of both sovereignty and theory, finally acknowledged Caliban as the “dark thing” he must “own as mine,” the trope of fugitivity entails a disavowed remainder, the problem of power and rule, which needs to be acknowledged. For freedom requires not only flight from rule, but flight into it, as a problem that no one can escape, but that a democratic politics explicitly acknowledges and undertakes to rework by participatory practices of contest.40

Using Moten’s own idiom, I would ask: “What if” we do not dichotomize the informal assembly and praxis of fugitive sociality, and politics-as-rule predicated on exclusion and regulation of difference? “What if” a democratic theory must blur the social and political but also acknowledge inescapable, fraught, yet potentially fruitful tensions—between tacit grammar and explicit acts of translation, between informal form and organized forms of power, between fugitive aliveness as resistance to rule, and organizing democratic power to make claims on how the world is ruled? “What if” we refuse (not reverse) the abstract polarity between subjection to sovereign rule as such, or statelessness as refusal to be governed as such, and “come down to earth” as Marx put it? We then find politicality not in rule or nonrule, as such, but in the judgments and actions by which subalterns address who makes decisions (and how) about which practices, values, and inequalities are being ruled out, or which encouraged, in the communities they are building by socio-poetic insurgency? In difficult historical contexts they rework and mediate tacit grammars, customary practices, and explicit forms of organized power as they reconstitute democratic forms of rule-making.41

These what-ifs suggest a conversation between Moten and Sheldon Wolin. The parallels are striking. Wolin depicts a “system” so “immovable and interconnected as to be unreformable as a totality”; he calls “pessimism” a “reasoned insight” and “suppressed revolutionary impulse”; and he endorses a “rejectionism” whereby citizens “withdraw and direct their energies and civic commitment to finding new life forms.” Moreover, “instead of imitating most political theories,” which adopt “the state as the primary structure, and adapt the activity of citizens” to it, Wolin refuses “the state paradigm” and the “liberal-legal corruption of the citizen.” He affirms how “common life resides in cooperation and reciprocity that human beings develop to survive, meet their needs, and explore their capacities and the remarkable world into which they have been cast.” He thus rejects Arendt’s splitting of political and social, and her valorization of the “who,” and in Moten’s terms he instead values how “entanglement and virtuosity” are negotiated in the “common life” of the ordinary. Both theorists thus defend “preservation” of customary ways of “taking care of beings and things,” as Wolin says, against neoliberal correction, progressive promises of incorporation, and radical romances of emancipation.42

Moten’s two antagonisms—between the few who run things and things that run, and between informal form and formalization—echo Wolin’s critique of bureaucracy, of “institutionalized systems of power,” and of “constitutional democracy”; and Moten’s refusals resonate with Wolin’s late claim that democracy names not a form of government but “fugitive” moments of insurgency. And though Wolin seems to mean “fugitive” only in its temporal sense of transient or fleeting, he also depicts democracy as interdicted by idioms of governance, contained by constitutions and organized power, and pathologized by norms stipulating the legal and proper. Like blackness— though Wolin never makes this association—his democracy is (called) criminal, transgressive, and chaotic; it is feared, hunted, and enclosed, though also “wanted,” desired, and used for legitimation. Both theorists embrace such epithets while showing how insurgency bespeaks “jurisgenerative” energies, engendered by commonality and memory, that precede and surround formal (state-centric) politics. Their fugitive protagonists—an undercommons or popular insurgency—claim a spatial and symbolic distance from a deranged modern regime, and in Wolin’s words “replace the old citizenship” by “a fuller and wider notion of being, whose politicalness will be expressed not in one or two activities—voting or protesting—but in many.” Of course, this very “politicalness” is one mark of deep differences.43

Though Wolin’s awareness of racial inequality appears in repeated associations of democratic moments and social movements with black insurgency, he does not grasp how “commonality” names not (only) a resource against enclosure but the historical production of whiteness and settler colonialism. He laments the gap between formal citizenship and genuine participation, which effectively disempowers legally enfranchised citizens, but never construes citizenship as a racial status, “standing” as white, constituted by a racial state of exception. His hard-pressed “citizens” draw on tacit (local, rooted) customs, but he does not credit how their “commonality” reproduces popular power by racial terror. Moten thus brings to this idiom of commonality and democracy, as to Arendt’s “common sense” and “world,” a justified presumption that such predicates of the political mean antiblackness. But acknowledging this truth is also the premise of thinking abolition and radical democracy together.44

For if Wolin’s commonality risks racial innocence, his idea of the political remains essential because it highlights the foreclosures in Moten’s sociality. First, Wolin depicts both tacit commonality and explicit insurgency as contingent and, in that sense, as political. Whereas Moten depicts sociality underwritten by ontology, and reproduced as antiblackness generates “common habitation and flight,” Wolin sees every (under)common undone by political economy and individualism, not only by incorporation into formal politics. Whereas Moten imagines the “absolute sufficiency” of sociality informally reproduced, Wolin argues that commonality itself is (re)generated and remade only by practices that, though “emerging out of” sociality, politicize—acknowledge, (re)articulate, or (re)organize—tacit customs and vernacular memories. Tacit commonality is at once discovered, remade and regenerated only [when] people make explicit claims in “public declarations,” or visibly exercise “collective power” to “promote or protect the well-being” of a “collectivity,” including an undercommon.45

Second, Wolin also links and distinguishes sociality and politicality by depicting the experience and practice of sharing and exercising power. For Wolin, local or customary “institutions and practices are sustained” only by our “capacity to share in power, to cooperate in it.” “Power to,” generated and shared by the ongoing practices of assembly and cooperation that Moten calls planning, is thus the basis of all other goods. But, as “distilled” from the “relations and circles we move within”—call this Moten’s sociality—this power, at once “symbolic, material, and psychological,” “enables political beings to act together.” As the political dimension of sociality, “power” can be extracted by states or undermined by individualism, and thus alienated, a loss that devitalizes the solidarity—and thereby the generative capacity—of sociality. The recurring “loss of the political,” as capacities to articulate the tacit and organize power, reveals the nature of the political as a distinctive “mode of experience,” for “we are always losing it and having to recover it.” But “renewal” is always possible, partly “as human beings rediscover the common being of human beings,” partly by “creating new patterns of commonality” across differences, and partly by (re)making “modes of action” by which to “concert their powers.” Though grounded in sociality, Wolin’s political thus opens an interval between the tacit and the explicit, in which experience is metabolized and (re)articulated. In this interval people question the organization of power and rules of justice, and they answer as they “reinvent forms and practices” that express “a democratic conception of collective life.”46

For Moten, of course, “democratic” and collective” signal the alienated rule that abstracts from lived sociality to “designate” a political to represent us, whereas black fugitives refuse to be governed or represented by others but also to translate themselves into legible political terms. In contrast, Wolin offers a potentially fruitful, not only correctional or appropriative—we might say agonistic—relation between the tacit and the explicit. In fact, practices of “fugitive democracy” recurrently emerge in and from black sociality, as the practices of Black Lives Matter activism most recently demonstrate. For sure, practices of concealment and evasion, which defend black fugitivity from surveillance, regulatory correction, and violence, and practices of public action that engage whites and the state, are contradictory in crucial ways, as Juliet Hooker has argued. But as Rom Coles and Lia Haro argue, frontline communities on the underground railroad also engaged repeatedly in “flagrantly public” action in concert, both in literal self-defense of black autonomy in its fugitive illegality, and to contest the rule(s) of police, the law, and the state; as recent protests suggest, they viewed formal political institutions both as “integral to white supremacy so far,” but also “as potential instruments toward emancipatory ends.”47

If Hooker sees temporal shifts between moments of “black fugitivity” and moments of “fugitive democracy” in the thought and practice of Frederick Douglass, Coles/Haro depict an ongoing “oscillation” between inward-facing and outward-turning practices. Likewise, Neil Roberts defends grand marronage for seeking a “sustainable rather than fleeting form of flight” by forging autonomous spaces, and yet, because “freedom in our world lies not in permanent evasion of Leviathan” but in “taming” it, he proposes an idea of “sociogenic marronage” to reconstruct “an order in need of systemic repair.” Not coincidentally, Wolin’s fugitive democracy, though “rejectionist” and antistatist in its major chords, includes a social democratic minor key, which notes the limits of localism and the necessity of seeking and using state power to address structural inequality and collective fate.48

Complex and generative tensions are lost, then, as Moten recovers the freedom schools organized by Fannie Lou Hamer but not her organizing for the right to vote, to exercise popular sovereignty locally, especially around police and schools, but also to create a “Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party” that entered national politics. Hamer (like the Black Panthers and Black Lives Matter) models how black radicalism has lived in an interval between the tacit grammar and ongoing “planning” of black fugitivity—as loopholes of retreat practiced and concealed in plain sight—and flagrant publicity as fugitive democracy. Whereas for Moten, the historical failure or defeat of outward-facing public action proves the futility of fugitive democracy, I would ask: “what if” we follow his own fugitive view that any being or act is both incomplete and excessive, to infer that specific historical experiments are not definitive failures, but unfinished in meaning, examples we could retrieve and refashion now? If keeping open such possibility risks cruel optimism, foreclosing it reifies the impasse he generatively transvalues in so many other ways.

### Link—Revolutionary Violence

#### Revolutionary violence fails and isn’t ontologically liberating.

More, 21—professor of philosophy at the University of Limpopo (Mabogo, “Sartre’s Solutions,” *Sartre on Contingency: Antiblack Racism and Embodiment*, Chapter 7, 187-191, dml)

Since the collective radical conversion of the racist is not possible, then the only possible solution, the only other way forward toward socialism, a society of equal freedoms, has to be through violent revolution on the part of the oppressed. Simone de Beauvoir attests to this:

We know only too well that we can not count upon a collective conversion. However, by virtue of the fact that the oppressors refuse to co-operate in the affirmation of freedom, they embody, in the eyes of all men of good will, the absurdity of facticity; by calling for the triumph of freedom over facticity, ethics also demands that they be suppressed; and since their subjectivity, by definition, escapes our control, it will be possible to act only on their objective presence; others will here have to be treated like things, with violence. (1994: 97)

In Hegelian terms, the slave must act to change the world and his situation for, as Sartre and de Beauvoir remind us, it is not the natural world which is oppressive but the world of human beings: “Only man can be an enemy for man; only he can rob him of the meaning of his acts and his life because it also belongs only to him alone to confirm it in its existence, to recognize it in actual fact as a freedom” (de Beauvoir, 1994: 82). What becomes clear from de Beauvoir’s statement is that only one human being can rob or deny another of her dignity or self-esteem precisely because it is through another human being that dignity and humanity are validated. It is one human being who can deny another’s humanity, question another’s humanity, demand that the other justify her humanity and thus her freedom. An appeal to Kantian morality of treating others as ends, an appeal to God, humanity, or brotherhood, will not be effective. The oppressed or slave must revolt.

In Sartre’s view, colonialism and racism—qua forms of oppression and denial of the humanity of the colonized and black victims, a refusal and deprivation of human freedom—constitute violence and can therefore only be responded to through violence. “No gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy them” (Sartre in Fanon, 1968: 21). That is why in a colonial situation: “[To] shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time; there remain [sic] a dead man, and a free man” (Sartre in Fanon, 1968: 22). Does this therefore imply that Sartre joins Georges Sorel in advocating violence for violence’s sake? Can he justly be characterized as the “prophet of violence”? It seems that neither Sartre nor de Beauvoir preaches violence for its own sake. Morally, violence is for him inexcusable. But under certain circumstance in which freedom is at stake, then it may become a necessary choice. He remarks: “I recognize that violence, under whatever form it may show itself, is a setback. But it is an inevitable setback because we are in a universe of violence; and if it is true that recourse to violence against violence risks perpetuating it, it is also true that it is the only means of bringing an end to it” (Sartre, 1988: 232). Sartre has been struggling with the problem of violence within himself since the early part of his career. He expressed this concern initially in some of his plays, such as Dirty Hands (Les Mains Sales, 1948), In the Mesh (L’Engrenage, 1948), and The Devil and the Good Lord (Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, 1951). He realized that many of the significant structures of our world are immersed in violence, that “we are in a universe of violence” and therefore it is almost impossible not to get one’s hands soiled with blood. This theme of “dirty hands” expressed Sartre’s acceptance of violence even though it is morally problematic.

According to Sartrean existential ontology, human freedom is the primordial aspect of human existence. Freedom is not something that human reality possesses or a property of human beings, but something which human reality is. Given that the negation of this freedom constitutes violence against the being of human reality, then the negation of this freedom can only be justified if that negation itself proves to be in the service of freedom itself. But, given that violence can sometimes be in the service of freedom itself; then such violence can be justified.

The problem with violence, however, is that it might turn out as a contradiction at times, for it may deny what it affirms. If freedom can have no other aim or end but itself, and if violence is the denial of freedom, then violence perpetrated to uphold or secure denied freedom becomes problematic because violence is a violation of freedom. Sartre admits as much, “Here we come upon the most deep-lying contradiction . . . violence involves both recognition and denial of human freedom” (Sartre, 1992: 177, 178). But even though violence is problematic by virtue of its denial of freedom, sometimes it may be necessary, particularly in response to violence that denies the very freedom of others.

Part of the rationale for the necessity of violence in cases where freedom is denied is that human beings can only be oppressed by human beings and not by things. From this observation, it follows that if one acts against oppression one necessarily acts against other human beings. This explains one of the aporias of action. One cannot act for humans without acting against them. In this case, an ethical action would require an attempt at a radical conversion of the oppressor rather than an appeal to violence. But since, as de Beauvoir has noted, we cannot count on the collective conversion of the oppressor, reality dictates another course: violence. In such circumstances, violence though unethical is however justifiable because in its very conception, it is a violence of freedom not only for the oppressed but for the oppressor as well. The oppressors or racists, because they are free, have an opportunity to treat the oppressed humanly. Unfortunately, in the grip of bad faith, they choose not to do so. But to allow this manifestation of their freedom to negate the freedom of others would be immoral. Therefore, violent action is morally necessary because it aims at the emancipation of both the oppressor and the oppressed; that is, it aims at the freedom of all human beings. In her Ethics of Ambiguity, Simone de Beauvoir contends that liberation for one means liberation for all, “To will oneself free is also to will others free” (1994: 73). This position echoes Sartre’s claim in Existentialism and Humanism, “I am obliged to will the liberty of others at the same time as mine, I cannot make liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim” (1966: 52).

In bad faith, the oppressor negates those conditions which would maximize the freedom of the oppressed. He or she is therefore an enemy of humanity. To act against such a human being is not to act against humanity but in the interest of humanity. As de Beauvoir aptly puts it: “A freedom which is occupied in denying freedom is itself so outrageous that the outrageousness of the violence which one practices against it is cancelled out” (1994: 97). People of good will and reason would definitely endorse this position. For example, by 1952, Nelson Mandela6 was already thinking along Sartrean and de Beauvoirian lines in relation to violence. Through the violence of the apartheid machine, Mandela began to understand that violence understands only the language of violence. Hence, in 1961, amid serious objections from Chief Albert Luthuli and others in the ANC who were morally committed to the Gandhian nonviolence position, Mandela argued for counter-violent military struggle for liberation. During his Rivonia trail he offered the following argument for counterviolence:

After a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force.

This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto We Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the Government had left us no other choice. (Mandela in Meredith, 1997: 265)

We should note that the person who thinks that violence is morally justifiable does not have to deny that if such an action is avoidable, that is, if freedom can be realized without loss of life, then this is the desirable course of action. But if violence must be used against oppressors in order to eradicate oppression, this action, while teeming with what is undesirable, is however preferable to allowing oppression to exist.

In the face of insidious American racism, Malcolm X once declared that black people should strive for liberation By Any Means Necessary (1970). But, as William R. Jones (in Harris, 1983: 232) has demonstrated, Malcolm’s position was not violence for its own sake. Indeed, Malcolm recognized the need for certain limitations in counterviolence. Even for Sartre, counterviolence against oppression is justified under the following conditions: (1) It must be only provisional and cannot produce systems that keep human beings perpetually in a condition of sub-humanity, (2) It can never be the first resort or easy way out. It must be the ”sole possible means to make man” (Sartre, cited in Anderson, 1993: 127), (3) It is born of the masses, (4) One struggles against it even in using it so that it is rigorously limited to what is absolutely necessary, (5) It must be denounced and presented as subhuman to those subject to it, so that it does not hide their true goal from them (Anderson, 1993: 127). Indeed, Sartre’s political writings reveal that he made a distinction between indiscriminate acts of terrorist violence which are valueless to the revolutionary objective and class or colonial violence which are justifiableacts of retaliatory violence in response to the numerous forms of oppression effected and maintained by the ruling or colonial elite.

My contention is that the phenomenon of racism is a problem which should be fought on many fronts because there is no single form of racism7 requiring a single huge solution, but a plurality of racisms in different forms. This of course raises the question: Will violence eliminate racism? The answer is: Maybe. What violence can achieve, in a colonial situation, is to effect an objective modification of the historical situation by transferring power from the colonizer to the colonized or transform the political situation from a capitalist society into a socialist society if need be. These changes in the situation would not necessarily constitute purely subjective transformation of the racist subject. Indeed, it might even reproduce racist stereotypes about the colonized or blacks, that they are violent and uncivilized because they appeal to barbaric means to resolve human problems. The powerful have a way of naming and describing phenomena according to their own wishes and advantage. An act of violence perpetrated by the oppressed will be described as “barbaric, uncivilized and cowardly act of violence” while the same violence against the oppressed by the oppressor will be described as “pre-emptive strike” or “self-defensive or self-protective immobilization of the enemy.”

### Link—Semiocapitalism

#### Their ev relies on some autonomous soul that can be recuperated to effectively resist semiocapitalism—double bind, either that’s a double-turn with all their posthuman neuroscience affect args because those would deny any authentic human subject or it means they uniquely reify settler colonialism

Povinelli, 17—Franz Boas Professor of Anthropology and Gender Studies at Columbia University (Elizabeth, “The Ends of Humans: Anthropocene, Autonomism, Antagonism, and the Illusions of Our Epoch,” South Atlantic Quarterly 2017 Volume 116, Number 2: 293-310, dml) [extimacy=opposite of intimacy]

Berardi’s call for a politics of solidarity between all life-forms against the pneumaphagia of semiocapital resonates with and is amplified by an allied movement among scholars in the humanities and humanistic social sciences to liberate themselves from humanism. Posthumanist scholars have attacked a series of ontological distinctions between the human animal and other animals (the various ways humans “begin to distinguish themselves from animals”; Marx and Engels [1970] 2004: 42). Homo sapiens, the “wise person,” may approach existence through a specific interpretive form (intentionality, self-awareness, logos), but nonhuman animals have forms of interpretation and “aboutness” that allow them to adjust behavior, make use of elements in their environment, and in doing so alter the conditions in which they find themselves—and then start the cycle again (see, e.g., Yablo 2014). In Berardi’s work the protagonists of contemporary semiocapital and its role in climate change and toxicity are not humans against other biotic, meteorological, and geological forces but all of life, including human life (the soul), against semiocapitalism’s rapacious subjugation of all existence.

But if this new possibility and form of solidarity provides a positive pathway for a new form of revolt against capital, it also opens a new set of political problems. The problems follow from the same critique autonomists and others level against the anthropocenic Human. Life does not exist in general any more than the Human exists in general. More crucially, in the anthropogenic condition of climate change and toxicity, even the phrase “forms of life” mystifies rather than analyzes how the concept of antagonism works when every region of existence is a set of accumulating and dissipating entanglements (see, e.g., Povinelli 2016). In other words, although a multitude of immanent forms of entangled existence exist in any given actual world, this does not mean that all actually exist. Thus, three illusions of contemporary late liberalism surround us: the autonomy of objects, the antagonisms of position, and the pluralism of being.

In the shadow of the coming catastrophe of semiocapital’s climate change and toxicity, do we need a parliament of things—a demogenesis fitting the simultaneity of soil, earth, and science (see Latour 2015)? Let’s leave aside the question of whether existence has agreed that its governance is like a human parliament. Are some things going to get more ballots, or more weight in the voting? Will we only allow those forms of entanglement that are our companion species to vote, excluding various forms of viruses, bacteria, and algae? Probably—this is the point of an antagonism defining the field of solidarity. And will the parliament of things include all things living and nonliving? Will desert sands get a vote? Or when we pass out the ballots will we predetermine what does and doesn’t have a soul, refusing the nonliving, the never-having-lived, a possibility of extending itself? Or do we decide that all things are vital? Do we work with those who say that from the perspective of anthropogenic climate change there is no difference between life and nonlife? From the perspective of the carbon cycle, soil, rock, water, air, microbial, plant, animal: all forms of existence are each other’s internal lung. Now not only does the human disappear into the total organism of the earth, Gaia, but so do all other forms of entangled existence move into an extimate relation to “each” other. Dick is now wide awake. There is no human, or even any humans, but merely regionally more or less densely compacted forms and modes of existence, one component of which has been abstracted out and named “the human.” One can only get these abstractions—life, human, earth, workers, mushrooms—by cutting and hacking into and across the rivers, streams, winds, breaths, roots, wires, chemical migrations in the attempt to embaginate a region of existence only to find oneself creating new rivers, streams, winds, breaths, roots, wires, chemical migrations (for example). One cannot make a body with organs. Nothing is autonomous, including the autonomist soul currently under attack.

Jean Baudrillard’s (1994: 153) prediction for the coming era of simulacra has come true:

We will live in this world, which for us has all the disquieting strangeness of the desert and of the simulacrum, with all the veracity of living phantoms, of wandering and simulating animals that capital, that the death of capital has made of us—because the desert of cities is equal to the desert of sand—the jungle of signs is equal to that of the forests—the vertigo of simulacra is equal to that of nature—only the vertiginous seduction of a dying system remains, in which work buries work, in which value buries value—leaving a virgin, sacred space without pathways, continuous as Bataille wished it, where only the wind lifts the sand, where only the wind watches over the sand.

In these deserts not only is the human liberated from dialectics, but it is also distended from itself. What human? Where is the human when flesh is inside neurons encased in metal, cooled by vast arrays, whose power is generated by vaster networks of energy production? All is multiply distended, attuned, and embodied. And this “where is it / am I” is then disembodied in the image of the Digital Cloud, which runs a good race with the anthropocenic Human as the primary illusion of our epoch (see Carruth 2014; Starosielski 2012; Günel, forthcoming). The human in semiocapital is not within this assemblage but in the leakage among various forms of corpo-reality. How does one “build forms of social solidarity that are capable of re-activating the social body” in the context of this competitive aggressive subjugation of all forms of existence in the “competitive aggressiveness” of contemporary capital? (Berardi quoted in Hugill and Thorburn 2012: 213). Who are the antagonists? How does one have an antagonism when all is extimate to all, when nothing is autonomous?

The Autonomy of the Wastelands

The autonomous soul that Berardi and others seek to defend from semiocapitalism’s assault is, in other settler colonial spaces, not merely an illusionary construct but a weapon of the enlightened liberal state in its constant maneuvering against indigenous people. And where autonomy from late liberal settler governance does emerge it is nothing like the autonomy that some within the autonomist movement imagine. Let’s start with autonomy as weaponry of settler colonialism, namely, the autological subject. The imaginary of the autological subject pivots on a miraculous enclosure of a human self defined by nothing but his or her historical unfolding of desire. Autological subjects make their history. The sense and drama of this imaginary form of subjectivity is always contrasted to the genealogical society—societies in which matters of the heart and labors of life are defined by preexisting collectively constraining restrictions on individual risk and exploration. We can think of these two imaginary forms of sociality as companion species defined by their different social tense—on the one side we find any account of the actual freedoms and justices of the autological subject endlessly deferred to an unreachable future, and on the other we find the genealogical society relegated to the frozen landscapes of past perfect. The normative orientation of the autological subject is said to be the open future—its desire is to endlessly unfold in myriad and unimpeded creative gestures and explorations. Its sovereignty rests in the more or less self-determining individual. But to make this unfolding a universal historical form of subjectivity and governance, this subject must make other forms and arrangements of existence radically different from itself and historically retrograde. The autological subject demands that the genealogical society be its opposite; namely, the genealogical society is past perfect, and its sovereignty must rest in its ability to determine the truth of the individual.

### Link—Settler Colonialism—Land

#### Their understanding of a Settler-Native antagonism [defined by innate relationships to land] creates ontological rifts among humanity that reifies the colonial project.

Sharma, 15—Director, International Cultural Studies Program, University of Hawai’i Manoa (Nandita, “Strategic Anti-Essentialism: Decolonizing Decolonization,” *Sylvia Wynter: Being Human as Praxis*, Chapter 7, pg 170-180, dml) [“nos”=Latin for “we”/“us”]

Emerging in the post–World War II era, indigeneity is a relatively recent mode of representation, one that encompasses very diverse people across the Americas, indeed across the world, often under a single, shared subjective understanding of being the “first” to live in any particular place.22 Being indigenous is a form of co- identification among people who previously did not see any connection with one another. It is also a way of laying claim to particular lands (or, more accurately, territories) on the basis of having (or having once had) specialized knowledge of that place. Yet, this mode of representation, however new or potentially expansive, remains particularistic. Indigeneity is a form of subjectivity that emerged because of the devastation wrought in the aftermath of 1492. Moreover, it is a form of subjectivity that interpellates people into efforts to gain national sovereignty within the global system of national states. Indigenous, then, as a mode of representation includes the often unacknowledged elision between native as a colonial state category of subjugation and indigenous as a category of resistance.

Indigenous conceptualized as such retains two interrelated problems that ensure that the kinds of unequal relationships organized in the aftermath of 1492 are reproduced. First, by denying the social constitution of the category of indigenous, it disavows people’s now-long history of connectivity across (and sometimes against) this category. Because this connectivity challenges the particularistic nature of indigeneity, recognition of interrelationality is itself represented as a threat. Second, by continuing to limit the criteria of membership of each nos, each is unable to accept as co-specifics those who are rendered as always-already oppositional others. Indeed, in making any particularistic nos, the significance of omitting certain others cannot be underestimated.

The category of indigenous, thus, does a sort of political work. It produces a particular nos (and thus a particular Other-to-indigenous nos).23 For some (though certainly not all) of those currently constituted as indigenous, it seems that one of the consequences of the enormously uneven Columbian exchange is the denunciation of the process of exchange itself. Today, the movement of life, plants, humans, and other animals is often cited as the cause for the devastation wrought on their native equivalent.24 Rather than focus on the hierarchical and exploitative relations of the Columbian exchange, some assume that the cause of the problem was / is mobility itself. Within such a worldview, that which moves is consequently denounced as inherently polluting, and, in an idiom that is gaining in popularity, movement and migration are posited as inherently colonizing.

An understanding of mobility as always colonizing is evident in the expansion of the term “settler colonist” to include all those deemed nonnative in any given space. Recently, within both indigenous studies and social movements for indigenous rights, the historical distinctions between the voyages of Columbus (and other colonizers) and those of slaves who survived the Middle Passage, indentured workers recruited in the wake of slavery’s abolition, and present- day migrants captured in a variety of state categories ranging from illegal to immigrant, have been collapsed. All, it is claimed, are agents of colonialism. It seems, then, that as there has been an expansion in the subjective understanding of people as indigenous, there has been a subsequent expansion in their other. Put differently, within some indigenous systems of belonging, all past and present people constituted as migrants are situated as colonizers.

In our present “great age” of migration, how did “colonizer” become a meaningful way to describe people who move across space?25 Indeed, how did “colonizer” come to be an increasingly dominant mode of representing indigenous people’s others, others who were once understood as cocolonized people or, at least, not as an oppositional other? Is there a relationship between these particularistic modes of representation and the false separation and hierarchical ranking of different but related experiences of colonization, such as the processes of expropriation and people’s displacement across space?

The answers to these questions lie within the logics of autochthonous systems of representation and the ways in which claims to indigeneity bring to life discourses of alienness or foreignness. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff argue, by “elevating to a first-principle the ineffable interests and connections, at once material and moral, that flow from ‘native’ rootedness, and special rights, in a place of birth,” autochthonous discourses place those constituted as natives at the top of a hierarchy of the exploited, oppressed, and colonized and insist on the centrality of the claims of natives for the realization of either decolonization or justice.26 Within the negative duality of natives and nonnatives that such discourses put into play, origins (and, in some contexts, claims of original, versus later, human discovery or inhabitation) become the key determinant of who belongs in any given space today—and who does not.

The quintessential alien or foreigner within autochthonous discourses is the figure of the migrant. This is because the hegemonic understanding of what it means to be a migrant in today’s world is one where migration is seen as movement away from one’s native land. Thus, migrants come to stand as the ultimate nonnative. Such a move works to shift the focus from a dialectics of colonialism—where the key historical dynamic is one of expropriation and exploitation, and the key relationship is one between the colonizers and the colonized—to one where the dichotomy between native and nonnative becomes central to both analysis and politics. Patrick Wolfe, a historian of Australia, captures this perspective well in his claim that “the fundamental social divide is not the color line. It is not ethnicity, minority status, or even class. The primary line is the one distinguishing Natives from settlers—that is, from everyone else. Only the Native is not a settler. Only the Native is truly local. Only the Native will free the Native. One is either native or not.”27

From such an autochthonous perspective, being native is both spatially and temporally dependent. Temporally, migrants may be identified as natives at some point in time and in some given space, but once having moved away from the spaces where such representations may be claimed, they become nonnatives. Spatially, migrants remain native but only to the places they no longer live in. Thus, some argue that migrants can continue to claim native rights to places they have moved from if they are able to show genealogical descendance from those with native status in that space.28 Candace Fujikane, in dismissing Asian claims to belong in the United States, puts it this way: “Indigenous people are differentiated from settlers by their genealogical, familial relationship with specific land bases that are ancestors to them. One is either indigenous to a particular land base or one is not. Asian Americans are undeniably settlers in the United States because we cannot claim any genealogy to the land we occupy, no matter how many lifetimes Asian settlers work on the land, or how many Asian immigrants have been killed through racist persecution and hate crimes, or how brutal the political or colonial regimes that occasioned Asians’ exodus from their homelands.”29

In this logic, indigeneity is racialized/ethnicized, and in the process, land—or more accurately, territory—is as well. Natives, it is assumed, belong in “their” native land and only there. Further, who can be recognized as native is dependent upon ancestry, thereby adding blood to the discourse of soil. Descent becomes of further importance in this distinction, for many indigenous people are, of course, also Asian (and European and African and so on) as well as vice versa. It is one’s ability to claim some indigenous ancestor that can allow one to be seen as indigenous today. While such claims can be social and not biological, many indigenous groups, following from certain governments’ own categorical recognition of indigeneity, rely on some form of blood quantum rule that requires a minimal indigenous lineage. Not surprisingly, such criteria for belonging (and for the rights and entitlements of membership) have not always worked for those subordinated through other axes of oppression and exploitation. Thus, many women have found that their claims to native status are often the first to be discounted.30

In this, there is an ironic historical continuity of autochthonous ideas and practices of belonging and the underlying logics of the colonial (and, in some places, postcolonial) state. Indeed, the meaning of native was one that was used to distinguish the colonized from the colonizer so that the natives could be represented as less human and, therefore, as legitimately colonized. Being native, then, was a signifier of being colonized and the ultimate signifier of abjectness. Nativeness as a mode of representation, then, was designed to institutionalize the new racist orders implemented by different colonial empires. Importantly, all colonized people were variously identified as “the” natives in order to signal their lack of membership in the propter nos of the colonizers.31

In the post–World War II era of postcolonialism, when, through much struggle, colonial empires were removed from the list of legitimate forms of political rule, the right to claim rights within and to any given space came, increasingly, to be seen as belonging to “the” natives. After all, we were told, the anticolonial project was often posited as fighting for the rule of the natives for the natives. Not surprisingly, then, the battle over resources and over place has, thus, increasingly become one about the meaning of nativeness.

In this way, autochthonous modes of belonging are significant in advancing particular nationalized regimes of rights, for the national subject is often defined through an exclusive racialized / ethnicized criteria through which political rights and rights to property, especially social property rights in land and natural resources, are to be apportioned within any claimed national space. Contemporary, postcolonial forms of racism are often based on ideas of autochthony. All those who are said to have migrated to the places where they live (or who cannot prove their prior inhabitance) are increasingly viewed as agents of (instead of co- victims of) colonial projects. The ruling ideology of nationalism has provided an explanation for belonging and has come to be a key way to distinguish between who is properly native to any given place and who is not. Today, the rhetoric of autochthony is evident throughout the world, including diverse sites in Europe, southern Africa, Central Africa, Latin America, North America, and the Pacific. Significantly, such a discourse spans the political spectrum from the Right to the Left. Here, I focus on the emergence of autochthonous discourses in indigenous nationalist politics (engaged in by both natives and nonnatives) in the territories claimed by Canada and the United States, with a particular focus on the Hawaiian archipelago, where this discourse is well rehearsed.

The position that all migrants are settler colonists has been advanced in a number of recent scholarly works in Canada and the United States. In the context of Hawai’i, it has been argued that “Asians” in Hawai’i (most of whom are the descendants of contractually indentured plantation laborers who began arriving in the mid- 1800s) are “settler colonists,” active in the colonization of native Hawaiians due to their nonnative status.32 The main distinction between the two groups, they argue, is that native Hawaiian claims are based on rights of national sovereignty over “their land, water, and other economic and legal rights,” while Asians, because they are not native, have no right to make such claims.33

In a Canadian context, Bonita Lawrence’s and Enakshi Dua’s article “Decolonizing Antiracism” (2005) in Social Justice makes some of the same arguments made by the contributors to the special issue of Amerasia Journal on “Asian Settler Colonialism in Hawai’i.”34 Like them, Lawrence and Dua also focus on those nonnatives who are nonwhite. They contend that the antiracist praxis of nonwhites has “contribute[d] to the active colonization of Aboriginal peoples.”35 Indeed, they contend that “antiracism is premised on an ongoing colonial project” and on “a colonizing social formation.”36 Postcolonial critiques of national liberation strategies, social constructivist critiques of the naturalness of races or nations, and arguments against ethnic absolutism, such as those made by Stuart Hall, become, for them, examples of how antiracism is a colonial practice.37 Lawrence and Dua maintain that these kinds of analyses colonize indigenous people by “contribut[ing] to the ongoing delegitimization of Indigenous nationhood.”38

In these essays, then, critiques of nationalisms or of the naturalization of social categories are tantamount to attacks against indigenous people. It is in such assertions that we can find the ideological character of autochthonous discourses. In arguing for the theoretical and political centrality of nativeness, there is an effort to depoliticize native nationalisms. By insisting that any critique of nationalism is tantamount to a colonial practice, the nationalist assumptions and politics of native nationalisms are taken out of the realm of that which can be contested. Consequently, native nationalisms are posited as the only strategy for decolonization.

It is precisely the nationalism inherent within autochthonous discourses that helps to explain not only why all nonnatives are conceptualized as colonizers but also why the (varied) critics of nationalism (or those who argue for the social basis for ideas of race and ethnic purity, or those who uncover a politics of solidarity across such lines) are also colonizers. Negatively racialized persons, in this logic of nationalized self- determinacy, are relegated to being mere minorities of various nations and their existing or hoped- for national sovereign states. Thus, because they are not a people / nation as defined by hegemonic doctrines of self- determinancy, Asians, for example, in Hawai’i, or elsewhere in the United States and Canada, are represented as not- colonized and, therefore, in the dualistic mode of autochthonous representations, as colonizers.

Within autochthonous discourses one can only be colonized if they “belong” or are indigenous to that space itself. In this view, the colonization that people experience supposedly ends once one moves away from the colony (or, now, the postcolony). Instead, these migrants come to be represented as colonizers. Because a key aspect of the subjective understanding of indigenous is being a colonized person, only other colonized persons can be seen to be co-specifics. Neither those constituted as migrants nor their struggles can be perceived as part of anticolonial struggles. As such, they cannot be included as commensurate human beings within any colonial or postcolonial space.

This view imagines the space of colonialism as finite. It fails to see the broader field of power that processes of colonialism opened up. More specifically, it fails to see migration as a part of the colonial experience. The world as seen through an autochthonous lens is one of discrete, disconnected spaces, each belonging to its native people. This is the autochthonous view of the world prior to colonization and of the ideal decolonized space. It thus appears that as borders and relationships begin to realign to allow for new forms of subjective understanding and conspecificity, some scholars and activists are actively working to re- fix borders and territories through particularistic strategies of identification. The new mode of representation of indigeneity, which, ostensibly, appears to be an expansion in subjective understanding, creates a Manichaean dualism of native and nonnative. Such a logics of representation assumes that all past and present processes of exchange are inherently destructive. Colonialism, from such a view, was (and remains) about people moving about and that it was / is in this process of moving away from where they are native to places where they are not that has caused the enormous destruction of life. By casting all human mobility as colonial acts, autochthonous modes of representation, ironically, empty out from the meaning of colonialism the enormous violence that has been done by colonizers. It also minimalizes—or even denies—the violence done to people who moved and who move today.

Borders, including the borders between natives and nonnatives, although seemingly about the physical separation of those in the national nos from its foreign others, then, are primarily concerned with making differences within the same space that the nos and its others both live in. Because we—and, with Sylvia Wynter, I use “we” in all the fullness of the term “humans”—have long lived in a world that is connected across now-demarcated spaces, making claims to land, to livelihoods, and to belonging on the basis of particularistic claims, such as a racialized national membership, only works to ensure that the oppressions and exploitations wrought in the aftermath of 1492 are maintained, albeit in new guises.

Conclusion

Autochthonous discourses present the Columbian exchange as a zerosum game between putative “groups” of natives and nonnatives. Neglected within such discursive modes of representation is the fact that the gross inequalities engendered by this exchange were structured not by some inherent struggle between natives and nonnatives but by a set of struggles between expropriators and the expropriated, the exploiters and the exploited, the oppressors and the oppressed. Tragically, these struggles were won by those who cemented their victory in a set of social relations that institutionalized private property, an ever- expanding capitalist mode of production, colonial, and then national, state power, and an interlocking web of ranked hierarchies formed around ideologies of the noncommensurability of humans through ideas of “race,” gender, “nation,” and citizenship. Each of these has been normalized to the extent that even (some of) the expropriated, exploited, and oppressed people on earth have come to identify with these ideologies instead of with each other.

However, if we understand the New World not simply as a mistaken formulation of Columbus imagining himself in the western part of India but one that brought the four hemispheres together in a global field of power, we come to see that the New World was made in and across multiple geographic sites. The moments of New World invention necessarily involved people across the planet and came into being not suddenly, in 1492, but over a longer period through which “European” elites expanded the territories they controlled and responded to the incredible consolidation and spread of capitalism. Indeed, as Sylvia Wynter well shows, the shorthand of “1492” does not capture the fact that the processes leading to the colonization of people in the Caribbean and Americas were begun by much earlier imperial ventures in the Middle East, western Mediterranean, eastern Atlantic and West Africa.39 Encounters here established a specific pattern of relations that were to be extended not only to the Caribbean and Americas but, importantly, within the space of what we now call Europe.

The New World, then, was forged through processes that people across space and time would be able to recognize. Marcus Rediker calls these processes the “four violences”: the expropriation of the commons both in Europe and in the Americas; African slavery and the Middle Passage; the exploitation and the institution of wage labor; and the repression organized through prisons and the criminal justice system.40 Silvia Federici adds to our understanding of these shared experiences by showing that the persecution of women and the containment of their liberty (especially during various and ongoing hunts for witches) were crucial elements in the Columbian exchange.41

People’s shared experience of the terror of expropriation, exploitation, and oppression led to their shared resistance, something, unfortunately, left unexamined within Wynter’s oeuvre.42 Neither the ruling- class version of colonization- as- progress nor the autochthonous view that colonization was caused by “foreigners” entering native spaces tells us this story. Recent work by social historians, such as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, or political theorists such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, however, show that there was indeed a serious struggle over the terms of what is now (too ahistorically and uniformly) often called “modernity.”43 That capitalists were victorious in this struggle should not blind us to the fact that they did not instigate the revolution (or the “root expansion in thought” that Sylvia Wynter discusses in relation to Columbus’s challenging of medieval European notions of space). The bourgeoisie, instead, were part of the counterrevolution against those actively challenging extant forms of ruling in Europe, including challenges to the medieval idea of transcendent power of all sorts (church, God, king / queen).

The actual revolutionaries were derisively called the multitude or the motley crew and were composed of the rural commoners, urban rioters, fishers, market women, weavers, and many others who mobilized countless rebellions to realize their immanent demand that producers fully realize the fruits of their labor, and do so on earth.44 As the spread of ruling relations moved across the planet, so too did communities committed to revolution. When the imperial elites in Europe expanded their territorial claims—and processes of expropriation and exploitation to the Caribbean, the Americas, and the rest of the planet—new communities of resistance across these spaces were formed on the basis of radical solidarities. Revolutionaries from spaces now imagined separately as Europe, Africa, the Caribbean, the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific encountered one another and, in many cases, saw in each other’s experiences a desire for their own common emancipation.

The motley crew, then, was very much a cluster of new world formations—new world because they stretched across the entire global field of power of expanding imperial states. They explicitly challenged emergent discourses of their innate noncommensurability, be it racialized, nationalized, or gendered lines of difference. As a result, as Linebaugh and Rediker uncover, these solidarities were considered as the greatest threat against the aspirations of the newly emerging elites—the traders, ship owners, slave owners, plantation owners, and leaders of imperial states. Significantly, it was ideas—and subjective identifications—of nation, race, and gender that severely weakened this “many-headed hydra” and set back its revolution.

It is precisely this revolution, this “root expansion in thought,” that Sylvia Wynter ignites with her call for a human species–wide sense of conspecificity. In her essay “1492: A New World View,” Sylvia Wynter creates an imaginative space for a new and expansive subjective understanding of who “we” are so that we can undo the continued exclusionary, uneven, and purposefully divisive legacy of 1492. While those who shamelessly celebrate the aftermath of 1492 continue to believe that they can act unilaterally and with impunity against groups they have identified as native and migrants with no consequence to their own lives, and while some native nationalists believe that the nos of natives is a liberatory one that will lead to a postcolonial state of their own, Wynter’s “new world view” allows us to see that both partial perspectives are ideological. Neither reflects the lived experiences of people the world over, which are organized through both shared experience and tangible connection. As a result, neither is able to seize the revolutionary promise of an expansion in our empathic and affective ties with those with whom we live our lives.

Wynter, by defining humanness as a social, historical, and discursive coproduction rather than merely a biological one, urges us to become cognitive revolutionaries, to see our potential to forge social relationships with one another—relationships that recognize not only the massive changes wrought by the events following Columbus’s voyage of 1492 but also the possibility of what we can do with these changes. The New World produced new social formations, and it is within these social formations that struggles for decolonization have taken place and continue to and need to take place. This does not mean that we must make a choice between the celebrants’ universality, which is little but a parochial concern of elites, or the alternative of dissidents that romanticizes an essentialized “community” set in battle against its others. Rather, we can, if we choose, reject both views and reorient ourselves—and respatialize ourselves—with one afforded to us by the world that we have inherited, a world wrought with strife and inequality but a single world, nonetheless. This project is and always has been, by necessity, a shared one. Indeed, the making of new social bodies is not an epistemological problem but an ontological one. It is in the ontological unity of our human intra-actions that we can come into being what we already are: a species of humans, one, no less, that is intimately involved with all other life on our shared planet.

### Link—Settler Colonialism—Ontology

#### Sweeping theories of radical indigenous ontological difference ignore the nuances of actual struggles that strategically repurpose settler categories

Rosenow, 19—Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford Brookes University (Doerthe, “Decolonising the Decolonisers? Of Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy and Beyond,” Global Society, 33:1, 82-99, dml)

Despite the force and importance of this argument, I have felt slightly uneasy when reading those conclusions. Focusing on radical ontological difference can easily lead to a romanticised reification of other peoples’ difference that is in danger of ignoring actual political struggles and demands on the ground. As Cusicanqui argues, those struggles might very well emerge out of an “indigenous modernity”, rather than an insistence on the right to one’s difference. By this she means that some Indigenous people aim to formulate a hegemonic vision for how to structure a society that is valid for everyone (Indigenous AND non-Indigenous): they work for a society that is in their “image and likeness”, and to use modern notions such as “citizenship” for this purpose, rather than rejecting the latter as irreconcilable with one’s own world.39 By contrast, some North American Indigenous intellectuals call for an Indigenous “resurgence” that, rather than seeking hegemony, altogether turns away from seeking recognition by wider (colonial) “society”. As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson points out, in such “resurgent mobilization … there is virtually no room for white people”. 40

But my unease was also emerging from something else, which is what I want to focus on in this article: the problem that encounters and conflicts are yet again made sense of within overarching structures of knowledge production rather than cultivation (despite the intention to do otherwise). As de la Cadena herself makes clear in the quotation above, what is encountered as “different” is inevitably described “in forms that I could understand” (my emphasis)—even whilst simultaneously recognising that one’s description does not capture what the encountered practices actually do. Sense-making, for de la Cadena, takes place at what could be called two levels: At a first level, there is the inevitable process of making sense of an alienating affective experience on the spot, from within one’s own framework of understanding the world. At a second level, then, de la Cadena attempts to make legible her grappling and not-understanding in the context of a book for an academically literate and interested audience—in other words, in the writing-up of her ethnographic research.

In Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s case, given that their articles do not aim to make an empirical contribution, sense-making takes place at what could be called a third level: what is drawn upon is the understanding that emerged out of the ethnographic work of others, which is brought into conversation with various bodies of theoretical work in order to make a conceptual contribution. This takes place via the coining of central concepts and the outlining of all-encompassing frameworks that are meant to help us understand the analytical, normative and political consequences of their argument for scholarly work more broadly. The ontological encounters of others are used to delineate the merits of ontological encounters in general, in IR and beyond. This objective leads to a particular way of developing and structuring a generic argument that makes it difficult to move beyond sense-making frameworks that are necessarily geared towards settling all those unsettling and disconcerting experiences that were the focus of the articles in the first place.

This is also the problem of some central decolonial work. Drawing on Edouard Glissant, Mignolo, for example, critiques the “requirement of transparency” that forms the basis for understanding in Western social science scholarship. He argues for the “right to opacity” of those located on the other side of the colonial difference.41 But this claim sits at odds with his simultaneous desire to write a new, all-encompassing history of “the modern/colonial world system”. 42 And like in Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s articles, terms such as “pluriversality”43 or “diversality”44 are coined in order to have a (one!) concept for a similarly all-encompassing solution to domination. While de la Cadena is critical of her own “anxiety to understand coherently (with which I meant clearly and without contradiction”), and while she points out how this “was often out of place”, 45 Mignolo as well as Rojas and Blaney and Tickner seek to place such anxiety in yet another coherent framework that holds everything together.

The question arises whether this can be any different in scholarly work that is not directly based on ethnographic research itself, and which can therefore not lay claim to a direct experience of ontological controversies. This has become an important question for my own (likewise third-level) work on anti-GMO activism. My work to date has primarily aimed at making a conceptual contribution, and has relied on a conversation between the ethnographic research of others and various bodies of conceptual work, including decolonial and “ontological turn” literature.46

But as I have already indicated in relation to de la Cadena’s work, when writing up their research for academic purposes, even those who have directly experienced ontological encounters find it hard to resist the tendency to conclude their work with stringent, overarching, coherent conclusions that the Westerneducated reader can grasp and “take home”. In the next section, I will draw on two anthropological ethnographic texts that are significant for research on the GMO controversy to show how this works. The two texts that will be analysed in the next section engage with the GMO controversy in Paraguay and Mexico respectively, and they have stood out for me in the way they manage to convey a sense of unease and grappling with ontological encounters and conflicts. However, as the next section will show, they as well end up providing a framework and conclusions that can accommodate and make sense of the encountered ontological difference.

3. Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy

According to Susana Carro-Ripalda and Marta Astier, much of the research that is carried out in relation to the question of what smallholder producers in the Global South truly think of (and say about) agricultural biotechnology is unable to grasp the “ontological incompatibility” that exists between the experienced human/nonhuman relations in small-scale agriculture on the one hand, and the logic that underlies genetic engineering (GE) on the other.47 This is precisely because most social research is itself grounded in the crucial modern/colonial nature-culture divide: the former can only be known through scientific means, while the latter can be known through the study of social/cultural/political practices. Knowledge about nature is about establishing “facts”, which are either true or false (i.e. nature as “one” is either correctly or incorrectly represented), while knowledge about culture is about studying meaning, which is necessarily (due to the existence of different cultures) multiple.

The question of whether GMOs do or do not pose a “factual” danger consequently lies outside of the remit of the social sciences, which therefore focus on the social dimension of statements that are made about nature. But as Kregg Hetherington’s reflections on his own anthropological research journey in Paraguay make clear, this tacit signing-up to modern ontology can lead to difficulties in understanding the reality of the people one is interested in.48 Coming from a position in which he took for granted the scientific distinction between (proven) “fact” and “error”, Hetherington explains how he “translate[d]” the claims of the leader of a local peasant movement49 (Antonio) about the truth of (GM) soy “killer beans” into something else:

Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an extended discussion with and about humans, and I was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio said about them … To be blunt, Antonio kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at him … I was comfortable saying that this was a figure of speech, a kind of political rhetoric, or even to claim that this is what Antonio believed, all of which explicitly framed ‘la soja mata’ (soy kills) as data for social analysis, rather than analysis itself worthy of response.50

However, Hetherington points out that not believing in the truth of the killer bean did not prevent him from “participating in Antonio’s knowledge practices”. 51 Becoming involved in the anti-soy bean activism of the peasants, Hetherington became “part of the situation” that made the killer bean turn into a crucial agent in a court case that was brought against two soy farmers for the murder of two activist peasants. As a result, killer beans became transformed into a matter of national concern. Crucially for Hetherington, participation involved more than joining the situation in spite of his lack of belief: it led to him becoming immersed in a relation with both peasants and beans that started to have a physical impact on him—in de la Cadena’s words, he indeed became “partially connected”: 52

Beans didn’t scare me at first. Indeed, as a foreigner to the situation that gives rise to killer beans (a Canadian no less), giant fields of soy were a familiar, even a comforting sight. But it took only a few months with Antonio for me to start feeling the menace from those fields. Soon, the sweetish smell of glyphosate, recently applied, and especially the corpselike smell of 2, 4-D mixed with Tordon, could ruin my appetite and make me expect to see people emerge from their homes to show me pustules on their legs and stomachs.53

Similar observations are also found in Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s contribution to the 2014 Agriculture and Human Values symposium on the challenges of making smallholder producer voices being heard in relation to agricultural biotechnology.54 While most of the contributions to the symposium concentrate on how to tease out smallholders’ “real” voices in the most effective way, Carro-Ripalda and Astier critically reflect on their own perceived failure to become knowledgeable about smallholders’ voices in their research on GM maize cultivation in Mexico.

It was through ethnographic fieldwork in rural areas in Central Mexico, in-depth structured interviews, focus groups, participant observation and, finally, a National Workshop in Mexico City with over 50 stakeholders (including smallholder producers) that Carro-Ripalda and Astier attempted to get a better sense of what the actual voices of peasants in the GM controversy were trying to convey.55 However, particularly the final workshop, which aimed to create conditions under which Mexican smallholder producers could speak on their own terms about GM maize cultivation, “unwittingly reproduced the conditions of exclusive, techno-scientific and regulatory spaces”. 56 The public discourse that centres on questions of safety, science, possibilities of regulation and problems of potential contamination, and which is upheld by both GM maize proponents and antiGMO activists, dominated the workshop debate. Even when present smallholders raised different concerns, the discussion always returned to the previous, main ones, as if those who had spoken differently “had not spoken at all”. The way that smallholders could articulate “their perceptions, ideas, and desires” was thereby “severely limited”. 57

Carro-Ripalda and Astier are focused on the dominance of one particular (techno-scientific, regulatory) discourse that, they maintain, disabled smallholder voices engaged in different discourses from speaking up or, when speaking, from being heard. In other words, smallholders were unable to adequately represent their own understanding of what is at stake in the GM maize controversy in Mexico. Considering what I have pointed out in the previous section, based on Rojas, difference is thereby transformed into an epistemological, rather than an ontological one: Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s argument is implicitly based on the assumption that, under the right conditions, difference can be translated into something that can be communicated to, and discussed with, other stakeholders. But the term “ontological incompatibility” that the authors themselves use indicates there is something else at play, which cannot easily be translated: the nature of the relation of smallholder producers to their “land, seed, crop, climate … as told and understood by themselves”; the “central place” that Maize continues to occupy in Mesoamerican pre-Hispanic cosmology, and “the social and cultural significance” that goes along with that.58

Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s emphasis on the problem of the dominant discourse, and the overarching Mexican structures of domination this discourse is related to (such as the “neoliberal vision of the Mexican agricultural future”59), makes it occasionally difficult to understand what the problem of “ontological incompatibility” really is about. At the end of the article, the place of the smallholder producers whom they have engaged seems once again clearly delineated and knowable: at stake for smallholders are, Carro-Ripalda and Astier argue, “their lives as maize cultivators, their pride in their craft and knowledge, and their ceremonially demanded right to information, choice and access to their ‘own resources’”. It is not just about “retaining ‘traditional’ ways of agriculture”, as the anti-GMO movement maintains, but also about claiming “political, economic and socio-cultural rights.”60 Though this certainly adds a significant dimension to the debate, it indeed simply seems to add to, rather than radically challenge, the frameworks that are conventionally used in the anti-GMO debate, as well as the frameworks that focus on how to bring out and represent other people’s “voices” in a better way. Is this simply unavoidable when it comes to the production of academic knowledge through/in academic writing? As already indicated in the previous section, academic writing pursues by definition the objective of enhancing knowledge and providing improved insight into a certain situation. In its very structure, an academic piece of work aims to resolve and settle, rather than to dislocate, to destabilise, or to provide discomfort.

Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s article is meant to render legible their own encounter of ontological difference for an academic audience. Is it possible for the reader to dig below these representational strategies, and to relate more directly to their encounter of what they themselves call ontological incompatibility? And which has led them to brand their final workshop, in a quite un-academic way, as a “failure”? There are a few places in the article in which their inability to put into words and arguments all of “the complexity of experiences, relations and reasons that bind people to maize”61 is more obvious. Becoming attuned to this complexity is linked to the authors having to become at least “partially connected”—to yet again use de la Cadena’s phrase—to the relations they attempt to trace. It is interesting, for example, that Carro-Ripalda and Astier talk about “voices” as going beyond the semantic level, as conveying something acoustically, and as requiring a form of listening that shies away from asking pre-given questions. It is also interesting that some of that took place when they literally walked together with their interlocutors; precisely as it is emphasised by Blaney and Tickner:62

Despite the shortcomings of the workshop … we felt that that, through our research on the ground, we had engaged with male and female farmers, heard about their perspectives on GM and their visions of a rural future, and accompanied them to work in milpas and markets. So, what do smallholder farmers’ voices sound like? What meanings did they convey to us? We will provide here but a few of those sounds and meanings … 63

Despite returning to the idea of voices as conveying “meaning” in this quote, meaning is related to sounds, to walking together, to particular places with their own sounds, smells, and colours. The sample of actual “voices” Carro-Ripalda and Astier then choose to present yet again invoke an intricate sense of the relationality of farmers and nonhumans:

It is a joy to plant, getting hold of the maize, of a beautiful cob which is pleasant, to go to the harvest, to look at pretty cobs, all regular. Because this is what sustains me.

You can see the difference in the seeds straight away … You need to look at the cob and as soon as I grab it I see the difference.

It is the person who knows the seed the one who chooses it [for replanting the following year].64

By contrast, GM maize is associated by the smallholders whom Carro-Ripalda and Astier cite with feelings of “artificiality, estrangement and distrust towards the created object (the GMO) in itself, not only because of deep ontological considerations … but because of the political and economic motives which are ‘assembled’ into it.”65 Although the authors make a distinction between ontology and politics/ economics here, their invoking of the “assemblage” precisely shows how the latter becomes part of ontology itself, and then (as in the case of Hetherington) impacts on the sensual, bodily connection with the maize. Understanding the relation between “things” in this way allows for an analysis of power and domination that has at least the potential of moving beyond pre-given frameworks; strategically suspending them in order to “sharpen [the] analysis of exactly how power operates, how relations are made and undermined, and with what consequences”. 66 Genetically modified maize is a problem because it is part of particular Mexican neoliberal visions and strategies, but in the context outlined by Carro-Ripalda and Astier, that vision is not only (and not even primarily) made sense of through given frames of knowledge, such as Marxist theories of the exploitation of labour, but sensually, through the way it disrupts the (physical) pleasure and joy that has sustained the farmer-maize-assemblage so far.67 GM technology externalises the maize from farmers and estrange them from their ways of life; and it is only through this externalisation that GM maize becomes perceivable as a potential source of “contamination”, as a danger against which farmers need to “defend” their seeds.68

Now, some might counter that the previous paragraph in practice only provides a fancy repackaging of the two well-rehearsed arguments brought forward by many anti-GMO activists: (a) that the problem of GMOs is an intrinsic property that makes it “unsafe” (which activists try to scientifically prove), and/or (b) that the fundamental problem of agricultural biotechnology is that it estranges farmers from their traditional, ancestral way of life, that it allows for their exploitation, and that it provides a further foothold for neoliberal visions of how the world should be ordered. Both arguments are grounded in modern ontology: the first goes down the route of science (contesting “facts” about the “nature” of GMOs on the basis of science itself), while the second goes down the “social” route by either making a case for the need to respect cultural multiplicity, or for the need to prevent economic exploitation. Some activists make use of all of these routes and arguments. Famous environmental activist and intellectual Vandana Shiva, for example, determines the alienating character of the GMO to be an intrinsic property, while at the same time depicting smallholder producers as intrinsic “‘reservoirs’ of local or indigenous knowledge or as ‘natural’ conservators of biodiversity through their traditional practices”. 69 According to Carro-Ripalda and Astier, this “unwittingly reinforce[es] images of smallholder producers as passive, timeless and voiceless.”70 This leads to precisely the sort of romanticised reification of “difference” that I have critiqued in the previous section of this article—paradoxically, in this case, on the basis of an ontology that is deeply modern, as it regards both “things” and “people” as ontologically stable and classifiable.

By contrast, the authors of the two texts I have analysed in this section trace ontological encounters that cannot be contained by the nature/culture dichotomy. There is no pre-given (social) theory of neoliberalism and global power relations that dictates how the “voice” of the farmer needs to be made sense of. There is also no pregiven understanding of the “factual” (scientific) nature of GMOs. The notion of radical difference that comes up in these two texts emerged from precisely the “misunderstandings” that the encounter of ethnographers with “other people” and their relations brought to the fore; but importantly, it did not make any clearer to the ethnographer what the “stuff” that grounded the misunderstandings is actually composed of.71 Yet, somewhat paradoxically, despite all this emphasis on misunderstandings, incompatibility, grappling, failure, and critical self-reflection of one’s own assumptions—at the end of the day what is left for the readers (at least if they do not explicitly focus on the “ethnographic excess” found in the writings) is the impression that they know more about “stuff” than they did before: that they understand the situation better, that new knowledge has been produced, that the object of analysis is more transparent than it has been before. How can this subjugation of the encountered ontologically difference to academic strategies of comprehensive sense-making avoided (if at all)?

This article itself is now coming up to what would normally be a conclusion—i.e. the treacherous waters of nailing its contribution to knowledge. Given that this article is yet again another “third-level” engagement with questions of ontology and decoloniality, the question is whether there is any way to avoid this pull of hegemonic modes of academic knowledge production. Rather than providing a conclusion and reiterate the core argument that the article has made, I will attempt to finish this piece by raising even more questions, and by providing some further reflections.

4. Turtles all the Way Down: (Further) Reflections on What Questions to Ask

The pull of hegemonic systems of academic knowledge production is difficult to avoid. This is the case even in writings that are directly based on ontological encounters and controversies, and that reflect on the displacement that encountering different ontologies has entailed. But as I have indicated, this problem is even more pronounced in writings—like my own—that provide what I have previously called “third-level” sense-making of ontological encounters.

The contribution of third-level analysis is usually a conceptual one, which makes it by definition veer towards the general and abstract rather than the concrete. In relation to the literature on decolonial thought and the ontological turn, this becomes manifest in three different (yet interrelated) ways: first, in the desire to provide an understanding of ontology that enables a conceptualisation of the former as multiple. Drawing on the work of Mario Blaser and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro respectively, Rojas and Blaney and Tickner argue that ontology can be thought of as multiple if reality is understood as always being “enacted” or “performed”. 72 This is what Blaser calls an understanding of ontology as “materialsemiotic”: one that defines reality as “always in the making through the dynamic relations of hybrid assemblages”. 73 Pinpointing it like this is inevitably geared towards answering the question of what reality as such, in general is about. Secondly, there is an ambition to coin the general normative-political project that arises out of this understanding with a singular concept, such as the pluriverse. Thirdly, arguments about ontological multiplicity and the emancipatory-decolonial political projects that arise out of its recognition are written for an audience of a particular discipline, such as IR: the aim is to provide a wholesale, general rethinking, or, indeed, “reconstruction” of the latter.74

What sort of questions drive conceptual work into that direction, and what desire “to know” underlies the questions? According to Cherokee philosopher Brian Yazzie Burkhart, for Native Americans “the questions we choose to ask are more important than any truths we might hope to discover in asking such questions”. 75 By contrast, Western knowledge is always (at least in the mainstream) propositional knowledge: “knowledge of the form ‘that something is so’”. Here, knowledge cannot be verified by referring to direct experiences: “there must be something underlying them and justifying them”. 76 Burkhart gives the example of the “routine response” given by “Western people” to Indigenous accounts of creation: “In [one] account, the earth rests on the back of a turtle. The Western response to this account is simply the question, ‘What holds the turtle?’” This question makes no sense to the Native storyteller, because the truth of the story lies in the paths to rightful action that it outlines, rather than what it has to say about the “reality” of the world. But when the Westerner insists on the question, the answer finally is: “‘Well, then there must be turtles all the way down’.”77

Equating Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s work with European mainstream (hence analytic) philosophy seems, at first glance, incredibly unfair. After all, those authors precisely advocate the cultivating of knowledge by direct awareness or acquaintance in exactly the way that Burkhart identifies as typical for Native Americans. But on the other hand, the framework that circumscribes their emphasis on the need for “concreteness” is still an abstract one that wants to answer the question of how things really are and should be: enacted, performed, pluriversal, … The point is not whether this argument about reality and politics is right or wrong. The point is to recognise that it is driven by particular questions that might make no sense in the context of other intelligence systems, but that need to be addressed in an academic article in order to make a conceptual argument compelling, convincing and original for an audience that primarily sits (whether it likes it or not) within a Western, colonial, hegemonic system of knowledge production.78 And even when the contribution to knowledge production is not primarily conceptual, as in the “second-level” work that I have analysed in the previous section in relation to the GMO controversy, the final argument that is made (e.g. about peasants’ economic and cultural rights) is yet again lucid and comprehensible to an audience that seeks to comprehend “stuff” within modern parameters.

Where to go from here (particularly as a white, European scholar)? As suggested by Tucker, one way might be to engage in much more direct, ethnographic research, which would enable more direct experience of ontological encounters. Despite previously-mentioned problems of even that research not going far enough, there is without doubt more space for providing a sense of grappling and dislocation if the originality of a piece of work is not purely grounded in the conceptual contribution it aims to make. However, not every scholar is able— body-, context- or funding-wise—to spend extensive periods of time in different places, and the ethical and political pitfalls of researching “radical difference” through fieldwork with—but often rather on—others have been pointed out by Indigenous scholars numerous times.79

But even for those unable or unwilling to do more primary, empirical research, there is space to push the boundaries of what can and should be written about (and how). For decades there have been attempts to provide “innovative” platforms, for example at conferences, to talk about “stuff” in different ways (e.g. through storytelling or artistic practices; not at least by e.g. Indigenous peoples themselves80). However, these “innovations” are still at the margins, and they will most likely never be able to compete with acknowledged knowledge production outlets such as journal articles and scholarly books. But even within the latter, there is always at least some space to push for more open-endedness, more reflection on the author’s embodied positionality, more auto-critique, more uncertainty and grappling (even if this is based on reading about the ontological encounters of others).

Although this sort of embodied self-reflection on a writer’s “situatedness” (which in my own case means being “on the colonising side of a divide”81) has obviously been advanced by many critical scholars for decades (including feminists and post- as well as decolonial scholars), this article has hopefully shown that there is still (always) a need to go further, in order to more fundamentally challenge hegemonic, modern/colonial modes of knowledge production. The sense of unease that I have outlined in section two was particularly strong when reading conclusions that were geared towards making recommendations for the discipline of IR, or for “international politics”, as such. Aiming to make generic conclusions for entire disciplines, political fields, or global “issues” pushes the generality and abstraction of a contribution even further away from an advocacy of the concrete. Why, and to whom, does it matter whether IR, as a discipline, or international politics, as object of study, becomes more pluriversal or not? What are the actual benefits of the concept of the pluriverse in the first place? Or to pick up the theme of this special issue: why does it matter whether IR is, or should move into, a mode of affirmation rather than critique?82 Why is this a good question to ask—and for whom? This is not just a theoretical problem, but it has real-life consequences for actually-existing decolonial struggles. The desire for making a generic argument about relational ontologies and a pluriversal politics harbours the danger of making a huge variety of demands and struggles that often exist in tension and contradiction with each other commensurable. Indigenous demands for the repatriation of “their” land might be at odds with the social justice demands for redistribution and “the commons”. 83 For Blaney and Tickner, decolonial thought is commensurable with not just the ontological turn literature, but also feminist and other critical interventions.84 Mignolo and Arturo Escobar advocate a transnational fight for global justice and are enthusiastic about the potential of global movements to achieve that aim together.85 Like Mignolo, Rojas explicitly draws on the World Social Forum slogan “Another world is possible” as well as the Zapatistas slogan of “a world where many words fit” to make her case about the need for a pluriversal understanding of emancipatory-decolonial politics.86 While it can be argued that this problem of seeing all these struggles and demands as commensurable goes back to a lack of actual engagement with particular decolonial practices and battles, what I have argued in this article is that it is also related to the problem of how and what sort of knowledge is produced and valued in the Western academy: knowledge that is abstract, generic, and applicable beyond a specific context. Knowledge that is driven by the desire to know what is. Knowledge that desires to know what holds the turtle—all the way down.

### Link—Settler Colonialism—Pessimism

#### Their understanding of the state as unified, immutable, and inevitably dangerous to Indigenous actors creates a pessimism trap that stifles Indigenous agency and activism.

Lightfoot, 20—associate professor in First Nations and Indigenous Studies and the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Ojibwe (Sheryl, “The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence,” *Pessimism in International Relations*, Chapter 9, pp 162-170, SpringerLink, dml)

Pessimism Trap 2: The State is Unified, Deliberate and Unchanging in Its Desire to Dispossess Indigenous Peoples and Gain Unfettered Access to Indigenous Lands and Resources

In other words, colonialism by settler states is a constant, not a variable, in both outcome and intent. Further, the state is not only intentionally colonial, but it is also unifed in its desire to co-opt Indigenous peoples as a method and means of control.

In 2005’s Wasase, Alfred presents the state as unitary, intentional and unchanging in its desire to colonise and oppress Indigenous peoples noting, ‘I think that the only thing that has changed since our ancestors first declared war on the invaders is that some of us have lost heart’.22 Referring to current state policies as a ‘self-termination movement’, Alfred states, ‘It is senseless to advocate for an accord with imperialism while there is a steady and intense ongoing attack by the Settler society on everything meaningful to us: our cultures, our communities, and our deep attachments to land’.23

Alfred’s Peace, Power, Righteousness (2009) also argues that the state is deliberate and unchanging, stating quite plainly that ‘it is still the objective of the Canadian and US governments to remove Indians, or, failing that, to prevent them from benefitting, from their ancestral territories’.24 Contemporary states do this, he argues, not through outright violent control but ‘by insidiously promoting a form of neo-colonial self-government in our communities and forcing our integration into the legal mainstream’.25 According to Alfred, the state ‘relegates indigenous peoples’ rights to the past, and constrains the development of their societies by allowing only those activities that support its own necessary illusion: that indigenous peoples today do not present a serious challenge to its legitimacy’.26

Linking back to the aim of co-option, Alfred argues that while the state’s desire to control Indigenous peoples and lands has never changed, the techniques for doing so have become subtler over time. ‘Recognizing the power of the indigenous challenge and unable to deny it a voice’, due to successful Indigenous resistance over the years, ‘the state has (now) attempted to pull indigenous people closer to it’.27 According to Alfred, the state has outwitted Indigenous leaders and ‘encouraged them to reframe and moderate their nationhood demands to accept the fait accompli of colonization, (and) to collaborate in the development of a “solution” that does not challenge the fundamental imperial lie’.28

In a similar vein, Coulthard’s central argument is centred on his understanding of the dual structure of colonialism. Drawing directly from Fanon, Coulthard finds that colonialism relies on both objective and subjective elements. The objective components involve domination through the political, economic and legal structures of the colonial state. The subjective elements of colonialism involve the creation of ‘colonized subjects’, including a process of internalisation by which colonised subjects come to not only accept the limited forms of ‘misrecognition’ granted through the state but can even come to identify with it.29 Through this dual structure, colonial power now works through the inclusion of Indigenous peoples, actively shaping their perspectives in line with state discourses, rather than merely excluding them, as in years past. Therefore, any attempt to seek ‘the reconciliation of Indigenous nationhood with state sovereignty is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority’.30

Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims in ways that ‘jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities’.31 He claims that states frst compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deemphasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency, overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, as was evident in earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women’s rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that the anti-discrimination and decolonisation frames could be used together against states. States did, in no way, nefariously impose a rights framework on Indigenous peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples’ human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways.

Pessimism Trap 3: Engagement with the Settler State is Futile, if Not Counter-Productive

Since the state always intends to maintain, if not expand, colonial control, and is seeking to co-opt as many Indigenous peoples as possible in order to maintain or expand its dispossession and control, it is therefore futile, at best, and actually dangerous to Indigenous existence to engage with the state. Furthermore, all patterns of engagement will lead to co-optation as the state is cunning and unrelenting in its desire to co-opt Indigenous leaders, academics and professionals in order to gain or maintain control of Indigenous peoples.

Alfred argues, in both his 2005 and 2009 books, that any Indigenous engagement with the state, including agreements and negotiations, is not only futile but fundamentally dangerous, as such pathways do not directly challenge the existing colonial structure and ‘to argue on behalf of indigenous nationhood within the dominant Western paradigm is self-defeating’.32 Alfred states that a ‘notion of nationhood or self-government rooted in state institutions and framed within the context of state sovereignty can never satisfy the imperatives of Native American political traditions’33 because the possibility for a true expression of Indigenous self-determination is ‘precluded by the state’s insistence on dominion and its exclusionary notion of sovereignty’.34 Worst of all, according to Alfred, when Indigenous communities frame their struggles in terms of asserting Aboriginal rights and title, but do so within a state framework, rather than resisting the state itself, it ‘represents the culmination of white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples’.35

Because it is impossible to advance Indigenous self-determination through any sort of engagement with the state, Coulthard also advocates for an Indigenous resurgence paradigm that follows both his mentor Taiaiake Alfred but also Anishinaabe feminist theorist Leanne Simpson.36 As Coulthard writes, ‘both Alfred and Simpson start from a position that calls on Indigenous peoples and communities to “turn away” from the assimilative reformism of the liberal recognition approach and to instead build our national liberation efforts on the revitalization of “traditional” political values and practices’.37 Drawing upon the prescriptive approach of these theorists, Coulthard proposes, in his concluding chapter, five theses from his analysis that are intended to build and solidify Indigenous resurgence into the future:

1. On the necessity of direct action, meaning that physical forms of Indigenous resistance, like protest and blockades, are very important not only as a reaction to the state but also as a means of protecting the lands that are central to Indigenous peoples’ existence;

2. Capitalism, No More!, meaning the rejection of capitalist forms of economic development in Indigenous communities in favour of land-based Indigenous political-economic alternative approaches;

3. Dispossession and Indigenous Sovereignty in the City, meaning the need for Indigenous resurgence movements ‘to address the interrelated systems of dispossession that shape Indigenous peoples’ experiences in both urban and land-based settings’38;

4. Gender Justice and Decolonisation, meaning that decolonisation must also include a shift away from patriarchy and an embrace of gender relations that are non-violent and refective of the centrality of women in traditional forms of Indigenous governance and society; and

5. Beyond the Nation-State. While Coulthard denies that he advocates complete rejection of engagement with the state’s political and legal system, he does assert that ‘our efforts to engage these discursive and institutional spaces to secure recognition of our rights have not only failed, but have instead served to subtly reproduce the forms of racist, sexist, economic, and political confgurations of power that we initially sought…to challenge’.39 He therefore advocates expressly for ‘critical self-refection, skepticism, and caution’ in a ‘resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, gender-emancipatory, and economically nonexploitative alternative structures of law and sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and political traditions’.40

Corntassel also demonstrates the third pessimism trap, that all engagement with the state is ultimately futile. For the most part, however, Corntassel’s observation is that the UN system operates like a reverse Keck and Sikkink ‘boomerang model’ and ‘channels the energies of transnational Indigenous networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries’, by which an ‘illusion of inclusion’ is created.41 He argues that, in order to be included or their views listened to, Indigenous delegates at the UN must mimic the strategies, language, norms and modes of behaviour of member states and international institutions. Corntassel fnds that ‘what results is a cadre of professionalized Indigenous delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN system than to their own communities’.42 In his final analysis, he charges that the co-optation of international Indigenous political actors is highly ‘effective in challenging the unity of the global Indigenous rights movement and hindering genuine dialogue regarding Indigenous self-determination and justice’.43

Finding that states deliberately co-opt and provide ‘illusions of inclusion’ to Indigenous political actors in UN settings, Corntassel comes to the same conclusion as Alfred concerning the futility of engagement, arguing that because transnational Indigenous networks are ‘channeled’ and ‘blunted’ by colonial state actors, ‘it is a critical time for Indigenous peoples to rethink their approaches to bringing Indigenous rights concerns to global forums’.44

Imagining a Post-Colonial Future: Pessimistic ‘Resurgence’ Versus the Optimism and Tenacity of Indigenous Movements on the Ground

All of these writers advocate Indigenous resurgence, through a combination of rejecting the current reconciliation politics of settler colonial states, coupled with a return to land-based Indigenous expressions of governance as the only viable, ‘authentic’ and legitimate path to a better future for Indigenous peoples, which they refer to as decolonisation. While inherently critical in their orientation, these three approaches do make some positive and productive contributions to Indigenous movements. They help shed light on the various and subtle ways that Indigenous leaders and communities can become co-opted into a colonial system. They help us to hold leadership accountable. They also help us keep a strong focus on our traditional, cultural and spiritual values as well as our traditional forms of governance which then also helps us imagine future possibilities.

As I have pointed out here, however, all three theorists are also caught in the same three pessimism traps: authenticity versus co-option; a vision of the state as unified, deliberate and never changing in its desire to colonise and control; and a view of engagement with the state as futile, if not dangerous, to Indigenous sovereignty and existence. When combined, these three pessimism traps aim to inhibit Indigenous peoples’ engagement with the state in any process that could potentially re-imagine and re-formulate their current relationship into one that could be transformative and post-colonial, as envisioned by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The pessimism traps together work to foreclose any possibility that there could be credible openings of opportunity to negotiate a fairer and just relationship of co-existence with even the most progressive state government.

This pessimistic approach is not innocuous. By overemphasising structure and granting the state an enormous degree of agency as a unitary actor, this pessimistic approach does a remarkable disservice to Indigenous resistance movements by proscribing, from academia, an extremely narrow view of what Indigenous self-determination can and should mean in practice. By overlooking and/or discounting Indigenous agency and not even considering the possibility that Indigenous peoples could themselves be calculating, strategic political actors in their own right, and vis-à-vis states, the pessimistic lens of the resurgence school unnecessarily, unproductively and unjustly limits the field of possibility for Indigenous peoples’ decision-making, thus actually countering and inhibiting expressions of Indigenous self-determination. By condemning—writ large—all Indigenous peoples and organisations that wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the state, negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with the state, and/or who have advocated on the international level for a set of standards that can provide a positive guiding framework for Indigenous-state relations, the pessimistic lens of resurgence forecloses much potential for new and improved relations, in any form, and is very likely to lead to deeper conflicts between states and Indigenous peoples, and potentially, even violent action, which Fanon indicated was the necessary outcome. The pessimism traps of the resurgence school are therefore, likely self-defeating for all but the most remote and isolated Indigenous communities. Further, this approach is quite out of step with the actions and vision of many Indigenous resistance movements on the ground who have been working for decades to advance Indigenous self-determination, both domestically and globally, in ways that transform the colonial state into something more just and may eventually present creative alternatives to the Westphalian state form in ways that could respect and accommodate Indigenous nations. Rather, it aims to shame and blame those who wish to explore creative and innovative post-colonial resolutions to the colonial condition.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration or UN Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 after 25 years of development. The Declaration is ground-breaking, given the key leadership roles Indigenous peoples played in negotiating and achieving this agreement.45 Additionally, for the first time in UN history, the rights holders, Indigenous peoples, worked with states to develop an instrument that would serve to promote, protect and affirm Indigenous rights, both globally and in individual domestic contexts.46

Many Indigenous organisations and movements, from dozens of countries around the world, were involved in drafting and negotiating the UN Declaration and are now advocating for its full implementation, both internationally and in domestic and regional contexts. In Canada, some of the key organisational players—the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), the Assembly of First Nations, and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, or their predecessor organisations—were involved in the drafting and lengthy negotiations of the UN Declaration during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the United States, organisations like the American Indian Law Alliance and the Native American Rights Fund have been involved as well as the Navajo Nation and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, who represent themselves as Indigenous peoples’ governing institutions. From Scandinavia, the Saami Council and the Sami Parliaments all play a key role in advancing Indigenous rights. In Latin America, organisations like the Confederación de Nationalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA) advocate for implementation of the UN Declaration. The three, major transnational Indigenous organisations— the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the International Indian Treaty Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council—were all key members of the drafting and negotiating team for the UN Declaration, and the latter two, which are still in existence, continue their strong advocacy for its full implementation.

Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires fundamental and significant change, on both the international and domestic levels. Because implementation of Indigenous rights essentially calls for a complete and fundamental restructuring of Indigenous-state relationships, it expects states to enact and implement a signifcant body of legal, constitutional, legislative and policy changes that can accommodate such things as Indigenous land rights, free, prior and informed consent, redress and a variety of self-government, autonomy and other such arrangements. States are not going to implement this multifaceted and complex set of changes on their own, however. They will require significant political and moral pressure to hold them accountable to the rhetorical commitments they have made to support this level of change. They will also require ongoing conversation and negotiation with Indigenous peoples along the way, lest the process becomes problematically one-sided. Such processes ultimately require sustained political will, commitment and engagement over the long term, to reach the end result of radical systemic change and Indigenous state relationships grounded in mutual respect, co-existence and reciprocity. This type of fundamental change requires creative thinking, careful diplomacy, tenacity, and above all, optimistic vision, on the part of Indigenous peoples. The pessimistic approaches of the resurgence school are ultimately of little use in these efforts, other than as a cautionary tale against state power, of which the organisational players are already keenly aware. Further, by dismissing and discouraging all efforts at engagement with states, and especially with the blanket accusations that all who engage in such efforts are ‘co-opted’ and not ‘authentically’ Indigenous, the resurgence school actually creates unnecessary negative feelings and divisions amongst Indigenous movements who should be pooling limited resources and working together towards better futures.

### Link—Theorizing

**Theory doesn’t alter material conditions of violence.**

**Zack, 17**—Professor of Philosophy, University of Oregon (Naomi, “Ideal, Nonideal, and Empirical Theories of Social Justice: The Need for Applicative Justice in Addressing Injustice,” The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, Oxford University Press, February 2017, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Ideals of justice may do **little** toward the correction of injustice in **real life**. The influence of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has led some philosophers of race to focus on “nonideal theory” as a way to bring conditions in unjust societies closer to conditions of justice described by ideal theory. However, a **more direct approach** to injustice may be needed to address **unfair public policy** and **existing conditions** for minorities in racist societies. Applicative justice describes the applications of principles of justice that are now “good enough” for whites to nonwhites (based on prior comparisons of how whites and nonwhites are treated).

Social information just dribbles in, bit by bit, and we simply get used to it. A single story about a person really hits home at once, but the grinding injustices of daily life are endured. It is easy to ignore them and we do.

Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (Shklar 1990, 110)

IDEAL theory about justice extends from Plato’s Republic to John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, including many careers devoted to analyses and criticism about such texts in political philosophy. Rawls offers a picture of the basic institutional structures of a just society, on the premise that in order to correct injustice, we must first know what justice is. According to Rawls, while “partial compliance theory” studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice, full compliance theory, or ideal theory, studies the institutional principles of justice in a stable society where citizens obey the law. Rawls began A Theory of Justice with the claim: “The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems” (Rawls 1971, 8).

Rawls’s ideal theory is **too abstract** to **correct** injustice or **provide** justice for victims of injustice in **reality**, because it is based on a thought experiment and the assumption of a “well-ordered” society in which there already is compliance with law (Zack 2016, 1–64). What people care about in reality concerning justice is **not** what ideal justice **is** or **would be**, but **how** immediate injustice can be **corrected**. Injustice is **always specific** in **concrete events** that are recognizable as certain types, for example, theft, murder, or police racial profiling. Injustice can be corrected by punishing those responsible for it in specific cases and instituting social changes that prevent or reduce future occurrences of the same type.

Rawlsian nonideal theories of justice, constructed for societies where people do not comply with just laws, rely on ideal theory as a standard for just institutional structures. The main question driving nonideal theory is how to construct a model or picture of justice that will result in the future correction or avoidance of present injustices. John Simmons quotes John Rawls from Law of Peoples, on this matter.

Nonideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective [LOP p. 89].

(Simmons 2010, 7)

However, injured or indignant parties may not care about the long-term goal of justice that could lead to balance or compensation for their situations. Not only are what P. F. Strawson (1962) called “reactive attitudes,” such as moral indignation, blame, and a desire for deserved punishment, strong in their focus on injustice, but the best theory of justice in the world **does not tell us what to do** about the injustices we are faced with in the **here** and **now**, especially “the more pressing problems” of race-related injustices. Such questions **cannot** be answered with reference to ideal **theory** or some **application** of ideal or nonideal theory to their **concrete situations**, because the **a priori nature** of both of these does not provide a fit with **specific contingencies**—ideal and nonideal theories do not generate **practical bridge principles**. As theories, they posit ideal entities, but without the apparatus of scientific theories which provides connections to observable entities or events. (Moulines 1985). The correction of injustice or injustice theory requires a philosophical foundation for itself.

Models of justice have often been naïvely utopian throughout the history of philosophy, because they are based on an assumption of **automatic total compliance**, as though **the right words** or pictures by **themselves** have the power to **transform reality**, or as though **agreement** with those right words or pictures will **automatically result** in action that will **automatically make** the world **instantiate** those words or pictures. When they are not fantastically and ineffectively utopian in this way, such models have been used to justify the already-existing dominance of some groups over others. (A prime example is John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, written decades before 1688 Glorious Revolution, to express the interests of the new rising class of landed gentry, which were eventually fulfilled by a Protestant king on the throne and a strong representative parliament after that revolution [Laslett 1988].)

Models of justice have legitimately served to inspire law in modern societies with government constitutions and national and local law. But, sometimes, as in US founding documents, although universal and absolute justice is proclaimed, subsequent events make it clear that this language was intended to legitimize just treatment for members of selected groups only, that is, white male property owners, at first. As a result of just law and its **selective application**, **over time**, there comes to be justice for an expanding group, but still not everyone in society. However, what is **written**, together with descriptions of real justice for some, can be a **powerful lever** for **obtaining justice** for **at least some** of the excluded. To understand how that works, it is necessary to develop an approach to justice that **begin**s with **injustice**, in **real situations** where there is already some degree of justice in a larger whole. The extension of existing practices of justice to members of new groups is applicative justice, a concept with substantial historical and intellectual precedent, although not by that name. In what follows, more will be said about the idea of applicative justice and then its history will be considered. Voting rights and housing rights are examples of candidates for applicative justice in our time. Finally, content in the form of narrative may be motivational for social change.

The Idea of Applicative Justice

Applicative justice is an approach to justice with the goal of making the unjust treatment of some comparable to those who already receive just treatment. Applicative justice takes a comparative approach, for example, comparing how young black males are treated by police officers in contemporary US society, to how young white males are treated (Jones 2013; Zack 2013, 2015). Applicative justice rests on a pragmatic approach to social ills, which includes the premise, based on Arthur Bentley’s 1908 insights in The Process of Government, that government is much more than the apparatus of state and written laws and court decisions. Government is an extended, dynamic process, an ongoing contention among interest groups in society. This full-bodied, empirical and pragmatic view of government process entails, for example, that we consider as parts of the same political mix/phenomenon/raw material all of the foregoing: the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 1960s Civil Rights Legislation, doctrines of probable cause, the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans, racial profiling, and police homicide with impunity. Thus, Rawls’s insistence that “the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests” (Rawls 1971, 4), should be understood as “the rights secured by justice should not be subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.” In reality, “the rights secured by justice” are constantly subject to political bargaining and the living calculus of social interests. One consequence of this empirical perspective is that moral **outrage**, **critiques** of white supremacy, or **analyses** of white privilege, along with other forms of blame, **cannot** be assumed to have the power to **change anything**, **by themselves**. By contrast, changing **relationships** between police officers and their local communities, or changing the **rules of engagement** when police stop or attempt to stop suspects, might on this view have some **causal power** (Ayres and Markovits 2014). It is important to realize that such changes in practice would not be specific applications of a theory of justice, but ways of changing social reality into a different political mix.

However, a better theory of justice, even a more racially egalitarian one and even a theory of applicative justice that was widely accepted, would still be no more than a change in what Bentley calls “political content.” Any theory of justice or any set of just laws is compatible with widespread racially unequal and unjust practice. And the converse also holds. Unjust laws or laws with gaps for unjust practice are compatible with just practice. Thus, applicative justice is pragmatic in taking the whole political mix/ phenomenon/raw material as its subject for a specific injustice. Unlike ideal or nonideal justice theory, the applicative justice approach brooks little faith that reality can be changed by a special conceptual space or mode of critical moral discourse that is undertaken apart from reality. Reality **cannot be changed** by **normative pronouncements**, by or on behalf of the oppressed, but **only** by **shifts in existing interests** of **groups of real people**. To base hopes for change on normative content **alone** may paralyze [**eliminate**] the **means** for taking action that **could result in change**, because such content proceeds as though matters of justice were **only matters of argument**. Those who have **opposed** social racial justice have **understood this well enough**, because instead of **mainly arguing** against new just law over the twentieth century, they have **taken action** to block progress.

### Link—Undercommons/Hapticality/Fugitivity

#### The alt can’t solve their links. [Fugitivity/undercommons/maroonage] is affectively appealing but fizzles out when actualized in the university.

Webb, 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997). Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision. There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

### Link—Wynter

#### The aff is naïve decolonization that prematurely discards valuable tools for emancipation at the first whiff of colonial association.

Meagher, 18—University of Connecticut (Thomas, “Maturity in a Human World: A Philosophical Study,” <https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8155&context=dissertations>, dml)

Of course, these reflections take as their point of departure not a universal and ahistoric form of patriarchy, misogyny, or sexism, but rather a historically particular form instantiated through Euro-modern colonialism (Wynter, 1990; Oyèwùmí, 1997; Lugones 2007). What is it at issue is not so much the intersection of standalone forms of racism and sexism, but rather their mutual co-constitution through an imperial and colonial matrix of power. Following Sylvia Wynter, we may then raise the issue that the problem of maturity may be linked to what she terms “the over-representation of Man as if it were the human” (2003). “Man” takes as its point of reference a white, European or Euro-American bourgeois male, a “global breadwinner” whose economic mastery is attributable not to illegitimate regimes of appropriation and exploitation but rather to Man’s intrinsic virtue. The modern episteme, Wynter contends, is premised on elevating Man to the status of an a priori ideal of humanity. A consequence is that modern forms of knowledge are shrouded in a logic of “biodicy” (Wynter, 2006), in which whatever ills humanity confronts can be attributed not to the misdeeds of Man but rather to the intrinsic lack of value to be found in those human beings who are not Man – women, people of color, the global poor, etc. As such, the imperative lurking behind Euro-modern conceptions of maturity, as well as their enshrinement and naturalization within Euro-modern institutions, may be not only “be a man” but simply “be Man.”

“Man,” of course, stands ambiguously at the heart of many modern discourses. On the one hand, “man” can be taken to refer explicitly and particularly to adult males. On the other hand, “man” and “mankind” are taken to refer to humanity in general, with similarly gendered pronouns and suffixes serving as generic referents. Feminist thought has long had to reckon with the ripe conditions for equivocation that this engenders, and Wynter and other thinkers confronting problems of racism and coloniality have gone further in establishing that for Euromodernity, “man” equivocates between references to all human beings and references merely to European peoples (and perhaps the occasional “honorary white”).

Yet receiving much less attention is another central ambiguity: if “man” has an equivocal relation to categories of race and gender, what of its relation to age and adulthood? If Euromodern discourses on man over-represent a racialized, gendered, classed subject as if it represented humanity writ large, is there a similar error in over-representing the adult as if it were all humanity? Clearly, it would be an error to say, for instance, that human rights are rights by virtue of one’s having attained adulthood; the “rights of man” often refer to rights that would appear to be the human rights of children as well as adults. Indeed, there may be some human rights that are distinctly owed to children – consider, for instance, S. Matthew Liao’s argument that children have a right to be loved (Liao, 2015). Yet here the issue of paternalism emerges, a source of recurring debates in Euro-modern thought due to its imbrication in colonial and patriarchal modes of power. If children have a right to have guardians, then the debate rages as to whether the child-like should likewise have some form of protectorate imposed upon them.

Here a critical response emerges: if paternalism functions as a Trojan horse for colonization and patriarchy, then perhaps it simply ought to be rejected wholesale. Hence, what if decolonizing values requires discarding the notion of maturity altogether? In other words, maturity is woven into the fabric Euro-modern values, and it is therefore a medium for the propagation of coloniality. Where efforts to value maturity are present, it seems, the valorization of “Man” and devalorization of women, people of color, etc. lurks in the shadows. If Wynter’s call is for “the human after Man,” then it might follow that what is needed is the achievement of the human after maturity.

b. The Problem of Naïve Decolonization

The notion that any values associated with colonialism or coloniality ought to be discarded, however, is fraught with problems. The apt metaphor here pertains to the folly of throwing babies out with the bathwater. Colonialism is an effort to instrumentalize land, people, culture, values, and knowledge; it invariably makes use of that which is valued prior to colonization. This is not to say that colonialism does not introduce new values of its own, but even where this is the case, colonialism often seeks to impose these through projects of cooptation that are established in reference to the values that precede them. In brief, the issue is that efforts to value maturity are by no means original or exclusive to Euro-modernity and coloniality.

Consider here Ifeanyi Menkiti’s contention (1984, 2004) that it is typical of African conceptions of personhood that one must mature in order to become a person. Full personhood is not a product of birth alone but is rather achieved through the acts and influences that make one meaningfully a member of a community. The claim, then, is not simply that it is better to be mature than not, but rather that a type of maturity is requisite to attain an ontological status of personhood: “passage through time helps create not only a qualitative difference between young and old, but also an ontologically significant one” (Menkiti, 2004: 325). The notion of maturity as bearing normative significance and even the notion of maturity as constitutive of the difference between those who are fully human and those who are not are not purely European or colonial inventions. This is not to say that Europe did not re-invent notions of maturity or bring to them a significance that was distinctly colonial and not indigenous to a pre-colonial context. Nor is it to claim that it was African societies’ normative attachment to forms of maturity that made them more susceptible to efforts of European colonization. The point is simply that maturity refers, ultimately, to ideals about which many societies have had constructive ideas prior to colonization, and the fact that there are colonial ideals of maturity, as well as precolonial conceptions of maturity that have been colonized and transformed in the process, does not imply that maturity ought to be discarded wholesale on the grounds that it is no more than a colonial artifact.

The effort to reject whatever is associated with colonizers or epochs of colonization can be termed “naïve decolonization.” I do not mean to suggest that decolonization is itself naïve but rather that one can distinguish between forms of decolonization that are naïve and forms that are mature. Naïve decolonization often works according to the logic of guilt by association. Under this framework, decolonization’s chief responsibility becomes to repudiate whatever happens to be associated with the colonizers. The problem with such an approach is one that Aimé Césaire raised in Discourse on Colonialism (2000): that to oppose colonialism, to maintain that it dehumanizes both colonized and colonizer, does not mean that one can go back to a pre-colonial world. Frantz Fanon, likewise, issued the call to “Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them” (1963: 311), but this “leaving” meant to refuse the claim that Europe was an adequate model, that its “successes” made it worthy of imitation. “It is a question,” Fanon wrote, “of the Third World starting a new history of Man, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe’s crimes, of which the most horrible was committed in the heart of man, and consisted of the pathological tearing apart of his functions and the crumbling away of his unity” (1963: 315). In short, the imperative to build a world no longer suffering from colonial pathologies may require that one not discard all European thought in much the way that European intellectuals often claimed that all non-European thought could be discarded. Naïve decolonization regards repudiation of the colonial as sufficient for decolonization; mature decolonization confronts a responsibility to build a world that is genuinely after colonialism, a world, as Fanon called for, in which tools would not possess human beings and enslavement would be brought to a permanent end, and wherein it would be possible for human beings to discover and love each other, wherever they may be (1967a: 231).

In that sense, we may issue a warning that Wynter’s call for “the human, after Man” may not mean, as such, the death of Man. The obvious points of reference here are Michel Foucault’s vision that man could be erased “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1994: 387) and Friedrich Nietzsche’s “God is dead. … And we have killed him” (Nietzsche 2001: §125). The problem with a call for Man’s death is that the death of Man is not necessarily the end of Man’s power. That Man should have hegemonic power in shaping the world, in organizing it in such a fashion so that each of its part serves Man’s ends, is an acute concern. But the death of Man does not guarantee the diminishment of such power. Foucault had expressed a similar concern in warning that having literally cut off the king’s head does not ensure that one will have done likewise in the realm of political theory (Foucault, 1978: 88-9); the question can remain, though, as to whether even cutting off the king’s head in political theory would eradicate the king’s power over how politics is thought about. Here African ontologies suggest a relevant point of consideration: the death of ancestors does not eradicate their power with regard to present and future generations (Gyekye, 1995: 68–84; Henry, 2000: 26–43; L.R. Gordon, 2006: 58–61).

Wynter, in building off of and beyond Foucault’s framework, discussed these matters in terms of “transumptive chains” that govern the shift from one episteme and epoch of power to another. The symbols and modes of knowledge production put into effect to undergird one regime of power, do not “resume” so much as “transume” – that is, their interruption by revolutions and epistemic breaks yields their continuation in altered forms. The “death of God” at issue for Nietzsche and others was less an issue of God’s absence and more an issue of how God had been replaced; could science, philosophy, or Man really serve the knowledge- and world-orienting roles that God had? To ask of humanistic institutions that they replace God is, in its own way, a continuation of the power of God: it is to impose a demand that is exogenous to those institutions and that may transcend their capacities quite drastically. The degodding of the Western episteme, Wynter contends, moved it out of a Christocentric framework of knowledge production into a partially secularized episteme of Man-1, premised on the centrality and ideality of “homo politicus,” which in turn was further degodded and begot Man-2, the episteme of “homo oeconomicus” (Wynter, 2003, 2006). But the structure of the argument implies that present efforts toward decolonization could, simply, beget Man-3, and simply because one takes as one’s aim that one will kill Man-2 does not negate the possibility that one’s efforts will culminate in the hegemony of Man-3.

A further reference point of relevance, then, is Sigmund Freud’s notion of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1977: 207–8, 328–38). Human beings enter into a world in which they are cared for, but their maturation facilitates the diminution of that care. Confrontation with an adult world, though, may spark forms of resentment that engender an anxious or oppositional relation to those by whom one has been nurtured. The notion of the Oedipus complex suggests a desire to displace and replace those sources of care, and the structure of such desire would be to persist without reflective awareness: e.g., I want to spite my father by surpassing him and reincarnate my mother’s love through another, but I may fail to understand that this desire is implicitly manifest in my acts. The psychoanalyst, then, can point to the structural tendency of human existence to produce Oedipal desires, and for the patient under analysis, this can facilitate reflection on how one’s behavior may ultimately be the symbolic expression of the Oedipal. Fanon (1967a), though, by taking this method seriously, saw that a rigid interpretation of it would have to be transcended, for in a colonized society, the sociogenesis of Oedipal structures would be quite different than it would be in the European context that stimulated Freud’s explorations. If in both France and Martinique it was Man that was symbolically produced as paragon of value, then the investment of Oedipal desire in one’s father could be typical among white children in France and atypical among black children in Martinique. The tragic consequence is that many black people would, in turn, act upon these desires unreflectively, pursuing dreams of integration and white acceptance that were simply unrealizable. Hence, the Oedipal could, in the colonial context, be an extension of colonial power, part of the array of psychological tools that undergird domination. A further problem, then, is evident even in opposition to the colonizer: pursuing the death of the colonizer, to passionately seek the death of Man, could be to fail to confront the causes of one’s debilitation and, indeed, to exacerbate them.

Psychoanalysis hinges on the importance of moving from a naïve understanding of one’s desires to a mature one. Ironically, this point is often lost on many of those who repudiate Freudian psychoanalysis. Indeed, both in positivist and post-structuralist psychologies there is much evidence of an Oedipal relationship to Freud, an over-investment in, as it were, cutting off his head in psychological theory. This may take pathological expression where it means that one recapitulates the worst of Freud’s mistakes and discards his most prescient insights. An example is illustrated by Emma Perez’s criticism of Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze’s Anti-Oedipus. If Guattari and Deleuze are correct that the Oedipal does not arise in the pre-colonial kinship structures of the non-West, it does not thereby follow, Perez contends, that colonization has not imposed the Oedipal on them. To resist the Oedipal diagnosis, in short, does not combat the “Oedipalization” that coloniality puts into place (Perez, 1999: 102–110). The “anti-” of antiOedipus may, ultimately, betray an Oedipal anxiety at the heart of post-structuralist efforts to hasten the death of their forbears. So, too, for positivist approaches that, repelled by the limitations of the “talking cure” approach of psychoanalysis, beget an uncritical and at times fetishistic relationship to neurophysiological reductionism. That there are limitations to the early articulations of psychoanalysis does not entail that one ought to overlook its strengths, in the same way that the psychoanalyst may recommend that the patient respond to the influence of a flawed parent by at least attempting to grasp and understand the parent’s genuine virtues and accomplishments; otherwise, the disdain may become pathological. The point of examining structures of Oedipal desire is not to discover an inevitable fate – to find that one is doomed to pathology and catastrophe – but rather to help one take responsibility for reflecting upon what one really wants and needs and, to use Fanon’s term, to be actional in the face of powers one cannot fully eradicate.

What Fanon and Perez point to, then, is a model of mature decolonization for which the mere acceptance and application of European ideas and concepts is inadequate but for which the wholesale and uncritical repudiation of those ideas and concepts is undesirable and irresponsible. Hence, the maturity of decolonization involves heeding both Audre Lorde’s warning that it would be naïve to expect the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house (Lorde, 1984: 110–3) as well as Jane and Lewis Gordon’s warning that the effort to dismantle the master’s house is necessary but insufficient for projects of decolonization (Gordon and Gordon, 2006). The master is, indeed, well-versed in how to use his tools to maintain his house; for this reason, decolonization that limits itself to immanent critique of the Euro-modern intellectual canon is likely doomed to tilt at windmills, for this canon was by and large erected in order to facilitate enduring modes of coloniality. But the diminution of the master’s power is not merely a matter of dismantling his house, and tools that the master has sought to employ might nonetheless be useful to construct other houses, to create alternative possibilities and futures. In short, naïve decolonization takes its responsibilities as delimited by the need to overthrow the master, but mature decolonization encounters an expanded responsibility which demands the creative and critical apprehension of the resources and inventions that can build a new world and set afoot a new humanity. As such, it needs to be wary of naïve decolonization, for, among other issues, naïve decolonization is a tool that masters can manipulate, have manipulated, and may even at times appropriate as their own. Think, for instance, of the many ways in which the ideal of a color-blind society, offered up initially as an anti-colonial idea, has been turned into an asinine but effective tool for passing and upholding policies with racist effects, or the ways in which the expansion of U.S. colonial power drew upon exploitation of the so-called “Black Legend” to replace Spanish colonial power without eradicating the colonial standing of the locales thus “liberated.”

To speak of “naïve decolonization” at all, though, is to raise a thorny linguistic issue, for “naïve” shares its etymological roots with the term “native.” The notion that its articulation in modern French and English vernaculars is completely unrelated to conceptions of “natives” in the colonies strains credulity. To decolonize the concepts that shroud intellectual production and normative life requires critical reflection on the relationship between the concepts as inherited and the greater conceptual scheme of which they are parts. So, for instance, we may speak of the efforts of those like Kwasi Wiredu (1997: 136–144) or Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (1986) toward decolonization by way of rethinking concepts from the perspective of languages not imposed by colonizers and, indeed, to be able to think enmeshed in these languages rather than as a merely occasional visitor to them. But it does not follow that one is in all cases better off by having abandoned terms that appear in the language of the colonizer, and the imperative of crosscultural communication – both in general and in the particular case of projects of decolonization – may require being able to critically and reflectively employ language that is neither purely innocent nor purely colonizing in its pragmatic effects. “Naïve” may simply refer to a cultural universal with transcultural validity, whereas the peculiar sense of “native” in Euro-modern languages may be the cultural particular of a cultural formation guided by the telos of colonization.4 And where “naïve” is used in such a way as to implicate this “native” baggage, one need not throw one’s hands up and abandon the term, since the alternative of distinguishing better and worse uses of it remains.

### Impact—Ressentiment

**The impact is ressentiment and a dogmatically revolutionary telos which can only devolve into a violent self-policing and pure negativity—prefer our method of pluralist assemblages.**

**Eloff 15.** Aragorn Eloff, nomad in South Africa, “Children of the New Earth – Deleuze, Guattari, and Anarchism,” July 31, 2015, http://meme.co.za/?p=152

Organisation is crucial, but let us not forget that **for all their differences** of **instantiation**, any group can **lapse into a mode of organisation** that **repeats** the form of **the Party** and **hardens into a new dogma** defined by **unquestioning loyalty**, **ascetism** and the **crushing** or **recuperation of desire turned against itself**. We need “**new micropolitical** and **microsocial practices**, new **solidarities**, a new **gentleness**, together with **new aesthetic** and **new analytic practices**.” This is **not about creating agreement**, because **the more we disagree** “the more **we create a field of vitality**.”

Again, we **should be wary** of the **subjugated groups** and their **repressed desires**, the **groupuscules** and their **channelling of libidinal investments** into **hierarchies**, **reform** and **inertia**. **What is the viscosity and consistency of our group forms?** How do we come together? What flows between us? **What are our fluid dynamics?** How quickly do we congeal or dissipate?

**Attentiveness to the new is crucial**: the world now is not the world then and we are not who we were. The new fascism – the Urstaat awakened and given new strength by capitalism – produces **a peace more terrifying than war** and if we are not careful then “**all our petty fears will be organized in concert**, all **our petty anxieties** will be **harnessed** to **make micro-fascists of us**; we will be called upon to **stifle every little thing**, **every suspicious face**, **every dissonant voice**, **in our streets**.” This does not mean that we cannot, however, also act **against our time** in favour of **a time to come**.

Engagements on the level of discourse are **important but limited**. Control functions just as much through **machinic enslavement of the body** – **affects**, percepts, imaginations, desires, calories, flows of water and electricity – as it does through **the social subjection** that produces, through the **signifying systems** that increasingly fill every corner of the world, **alienation** and **ideological hegemonies**. The new signifying systems also operate in **a double movement**, whereby they **open up the flows of information** whilst simultaneously **closing down collective enunciative capacity.**

**Ressentiment – revenge, resentment and reaction – impedes all revolutionary becoming** and will **only lead to further oppression**, of **each other** and of **ourselves**. Do not **trust those who spread ressentiment** and call for **the settling of accounts**; they **seek only slaves** as allies and always reproduce what they aim to destroy. “To have ressentiment or not to have ressentiment – there is no greater difference, beyond psychology, beyond history, beyond metaphysics. It is the true difference or transcendental typology – the genealogical and hierarchical difference.”

**This is especially true of identity politics**. If we remained **trapped in a Hegelian spirit** of **revenge** then our **victories** will **always be written into the world as victories as slaves**. Identity, **even intersectional identity**, reifies **molar categories** in its **production of axes** of differentiation. Instead of **categories that always repeat the Same** through **false appeals** to **identity**, **analogy**, **resemblance** and **opposition**, we would do better to **think of our multiple** and **alway-shifting overlappings** as **events** and **encounters**, not as perennial attributes of interpellated subjects. **If we’re seeking to hold on to established identities, then what are we resisting?** Our own transformation through association with other bodies? Our capacity to expand joy? Is it not precisely the blockage of desiring-production within sedimented identities that has resulted – and continues to result – in relations of hierarchy and domination? Besides, “the forces of repression need always an ascribable self and specifiable individuals to apply. When we **become a little liquid**, when we **evade the ascription of the self**” then **perhaps we have a chance**. Let us then become liquid; let us fold and unfold and refold in the practice of what Edouard Glissant calls **‘relation-identity’**. This way we can also begin to **discover our “rigid segments,”** our **“binary and overcoding machines,”** and that “we **are not simply divided up by binary machines** of class, sex, or age” but that there are “others which we **constantly shift [and] invent without realizing it**.” Our true names are not “pure” but instead “bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor.”

At the same time, struggle on the level of axioms is **not unimportant**. **The fight for reforms** – for service delivery, for jobs, for recognition, for a voice – can **aid in minority becomings**. However, struggles on this level **only facilitate such becomings** and **are not always necessary**. These molar politics are “the index of **another coexistent combat**,” a **micropolitics**. At the very least, **we must be done with the hegemony of hegemony**. Our “**revolutionary organization must be that of the war machine**.” We seek a **nomadic revolutionary science**, not a **Royal science of teleologies** and **base-superstructures** and **counter-hegemonies** and **determinations in the last instance**. We are **multiple**, **heterogeneous**. There are **always an infinity of peoples**.

### Impact—World-Target

#### The only thing voting aff exports from debate is a thoroughly militarized epistemology that can only relate to Otherness as violence.

Chow 6. Rey Chow, Andrew W. Mellon professor of the humanities at Brown, The Age of the World Target, pg. 38-41

In the decades since 1945, whether in dealing with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and countries in Central America, or during the Gulf Wars, the United States has been conducting war on the basis of a certain kind of knowledge production, and producing knowledge on the basis of war. War and knowledge enable and foster each other primarily through the collective fantasizing of some foreign or alien body that poses danger to the "self" and the "eye" that is the nation. Once the monstrosity of this foreign body is firmly established in the national consciousness, the decision makers of the U.S. government often talk and behave as though they had no choice but war.38 War, then, is acted out as a moral obligation to expel an imagined dangerous alienness from the United States' self-concept as the global custodian of freedom and democracy. Put in a different way, the "moral element," insofar as it produces knowledge about the "self" and "other"—and hence the "eye" and its "target"—as such, justifies war by its very dichotomizing logic. Conversely, the violence of war, once begun, fixes the other in its attributed monstrosity and affirms the idealized image of the self. In this regard, the pernicious stereotyping of the Japanese during the Second World War—not only by U.S. military personnel but also by social and behavioral scientists—was simply a flagrant example of an ongoing ideological mechanism that had accompanied Western treatments of non-Western "others" for centuries. In the hands of academics such as Geoffrey Gorer, writes Dower, the notion that was collectively and "objectively" formed about the Japanese was that they were "a clinically compulsive and probably collectively neurotic people, whose lives were governed by ritual and 'situational ethics,' wracked with insecurity, and swollen with deep, dark currents of repressed resentment and aggression."39 As Dower points out, such stereotyping was by no means accidental or unprecedented: The Japanese, so "unique" in the rhetoric of World War Two, were actually saddled with racial stereotypes that Europeans and Americans had applied to nonwhites for centuries: during the conquest of the New World, the slave trade, the Indian wars in the United States, the agitation against Chinese immigrants in America, the colonization of Asia and Africa, the U.S. conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century. These were stereotypes, moreover, which had been strongly reinforced by nineteenth-century Western science. In the final analysis, in fact, these favored idioms denoting superiority and inferiority transcended race and represented formulaic expressions of Self and Other in general."' The moralistic divide between "self" and "other" constitutes the production of knowledge during the U.S. Occupation of Japan after the Second World War as well. As Monica Braw writes, in the years immediately after 1945, the risk that the United States would be regarded as barbaric and inhumane was carefully monitored, in the main by cutting off Japan from the rest of the world through the ban on travel, control of private mail, and censorship of research, mass media information, and other kinds of communication. The entire Occupation policy was permeated by the view that "the United States was not to be accused; guilt was only for Japan":41 As the Occupation of Japan started, the atmosphere was military. Japan was a defeated enemy that must be subdued. The Japanese should be taught their place in the world: as a defeated nation, Japan had no status and was entitled to no respect. People should be made to realize that any catastrophe that had befallen them was of their own making. Until they had repented, they were suspect. If they wanted to release information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it could only be for the wrong rea-sons, such as accusing the United States of inhumanity. Thus this informa-tion was suppressed.42 As in the scenario of aerial bombing, the elitist and aggressive panoramic "vision" in which the other is beheld means that the sufferings of the other matter much less than the transcendent aspirations of the self. And, despite being the products of a particular culture's technological fanaticism, such transcendent aspirations are typically expressed in the form of selfless uni-versalisms. As Sherry puts it, "The reality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed less important than the bomb's effect on 'mankind's destiny,' on 'humanity's choice,' on 'what is happening to men's minds,' and on hopes (now often extravagantly revived) to achieve world government."'" On Ja-pan's side, as Yoneyama writes, such a "global narrative of the universal history of humanity" has helped sustain "a national victimology and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years." Going one step further, she remarks: "The idea that Hiroshima's disaster ought to be remembered from the transcendent and anonymous position of humanity .. . .might best be described as 'nuclear universalism.' "44 Once the relations among war, racism, and knowledge production are underlined in these terms, it is no longer possible to assume, as some still do, that the recognizable features of modern war—its impersonality, coerciveness, and deliberate cruelty—are "divergences" from the "antipathy" to violence and to conflict that characterize the modern world.45 Instead, it would be incumbent on us to realize that the pursuit of war— with its use of violence—and the pursuit of peace—with its cultivation of knowledge—are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, the coin that I have been calling "the age of the world target." Rather than being irreconcilable opposites, war and peace are coexisting, collaborative functions in the continuum of a virtualized world. More crucially still, only the privileged nations of the world can afford to wage war and preach peace at one and the same time. As Sherry writes, "The United States had different resources with which to be fanatical: resources allowing it to take the lives of others more than its own, ones whose accompanying rhetoric of technique disguised the will to destroy."45  From this it follows that, if indeed political and military acts of cruelty are not unique to the United States—a point which is easy enough to substantiate—what is nonetheless remarkable is the manner in which such acts are, in the United States, usually cloaked in the form of enlightenment and altruism, in the form of an aspiration simultaneously toward technological perfection and the pursuit of peace. In a country in which political leaders are held accountable for their decisions by an electorate, violence simply cannot—as it can in totalitarian countries—exist in the raw. Even the most violent acts must be adorned with a benign, rational story. It is in the light of such interlocking relations among war, racism, and knowledge production that I would make the following comments about area studies, the academic establishment that crystallizes the connection between the epistemic targeting of the world and the "humane" practices of peacetime learning. From Atomic Bombs to Area Studies As its name suggests, area studies as a mode of knowledge production is, strictly speaking, military in its origins. Even though the study of the history, languages, and literatures of, for instance, "Far Eastern" cultures existed well before the Second World War (in what Edward W. Said would term the old Orientalist tradition predicated on philology), the systematization of such study under the rubric of special geopolitical areas was largely a postwar and U.S. phenomenon. In H. D. Harootunian's words, "The systematic formation of area studies, principally in major universities, was .. . a massive attempt to relocate the enemy in the new configuration of the Cold War."47 As Bruce Cumings puts it: "It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia."48 In the decades after 1945, when the United States competed with the Soviet Union for the power to rule and/or destroy the world, these regions were the ones that required continued, specialized super-vision; to this list we may also add Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As areas to be studied, these regions took on the significance of target fields—fields of information retrieval and dissemination that were necessary for the perpetuation of the United States' political and ideological hegemony. In the final part of his classic Orientalism, Said describes area studies as a continuation of the old European Orientalism with a different pedagogical emphasis: No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and "applies" his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France." Whereas Said draws his examples mainly from Islamic and Middle Eastern area studies, Cumings provides this portrait of the Fast Asian target field: The Association for Asian Studies (AAS) was the first "area" organization in the U.S., founded in 1943 as the Far Eastern Association and reorganized as the AAS in 1956. Before 1945 there had been little attention to and not much funding for such things; but now the idea was to bring contemporary social science theory to bear on the non-Western world, rather than continue to pursue the classic themes of Oriental studies, often examined through philology. . In return for their sufferance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources (positions, libraries, language studies)—and soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occupied departments of East Asian languages and cultures. This implicit Faustian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal.50 A largely administrative enterprise, closely tied to policy, the new American Orientalism took over from the old Orientalism attitudes of cultural hostility, among which is, as Said writes, the dogma that "the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible)."" Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic con-ception of the world as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disci-plining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes"—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to "know" the other cultures? Can 'knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self" / "eye"—the "I"— that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences.54 This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object" —and by "the problem of the vanishing object."55

## Cap K

### Link—Aesthetics

#### Aesthetic resistance becomes a new market for indie capitalism

**Kyratzes 13** (Jonas Kratzes, writer and filmmaker, “Rebellious Aesthetics and Indie Capitalism”, 12/18/13, <http://www.jonas-kyratzes.net/2013/12/18/rebellious-aesthetics-and-indie-capitalism/>) // EL

Boots Riley is not only one of my favourite contemporary musicians, he’s also an artist whose politics are radical in a way that seems to be relatively rare in the United States. A while ago he wrote something (in reference to outrage about Urban Outfitters selling a “Vintage Men’s Punk Leather Jacket“) that I thought was really worth sharing and discussing.

Punk and “Underground” Hip-Hop is simply indie capitalism. Indie capitalism is not an answer to our problems, even if it didn’t develop into this. A rebellious aesthetic is not an actual revolutionary movement. An aesthetic is always absorbed and used by the class which is in power. This is why we must have a radical movement that builds its numbers for revolution by using mass direct action to make material changes in the lives of those involved, while making it clear that we are out to create a new system- showing the class structure of the current system, while teaching through example that there is power in numbers and that we can win.

Next up for urban outfitters: whatever revolutionary uniform we’re wearing right now.

This is quite possibly the most succinct phrasing of the problem I have with so much recent “radical” art, whether it’s punk music or indie games: the belief that doing something aesthetically or socially unusual is itself a revolutionary act. And I see why it’s easy to make that mistake: after all, there is definite resistance from the established order! Whether your art is pushing a previously-excluded social identity or a new/rediscovered style or technique, the fact that you have to fight people who quite clearly identify with the system makes you feel like you’re fighting the system itself. But you’re not, and that’s the whole point of calling it a system – its current representatives are part of the machine as much as any worker is, and are just as easily replaced. Their position in society may be a manifestation of the inequality of the system, but they’re not the cause of the inequality – only its face.

Capitalism consists of a set of social relations, not of a group of capitalists. And the social relations of capitalism are all about conflict; capitalism thrives on conflict, and in its eternal quest for compound growth, capitalism loves nothing more than a new market. In fact, capitalism desperately needs new markets, because the existing markets simply cannot provide enough growth to avoid crisis. But when the big, sluggish, corporate world can’t innovate or indoctrinate quickly enough to produce new markets, who can help? Why, it’s the young, flexible, passionate indie capitalist, who has always felt excluded from the mainstream, who wants a new space, a new way of making or selling art… a new market.

And the history of social oppression? Well, that’s doubly fantastic. It means that the new target audience is hungry for art directed exclusively at it, experiencing a kind of nationalistic pride at being able to support artists that belong to the same identity group. And it also means that the pent-up anger of this group can be safely dissipated into “radical” art, the purchase and consumption of which gives the emotionally and politically engaged audience the feeling that they’re doing something for the greater good, that progress towards equality is being made. But all that’s happening is that a new market is being created, and indie capitalists are making money off of it. These new capitalists may be different in some ways (skin colour, clothing, sexuality, gender, aesthetic preferences, religious beliefs, nationality, etc.) but the system itself hasn’t changed in any way, except that representatives of the old order can pat themselves on the back for how “inclusive” and “forward-thinking” they are.

Then, given enough time, the glamour of recently accomplished “change” wears off, and it’s time for another rebellious aesthetic to fight for the right of a small group of people to make a living, never even noticing that “the Man” used to be a rebellious artist himself.

So what’s a politically radical artist supposed to do? Starve?

Many radical artists seem to struggle with that question. They dislike capitalism, so they feel bad about selling things – but they also need to pay the rent. Are they selling out? Are they hypocrites? Often the only way out of this dilemma is to embrace the myth that indie capitalism is somehow morally better than the regular kind, because the money is going to an oppressed person. In this way, they often end up perpetuating the narrative of the exceptional minority: look, this person made it, they’re one of us, they’ve struck a blow for our cause, everything is getting better. This is even less productive than worrying about your own hypocrisy.

The cause of this political and philosophical confusion in radical artists is a very simple error in framing their own situation. If you follow the logic of “the personal is the political” and understand capitalism as a matter of lifestyle, a matter of identity, then the only way to be morally pure is to “drop out” – and given that pretty much the entire world is capitalist at this point, that would mean abandoning civilization itself. The moral anticapitalist will always see a sinner in the mirror, and in every battle to destroy “the capitalists” will manage only to, in the words of Todd Gitlin, “change the color of inequality.”

But understanding capitalism as a system, not a sin, easily solves this problem. Everyone participates in capitalism, not just “the privileged” – capitalism defines and affects the totality of social relations, and no-one is free from it. But no-one is morally responsible for it, either. Rupert Murdoch may be a terrible human being and a blight upon the face of the Earth, but he’s far more a function of the system than he is its owner. Obviously most sane people wouldn’t be particularly sad if a dragon swooped out of the sky and ate him, but nothing much would be changed by this admittedly pleasant turn of events. If we stop fetishizing the personal, we suddenly remember how to see the political.

Letting go of the egocentric moralistic perspective means treating one’s art in a healthier, humbler way. It means not overestimating resistance to one’s aesthetics or identity as a sign that one’s work is inherently revolutionary; it’s also a reminder that genuine revolution has to go beyond art. It’s too easy to believe in one’s own myth and neglect to actually participate in the struggle.

Make your art. Sell your art. Don’t be ashamed. But if you want a revolution, don’t stop there.

### Link—Art

#### Their artistry becomes coopted to be another piece in the mass production of capitalism, bolstering the appeal of consumption

**Molina 18** (Mireia Molina, journalist, “What Is Capitalism Doing To Art?”, *concrete*, 1/16/18, <https://www.concrete-online.co.uk/what-is-capitalism-doing-to-art/>) // EL

As we walk out of a brilliant art exhibition in any part of the world or as we finish leafing through countless books in a bookshop, there is always one last step left, and very often not least, to complete the artful experience. Get your purse out and start admiring, and inevitably wanting and even needing those unnecessary, yet very special, artistic notebooks, postcards or pens.

Klimt’s Kiss themed umbrellas, Van Gogh’s Cherry Blossom mugs and scarves… you can even probably find a matchbox with the face of Frida Khalo stuck on it, and oh, that 2018 diary with deep, daily quotes and book recommendations would be so useful! I could go on and on, but the truth is that I would rather spend a whole hour in the souvenirs shop to see how I can decorate my everyday activities and surround myself with constant inspiration – and let the museum make a good profit on it, too.

However, while you can certainly get some nice room decorations out of it, this constant production of art generates much debate.

King of artistic mechanisation, Andy Warhol saw in art a chance to bring the American society together. By making art of Campbell’s tomato soup or a can of Coke, he equally represented the higher intellectual elite and the poorest people in society. Everyone could buy a Coke, he said, and it would be equally delicious in anyone’s hand.

Warhol’s series of Marilyn Monroe or Elizabeth Taylor’s faces turned celebrities into art, and turned art into pop culture. His production of advertisements and record covers meant art would no longer be exclusive to the intellectual and artistic circles, or the ones who could afford it, but anyone could see his artwork in shops or the streets. Whether you like his work, or his capitalistic philosophy, he in a way made art accessible to everyone.

But while this idea can be romanticised when we look at the bold and bright 20th century pop art, it is not quite as charming anymore.

Yes, everyone can now display a Rothko or a Monet on their living room walls by buying a poster, but only because their distribution is so generalised we can probably even find it in a supermarket. And while this is making art accessible, such automatic production does not only turn art into a product, it can do it to the point where it loses its meaning.

We have seen Munch’s The Scream countless times, and have been fed with Mona Lisa’s face only to end up seeing it behind rows of dozens of phones and cameras. How can we know if we like Van Gogh’s sunflowers if we have been told they are a masterpiece pretty much all our lives? I do not want to undermine such artist’s works at all, surely they deserve to have grown to be so popular.

However, such artistic bombardment might influence our sense of judgement and might not let us value an artwork for itself. The same happens with films, or books, which are published with the word “bestseller’”on their covers as a synonym of “brilliant.”

There is no way we can’t or shouldn’t be influenced by others’ opinions. If anything, they enrich our understanding of art. Reviews and critiques are the main substance of cultural magazines, and often make interesting and wonderful articles that make you think twice, even challenging any assumptions that society itself might have generated.

It is the massification of art, however, its constant and serried production, which blurs the line between artwork and product, human and machinery. And products, in our capitalist society, are made to be sold. Something as seemingly counter-cultural as the hippie or the beat generation movement only survived because of their popular spread – in fact, Kerouac himself stated there was no such thing as a generation – and rock bands’ logos are turned into T-shirts, creating fashion trends.

Paradoxically, art’s success is what makes it lose its uniqueness. Capitalism turns its rebellion into yet another product and sells it to us, and its popularity makes it lose its meaning. Did we really like that film we watched, that book which took us so long to finish or the artist everyone is obsessed with? Or are they just another product that have been sold to us?

As the forever popular Fight Club teaches, perhaps the “things you own end up owning you…”

### Link—Infrapolitics

#### The aff is reliant on a faith in infrapolitics: ignores that resistance requires complex organizational determinations that their quasi-anarchism eradicates

Adolph **Reed 2K**, Professor of Political Science at the New School for Social Research, PhD in Political Science from Atlanta University, 2000, “Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene”, pp 3-4

I can also imagine objections to this notion of politics—protestations that say it is too narrow; that it overlooks the deeper significance of what Robin Kelley, following political scientist James Scott, has usefully summarized as “infrapolitics”: the region of “daily confrontations, evasive actions, and stifled thoughts.” Hogwash. Twenty years after Reaganism took hold and twenty-three years after Maynard Jackson, Atlanta’s first black mayor, summarily fired nearly 2000 striking black sanitation workers with no rooted opposition from the black community, it’s time for us to face some brute realities. Sure, there’s infrapolitics—there always is, and there always will be; wherever there’s oppression, there’s resistance. That’s one of the oldest slogans on the left. But it’s also a simple fact of life. People don’t like being oppressed or exploited, and they respond in ways that reflect that fact. That and a buck fifty will get you on the subway. “Daily confrontations” are to political movements as carbon, water, and oxygen are to life on this planet. They are the raw material for movements of political change, and expressions of dissatisfaction that reflect the need for change, but their presence says nothing more about the potential for such a movement to exist, much less its actuality.

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.

At worst, and more commonly, defenders of infrapolitics treat it as politically consequential in its own right. This idealism may stem from a romantic confusion, but it’s also an evasive acknowledgement of the fact that there is no real popular political movement. Further, it’s a way of pretending that the missing movement is not a problem—that everyday, apolitical social practices are a new, maybe even more “authentic,” form of politics.

### Link—Infoshop

**The 1ac is just an infoshop—precludes any possibility for revolutionary change. Only change at a level of class consciousness and organizing is capable of resolving their impacts**

Joel **Olson 13** , associate professor at Northern Arizona University, “The problem with infoshops and insurrection US anarchism, movement building, and the racial order”, ‘Contemporary Anarchist Studies’, published in 2013

An infoshop is a space where people can learn about radical ideas, where radicals can meet other radicals, and where political work (such as meetings, public forums, fundraisers, etc.) can get done. In the infoshop strategy, infoshops and other “autonomous zones” model the free society (Bey 1985). Building “free spaces” inspires others to spontaneously create their own, spreading “counterinstitutions” throughout society to the point where they become so numerous that they overwhelm the powers that be. The very creation of anarchist free spaces has revolutionary implications, then, because it can lead to the “organic” (i.e. spontaneous, undirected, nonhierarchical) spreading of such spaces throughout society in a way that eventually challenges the state. An insurrection, meanwhile, is the armed uprising of the people. According to the insurrection strategy, anarchists acting in affinity groups or other small informal organizations engage in actions that encourage spontaneous uprisings in various sectors of society. As localized insurrections grow and spread, they combine into a full-scale revolution that overthrows the state and capital and makes possible the creation of a free society.3 Infoshops serve very important functions and any movement needs such spaces. Likewise, insurrection is a central event in any revolution, for it turns the patient organizing of the movement and the boiling anger of the people into an explosive confrontation with the state. The problem is when infoshops and insurrection are seen as revolutionary strategies in themselves rather than as part of a broader revolutionary movement. In the infoshop model, autonomous spaces become the movement for radical change rather than serving it. **The insurrection model tries to replace movement building with spontaneous upheaval rather than seeing upheaval as an outcome of social movements.** The infoshops and insurrection models, in other words, both misunderstand the process of social transformation. Radical change may be initiated by spontaneous revolts that are supported by subterranean free spaces, but **these revolts are almost always the product of prior political movement building**, and their gains must be consolidated by political organizations, not the spaces such organizations use. **Social movements, then, are central to radical change**. The classical anarchists understood this well, for they were very concerned to build working-class movements, such as Bakunin’s participation in the International Working Men’s Association, Berkman and Goldman’s support for striking workers, Lucy Parson’s work in the International Working People’s Association, and the Wobblies’ call for “One Big Union.” (To be sure, there were also practices of building free spaces and engaging in “propaganda by the deed” in classical anarchism, but these were not the sole or even dominant approaches.) Yet surprisingly much of the contemporary anarchist milieu has abandoned movement building. In fact, the infoshops and insurrection models both seem to be designed, at least in part, to avoid the slow, difficult, but absolutely necessary work of building mass movements. Indeed, anarchist publications like Green Anarchy are explicit about this, deriding movement building as inherently authoritarian (for example Morefus n.d.). The anarchist emphasis on hierarchy contributes to this impatience with movement building because the kind of political work it encourages are occasional protests or “actions” against myriad forms of domination rather than sustained organizing based on a coherent strategy to win political space in a protracted struggle. **A revolution is not an infoshop, or an insurrection, or creating a temporary autonomous zone, or engaging in sabotage**; it cannot be so easy, so evolutionary, so “organic,” so absent of difficult political struggle. A revolution is an actual historical event whereby one class overthrows another and – in the anarchist ideal – thereby makes it possible to abolish all forms of oppression. Such **revolutions are the product of mass movements**: a large group of people organized in struggle against the state and/or other institutions of power to achieve their demands. When movements become powerful enough, when they sufficiently weaken elites, and when fortune is on their side, they lead to an insurrection, and then perhaps a revolution. Yet in much of the anarchist milieu today, building free spaces and/or creating disorder are regarded as the movement itself rather than components of one. Neither the infoshops nor insurrection models build movements that can express the organized power of the working class. Thus, the necessary, difficult, slow, and inspiring process of building movements falls through the cracks between sabotage and the autonomous zone. Ironically, this leads many anarchists to take an elitist approach to political work. Divorced from a social movement, the strategy of building autonomous zones or engaging in direct action with small affinity groups assumes that radicals can start the revolution. But **revolutionaries don’t make revolutions. Millions of ordinary and oppressed people do.** Anarchist theory and practice today provides little sense of how these people are going to be part of the process, other than to create their own “free spaces” or to spontaneously join the festivals of upheaval. This is an idealistic, ahistorical, and, ironically, an elitist approach to politics, one that is curiously separated from the struggles of the oppressed themselves. C.L.R. James argues that the task of the revolutionary is to recognize, record, and engage: recognize in the struggles of the working class the effort to build a new society within the shell of the old; record those struggles and show the working class this record so they can see for themselves what they are doing and how it fits into a bigger picture; engage in these struggles with the working class, participating rather than dominating, earning leadership rather than assuming it, and applying lessons learned from previous struggles (James et al. 1974).4 This is a much more modest role for revolutionaries than germinating the revolution or sparking it, and one that is clearly consistent with anarchist politics. Yet the infoshops and insurrectionary models reject this approach for a top-down one in which anarchists “show the way” for the people to follow, never realizing that throughout history, **revolutionaries** (including anarchist ones) **have always been trying to follow and catch up to the masses, not the other way around.**

### Root Cause—Cybernetics

#### Cybernetics is the product of advances away from industrial capitalism, we explain their theory but they can’t explain ours

**Harris and Davidson** **’94** (Jerry Harris, history at DeVry Institute of Technology in Chicago, Carl Davidson, director of Networking for Democracy, “The Cybernetic Revolution and the Crisis of Capitalism”, 1994, <http://www.net4dem.org/cyrev/archive/issue1/articles/Cyber%20Revolution/cyberRev.PDF>) // EL

THE CRISIS AND INFORMATION CAPITALISM Coinciding with the crisis of accumulation, however, was a revolutionary development in the means of production. Advances in computer, microelectronics and telecommunications technologies have brought major changes to the basic character of industrial capitalism. The application of knowledge is now the primary means of new value production. Of course, all labor has always contained two parts--the knowledge of how to produce something and the physical effort necessary to make it. In first wave society, physical labor encompassed the vast majority of work, whether it took the form of growing corn, weaving wool or maintaining feudal manors. In second-wave industrial society, however, machine technology and manufacturing increased productivity by a factor of 100. The knowledge of building a lathe or steam engine reduced the proportion of input of physical labor. But still the factory system relied mainly on physical labor and large scale material assets and inputs to produce value. But in third wave societies, the application of microelectronics technology has already increased computer productivity by one million. Intellectual capital, developed and held by knowledge workers and encoded in software and smart machines, is the key element of wealth in today's information capitalism. Physical labor and industrial machinery are now secondary to the value added by information. This has had a dramatic impacted on both finance and manufacturing, as is allowing capitalism to develop along new lines. The application of new information technology has meant that industry can produce more with fewer resources, less energy and less labor. Plastics have replaced metals, fiber has replaced copper, and chips are made of sand and clay. In fact computer technology consists almost entirely of intellectual capital, with raw materials costing only 1% and unskilled labor 5%. By 1988 the U.S. required only 40% of its blue-collar labor force to produce the amount of manufactured goods equal to that produced in 1977. From 1967 to 1988, weight per dollar value had fallen by 43%. By 1985 Japan had increased its output two and half times with just the same consumption of raw materials and energy as in 1965. Cars used to contain 1600 pounds of steel; much of that weight is now replaced with plastics. Thus the application of intellectual capital--in this case in the form of design--has meant the drastic reduction of both physical capital and the labor force. But the restructuring goes even further. Because the speed of processing information has increased, on-time warehousing, niche marketing, and the elimination of middle management have become possible. Second wave Industrial society produced mass products in huge factories with a giant labor force. This necessitated a huge number of middle managers to count production, oversee workers and move information along the command hierarchy. Now the rapid acquisition and deployment of information is the primary goal of management and corporations have restructured to insure its movement. With expanded information technology and cuts in employees, middle managers are a disappearing breed. Timely information--which has led to shorter product runs, lower supplies, and niche marketing-- also means rapid change and innovation. In essence the "creative destruction" of capital has been speeded-up. Its reflection in the labor force means more part-timers and more temporary workers. The most rapidly growing job category is contingent labor, forming 60% of all new jobs in 1993. This has increased the downward pressure on wages further. Even during the "jobless" economic recovery of 1993, while profits made a healthy recovery, the median hourly wages for males fell another 2.7%, New technologies, corporate flight, and wage cutbacks have laid the basis for renewed accumulation, even in manufacturing. But this restructuring has increased poverty and class contradictions throughout society. The urban crisis, greater economic insecurity and political instability are spreading in ever widening circles. Like Catch 22, the system resolves one crisis only to create another with similar features.

### Root Cause—Disability

#### Disability was given meaning through capitalism’s desgination of lack of productivity

**Phillip 21** (Phillip B, the Red Patriot team, “Disability and Capitalism, *Red Patriot*, 9/25/21, <https://redpat.org/2021/09/disability-and-capitalism/>) // EL

The concept of disability is not necessarily one that is created to help people in our society, but rather one that is used to label people as “less than” able to create based on the standards put forth by capitalists.  We do not define disability by something that a person needs, we define it by what a person lacks when compared to an “optimal” man for the industry bosses.  We know that what we wish to see from the working class is the principle of “from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs.”  We do not believe that those who can contribute less deserve less, and we do not place value on a person based on their level of production.  All people deserve dignity, equality, and for their material needs to be met.

In the United States, the life of those with disability is often one of alienation.  Both alienation from society and from their labor.  People labeled as disabled are not given the same opportunities to work, learn, and interact with the community as those deemed conditionally optimal for labor.  They are treated as though their labor does not have equivalent value, and as a result this causes a schism both within their class and work relationships.  In 2020, only 20% of people with a disability were employed while 67% of people without disabilities were participating in the labor force.  People with disabilities often have to live in group homes as their families are too consumed by work to give proper assistance.  Material conditions are lacking both for the families of disabled people and those who are deemed disabled.  Independence and integration into society begins to crumble as those with disabilities are not always allowed to make their own choices, but instead have to deal with routines, caretakers, and bosses who believe they are unable to reach their goals.

While it is hard to gather information regarding modern communist countries and disability, we can look at the rhetoric of modern communists and our history.  Modern communists call for the abolition of disability.  It is believed that all people should have their material needs met, and those who wish to work should have an opportunity to work to their ability.  We can also see how disability was handled during Lenin’s time; and this gives us insight into how those with disability were less likely to feel alienated.  In 1921 the All-Russian Cooperative of Disabled People was formed, in 1923 the All-Russian Union of Blind followed suit, and in 1926 the All-Russian Union of Deaf followed as well.  These organizations operated as a central democracy run by their members with support from the national government.  It gave power to the people with these conditions, and it brought them together as the functioning members of society that they are.

I hope that we can examine these models in detail and understand how empowering those with physical variations, while removing the stigma that comes with them, can lead to an abolition of the need to separate those who have different material needs.  I hope that we can see that the “optimal” man is a figment of capitalist society and that all people deserve to have a say in their life, labor, and the way in which they integrate into society.

#### Industrial capitalism created the new class of ‘disabled’, regarding them as social problems and segregating them out of mainstream life

**Russell 2** (Marta Russell, American writer and disability rights activist, “Capitalism and Disability”, Socialist Register, 1/1/02, <https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/issue/view/439>) // EL

CAPITALIST BEGINNINGS AND THECOMMODIFICATION OF THE IMPAIRED BODY The primary oppression of disabled persons (i.e. of people who could work, in a workplace that was accommodated to their needs) is their exclusion from exploitation as wage labourers. Studies show that disabled persons experience lower labour-force participation rates, higher unemployment rates and higher part-time employment rates than non-disabled persons. In the US, 79% of working-age disabled adults say they would prefer to work, yet in 2000 only 30.5% of those with a work disability between ages sixteen and sixty-four were in the labour force and only 27.6% were employed; while 82.1% of non-disabled persons in this age group were either employed (78.6%) or actively seeking work for pay. Though having a job does not always translate into an above-poverty-level existence, disabled persons’ historical exclusion from the labour force has undoubtedly contributed to their poverty. Disabled persons are nearly three times as likely to live below the current poverty line — 29% live in poverty, compared to 10% of non-disabled people. In the USA fully one third of disabled adults live in a household with an annual income of less than $15,000, while the 300to 400 million living in developing countries have even less chance of employment and exist in abject poverty, usually with no social safety nets at all.

Historical materialism provides a theoretical base from which to explain these conditions and outcomes. Under feudalism, economic exploitation was direct and political, made possible by the feudal concentration of land ownership. While a few owners reaped the surplus, many living on their estates worked for subsistence and disabled people were able to participate in this economy to varying degrees. Notwithstanding religious superstition about disabled people during the Middle Ages, and significant persecution of them, the rural production process that predominated prior to the Industrial Revolution permitted many disabled people to make a genuine contribution to daily economic life.

With the advent of capitalism, people were no longer tied to the land, but they were forced to find work that would pay a wage — or starve; and as production became industrialized people’s bodies were increasingly valued for their ability to function like machines. Bosses could push non-disabled workers to produce at ever increasing rates of speed. Factory discipline, time-keeping and production norms broke with the slower, more self-determined and flexible work pattern into which many disabled people had been integrated. As work became more rationalized, requiring precise mechanical movements of the body, repeated in quicker succession, impaired persons — the deaf or blind, and those with mobility difficulties — were seen as — and, without job accommodations to meet their impairments, were — less ‘fit’ to do the tasks required of factory workers, and were increasingly excluded from paid employment. And so ‘the operation of the labour market in the nineteenth century effectively depressed handicapped people of all kinds to the bottom of the market’.

Industrial capitalism thus created not only a class of proletarians but also a new class of ‘disabled’ who did not conform to the standard worker’s body and whose labour-power was effectively erased, excluded from paid work. As a result, disabled persons came to be regarded as a social problem and a justification emerged for segregating them out of mainstream life and into a variety of institutions, including workhouses, asylums, prisons, colonies and special schools. Exclusion was further rationalized by Social Darwinists, who used biology to argue that heredity — race and genes — prevailed over the class and economic issues raised by Marx and others. Just as the ‘inferior’ weren’t meant to survive in nature, they were not meant to survive in a competitive society. Legislation, influenced by Social Darwinism and eugenics theory, was enacted in a number of jurisdictions for the involuntary sterilization of disabled people. Advocates of eugenics such as Galton, Dugdale and Goddard propagated the myth that there was an inevitable genetic link between physical and mental impairments and crime and unemployment. This was also linked to influential theories of racial superiority, according to which the birth of disabled children should be regarded as a threat to racial purity. In the notorious Buck v. Bell decision of 1927, the US Supreme Court upheld the legality of the forced sterilization of disabled people. At the extreme, Nazi Germany determined that disabled individuals were an economic burden and exterminated tens of thousands of them. But even in ‘democratic’ America bean-counting logic prevailed: by 1938, thirty-three American states had sterilization laws and between 1921 and 1964 over 63,000 disabled people were involuntarily sterilized in a pseudo-scientific effort to prevent the births of disabled offspring and save on social costs. Whether or not codified into law, the sterilization of disabled people was common in a number of countries in the first half of the twentieth century, including Britain, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, and Canada.

#### Capitalism created disability, defining the cost vs production\*

**Russell 2** (Marta Russell, American writer and disability rights activist, “Capitalism and Disability”, Socialist Register, 1/1/02, <https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/issue/view/439>) // EL

So, just as capitalism forces workers into the wage relationship, it equally force-fully coerces disabled workers out of it. Disabled workers face inherent economic discrimination within the capitalist system, stemming from employers’ expectations of encountering additional production costs when hiring or retaining a non-standard(disabled) worker as opposed to a standard (non-disabled) worker who has no need for job accommodations, interpreters, readers, environmental modifications, liability insurance, maximum health care coverage (inclusive of attendant services) or even health care coverage at all. ‘Disability’ is a social creation which defines who is offered a job and who is not, and what it means varies with the level of economic activity. This is because the root cause of the work-place discrimination experienced by disabled people is to be found in an accountant’s calculation of the present cost of production versus the potential contribution the employment of a given worker will make to future profits. If ‘disabilities’ among the direct producers add to the cost of production without increasing the rate of profit, owners and managers will necessarily discriminate against them. Expenses to accommodate the ‘disabled’ in the workplace will be resisted as an addition to the fixed capital portion of constant capital. Hence the opposition of small and medium businesses, especially the US Chamber of Commerce, to the ‘Americans with Disabilities Act’. Managers and owners will only tolerate the use of ‘disabled’ workers when they can save on the variable portion of cost of production, e.g. by paying low wages to disabled workers, or through tax breaks and other subsidies. So an employee who is too costly (i.e., significantly disabled) to add to net profits at the current level of output will not likely become (or remain) an employee at all. US Census data consistently show that, as compared with the four-fifths of working-age persons with no disability who have jobs, only just over one-quarter of people with a significant disability do so. Employers and investors rely on the preservation of the status quo labour system which does not require them to absorb the non-standard costs of employing disabled workers under the current mode of production, let alone the 800 million people who are or partially unemployed worldwide. Consequently, disabled individuals who are currently not in the mainstream workforce, who are collecting disability benefits and who could work if their impairments were accommodated, are not tallied into employers’ costs of doing business. The disability benefit system thus serves as a socially legitimized means by which the capitalist class can avoid hiring or retaining non-standard workers and can ‘morally’ shift the cost of supporting them onto poverty-based government programs — thereby perpetuating their poverty. Being categorized as ‘disabled’, however, and the subsequent impoverishment that so many face when struggling to survive on disability benefits, serves another class function: it generates a very realistic fear among workers of becoming disabled. At base, the inadequate safety net is a product of the owning class’s fear of losing full control of what they do with the means of production; the American work ethic is a mechanism of social control that ensures capitalists a reliable work force for making profits. If workers were provided with a social safety net that adequately protected them through unemployment, sickness, disability, and old age, labour would gain a stronger position from which to negotiate their conditions of employment. American business retains its power over the working-class through a fear of destitution that would be weakened if the safety net were to actually become safe. Disabled persons who do not offer a body which will enhance profit-making as labourers are used to shore up US capitalism by other means. Entrepreneurs and rehabilitation specialists have made impaired bodies of use to the economic order by shaping disablement into big business and turning the disabled body into a commodity around which social policies get created or rejected according to their market value. The corporate solution to disablement — institutionalization in a nursing home, for instance — evolved from the realization that disabled people could be made to serve profit because public financing guaranteed the revenue (in the USA, Medicaid funds 60% of the cost, Medicare 15%, private insurance 25%). Disabled people are worth more to the Gross Domestic Product when occupying a ‘bed’ than a home. When a single impaired body can generate $30,000 — $82,000 in annual revenues Wall Street counts it as an asset that contributes to companies’ net worth. Despite the efforts of the disability rights movement to de-institutionalize disabled populations and shift policy towards the provision of in-home services, the logic of capital reasserts itself via the recommodification of the disabled body in the home (insofar as public funding permits — with the advent of ‘managed care’, trying to limit costs, there is an increased financial motive to underserve). Corporations have taken an interest in the money-making potential of the in-home services field, and indeed promote the in-home services model as they build their new ‘home-care’empires. As Jim Charlton puts it, ‘the transformation of people into commodities hides their dehumanization and exploitation by other human beings: it becomes simply an economic fact of life’. It is also evident that the definition of disability is not static but fundamentally linked to the needs of capital accumulation. Hence, when the welfare state entered into ‘crisis’, governments attempted to narrow the definition of disablement and to cut entitlement levels. There have also been widespread closures of the institutions that warehoused disabled people, but without an allocation of adequate resources and services to enable them to live independently. Yet this withdrawal of the state from certain types of benefits does not entail any rupture in the intervention of the state in the lives of disabled people. The state’s interventionist role remains but is refocused on the ruthless cutting of social expenditures, including services and income support programmes to disabled people, in the name of neoliberal efficiency. The rise of capitalism has thus seen dramatic changes in the ideological classification and treatment of disabled people. Yet while socialists have considered the relationship between the rise of capitalism and, for instance, the enactment of the English Poor Laws, the classification, marginalization and oppression of disabled people have been largely ignored. Speaking generally, the rise of capitalism clearly had contradictory outcomes for disabled people. On the one hand, there were positive effects in terms of better medical technology that lengthened the life span and increased the quality of life for those who could afford it. On the other hand there were some very negative effects, including classification into rigid and arbitrary diagnostic categories and incarceration in oppressive institutions. Exclusion from exploitation in the wage-labour system, as the ‘deserving poor’, lies at the core of disabled peoples’ oppression in every aspect of modern life.

## Progressive NATO CP

### CP—1NC

#### The United States federal government should reduce defense spending and pressure other NATO member states to center all cooperative ventures around the promotion of economic, gender, LGBTQ+, and racial equality.

#### “NATO bad” is a disastrous foreign policy for the left --- the US is not the only bad actor in the world --- letting Russia overrun small and defenseless countries ensures failure --- but reducing military spending while repurposing our alliances towards beneficial cooperative activities can solve all of their criticisms of alliances

Burmilla 19 [Ed Burmila, assistant professor of political science, “Naughty by NATO,” September 2019, *The Baffler* 47]

The “crises” created by the neoliberal flavored military-foreign policy establishment will not always be so easy to answer correctly. Imagine that a hypothetical perfect leftist finds his or her way into the White House. He or she will obviously be smart enough not to start stupid wars as stunts. But what happens if, for example, Vladimir Putin or his successors seek to bolster their domestic standing by invading the Baltic States—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—to reclaim them as former parts of the USSR? What if another country, say China or Russia, uses non-state actors as a proxy to launch a coordinated attack via the internet on critical U.S. infrastructure? “LOL aren’t you glad I’m not a warmongering neocon!” isn’t going to cut it as a response, despite being a true statement. And the weird idea of a far left-far right coalition—exemplified by Tulsi Gabbard, the “leftist” candidate every right-winger loves for not-at-all suspicious reasons—arguing that avoiding conflict with a country like Russia is best achieved by doing whatever Russia wants is, let us just say, not viable.

What is the appropriate response? Right now, it is impossible to say what the position of the American left would be in this situation, because its foreign policy is ambiguous and situational. The gut reaction of anti-interventionism has appeal. So too does the argument that if the United States should not be overrunning small and relatively defenseless countries, then neither should other military powers. There will be situations, no matter how much they would better be avoided, in which a hypothetical Congress or White House occupied by a true leftist would need to react to events beyond his or her control.

Alternatives to That

What would that look like? What, in short, is left foreign policy? Michael Walzer, in his commendable A Foreign Policy for the Left (2018), is among the few people who have seriously taken on that question in a practical (as opposed to strictly academic) context. He gets right the fundamental formulation: left foreign policy should and must flow naturally from the core values of the left.

In modern American politics, “defense” and “foreign policy” are sometimes treated as interchangeable concepts; that’s bad. A basic first principle for left foreign policy could be a return to the wider, traditional conception of foreign policy as a toolkit. Foreign aid, economic agreements, traditional diplomacy, combatting inequality and violent extremism (including domestically, of course), and cooperation with international organizations to address truly global issues would all combine to offer more potential than the current bipartisan stance that foreign policy is best reduced to “We will bomb the shit out of you or not. Pick one.”

A second core principle would be a real commitment to the thing American foreign policy has paid condescending lip service to for decades: the promotion of democratic institutions in other countries. This must obviously stop short of direct intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations, and will only be plausible once the United States deals with its own panoply of problems with voter suppression, felon disenfranchisement, and other anti-democratic practices.

A third and more nebulous step must be to define, in accordance with the left’s core values, the “national interest” of the United States. It is simple enough to say that America must protect “its interests” but much harder to articulate what those interests are beyond “anything Congress and the president feel like it is at a given moment.” If the promotion of economic, gender, LGBTQ+, and racial equality were made a political priority at home and abroad, the considerable economic power of the United States could be a game-changer. That will require, of course, a ground-up rethinking of unregulated free markets as the basis for all American values and practices. Fortunately the left is already pretty good at proposing alternatives to that.

Finally and perhaps most obviously, the nation must shift decisively away from relying so heavily on military hegemony to advance its interests. Any leftist worth his or her salt can tell you that reducing the bloated, economically crippling defense spending that is a cornerstone of Washington consensus politics is a first step. To implement such changes will require the same kind of thoroughness and attention to detail that the left has applied to domestic issues like Medicare for All. Exactly what will be cut? Why? How will whatever function that spending performed (if any) be replaced by a more effective form of foreign policy?

Articulating a well-developed foreign policy worldview will be aided by moving beyond today’s limited foreign policy conceptions—to shift the paradigms, to put it in the most annoying possible terms. Left ideas are usually shoehorned into easy-to-digest categories like “pacifism” or “isolationism.” As the right has proven repeatedly, coming up with better language with which to communicate ideas to voters will be essential.

HyperSimplification

Look, I don’t have all of the answers, and to be frank and crass, if I did I would not likely give them away to the world for The Baffler’s going rate for freelance contributions. I am certain, though, that the current state of left foreign policy is a void that needs to be filled with something other than the Wikileaks Bro politics, perhaps best exemplified by the phenomenon that is Tulsi Gabbard, of apologias for authoritarian nationalist leaders around the world. It is not enough to identify the obvious flaws in liberal foreign policy, with its convoluted hawkishness and rebranded military-centered consensus worldview, and simply conclude that the polar opposite must be the best course.

Criticizing Hillary Clinton’s (or now Joe Biden’s) campaign for its terrible foreign policy stances is the low-hanging fruit. Looking inward and reflecting on the core goals and values of left politics—rejecting the allure of Tucker Carlson-approved ideas like “Hey, isn’t being friends with Putin a good thing?”—will be the more challenging part. For over a century the United States has been a global Bad Actor, and it is imperative that it interact differently with the world. But pretending that it alone is a Bad Actor, and the intentions of every other nation will become honorable as the United States renounces its sinful ways, is dumb.

Foreign policy is not merely a set of choices; it also requires responding to events other actors initiate. This is where modern left views come up shortest. Non-interventionism is intellectually appealing not only because it fixes many of the current evils and ills of U.S. foreign policy—Hey, let’s stop starting wars!—but because it reduces everything to one simple answer. There is no need to learn about the Spratly Islands dispute among China and its neighbors, oppression of the Uyghurs, Donbas, Syria, the multi-sided civil war in Yemen, and other current points of tension. Like the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, confusing foreign conflicts that do not conform to the narrative of one good guy fighting one bad guy are difficult for our political system to process. The urge to oversimplify or ignore these conflicts, especially when they are distant and not perceived as directly relevant to Americans, is strong.

Vestigial organs of the Cold War world order like NATO could, with a better underlying set of values, be useful tools toward promoting left foreign policy goals. That is not to assert that it will, as America’s role in NATO is only as good as the domestic politics driving it. Collective agreements can be a useful alternative to, for example, multi-trillion-dollar domestic defense spending. America’s military alliances are not inherently bad; the choices our elected officials make are the problem. Growing its foothold in domestic politics will be easier when the left can advance a coherent foreign policy worldview that communicates what it intends to do rather than only what it will not do.

### Solvency—2NC

#### Mutual defense can be repurposed for progressive ends. NATO is an effective counter to imperialism.

Schablein, 18—chair of the Lower Shore Progressive Caucus, a local chapter of Progressive Maryland (Jared, “Supporting NATO is progressive,” <https://www.progressivemaryland.org/supporting_nato_is_progressive>, dml)

For my entire life as an activist, I have been critical of the United States’ foreign policy and rightfully so. All most every single one of our nation’s foreign engagements since World War II has been imperialistic, hyper-aggressive, and generally destructive. The US has found itself backing brutal dictators and engaging in regime-change wars that caused mass instability in South America, the Middle East, and regions through the world as well as taking part in military conflicts in which we should never have been.

Currently, President Trump like the administrations of old has continued many of these same reckless policies and pointless aggressive wars. However, President Trump has taken these reckless policies a dangerous step further by undermining and trying to destroy agreements and policies that keep peace and stability in at-risk parts of the world by constantly attacking our closest allies with false claims and outrageous rants. One of the few current US foreign policies that is agreeable and good for both the country and world at large is the United States’ involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, better known as NATO.

NATO was created on April 4, 1949, with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Despite popular belief, NATO was created for more than just countering the political and military threat at the time in the Soviet Union. The treaty set up several commitments and goals for each member nation to uphold and pursue including maintaining peace in Europe, creating cooperation among NATO members, and mutual defense. The treaty also commits members to ideals of democracy, liberty, and peaceful resolutions to international disputes. NATO has been able to withstand the test of time because it has constantly changed and evolved to meet current political and international security concerns all while maintaining its core goals and beliefs.

Over the years NATO has had many achievements. These achievements include having seven straight decades of peace within NATO borders; forging over forty partnerships with non-member nations around the world to ensure stability, peace, and conflict reduction; enacting international crisis management operations like peacekeeping operations in Kosovo during the late 1990s -- resulting in the current peace and start of new prosperity in the Balkans; and working with the African Union to stop piracy off the coast of Africa -- resulting in piracy being down 75% since 2011.

Despite all NATO’s success, there are still many challenges that face the world and the alliance that one nation cannot handle alone. These threats include global terrorism, cyber attacks, environmental issues like climate change, and Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe with the illegal annexation of Crimea and the build-up of military forces along NATO’s borders. NATO is preparing itself to address these issues by reinforcing its deterrent efforts, supporting international efforts to maintain stability, investing in counter-terrorism, combating climate change and preparing cyber defenses. Together through mutual defense, counter-terrorism, and stability efforts, the United States through involvement in NATO can work with international partners to avoid conflict and build a better world.

Despite Trump, most of the grown-ups in his defense and foreign policy setup want to stay involved in NATO. Why? And why should progressives care?

The first major reason to stay involved in NATO is mutual defense and security between allied nations. The biggest component of NATO’s founding treaty is Article Five, which establishes that an attack on one member ally is considered to be an attack on all allies. This important article is crucial for many reasons, but principally providing more resources to allies in a crisis. NATO has many different types of countries both big and small from regions across Europe and North America. Some smaller nations like the Balkans nation of Montenegro are centered in regions where there have been decades of political instability and armed conflict. If an armed conflict arose, smaller nations like Montenegro would have the resources and support needed from outside allies to repel outside attack and to help protect the country’s people and sovereignty.

Another positive aspect of Mutual Defense is the fact that it builds close relationships that spill into other aspects of life. It should be no shock that many of our same NATO allies are also our closest trading partners. Through trade and international commerce, with other NATO nations, the United States can sell more goods and collectively grow its economy as well our allies, creating mutual economic benefit. Finally, alliances like NATO make it easier to share ideas and culture between nations. The sharing of ideas and knowledge collectively improves and advances of societies across the alliance from the United States to Estonia and everywhere in between. Mutual defense also serves as a powerful deterrent to prevent armed conflict or acts of aggression toward allied nations.

NATO’s 2014 update, the Readiness Action Plan, sharpens the alliance’s ability to move quickly in fast-moving emergencies, including increasing rapid-response forces and more mobile, small headquarters.

Terrorism is a persistent global challenge that is one of the biggest threats to citizens of the United States and all NATO countries. Terrorism knows no border, nationality or religion, making it a difficult issue to address and one that no one nation can handle alone. The US works within the Terrorism Intelligence Cell at NATO headquarters and in a hub in Naples, Italy to improve threat awareness and preparedness to respond to attacks – anywhere in the Alliance, including the US and Canada.

The third and final major reason the United States should remain involved in NATO is to maintain stability and prevent conflict around the world. NATO establishes peace by working with international partners from shaping policy to building defense capacity. Over the past several years, NATO has started over 450 collaborative activities among its 29 member nations and 41 partner countries ranging from cyber defense to humanitarian efforts. NATO efforts were vital in bringing peace to the Balkans in the 1990’s, preventing World War III during the Cold War, and helping governments rebuild stability after failed wars in the Middle East. Through building international partnerships and collaborating with member nations, the United States can reduce the number of conflicts that take place around the world and help bring stability to at-risk regions of the world without involving major US presence or armed conflict.

It is the goal of all progressives to create a US foreign policy that is less militaristic, expensive and aggressive. That is why as a nation and as a political movement we must remain committed to NATO involvement. One of the most important things when it comes to bringing peace and stability is this: If we don’t want US troops fighting in foreign lands, we need to maintain our alliances. Our commitment must focus on changing foreign policy to reduce the amount we spend on defense and end the number of aggressive wars we enter. As a member of NATO, our allies can help us achieve that goal by helping in our national security through collaboration and help maintain stability by working with international partners to bring and maintain peace.

That being said, I hope that we can transform US foreign policy from its current militaristic and aggressive attitude to working with our allies to ensure peace through other means and working to prevent attacks in our own borders instead of interfering and causing instability in other nations. This progressive goal can be achieved if we stay a part of the NATO alliance.

## Care CP

### CP—1NC

#### Text: The United States federal government should facilitate and fully resource the establishment of national care infrastructures through progressive and redistributive taxation.

#### The counterplan transforms the liberal welfare state in ways that foster radical flourishing and interdependency.

Chatzidakis, et al, 20—Professor in the School of Business and Management, Royal Holloway (Andreas, with Jamie Hakim, Jo Littler, Catherine Rottenberg and Lynne Segal, writing collectively as The Care Collective, “Caring States,” *The Care Manifesto: The Politics of Interdependence*, Chapter 4, 677-805, Kindle, dml)

The state is a critical arena if we are to create any sort of universal care. States must cease to be places where the interests of corporate-driven patterns of economic growth predominate, as these routinely rest upon deepening inequality, including embedded ethno-nationalism. Instead, their first and ultimate responsibility should be to build and maintain their own sustainable infrastructures of care. This means turning the current priorities of most nation states on their head.

A caring state is one in which notions of belonging are based on a recognition of our mutual interdependencies, rather than on ethno-cultural identity and racialised borders defended in the name of national security. It is one in which the provision for all of our basic needs is assured while, at the same time, it caters to the health of the environment and deepens participatory democracy at every level. The caring state is only successful inasmuch as it nurtures every human being and other living creatures within its bounds. And while no state can ever completely eliminate human aggression, relations of domination, or natural and human-made disasters, a caring state provides the conditions in which the vast majority of people can, nevertheless, not only survive but thrive.

First and foremost, a caring state must resource all the structures that facilitate the well-being and foster the capabilities or sustainability of all human and non-human life within its domain. For this to happen, we must transform the way belonging and citizenship operate within current state borders. For many countries, such as the US, this will often mean taking the lead from the struggles of Indigenous and First Nations People. In line with Canada’s Leap Manifesto, we argue that there must not only be recognition of past atrocities but also a reckoning with and some form of reparation for them, whether genocide, slavery and/ or dispossession. This will, of necessity, entail a process of decolonisation and the reclamation of stolen lands as well as stolen lives. It will also include reassessing how histories of imperialism and inequality are narrated in public heritage spaces and educational institutions. Only by confronting the past and prioritising the needs of those who have been most marginalised, violated and negated by uncaring nation states will we be able to move forward into a juster future and cultivate a radically different way of relating to others and the world itself.

States, in short, need urgently to build a care infrastructure based upon a recognition of our profound interdependencies and vulnerabilities, while putting the necessary material, social, and cultural conditions in place for the mutual thriving of all. Can this be done? It can, but first we must rethink the earlier, Keynesian welfare model.

The Welfare State and Its Discontents

We often hear resentment expressed towards the older generation of so-called baby boomers, the ‘lucky generation’. It was this generation that largely benefited from the expanding post-war welfare state, following the New Deal in the US and William Beveridge’s promise, in his famous 1942 Report, to provide care and support for everybody ‘from cradle to grave’. Influenced by Keynesian economics, with its warning that markets could not be relied upon to regulate themselves, the new post-war consensus generated widespread support for far-reaching extension of social services and state resources. This happened despite the fact that many European governments were near bankrupt as a result of the war. During this period, in many countries in the Global North, the state was understood to be responsible for facilitating the well-being of its citizens and for improving social infrastructures, while helping to ensure decent lives for all – whatever the shortcomings in practice, particularly in relation to racialised subjects and the realities (and eventual legacies) of colonialism. By the 1950s, for instance, 20 per cent of the British economy was publicly owned, including most essential services such as transport, energy and other key industries, and by 1979 almost half the British population lived in council housing, with the gap between the richest and poorest lower than ever before.

Similar policies were pursued across much of the Western world, supported by higher levels of progressive taxation. In the UK, the pioneer of British social policy, Richard Titmuss, insisted on the importance of universal benefits, conceived as entitlements, to ensure all citizens had an equal interest in the state, while judging gross inequalities to be both ‘morally wrong and corrosive of a healthy society’. In popular radio broadcasts, the British psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott highlighted the fact of human dependency, stressing the essential importance of ‘holding environments’ for the child, which fed into ideas about the significance of caring welfare states through support for mothers and the provision of decent homes and welfare services. 1

Rethinking the Keynesian Welfare State

A state organised around care would adopt many of the initial post-1945 welfare promises, while working to eliminate the inherently sexist, racist, hierarchical premises and manifestations of that time, and combating the anti-immigrant xenophobia still so evident today. A caring state will always begin by valuing caretaking over profit-making, and champion caretaking as a highly valued end in itself. Our vision of a caring state is one in which each life is understood to have intrinsic value and where belonging is not defined over and against a racialised or subordinated other. The caring state ensures high-quality and flexible care that is predominantly free at the point of use during all stages of life, from infancy to old age. It provides as well as ensures affordable housing and shared public and cultural spaces for all, along with high-quality public schooling, vocational training, university education and healthcare. A caring state recognises that its infrastructure as well as its day-to-day functioning depend on a myriad of skills and competencies.

All education and vocational training needs to emphasise care and caretaking practices, developing the capabilities of each person to hone their caring skills, while insisting that learning is about enhancing old as well as discovering new ways to nurture life and the world – whether in the sciences, humanities, carpentry or cooking. Indeed, from early on the caring state cultivates everyone’s capacity to care by providing relevant education and the necessary conditions for mutual thriving. Such attempts were not only pioneered in those community nurseries set up by feminists in the 1970s, but, as we’ve seen, over the years have been the focus of disability rights activists and mental health users. Furthermore, once caring and practices of caretaking become the organising principle of states, mental health issues will wane. Much of the misery of our times is inextricably linked to the entrenchment of neoliberalism, the gig economy and a growing sense of precarity among the 99 per cent. The caring state would produce substantive solutions to the growing mental health crisis, rather than inadequate sticking plasters. We need radical and systemic transformation.

Given our interdependencies, each and every citizen of the caring state must be recognised as having something of significance and value to contribute at every stage of life. Thus, a transformation of cultural norms goes hand in hand with the state’s avowal of everybody’s intrinsic dependency, with autonomy and dependency seen as two sides of the same coin.

Significantly rethinking the welfare state in this way also moves us well beyond the traditional domestic and gendered division of labour, since both the need to care and the need for care are understood to be shared by all. This is why rethinking the welfare state is also about rethinking how public provision is conceived and distributed. The caring state is precisely not a paternal, racist or settler-colonial state. Public provision in the caring state does not revolve around deepening dependencies but rather enables everyone to cultivate what disability studies have called ‘strategic autonomy and independence’, while creating the conditions that allow for new relationships within and among the state and its diverse communities – relationships predicated on everyone receiving what they need both to thrive and to participate in democratic practices.

In other words, the state, while necessary to manage the smooth provision of services and resources that enable communities and caring markets to thrive, must also be responsible for facilitating more, rather than less, democratic participation. A caring state is not a vertical, top-down, disciplinary or coercive one, but instead facilitates what Davina Cooper calls ‘the creative, horizontal and ecological tending of present and future’. 2 A caring state necessarily works in the vein of social justice rather than criminal justice, learning the lessons of abolitionist feminism to build supportive communities rather than privatised systems of incarceration. It also imaginatively encourages ‘common uses and spaces’ by providing open institutions and resources which can be overseen by citizens through participatory democratic processes, such as citizens’ assemblies. The caring state, in short, ensures the resourcing necessary for promiscuous care alongside caring communities to thrive.

There is copious evidence that democratically controlled, collectively resourced public services produce greater satisfaction than profit-seeking, commercialised services. 3 They significantly reduce inequality and secure broader solidarity and support, whatever the tensions they might also generate. A caring state is therefore one that provides the conditions allowing for such tensions, disagreements and ambivalences to emerge, since this encourages deliberation and concerted action. This means fostering institutions, norms, and communities that are well resourced and thus best positioned to enable us to work through at least some of the tensions of routine caring interactions. Consequently, state provision of care services is not enough without transforming its modes of delivery.

A caring infrastructure also entails shorter hours in paid work, to allow adequate time as well as resources for people to expand their capacity to care, whether in familial or any other caretaking settings. The best of hands-on care requires the time to slow down and maintain relational continuity while patiently taking stock of others in order to enable those being cared for to use or develop whatever scope they have for personal agency and well-being. This is why shorter working hours – as popularised by the campaign for the four-day week – is also key to facilitating the conditions that can educate and expand our capacities for caring, encouraging mutual participation in democratic deliberations as an integral part of the provision or need for care. 4 Once care is prioritised in this way, it becomes easier to find ways to recognise and try to meet our shifting dependencies, assisting those who need to develop or gain control over capabilities others can take for granted.

From Welfare State to Caring State

Facing collapsing infrastructures and calamities of care and livelihoods, there have already been moves to rethink policies and practices in certain cities and municipalities, although rarely on a national level. Some administrative regions have begun to offer more support for co-operative grassroots initiatives for jobs and services, both little and large, as we saw pioneered in Cleveland in the US and more recently in Preston in the UK. With homelessness a pressing problem of our time, assistance with community housing projects has also been growing, while the exemplary Social Services and Wellbeing Act passed in Wales in 2014 specifically requires local authorities to promote the development of community and user-owned services. Such modes of care can in principle not only encourage less bureaucratic and more flexible targeted services and support, but help build that vital sense of solidarity, agency, community and belonging necessary for sustaining resource building and caretaking. We can learn from and build on examples such as these. A caring state would facilitate and help resource precisely these kinds of horizontal and community-oriented projects, ensuring affordable and decent housing for all, while the relationships between the different levels and scales of governance would, of necessity, be ones of mutual responsibility but also – and crucially – subjected to continual debate and reflection.

The idea that we are all entitled to equal access to public resources when we need them will not banish all of our fears surrounding fragility and dependence. But it is the only way to lessen these fears and nurture belief in our shared humanity and interdependence, whatever our pluralities and shifting needs, especially those we have been encouraged to disavow and disparage. Insisting on such priorities would offer reassurance that those we care most about could always find forms of support, even if we cannot provide it ourselves. Above all, prioritising care would also offer the vast comfort of knowing we live in a world that is capable of valuing all living things within it and, just as importantly, that works to repair and replenish the resources we rely upon, whether ecological, manufactured orself-fashioned.

Such a world clearly rids us of old forms of state paternalism with its gendered, ethnic and racial exploitations, challenging ingrained and recently mounting ethno-nationalism by creating more porous borders for the movement of people, while deepening democratic practices on all levels of society. The caring state therefore not only builds and cultivates an infrastructure of care from cradle to grave, it also engenders new conceptions of belonging, citizenship, and rights through necessarily providing for the basic needs of all. A caring state is ultimately based on a sense of solidarity towards all its inhabitants, while also enabling what Joan Tronto calls ‘caring with’, the idea that citizens should care not only for other citizens but for democracy itself.

Thus, belonging, citizenship, and rights must all be organised around the principle of care rather than by birthplace, identity or national territorial claims, so that a commitment to care will be the only pledge of allegiance necessary to live in the caring state’s domain. Too many of those who have provided and continue to provide the bulk of caring work in wealthier countries have been denied citizenship, even though they sometimes arrived as children. This was the case in the recent Windrush scandal in Britain, where West Indian migrants who had lived in the UK since childhood were unlawfully detained, denied legal rights and in some cases deported in the ‘hostile environment’ imposed by the Home Office. In contrast, new notions of caring citizens and citizenship would not only help atone for these and other past violations but completely alter our present and future notions of belonging.

This is not an impossible dream. Here, as with notions of belonging, we have much to learn from the history of Indigenous struggle against settler colonialism and extractive capitalism. In the fight against the Dakota Access Pipeline, for instance, Indigenous nations from across North America and beyond established the treaty camps at Standing Rock. Despite a devastating history of genocide and serial betrayals by the US government, the camp was not exclusive to Native Americans. Anyone was welcome so long as they adhered to the values of the camp, which included a commitment to protect the water and Mother Earth. As the historian Nick Estes states, whatever their shortcomings, the treaty camps offered a vision for an alternative future. There, ‘free food, free education, free health care, free legal aid, a strong sense of community, safety, and security were guaranteed to all.’ 5 In other words, they were designed according to need, not profit. The camps were built on caretaking and enshrined a radically different vision of belonging, as well as of relating to other people and the world.

Through the creation and resourcing of a caring infrastructure, rejecting all past and current state violence, states can and must be transformed. This will involve giving priority to those who have historically been most marginalised, and recognising the right of every inhabitant of the state to care and be cared for in all care’s various meanings and manifestations. Adopting some of the premises of post-war welfare states, but refusing their traditional racialised policies, rigid hierarchies and sexual and racial divisions of labour, our progressive vision of states would undermine the conditions that produce economic and environmental refugees and migrants. Indeed, if care were to become the organising principle of all states across the globe, economic inequality and mass migration would decrease and environmental injustice would be rectified through our mutual commitment to caring for the world. Ultimately, then, our caring imaginaries must move away from only caring for one’s own, towards the community-building of radical municipalism and nation states, ending with caring for the furthest reaches of our interconnected planet. Making this a reality necessarily involves rethinking and tackling our uncaring economies.

### Solvency—2NC

#### Imagining a caring, redistributive state facilitates efforts to repurpose institutions for revolutionary ends despite their violent history.

Pârvan, 21—Lecturer, MSSP Program, University of Pennsylvania (Oana, “Technologies of Control and Infrastructures of Redistribution,” e-flux #123, December 2021, dml)

The legacy of the 2019–21 biennium is yet to be fully grasped and processed, and often the urgency of chasing the next affective imperative (be it fear, terror, concern, relief, or indignation dictated by the virus’s iterations) can distract from looking back at how rapidly this period has transformed the world in ways unacceptable before 2019. Superficially, corporate capital in the form of techno-giants, big pharma, and the surveillance industry has managed to do the unimaginable: extract, evade, and profiteer even more than before, enabled by governments and central banks—the same governments and central banks advocating for the resilience, self-reliance, and autonomy of welfare states, individuals, and real economies. All the while, in many countries, the mantra of “public health on the brink of collapse” echoed as the best and most insistent advertisement for private healthcare in decades.

As more inhabitants of the planet seemed to empathize with experiences of being immobilized, terrified, and collateralized, the assassination of George Floyd in Minneapolis generated the Abolitionist Summer, with unprecedented multiracial and internationalist resonances. This was the most affirmative legacy of the biennium, alongside the activation of mutual aid infrastructures and all the practices of reciprocal nurture that kept most alive.

According to the Greek economist Yanis Varoufakis, August 12, 2020—the day the UK’s national income declined by over 20 percent as the London Stock Exchange saw an increase of more than 2 percent—was the symbolic moment of the decoupling of finance and the real economy. Continuing the trend that started after the 2008 financial crisis, in 2020 the global economy was supported by the proliferation of central bank money, independent of whether profit was made or not. Furthermore, the pandemic also determined a massive relocation of value extraction to digital platforms, which now adhered even more to people’s time, reproductive work, and eventually their lives. “Amazon,” Varoufakis explains, “is not a market; it’s a fiefdom. And it’s a fiefdom that’s connected to other fiefdoms, like Facebook, through the cloud services of Amazon, which are much greater and bigger than Amazon.com. It’s like a more technologically advanced form of feudalism.” In his postcapitalist utopian novel Another Now: Dispatches from an Alternative Present, Varoufakis depicts a world in which capitalism died in 2008 thanks to a utilities pay strike in Yorkshire. Inspired by speculative fiction and social-justice movements, what are some directions for imagining top-down redistribution into existence? A good starting point is the $427 billion in global corporate and private tax evasion in 2020—money that could be used to cover the salaries of thirty-four million nurses every year, thereby granting free healthcare to everyone. While rich countries are responsible for facilitating 98 percent of all global tax losses, impoverished countries are losing “tax equivalent to nearly 52% of their health budgets.”[footnote The State of Tax Justice, 4.] A true global challenge that requires international collaboration, tax justice can be achieved by global policy measures such as the automatic exchange of bank account information between countries, the registration of the beneficiaries of profits (“beneficial ownership registration”), country-by-country reporting of the profits of multinational corporations, a unitary taxation system for corporations to pay taxes where the real work is done (not where they declare profits), and, eventually, a UN tax convention, able to be enforced by tax collectors equipped and funded to do their jobs.

While the Tax Justice Network, an advocacy group consisting of researchers and activists, has pushed for these measures since 2003, Covid-19 has brought new challenges in terms of international tax abuse. The pandemic iteration of capitalism requires customized redistribution antidotes to what some have called the “Amazon model.”[footnote The State of Tax Justice, 10.] One antidote is an excess profit tax

on the large multinational corporations whose profits have soared during the pandemic while local businesses were forced into lockdown. For the digital tech giants who claim to have our best interests at heart but have been short-changing us out of billions in tax for years, this could be their redemption tax.

Another antidote is a wealth tax on asset values that have exploded during the pandemic, as in the case of Amazon shares, which have increased in value by $60 billion during the pandemic. What if profit was to be taxed where workers and consumers generate it? Corporate tax abuse isn’t new, but with inequalities dramatically exacerbated by the pandemic, is it not time to end the “moral bankruptcy of allowing value to be captured far from where it is generated”?[footnote The State of Tax Justice 2020, 9.]

What to do with a spare $427 billion then? Varoufakis might claim that this money isn’t even necessary, as the aforementioned central banks could just divert digital money from corporate finance toward common citizens, through a personal digital bank account, a portion of which would represent a form of universal basic income (UBI) not derived from taxation but rather from a sort of redistribution of global dividends. Italian feminist Cristina Morini slightly tweaks the notion of universal basic income, taking inspiration from the Italian feminist movement Non Una Di Meno. Moroni argues that with waged labor almost extinct and gendered reproductive labor a terrain of extraction for both techno-capitalism and the state, what is needed is “self-determination income,” in other words,

basic income which is self-determined, universal, and unconditional and which does not depend on job activity, on citizenship status or a permit to stay … An instrument for everyone for preventing gender violence and for providing autonomy and freedom from exploitation, labor and precarity.

Can our conception of politics be shifted from the capitalist trope of producing scarcity for extraction to an ecology of the redistribution of abundance? Morini’s self-determination income not only resonates with the postworkerist imaginations of time freed from alienation and devoted to care and art; it also provokes the question of what global citizenship looks like at a time when many countries are eroding the rights of elderly citizens, and “denizenship” proliferates at nauseating speed, with an ever-renewed arsenal of borders and incarceration.

While this period is certainly marked by a discursive emphasis on the public dimension of care and health, and while the virus itself brings forward a dimension of interdependence that one cannot unsee, the underlying idea “we are in this together” bears an estranging tone in the various settings, as states either abandon public health and safety, or enforce isolation and containment. But could interdependence become the foundation of politics? The Care Collective, born out of a London-based reading group, thinks so. In their book The Care Manifesto, they advocate universal care promoted by a state—“not a paternal, racist or settler-colonial state”—that can

enable everyone to cultivate what disabilities studies have called “strategic autonomy and independence,” while creating the conditions that allow for new relationships within and among the state and its diverse communities—relationships predicated on everyone receiving what they need both to thrive and to participate in democratic practices.

Inspired by mutual-aid traditions and social-justice movements, the ongoing practices that answer the question “how do we care for each other and the planet?” should be only the starting point for altering larger systems of cohabitation, like markets, constitutions, states, and neighborhoods. This is how we reach solutions and tools for redistribution, like a return to public space making, platform cooperativism, new municipalism, replacing outsourcing with insourcing, and replacing public-private partnerships with “public-commons partnerships” “in which co-operative institutions link up with public services and local citizens with an active stake in their organisations.”

Within the discursive moment of this biennium, the movement for black liberation and for abolition has been an indispensable and tireless space for projecting futures, imagining safety, health, and thriving not only for this generation but for many to come. With the Vision for Black Lives, which was first published during the post-Ferguson movement of 2016 and then rewritten in 2020, the Movement for Black Lives built a policy platform around the demand to end the war against black communities, especially black youth; black women; black trans, queer, gender-nonconforming, and intersex people; black disabled people; and black migrants. They also called for the abolition of all jails, prisons, and immigration detention centers; an end to the death penalty and the war on drugs; an end to the surveillance of black communities; and an end to pretrial detention and money bail. And while these demands sound very specific to the North American setting, are racism and mass incarceration really just North American? I am specifically thinking about the proliferation of privately managed maxi prisons in the UK—publicly funded, privately managed prisons that will eventually have to be filled somehow.

The North American movement for black liberation is a source of inspiration for at least two reasons. Firstly, the hegemony of the US means that its oppressive social and economic ideas can become influential in all communities directly impacted by its geopolitical reach, so understanding the consequences of those ideas is key. Secondly, movements like Black Lives Matter have had political and organizational victories in one of the most hostile and militarized civilian environments in the world. Their methods are thus a model for how marginalized communities everywhere can make their voices heard. In a time marked by terror and isolation, Black Lives Matter has made space for people internationally not only to unearth the roots of genocide in the past and expose the obscenity of racism in the present, but also to “radically reimagine public safety, community care and how we spend money as a society.” Black Lives Matter put abolition on the public agenda, provoking debates that went beyond merely defunding the police. While older generations, in “old media” like tabloids and talk shows, often dismissed the abolitionist option, younger generations were digitally exposed to imaginaries of futures in which climate justice, abolition, and queerness were embraced and uplifted. Those seeds of the future find support in policy initiatives like the Breathe Act, a revolutionary piece of proposed legislation unveiled by the Electoral Justice Project of the Movement for Black Lives in 2020. The Breathe Act redefines public safety and community care in an abolitionist direction, which is an indispensable dimension of present and future redistribution. The proposed legislation calls for

divesting federal resources from incarceration and policing, while investing in new, non-punitive, non-carceral approaches to community safety that leads states to shrink their criminal-legal systems and center the protection of Black lives, by allocating money to build healthy, sustainable, and equitable communities.

What if the Breathe Act were to inspire other countries to divest from privately managed maxi prisons or detention centers for migrants, and invest in public insourced quality healthcare and education, while redistributing self-determination income for all, irrespective of citizenship or permission to stay? From feminist theories and political practices to the Breathe Act, what is at stake are different conceptions of the state and the public good that transcend all previous models of welfare, since they make visible those same infrastructures of gendered and racialized extraction on which states were built and continue to thrive for the benefit of the few.

As abolitionist geographer Ruth Gilmore Wilson teaches, “if unfinished liberation is the still-to-be-achieved work of abolition, then at bottom what is to be abolished isn’t the past or its present ghosts, but rather the process of hierarchy, dispossession, and exclusion that congeal in and as group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.” A horizon of redistribution in the context of the pandemic iteration of capitalism is intrinsically opposed to carceral practices and inspired by the longevity of what Gilmore Wilson calls “abolition geography,” which “is capacious (it isn’t only by, for, or about Black people) and specific (it’s a guide to action for both understanding and rethinking how we combine our labor with each other and the earth),” which “takes feeling and agency to be constitutive of, no less than constrained by, structure,” and which is “a way of studying, and of doing political organizing, and of being in the world, and of worlding ourselves.”

#### imagining new forms of care politics opens up the space to incorporate different relationships to care. that increases interdependence and multiplicity.

Raghuram 22 – Professor and Researcher in the School of Social Sciences & Global Studies at the Open University. [Parvati. “Caring for the Manifesto – Steps toward Making It an Achievable Dream.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, vol 28, issue 4 (2021). Jan 26, 2022.]

The Care Manifesto is a timely volume coming as it does in the middle of a pandemic when the value of care for our countries and communities has been reinforced. We increasingly hear about the importance and value of care—care in hospitals, in communities, within families, and in myriad other places and spaces. Some of these care needs arise from the lack of care in other places; friendships, family networks, and other circles of care that have been left attenuated as people deal with the ravaging effects of COVID-19 on work, social life, and kinship networks. The ability of people to belong to affective communities—to meet and greet, to hug those whom they love, i.e. to express care in quotidian ways, have all been paused at best and removed at worst as the death toll from the pandemic rises. The lack of care is also an inheritance of uncaring economies and states. The Care Manifesto is a stark reminder that to be in the world requires caring relationships. The book highlights how and where care survives and thrives, the practices that enable these, and what is required to make a more caring world.

The book’s main target is the diminution of care through careless policies driven by neoliberal political–economic structures. It traces why and how care has come to not matter. Reading this crisis as conjuncture (Hall and Massey 2010) enables the authors to analyze the devastation caused by uncaring neoliberalism and argues persuasively for redoing the basis of what is valued, and how, in contemporary (Western) society. This requires, as the authors argue, “the opposite of the temporary ‘care fixes’ engineered by so-called compassionate capitalism” (61). They highlight the inequalities and injustices in the world into which COVID-19 arrived. These inequalities always existed but were highlighted and deepened by COVID-19. However, like all crises, COVID-19 also offers political possibilities. What are the new openings offered at this moment and how do we forge a more caring society? Given the ravages to the economy, how do we start again by valuing what we saw was essential for remaking our societies. How do we remake a caring world through networking successful experiments around care? Hence, as important as the word care in the title is the word manifesto.

Manifestos are a call to action, to much-needed action. They are more than a vision; they also need to offer a blueprint for change. The volume is organized through some elements of such a blueprint. As a manifesto it is ambitious, calling for wholesale change—of communities, families, states, economies, of the world. The volume offers a clear and compelling vision that is set against existing problematic care practices. The volume then helpfully makes the case for the manifesto as a deliverable good through examples, most of them from the Global North, i.e. the location of the authors. The collective offers hope that a more caring future is already in the making and that networking these examples, scaling up, and learning from each other can provide a way out of the carelessness that marks so much of the present.

In the rest of this commentary, I want to point to some areas of tension that, I suggest, need to be addressed if we are to make the manifesto achievable. They are highlighted by the authors as the ambivalences and paradoxes that are inherent to care. These ambivalences offer a starting point, not for unpicking the brilliant vision of the volume but for making that vision a reality. As the authors argue, addressing these ambivalences is crucial for mapping a way forward.

After all, working with and through ambivalence and contradictory emotions is key to building democratic communities. Conversely, only by deepening participatory democracy, a core element in our broader vision of creating a more caring world, can we hope to properly work through the many ambivalences of care. And although we can never eliminate care’s difficulties, we propose that we can mitigate them once we start building more caring kinships, communities, markets, states and worlds. (36–37).

It is in that spirit that I offer my comments.

Caring for the Manifesto

So how do we care for the Manifesto? How do we make it come to fruition? This is where carefully working the ambivalences inherent to the production of care needs to be exposed and addressed. In this section, I point to some of these.

Care as Affect

The Care Manifesto defines care as a

social capacity and activity involving the nurturing of all that is necessary for the welfare and flourishing of life. Above all, to put care centre stage means recognising and embracing our interdependencies. In this manifesto we therefore use the term ‘care’ capaciously to embrace familial care, the hands-on care that workers carry out in care homes and hospitals and that teachers do in schools, and the everyday services provided by other essential workers. (11)

However, what is gained by focusing on care and what is lost? Care is affective and threaded through with emotions—love, happiness but also anger and pain. Feminists argued that social reproduction, the lens widely used in the 1970s and 1980s, was not adequate because affect and its uncertainties and instabilities, but also rewards, had to be part of the mix. To move to care would be to take on that affective register, to see care not only as work, as ethical demand, or a responsibility but to show where the affective dimensions to care for people and the environment everywhere on earth will come from. The Manifesto briefly focuses on how “[s]ympathy and solicitude, like all other human emotions, always fluctuate, frequently at odds with other needs, desires, and affective states—such as personal gratification and recognition—or entangled with feelings of guilt or shame” (34).

However, affect is also the stuff of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism too plays with affective registers. Feelings of guilt and shame mix with personal gratification as we shop for goods that are produced through uncaring practices. The happiness we get from using those goods is instantaneous and therefore outweighs the longer-term benefits of dismantling exploitative modes of production. People care for both but often choose one form of care, gratification, and a feeling of self-care, over the other, of caring for and bringing together a more caring world that is attentive to those who are not always “present.” In effect, one has to deal not only with how neoliberal subjects but also neoliberal subjectivities are produced, as people struggle with their different, simultaneous desires and hopes. A recent essay by Harry Pettit (2019) focuses on young people and the role that hope plays in producing their desires and aspirations. It outlines the everyday practices and mediations through which these hopes are fostered and how neoliberalism therefore gets legitimacy even as it produces precarity. Perhaps one step toward achieving the collective’s ambition would be to look at disciplines not currently covered in the Manifesto. There is a vast literature on care in social psychology and in education that has much to teach us about why people don’t care, or, more often, care less about somethings than others. There are gradations to care and it is these gradations that make caring complex, ambivalent. People are literally between different intensities of affect, toward those who are near and far, those whose care we value most. It might be easier if we only had to sort out an uncaring world!

Besides, care is increasingly mediated. When a family member feeds you stories of hope based on neoliberal promise, often in quotidian ways such as a text message or messages shared on social media platforms, they take root in ways that are hard to dislodge. The power of such mediated forms in producing affect and of how these circulate, get amplified, and realized have to be taken on squarely if we are to dislodge the seductive powers of neoliberalism. How do we strengthen some affective registers and what is the work that has to be done to simultaneously take account of caring and less-caring emotions that circulate across media? Will time and resources be enough or do we need to deal with these at the level of affect, through educating ourselves to be attentive to the affects that are caring and how they can be fostered not only face-to-face but also in increasingly mediated relationships? In particular, the role of media of different forms in shaping these affective registers, how these circulate, fall on fertile grounds and are fed through the very sites that the collective focus on—family, community, state, and economy—needs more attention. We need care to take on the affective in neoliberalism if it is to be effective. The effect of neoliberalism is real, present, compelling. It competes with and subverts the forms of care that the Collective envisions.

Care as Labor

One thing that COVID-19 showed us is that not all key workers were care workers. They were engaged in social reproduction, working as “delivery drivers and garbage collectors” (92). For me, these tasks are better captured through social reproduction, a term that includes all the different activities and relationships that are necessary to maintain everyday life (Glenn 1992). Social reproduction encompasses a range of activities that can’t be considered caring (Kofman and Raghuram 2015). To expand the definition of care to include all the tasks envisaged in this volume might actually be a disservice.

I am particularly concerned to focus on social reproduction because it highlights the labor required to care and how people are compelled to care, and constrained from opting out of caring. The distinction between work and care is tricky when care is work. For some, this work is monitored and managed through institutionalized processes of working lives. Such carers are commanded about what constitutes appropriate and adequate care, by employers and by regulators. Not caring looks like a privileged option. Attuning to the difficulties of caring requires going to other sources. It needs us to listen to those who have cared under difficult circumstances, not just ideal circumstances. While the Manifesto aims to imagine another world where care is not only labor, it also has to take account of the views and perspectives of those for whom it is largely labor. This might help us to better achieve the vision of the Manifesto, to ensure that the challenges of care as work too can be addressed.

Care comes with a high degree of responsibility. This responsibility can be redistributed through a caring state and a caring economy, but these only go so far. Ultimately the immediacy of care—of needing to make a decision on the care requirements of a child, often not your own, and weighing that up against caring for yourself, requires making tough choices. It requires resolving or at least accommodating different values in time. As the Manifesto points out, existing forms of commanded care sit uneasily with the immediacy and creativity required to care attentively, in time and in place. Both responsibility and immediacy must be managed simultaneously. However, caring families and communities have depended on those who are least privileged to juggle these values, to make decisions, and to come up with caring solutions. There is no clear right in these choices—ambivalences can have ambiguous outcomes. The Manifesto attempts to lay out a clear path but perhaps the path is not quite as self-evident or straightforward. Experimentation comes with misses and errors. What are these failures that we should be aware of? One way forward in realizing the Manifesto’s ambitions would be to draw on insights from literatures in the caring professions and from those focusing on social policy. They point to some of the ambivalences that care as a vision has navigated.

Race and Care

Much of care is theorized through the experiences of the unnamed white body. However, caregiving is deeply racialized. The Care Collective recognizes the extent to which the divide between those who care and the cared-for has been drawn across gender lines, especially as these intersect with class and race. However, these racialized and classed formations are not easily dismantled. For instance, Uma Narayan (1995) has pointed to how care and justice were both handmaidens of colonialism. Racial difference and coloniality were produced and justified using the language of care. These different inheritances of care mean that the racialized body has very different embodied and institutional memories of care. Care has inheritances that need to be taken into account if we are to produce a more caring world. These inheritances are not stable or whole. They already carry within them other openings and starting points but these need to be explored and taken on board.

Bodies that have not received care raise very different questions for how to shape a care manifesto. Race, for instance, needs to be foundational in conceptualizing care as care practitioners have discovered. For instance, Audrey Thompson (2004) illustrates how only Black teachers recognized the different care needs of children of color and they use “colourtalk” to assist Black students in combating racism. Color talk “decentres and denormalises Whiteness” (Thompson 2004, 33). These different embodiments of care are most stark in writings on enslaved families, where “caring for” may involve killing the child who is born into slavery (Noxolo et al. 2008). Race and racism redefine care in the most intense and painful ways imaginable. How do we engage such racialized bodies in The Care Manifesto’s vision?

The histories of carelessness and carefulness are not only embodied but also institutional, shaping the very definition of care. For instance, Micheline van Riemsdijk (2013) found that Polish migrant nurses in Norway, who may be deemed white, have their knowledge devalued because of the history of how Poland has been viewed, in Norway, as part of a “less advanced” Eastern Europe. Care was produced and viewed through these racialized histories so that care as a category was itself mutable and changing in the context of race. To be looked after by racialized people is to feel not cared for. White bodies too are racialized through the complicated histories of place, making whiteness too a complex category. The importance of geopolitical formations in the valuing of care takes care outside the individual alone and places it centrally within the politics surrounding the reproduction of societies, including its histories (Kofman and Raghuram 2015).

Care has been dislocated from Black bodies in multiple ways and these dislocations have to be accounted for when shaping a caring world. As the Black Lives Matter struggles have shown us, it is not enough to say all lives matter. The histories of racialized and classed injustices require reparation and not just equality. This is not to decry the vision of a caring world for which the Collective argues. Rather it is to suggest that alongside this vision we need to involve others whose experiences of care may be very different, those that have different embodied and institutionalized experiences of care.

Situate and Translate

Care is not only dislocated from some bodies but is also located differently in different places. For example, the critique of neoliberalism and the erosion of the welfare state, one of the prime targets for the volume, is a very particular phenomenon—located in some Global North countries. Most countries have never had welfare states; in others, welfare measures are being instituted for the first time, sometimes through the influence of global policy and driven by conditionalities to loans. Sharkh and Gough (2010) usefully outline some of these variations—highlighting seven welfare regimes at the time that they were writing. These include the proto welfare states, which combine fairly high state spending commitments and welfare outcomes with conservative stratification, informal liberalism, and family provision (e.g. many Eastern European and Latin American countries); the “successful informal security regime” which combine informal and formal welfare with marketized social welfare and is seen in countries such as East Korea and Taiwan; a set of regimes with high informal security systems but with poor outcomes on a combination of these characteristics such as high inequality, large gender differences in welfare outcomes (South Asia), high morbidity (Southern African countries with HIV); and finally a set of insecurity systems with not only low but falling indicators of welfare (many in sub-Saharan Africa). It is in these latter countries that any newly introduced welfare systems, instigated through global social policy instruments, are improving things, not worsening them. Thus, not every place is undergoing neoliberalism or reductions in care in the same ways. Place matters so care needs to be situated.

There are also place variations in how patriarchy and racism, the interrelated but distinctive other bases for the lack of care, play out. Both exist everywhere but take different forms across the world. However, patriarchy is often the primary lens for thinking through care arrangements in the Global South while those in the Global North are seen as an effect of neoliberal policies. How far are we able and willing to look at patriarchal practices within our own homes and workplaces in the Global North?

This is not to argue for geographical exceptionalism, i.e. to only attend to local variations in care, in caring institutions, or in moral values, because doing so would mean that each locale would be seen as disconnected and unique. As Subrahmanyam argues, these “area specialists will merely find themselves either ‘fitted in’ to a big picture, or ‘left out’” (Subrahmanyam 1997: 744). As I have argued elsewhere (Raghuram 2012), what we need is to rethink how global care is being made up differently through the multiple forms of care arrangements and conceptualizations that make up the globe. Each locale has its own distinctive way of thinking care but this multiplicity must play a constitutive role in making the global. The narratives of global care as it exists today need undoing and redoing if we are to globalize care effectively and appropriately. We need to recognize the complex genealogies, commitments, and claims (Tsing 2005) that make up the globalizing world of care. Importantly, this requires a series of networking moves, sharing and translating across caring manifestos in different places, to learn from other examples of how care could be done, to use this to question our own notions of care.

These translations occur not only across differences between places in how care plays out but also through spatial entanglements. In my own work, migration represents one axis for these entanglements. Migrant care for nonmigrants, the care of migrants, the intermingling of migrants from different parts of the world, many but not all of whom are working in the care sector, and those who migrate to receive care, all have to negotiate the different understandings of care globally. They have to resolve place-based variations in care arrangements, affects, and hopes, translate them and make them work. Learning from them is an important step for realizing the vision of the Manifesto.

Moreover, care also highlights relationalities and interconnectedness, making it difficult to craft boundaries between social, political, and economic forms of organization. For instance, communities can operate not only as caregiving or organizing units but also as economic forms. Similarly, familial care is embedded within household and extra-household economics and is shaped by the state. It is always tricky to draw lines between chapters in a book, never more than when dealing with care. But ambivalence involves multiple values that can be oppositional between these sectors and places of care. Situating, relating, and translating care are all needed to make the world a more caring place.

In Conclusion: Writing about the Manifesto with Care

Caring about the Manifesto as a volume perhaps required inviting and engaging others from across the world into the Collective.. For instance, so much care in many of the countries from which the authors write is provided If we are to talk about universal care, then this includes listening to the voices of those who have cared under difficult circumstances, racialized carers, and those from across the world by migrant workers from countries such as the Philippines. What does a caring manifesto look like from their perspective? Moreover, what is the provenance of these knowledges? How do we stop these from being addendums to an already crafted argument? Moreover, who is allowed, or enabled to make those much required critiques of patriarchy in the Global North, which too underpins the lack of care we see there? How do we increase the orbit of feminism to make these conversations possible (Narayan 2019)?

But I also want to write about this Manifesto with care, not as critique or through the lens of deficit but as an important step in a journey that many of those thinking about care are taking. The Collective’s Manifesto remains a brilliant intervention about which we need to think and write with care. The volume is clear in putting care right at the center of our lives. I hope what I have done here is to suggest some meaningful steps to make their vision possible so that the vision does not remain an “impossible dream.” I look forward to the journey!

### State Key—2NC

#### Creating a public ethic of care retools institutions towards the responsibility for care.

Urban 20 – Researcher at the Institute of Philosophy at the Czech Academy of Sciences and head of the Department of Contemporary Continental Philosophy. [Petr. “Organizing the Caring Society: Toward a Care Ethical Perspective on Institutions.” Care Ethics, Democratic Citizenship and the State. International Political Theory. July 9, 2020.]

Public Ethics of Care and the State’s Public Policies

Over the past two decades, care theorists have adopted, roughly speaking, two different strategies in rethinking the institutional boundaries of caring. Some care ethicists maintain that “the family is preeminent among institutions and places where caring projects unfold” (Ruddick 1998, 13; cf. Tronto 2001, 76) and propose to move from the (post-patriarchal) family or the home ‘outward’ in order to use the caring characteristic of these institutions to “build a public ethic of care” (Noddings 2002, 301; cf. Kittay 1999, 133). On this account, “a social theory (or guide to public policy) that builds from the home outward will require changes in many of our institutions and even in the idea of institutions” (Noddings 1998, 68). Other care theorists, in contrast, propose that “care should be positioned in notions of citizenship rather than family” (Sevenhuijsen et al. 2003, 299) and argue that “the community, as represented by the state, has primary responsibility for care of its citizens, and … citizens in turn have the right to nonfamily care” (Glenn 2000, 90). On both accounts, however, it is the aim of a ‘public ethic of care’ to ensure that (1) caring is legitimated as a collective (public) responsibility; (2) access to care -giving and care-receiving is relatively equally distributed and not dependent on economic or social status; and (3) the responsibility and actual work of caring is shared equitably and does not fall disproportionally on disadvantaged groups (cf. Glenn 2000, 88).

Now, whatPaternalism does all this mean, if we are to translate this view into the real life of our societies and institutions? First, it means different things in different contexts, since the actual social and political institutions in which caring is discussed, decided upon and done differ with respect to particular social, cultural and political environments. The idea of a ‘public ethic of care’ has therefore inspired a number of critical analyses of current institutional arrangements of caring in various geographical and cultural contexts worldwide as well as a number of concrete proposals for public policies that are centered around the idea of the collective responsibility for care and the right to the equal access to adequate care-giving and care-receiving (cf. Clement 1996; Ruddick 1998; Sevenhuijsen 1998; Kittay 1999; Glenn 2000; White 2000; Tronto 2001; Noddings 2002; Sevenhuijsen et al. 2003; Hankivsky 2004; Barnes 2006; Held 2006; Engster 2007; Stensöta 2015). With respect to the role of the state and its institutions in realizing a ‘public ethic of care’, care theorists elaborated in particular on an ethical justification of the welfare state (Sevenhuijsen 1998; Kittay 1999; Glenn 2000; Engster 2007) as well as a criticism of paternalistic and neoliberal forms of the state care provision (White 2000; Tronto 2001; Held 2006; Barnes 2012). Daniel Engster (2015) recently proposed what is perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed account of a public ethic of care so far, which in a systematic way applies care ethics to a number of social policy areas, such as health care, child care, old age, and poverty, and suggests how the basic institutions of a caring welfare state should be designed.

Yet, it is not the aim of this chapter to explore the existing proposals for a public ethic of care in detail. Our previous discussion shall suffice to make the case that any full-blown moral and political theory of care has to deal with the structure and functioning of our social and political institutions. The institutional approach in care ethics sees care as a collective responsibility that needs to be realized through various social and political institutions. To take care as a crucial element in the life of all individuals and communities means to challenge the current institutional arrangements of caring and propose alternative ways of organizing care in our societies and polities. This conclusion puts us in a better position to see the shortcomings of the famous critique proposed by Alison Jaggar who suggests that “care’s emphasis on individual responses to immediate needs … encourages what are sometimes called band-aid social work approaches to moral problems rather than efforts to solve them institutionally or prevent their occurrence through social changes” (Jaggar 1995, 196). Such a criticism toward care ethics is not only “overstated”, as Hankivsky (2004, 34) noted, but rather completely inadequate when applied to the above-discussed views that represent the institutional approach in care ethics.

Given the care ethical insight that care should be positioned in the notion of citizenship and that the state has primary responsibility for ensuring access to adequate care-giving and care-receiving for all, the state and its institutions that serve this goal must be of prominent interest for care ethicists. In the following section, I want to turn attention to the question of how a care ethics perspective on institutions can be applied to the domain of public administration . Hence the chapter shifts its focus from a care ethical discussion of the institutional boundaries of caring and the design of public policies to a care ethical discussion of how the provision of public services and goods should be best administered.

Public Administration and Caring Institutions

Public administration can be defined as a cooperative group effort in a public setting that comprises of those activities that are involved in implementing the policies and programs of governments but also have a role in the formulation of public policy. Theoretically public administration is an interdisciplinary field of study that examines the structure and workings of institutions that are charged with the administration of governmental functions and studies the behavior of officials responsible for the conduct of these functions. The aim of this section is to take a closer look at existing attempts to apply a care ethics perspective to public administration theory and practice.

Care Ethics and Public Administration

Let us start by taking a quick look at how care ethics was first applied to educational administration in the early 1990s. Drawing on Noddings’ (1984, 1987) ideas about the educational reform, Starratt (1991) and Beck (1992) argue for introducing care ethics and the values of caring in educational leadership and administrative practice. Building on Noddings’ (1984) and Gilligan’s (1982) view that care ethics should aim at fostering growth, connection and nurturing relationships, Beck argues that care ethics would “lead administrators to listen to and value persons in the context of their communities’ schools. It would encourage them to involve students and teachers in problem solving, allowing them ‘access to decision-forming arenas’” (Beck 1992, 482). Care ethics, these theorists argue, would reorient educational administration from its current exclusive emphasis on the values of effectiveness and competition to the values of care. It would foster “open, trusting, professional communication” (Starratt 1991, 196), recommend opting for “cooperative strategies” (Beck 1992, 476) and aim at reducing “the Paternalism artificial separations that cripple caring relations” (Noddings 1987, 27). Davidson (1994) widens the scope of investigation to public administration in general. She identifies, following Noddings (1984), the care perspective as a ‘feminine perspective’ and argues that deploying this perspective in public administration would “revitalize our demoralized public organizations … and create opportunities for enhanced interpersonal relationships—both within our bureaucracies and between these bureaucracies and the communities that serve” (Davidson 1994, revised in Scranton and Ranney 2001, 579).

Yet, a problem with these first attempts to apply care ethics to administration lies in deploying the above-discussed narrow view of caring as a nurturing personal relationship. This reduces the perspective of these scholars to a narrow focus on promoting connection and personal growth within the institutional context. Moreover, Davidson’s account of ‘feminine administrative behavior’ is clearly open to the objection of gender essentialism which is related to serious issues identified by early critics of the ‘feminine approach’ in care ethics (cf. Tronto’s 1987 criticism of Noddings).

In contrast, DeLysa Burnier’s proposal for a ‘care-centered public administration’ draws on Tronto’s (1993) argument for a political ethic of care and takes as a point of departure Fisher and Tronto’s (1990) broad definition of caring as a social practice which, if fully accomplished, comprises four interrelated phases of caring-about, caring-for, care-giving and care-receiving. Burnier also builds on a feminist approach to public administration developed in the pioneering works of Camilla Stivers (1991, 1993, 1994, 2000). In her groundbreaking 1991 paper, Stivers draws attention to women’s historical exclusion from public administration theory and suggests four areas of public administration where a feminist perspective might offer fresh insights: (1) the question of administrative knowledge, (2) the model of the ideal public servant, (3) the nature of administrative discretion and (4) the dimensions of the administrative state. Most importantly, Stivers argues for a feminist rethinking of the very ground of administrative legitimacy, which would base legitimacy and accountability of administrative discretion not only on the individual conscience and the internal processes of a particular agency but on substantive collaboration with affected others which aims at the inclusion of a diverse range of perspectives. A feminist account of administrative practice foregrounds the view of power as a form of “enabling capacity”, stresses “the possibility of leadership as facilitation rather than giving orders, and authority as accountable expertise rather than a chain of command” (Stivers 1991, 59).

In what follows, I want to discuss DeLysa Burnier’s proposal for a ‘care-centered public administration’ in detail. On Burnier’s view, a care ethics perspective (1) provides an alternative ‘assumptive base’ of public administration; (2) complicates the conventional founding and historical narrative of the discipline; (3) legitimizes a ‘relational leadership’ approach in public administration (Burnier 2003, 535–540).

Bureaucracy with its emphasis on the efficient and neutral delivery of public goods and services represents the traditional foundation of public administration. The New Public Management reforms of the 1990s changed this foundation dramatically by replacing bureaucracy with the principles of the market centered around the value of efficiency. The governmental delivery of goods and services to citizens was transformed into market transaction where private providers of services compete for customers seeking to maximize their choices. As it is well documented in literature on public administration, the New Public Management reforms deprived the public sector of its more traditional moral values and permitted “a widespread practice of the administration of services to develop that destroys the very idea that the providing organizations could be matters of public concern” (Hirst 1997, 127; cf. Hoggett 2005). Now, given the financial and ethical crisis that resulted from an increased market orientation, Burnier argues, it is not only “imperative that administrators who believe in government’s public mission retake center stage and regain control of the public agenda” (Burnier 2009a, 399) but what is needed is “a care transformation of the public sector” which “values care, makes care work visible, and places care values and practices at the center of public administration scholarship and practice” (Burnier 2009a, 396). It is not Burnier’s suggestion that care should replace the values of bureaucracy and the market, but rather that public administration should take care as seriously as it has taken bureaucracy and markets. What would such a transformation entail? How would a care-centered public administration look?

Before answering these questions, let me first draw attention to Burnier’s ‘interpretative-critical’ methodology. It is worth noting that Burnier arrives at the characteristics of a care-centered public administration primarily not from a normative ideal image of public administration but rather from real-life examples (both past and present) of a certain type of administrative practice. Drawing on Stivers (2000), Burnier studies the efforts and activities of the ‘settlement women’ and identifies behind these activities an “alternative ethos for governance and administrative practice” (Burnier 2009b, 587) which emphasizes relationality , viewing situations from multiple perspectives, concern for others, cooperative problem-solving, care and compassion. Although this alternative construction of administrative reality has never become public administration’s dominant construction—Stivers speaks of “public administration’s buried heritage” (Stivers 2000, 49)—neither has it disappeared. During her years of teaching public and non-profit administrators in a Master of Public Administration (MPA) university program, Burnier observed that “for many public administrators, especially those working at the street and agency levels, care-centered administration is already at the core of what they do” (Burnier 2009a, 396). Thus, Burnier argues, if we carefully listen to the “everyday talk of government employees and administrators”, a fresh discourse might emerge that legitimizes and illuminates “how care as a value and practice is inextricably tied to everyday judgments that clients, citizens, and administrators make about what it means to do a job well or what it means to be a ‘good’ administrator” (Burnier 2003, 541). Yet, such an inquiry should not only be ‘interpretative’ but should also be ‘critical’ in the sense of paying adequate attention to the larger institutional context and its collective meaning structures (Burnier 2005, 398).Footnote1

What mainly characterizes a care perspective on public administration is the belief that administering is a situational and relational practice which seeks to improve the lives of all individuals and communities . This further entails several particular beliefs, such as that (1) good administrative processes and outcomes should reflect not only expert judgment but a collaborative work that takes into account different viewpoints and lived experiences; (2) good administrators should use their discretionary authority not to accumulate more power but to reach out to the public and invite them to join a dialogue; (3) good administrative knowledge should be situated in experience and dialogical reflection; and (4) good administrators should be critically reflexive, willing to question and challenge their own values, assumptions and professional judgments.

As noted earlier, Burnier does not suggest that a care discourse should be deployed to delegitimize and replace any other normative ground of public administration. In a care-centered public administration, public officials would still be required to apply rules and deliver public goods and services fairly and equally. Although public administrators may experience conflicts between bureaucratic requirements of neutrality and objectivity and care requirements of cooperative and contextual problem solutions, ‘caring administrators’, Burnier argues, would take into consideration both as they inevitably work under multiple ethical contexts (Burnier 2003, 539–541).Footnote2 Burnier suggests several practical measures that could help a government or an institution become more care-centered. These measures include (1) changing the organizational structure and culture, (2) deploying relational leadership, (3) introducing formal recognition and compensation for care work and emotional labor in the public sector and (4) teaching and training public officials aimed at acquiring knowledge and skills needed for individuals to become caring administrators. Unfortunately, Burnier does not say much about the needed changes concerning the organizational structure and culture, as her focus is mostly on individual behavior of public administrators.

As regards the behavior of administrative leaders and managers, Burnier emphasizes a transformative potential of relational leadership (cf. Regan and Brooks 1995; Sernak 1998). The relational leader practices facilitating and reciprocal power as ‘power with’ rather than ‘power over’. Such a leader promotes collaboration, caring, courage and vision within an organization and remains open to the perspectives of others. The relational leader must “communicate that care is an organizational value to be embraced and practiced by individuals throughout the organization” (Burnier 2003, 538). The emotional labor and care work of relational leaders as well as other employees go often unrecognized in public sector agencies. It is a marginalized and devalued practice, although it can substantially contribute to creating better working conditions in an organization and enhancing the well-being of its clients. Thus, Burnier (2009a) argues, we need to introduce measures of formal recognition and compensation for emotional labor and care work in organizations (such as alternative modes of evaluation, incorporating this work in job descriptions and audits etc.). Finally, governments and public agencies should bear the responsibility for providing public administrators with quality education and training aimed at acquiring knowledge and skills needed for individuals to exercise good administrative discretion and navigate through the complex web of multiple ethical contexts of administrative practice.

#### Institutional care must be analyzed through purpose, power, and particularity. That creates effective public ethics and increases interdependency.

Urban 20 – Researcher at the Institute of Philosophy at the Czech Academy of Sciences and head of the Department of Contemporary Continental Philosophy. [Petr. “Organizing the Caring Society: Toward a Care Ethical Perspective on Institutions.” Care Ethics, Democratic Citizenship and the State. International Political Theory. July 9, 2020.]

Conflict, Power and Bureaucracy in Caring Institutions

Burnier’s pioneering work lays the ground for a care-oriented administrative theory and practice. Yet, it leaves many areas of research open for further elaboration. Drawing on Fisher and Tronto’s (1990) broad definition of caring and the distinction of four phases of the care process, Burnier (2003) calls for “the task of explicating the four phases of care more systematically in the context of public administration” (Burnier 2003, 541). However, she seems to leave aside an important element of Fisher and Tronto’s analysis, namely their emphasis on the possibility of conflicts and contradictions arising in the complex process of caring. It is precisely this element which comes to the forefront of Tronto’s recent interest in institutionalized caring. “In fact”, Tronto argues, “institutional care is better understood in the context of conflict. As such, care institutions need explicit institutional arrangements to help to resolve conflict as it arises” (Tronto 2010, 168). This requires, in Tronto’s view, creating an explicit ‘political space within institutions’, that is, “a political process that considers the needs, contributions, and prospects of many different actors” (Tronto 2010, 169).

Although Tronto (2010) seems to articulate her account of ‘caring institutions’ with respect to institutions and agencies that serve to directly provide care, I assume, given her broad definition of caring, that Tronto’s characteristics of ‘caring institutions’ do apply to any kind of institution through which government implements its policies and delivers public goods and services.Footnote3 Tronto approaches the question of how to assess whether an institution provides good caring from a perspective of three “critical elements for assessing practices of care” which grow out of an understanding of care as a relational practice (Tronto 2010, 161). All forms of caring, Tronto argues, “require that attention be paid to purpose, power, and particularity ” (Tronto 2010, 161—emphasis added). It is true about all forms of caring, but it is especially true about the institutional ones, that they take place in the contexts of possible conflicts and disagreements about the ends of care and within unequal power relations. Conflicts and disagreements often concern the key question of the care process, namely what are the needs that should be addressed and how best to address them. Any institution which suppresses its awareness of existing power relations (both within and outside the institution), the inevitable conflicts about the institution’s purposes and the disagreements in needs interpretation will most likely inflict harm to those who are affected by the institution’s agency. Hence, Tronto argues, in order to be more caring an institution has to raise its awareness of the three critical elements, “these aspects of care within the institution need to be worked out consciously … they … require a deliberate, political process” (Tronto 2010, 162; cf. Tronto 2001).

What does this mean in more practical terms? First, institutions should be “highly deliberate and explicit about how to best meet the needs of the people who they serve” (Tronto 2010, 169). They have to find out ways of an active needs interpretation process. This concerns, Tronto argues, not only the needs of the institution’s clients but needs at multiple levels including the needs of the employees of the institution: “care institutions have to think about the nature of the caring process as a whole in order to guide their actions. This requirement does not only demand that the ‘needs’ of the ‘customers’ come first but also that the needs of care workers, the allocation of responsibility and proper assessment also happen within the organization” (Tronto 2010, 162). Yet, an adequate needs interpretation is a hard task for any institution, since, given the unequal power relations in institutionalized settings, the needs expressed by less advantaged people may be easily manipulated or distorted or simply not heard (Tronto 2010, 164f.).

One of the ways to counter the risk of inadequate needs interpretation is to make the institutions more democratic, inclusive and responsive so that they “take into consideration the needs and perspectives of all within the institution” (Tronto 2010, 168; cf. Tronto 2013, 158–166). Tronto does not say much about the practical measures that would lead to such a transformation of institutions. She touches upon the ideas of changing the institutional culture (cf. Groombridge 2010), of empowering the institution’s staff (cf. Koren 2010), of allocating responsibilities and care work more fairly and of flattening hierarchies in institutions (Tronto 2010, 165, 168), but she does not suggest what that would entail in terms of particular changes to the organizational structure, leadership style, skills and knowledge of employees, consultative mechanisms and so on. Tronto does not really elaborate on whether different types institutions at different levels (e.g. local, regional, national) require same or different changes to become more caring, that is, more responsive, inclusive and democratic.

I want to conclude this section by taking a closer look at a recent attempt in theorizing caring institutions that has the potential to overcome some of the shortcomings of the previous proposals for a theory of caring institutions and seems particularly promising with respect to thinking about institutions in the context of public administration. In her ‘Prolegomena to a Caring Bureaucracy’ (2017), Sophie Bourgault addresses the hard question of whether large bureaucratic institutions can be conducive to good caring. She seems to be fully right in claiming that this question is of “utmost importance for feminist ethics of care” (Bourgault 2017, 203), since, as discussed earlier, any serious attempt to think a ‘care politics’ has to deal with care policy formulation and implementation which takes place (also) through many large institutions of the administrative state. Bourgault (2017) counters the mainstream feminist criticism of bureaucratic organizations by arguing that (1) the ideal-bureaucratic (Weberian) emphasis on the criteria of competence in hiring and promotion, clear division of responsibilities and just distribution of resources are supportive of many key (care) feminist aims; (2) removing organizational hierarchies and un-structuring institutions may sometimes be counterproductive to the (care) feminist goals of curbing domination and oppression in our societies and polities.Footnote4 Bourgault’s point is that it is possible and fruitful to think large institutions capable of embodying both bureaucratic and caring values.

With regard to organizational structure and power allocation within large institutions, Bourgault suggests creating semi-hierarchical power and decision-making structures that combine clear rules and power divisions with good listening and communicative skills. Flattening the decision-making processes and structures through hybrid organizational forms and ‘organized dissonance’ (Ashcraft 2001) does not amount to removing all hierarchies and power inequalities within an institution (cf. Martin 1990, 2013).

Bourgault follows previous care theorizing about institutions by stressing that institutions need to become more attentive and responsive. Inspired by Fricker’s (2007) reflection on ‘epistemic injustice’, Bourgault elsewhere (2020) draws attention to the epistemic injustices that often occur in institutional contexts, such as “discursive dysfunctions that regularly take place in our judicial system, hospitals, schools, workplaces and social service counters” or public officials’ prejudices that “compromise the way in which they exercise judgement, the way in which they listen (or rather fail to listen)” (Bourgault 2020, 92, 94). This may, as a consequence, harm the client’s “capacity as an epistemic subject, that is, as a giver of information and a partner in discursive exchanges” (Bourgault 2020, 94). Fricker (2007) suggests countering such epistemic injustices by ‘virtuous hearing’ which incorporates a critical awareness of the impact that our social power and identities have and an upward compensation of attention and credibility with respect to marginalized communities and individuals. Bourgault rightly stresses that above Fricker’s suggested ways of ‘virtuous hearing’ we also ought to consider a downward correction of credibility by taking into account “the unduly high levels of credibility and attention offered to the very privileged or powerful (that is, credibility excesses)” (Bourgault 2020, 95).

What does(see Emotions) that require from an institution in practical terms? A caring institution, Bourgault argues, should ensure that it (1) has administrators with solid listening and communicative skills (personal attentiveness) and (2) puts in place extensive institutional consultation processes that enable reflective ways of defining and(see Care; Neoliberalism) addressing the needs of all affected groups (institutional attentiveness). One of the most important questions here is the question of how to facilitate good administrative discretion. On the one hand, administrators should be encouraged to exercise discretion; on the other hand some measures must be in place to ensure that discretion is exercised “without falling into illegitimate arbitrariness” (Bourgault 2017, 208). The point is that these measures do not have to be reduced to adopting more institutional rules and stronger control mechanisms. It is possible to facilitate good discretion by hiring and promoting administrators with good communicative and listening skills, providing administrators with adequate training and support in acquiring needed cognitive and emotional skills combined with professional expertise and developing an organizational culture that recognizes and values good discretion. If an institution seeks to create such a culture, Bourgault argues, it must also pay adequate attention to the issue of time, as bad discretion often occurs under the circumstances of a lack of time. With a special regard to large public sector institutions we need to “think critically about the impact of neoliberal management practices and social acceleration, for these weigh heavily on institutional responsiveness and our ability to offer particularized and non-prejudicial public services” (Bourgault 2020, 95).

### Solvency—Capitalism

#### Care institutions work against neoliberal market based care by retooling public policies.

Tronto 10 – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, PhD Princeton University. [Joan C. “Creating Caring Institutions: Politics, Plurality, and Purpose.” Ethics and Social Welfare, Vol 4 (2010), Issue 2: Care Ethics: New Theories and Applications. June 23, 2010.]

Framing the Question

In recent years, scholars have made convincing arguments about the need for robust care policies (Engster [2007](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259); Folbre [2001](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259); Hankivsky [2004](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259); Held [2006](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259); Heymann [2000](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259); Williams [1999](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259), [2001](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)) and have provided evaluations of the effectiveness of various policies (Gornick et al. [2005](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)). But public policies, as well as less formal care practices, all work through institutions. If we are committed to policies to improve care we need also to be able to answer the question: how can we tell which institutions provide good care? A high school teacher told me that she can tell the quality of a school she has entered within 10 minutes of being in the building. ‘How?’ I asked. ‘Oh’, she replied, ‘you can just tell which buildings have caring principals and teachers.’ While I am sure that this teacher is correct, those of us without such tacit knowledge, and, more generally, citizens in a democratic society, also want to be able to judge whether institutions provide good care. Is there a way to articulate the basis for such judgments more systematically? To provide some guidelines is the goal of this essay.

Scholars such as Nel Noddings ([2002](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)) argue that the best way to think about care institutions is to model them upon the family. Noddings quotes Lisbeth Schorr to support her point. Schorr concluded, in reviewing social welfare programs that benefit children, ‘In their responsiveness and willingness to hang in there, effective programs are more like families than bureaucracies’ (Schorr [1997](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259), p. 231). On the contrary, I shall argue that while we can turn to family life to intuit some key elements of good care, to provide good care in an institutional context requires that we make explicit certain elements of care that go unspoken and that we take for granted in the family setting.

In recent years, one response to ‘defamilization’ of care (Lewis [1997](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)) has been to turn increasingly to the market. As consumers, patients, parents, casual observers, we often can and do pass judgments about the quality of care in various institutional settings. In adopting many of the patterns of market life in ‘the New Public Management’ (Page [2005](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)), managers in care institutions also have been trying to parse out the effectiveness of institutionalized care. They use such tools as measurements of ‘customer satisfaction’ and the introduction of competition as ways to assure that public services are being well provided. Cottage industries provide evaluations of ‘patient satisfaction’, or ‘customer satisfaction’, and these evaluations are justified, especially by their effect on the bottom line. A recent survey of patient satisfaction with nursing, for example, began by noting that as patients become more like consumers, profits are affected by the quality of the ‘patient satisfaction’ (Wagner & Bear [2009](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)). Universities struggle to measure teaching effectiveness as well (Preskill & Russ-Eft [2005](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)). But satisfying consumers may not be the same thing as providing care adequately. Market assumptions about the consumer—that she is rational, autonomous, capable of making a choice, and possessed of adequate information to do so—may not characterize the situation of people in care settings. In measuring patient satisfaction with nursing, for example, the questionnaires are only to be filled out by the patient, not by a family member. Surely, though, family members can provide insight into the quality of nursing care that might be more or equally useful to the evaluation by the patient. Such assumptions necessarily undermine the prospects for observing and improving care. Similarly, competition may be useful in goading public service providers to compete against one another, but it does not establish standards for care, only that one provider is better than another. If all are undesirable, a market mechanism cannot provide an alternative unless someone else decides to enter the market. Given its complexity, low rate of return, and labor-intensive nature of care provision, market solutions are unlikely to emerge from such competition. Perhaps, then, the market is not the starting place for analyzing the adequacy of care.

Instead of using consumer-like measures of good care, then, I shall start from the assumptions of those who are skeptical about institutional care as an alternative to family care. To do so, I shall make explicit some dimensions of family care that are usually left in the background. Families, I shall argue, already make certain assumptions about the purposes of care, about meeting the particular needs of individuals, and about the internal allocation of power. In formal care institutions, however, there may well be conflicting approaches to purpose, particularity, and power arrangements. As a result, care institutions need to have formal practices in place that will create the space for evaluating and reviewing how well the institution meets its caring obligations by being highly explicit about its pursuit of purposes, how it copes with particularity, and how power is used within the organization. From this set of initial concerns, we will be in a better position to evaluate whether care institutions are caring well.

Changing Institutionalized Contexts for Care

Berenice Fisher and I have described care in general in these terms:

On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. (Fisher & Tronto [1990](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259), p. 40; Tronto [1993](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259), p. 103)

In the context of institutional care, obviously some care issues are more relevant than others; self-care, for example, does not usually happen in institutional contexts. Nevertheless, while institutional caring is generally provided for the people who Robert Goodin has described as ‘the vulnerable’ (Goodin [1985](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)), it is still useful to recall the complex and multi-dimensional nature of care proposed by Fisher and Tronto. By describing four phases of care—caring about, i.e. recognizing a need for care; caring for, i.e. taking responsibility to meet that need; care giving, i.e. the actual physical work of providing care; and, finally, care receiving, i.e. the evaluation of how well the care provided had met the caring need—we have highlighted many points where conflict, power relations, inconsistencies, and competing purposes and divergent ideas about good care could affect care processes. We have further argued that a care process that was integral and holistic, in which these phases somehow fit together, approached more closely ideal or good care. In her research, Fisher discovered that caring often seems to consist of something ‘extra’ (Fisher [1990](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)). If caring is the ‘extra’, then how can we ever discuss it in institutional terms? It would seem that for institutions to provide ‘extra’ is already to move it from the status of ‘extra’ to ‘routine’.

In foregrounding care as a kind of human activity, we followed many early feminist scholars of care such as Noddings ([1984](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)) and Ruddick ([1989](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)) in emphasizing care as a purposive practice. But as I have also noted, care is likely to face two dangers, namely those of paternalism, in which care givers assume that they know better than care receivers what those care receivers need, and parochialism, in which care givers develop preferences for care receivers who are closer to them (Tronto [1993](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)). If we bring these two global, political concerns about caring down to the level of more concrete caring relationships, then the problems addressed by caring are the problems of power and particularity. Thus, all forms of caring, institutional as well as personal, require that attention be paid to purpose, power, and particularity. Identifying these three as the critical elements for assessing practices of care grows out of any understanding that takes care as a relational practice. Among others, Christine Koggel ([1998](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)) and Jennifer Nedelsky ([2008](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)) have insisted that we recognize caring as relational.

In part because most people's explicit experiences of being in care relationships are rooted in the family, we often take family care as paradigmatic of all care relations. The current phenomenon of shifting care from household to market, state, or non-profit organization is a shift in the kind of institutionalized care, because the family, though it often appears ‘natural’, is also a social institution with a particular history and structure. In recent years, feminist explorations of the nature of the family and care within it have made clear that all such arrangements are deeply embedded in their own times and places (Hays [1996](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259); Ruddick [1995](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)).

But is it still useful to think about this mythic family? What is it that makes family care so desirable? In the first instance, family care seems somewhat automatic. No one questions seriously the purpose of family care: helping the members of the family to flourish together and, often in our culture, as individuals. In the second instance, while this care appears to be automatic, in fact, family care rests upon clearly understood lines of power and obligation: children and parents, spouses, aunts and uncles, servants, know what they owe to one another. In the third instance, family care is highly particularistic: each family evolves its own ways of doing certain things, and part of the pleasure in being cared for by someone in one's own family is that the family member is likely to understand and act to accommodate those peculiarities.

The family was not always such a paradise, but it was the realm where most caring work was done. We should not be too nostalgic for the family, however. While changes in care through the growth of public institutions correspond to the diminishment of the family as the primary institution of care, these changes are also tied to many other changes in the nature of modern life. Until professional health structures grew, for example, people expected to live and die in their homes. Until antibiotics, death was often caused by fast-moving infections as well as by long-term chronic illness. Until recently, children of all but the most privileged classes were expected not to be educated but to become workers and often at a very early age. The field, mine, or work-house served as day care and schools. Whether these earlier modes are more desirable is not such an easy question.

Leaving aside our sentimental views of the family, though, the challenge is whether more public social institutions can be similarly arranged so that they provide the same elements of care that the family ideally provided. I will suggest that the same three elements can be present, but not in the same way. While the beauty of relationships in the mythic, glorified family was that they did not need discussion, they evolved out of the ongoing interactions among the personalities in the household. Thus, they could be taken for granted. In any other institution these aspects of care within the institution need to be worked out consciously. This does not make these elements less achievable, but it does mean that they become more visible and require a deliberate, political process to enact them. These three elements, then, are: first, a clear account of power in the care relationship and thus a recognition of the need for a politics of care at every level; second, a way for care to remain particularistic and pluralistic; and third, that care should have clear, defined, acceptable purposes.

As we think about institutional settings for care, we rarely invoke similar language about purposefulness or about power and particularity. As managerial experts have often advised, organizations that focus on the outcome of their work, rather than their profits, often work better. As Richard Ellsworth puts the point: ‘A clearly articulated and properly formulated purpose—one that members of the organization understand and value—provides continuity and constancy while placing the need to adapt to changing customer needs at the heart of the company's shared values’ (Ellsworth [2002](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259), p. 5). At a second level, if we think about this idea in terms of care, we might reformulate it: care institutions have to think about the nature of the caring process as a whole in order to guide their actions. This requirement does not only demand that the ‘needs’ of the ‘customers’ come first but also that the needs of care workers, the allocation of responsibility and proper assessment also happen within the organization.

Indeed, thinking about the organization's purpose quickly requires us to notice the complexity of care, and that of all those people involved in the organization of care. Even Ellsworth's facile formulation of the requisites for ‘leading with purpose’ disclose that there has to have been a lengthy process by which the members of the organization have come to understand their common purpose and how best to act upon it. Thus, to imagine a world organized to care well requires that we focus on three things: politics: recognition and debate/dialogue of relations of power within and outside the organization of competitive and dominative power and agreement of common purpose; particularity and plurality: attention to human activities as particular and admitting of other possible ways of doing them and to diverse humans having diverse preferences about how needs might be met; and purposiveness: awareness and discussion of the ends and purposes of care. If we keep these aspects of care in mind then we will be able to determine how to think through institutions using the ‘logics of care’ (Waerness [1984a](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259) Waerness [1984b](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259), [1990](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496535.2010.484259)) that they require.

### Solvency—Gender

#### A public model of care redistributes the responsibility of care between the private and public spheres and creates new political foundations based on interdependence that forward gender equity.

Udhe 18 – Researcher in the Department of Gender & Sociology at the Czech Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology. [Zuzana. “Caring Revolutionary Transformation: The Combined Effects of a Universal Basic Income and a Public Model of Care.” Basic Income Studies, vol 13, no 2 (2018). Dec 13, 2018.]

I suggest that a public model of care allows for a redistribution of the responsibility of care between the private and public sphere and secures access to care on a solidary basis according to needs (i. e. it transforms the institutional context of the gendered division of labour). An unconditional basic income, on the other hand, transforms the material implications of the gendered division of labour by separating financial security and income from paid employment, disrupting the centrality of work in paid employment and allowing for a redefinition of the principle of merit. The combination of these two effects – changing the institutional context along with the implications of the gendered division of labour – can foster deeper changes in gendered relations and the recognition of caring activities.

I understand a public model of care as a social organisation of care based on intersubjective ontology[11] and a shared social responsibility for care. It is built on a developed public provision for a variety of day care facilities (e. g. for children, the sick, elderly, or disabled), public assistance and other services that socialise care and certain housework but ultimately it also includes public health care, education and after-schooling activities. The concrete realisation of a public model of care can take multiple forms. Care institutions can be collectively-owned and participatory institutions, state, city or non-profit institutions, voluntary community care, or public home assistance (i. e. care workers are public employees). While it is based on shared social responsibility for care, it also needs to protect the intimate sphere which is an important place for well-being and preservation of individual integrity (Young, 2005b). Public institutions are to support and supplement familial care. Socializing reproductive work and care is an expression of recognition of interdependence and interpenetration of the private and public spheres. What is important is the distinction of a public model of care from a traditional model of care and a market model of care. A traditional model of care is based primarily on familial responsibility for care and is heavily dependent on women´s unpaid work which can be supported through care and family allowances. In a market model of care families and those in need of care buy care services on the market. (I will focus on shortcomings of a market model of care later in this paper) Publically financed care institutions were to some extent established in real socialist countries and European welfare states, although not entirely without problems. However, together with the dismantling of the welfare state which became a dominant trend since the 1990s, these public provisions are being shifted to the market or back to families (Gilbert, 2002).

A public model of care redistributes the responsibility of care between the private and public spheres. The goal is not a complete removal of care from the family but an establishment of a variety of institutions which share along with the family social reproductive work and care. A public model of care challenges the illusory norm of an independent, able-bodied, socially isolated individual without care responsibilities. It shifts the focus of the responsibility of care away from the family as in a traditional model of care towards a principle of solidarity; in contrast to a market model of care, it also takes into account the care needs of the lower social classes and marginalised groups. Although a public model of care does not do away with the traditional gendered division of labour, it transforms the societal context by challenging the strict separation between the private and public sphere.

However, because a public model of care does not question the priority of labour market participation, often the provision of childcare or eldercare facilities is framed as a means to increase women´s engagement in paid employment. As such, it creates a double workload for women, as they largely continue to do most of the work within the household despite holding down a paid job. Furthermore, since a public model of care does not lead to a transformation of the current labour market, it fails to address the problem that for some groups of women, paid employment is neither emancipating nor a source of self-realisation – something which they could, in contrast, experience with caregiving. To sum up, a public model of care fails to question the undervaluation of care stemming from the limited understanding of meaningful work as paid employment. If we want to support women’s emancipation and gender equity in society, it is simply not enough to dust off post-war ideas of the welfare state and public care facilities; we also need to problematise the one-sided, limited understanding of work as paid employment which is attached to a limited notion of social recognition.

An unconditional basic income challenges this wagework bias by separating financial income from paid employment. Today, the trends towards workfare have further reinforced the negative aspects of the post-war version of welfare state social benefits (e. g. unemployment benefits, pensions, social security) that are contingent on labour market participation (Gilbert, 2002). Shortcomings of this approach are even highlighted by the changing characteristics of the labour market, which lead to increase of job insecurities, the growth of work in the informal sector, “negative flexibilisation” and intensification of work, and overall precarization (Beck, 2000; Standing, 2011).

An unconditional basic income provides a sum of money to everyone within a certain political community without additional conditions and without the often humiliating procedures of applying for and reviewing such payments. A UBI can be understood as a share of society’s wealth, the result of social and technological long-term development. The entitlement to a UBI is individual, unconditional (although in some proposals it is limited to the legal age of adulthood), universal (although it depends on the definition of a political community and, in some proposals, it is limited to citizens, which obviously limits its universality), and in order to realise its potential, the amount should be sufficiently high to meet basic social needs[12] (Da Silva, 2014; Gorz, 1999; Van Parijs, 2000).

A UBI introduces an unconditional financial payment which allows for a transformation of the way we perceive the principle of merit. This could be an indirect effect of an unconditionality of a UBI because to merit financial reward one does not need to work in paid employment. If one would not have to have paid employment in order to have the financial means to live a decent life, it would also open to transformation the work-centred ethos of late capitalist society. Furthermore, a UBI separates financial income and security from wagework without the stigmatisation recipients of social support are subjected to; it is without the social disregard which has a strong negative psychological effect on both the unemployed and, for example, parents who receive parental allowances (mainly women). It can provide those caring for dependent members of society with dignity and divest them of the label of spongers who get something for nothing. It can also secure them with a certain level of independence, whether from their husband or partner, their employer or bureaucracy. For a UBI to have a maximum gendered effect it is important that it is paid also to children (in full or reduced amount) which would provide an adequate financial security also to solo-parent families. Last but not least, a UBI eliminates the risk of poverty in old age, which has also a gendered dimension because of the gender pension gap. Philippe Van Parijs convincingly shows that the above mentioned arguments support a UBI (Van Parijs, 2000; Zelleke, 2011). While a UBI does not directly provide recognition to care, it weakens the misconception that socially beneficial activities which “merit” financial reward are only those activities undertaken through paid employment. This misconception is deeply rooted in the structures of our society (Weeks, 2011) and it principally does not allow for recognition of care. It is for this reason that the current gendered division of labour leads to a gender wage gap, gender pension gap, gender power hierarchy in the family and also in society, and to a diminished self-esteem that many women who devote much of their time to care experience. Although a UBI cannot alone transform the gendered structures of the division of labour, it can change its significance and material implications of this division by eliminating poverty and the economic dependency of women and by eroding the wagework bias.

Nevertheless, a stream of feminist thought opposing a UBI stresses that gendered inequality associated with the division of leisure time and the opportunities for self-fulfilment could still linger even after the implementation of a UBI. As such, men could break away from the existential necessity of paid full-time or unattractive employment in favour of their preferred activities, while most women would do the same in favour of caring for others which, while some might prefer this, others might not (Gheaus, 2008; Robeyns, 2001). On the other hand, without the pressures of financial necessity where many couples eventually adopt a traditional male breadwinner and female caregiver model, such a change could potentially open the doors to redefining a traditional model that does not necessarily express people´s choice but rather their adaptation to external circumstances. A UBI would allow egalitarian couples to implement their ideas on shared childcare, whereas today they face institutional barriers in the form of, for example, lower women’s pay or time-demanding employment, a barrier further enhanced when a family is dependent on just one income (i. e. fathers of young children typically work longer hours). In these partnerships, a UBI would allow for a change in the gendered division of labour, which could spread to other social strata and groups (Elgarte, 2008).

At the same time, however, a UBI could also lead to a more significant transformation of the labour market because it provides people with the opportunity of choosing employment or having the option to not work during certain phases of life, thus, contributing to institutionalization of an interrupted career path as the universal norm. This aspect is not sufficiently considered within the feminist critique of a UBI (Bergmann, 2008; Gheaus, 2008; Orloff, 2013). If everyone had a guaranteed basic income, they would likely change their life plans. Their main purpose would not simply be to earn enough money to pay for rent, food, clothes and to provide for their children. Their principal priority rather would be doing what they actually want to do or figuring out how they could benefit their community. Today, it is mainly women who practice an interrupted career path, interrupting their paid employment for a period of caregiving. Because the “male” uninterrupted career path is considered the norm, women are discriminated against in the labour market. If instead an interrupted career path became the norm, this would open the doors to the institutionalisation of the universal caregiver model as discussed by Nancy Fraser (cf. McLean et al., 2015). Moreover, a UBI may also bring about wage rise in those jobs which are necessary for sustainability of a society but are not adequately valued by the market, including care work. When people are not forced to accept any kind of job, these socially indispensable jobs would need to be better remunerated in order to attract employees. However, this requires that people without citizenship of the country where they reside are also granted a UBI, otherwise migrants would constitute a cheap labour force and the mentioned potential effect on the labour market would not be realized.

In order to realise the potential of a UBI, I suggest that we need to elaborate its foundations in intersubjective ontology. How a concrete policy is implemented depends on its foundations. Seemingly the same policies may have very different outcomes depending on the ontological foundations which direct a policy´s justification and a way of implementation. One of the leading contemporary proponents of a UBI, Philippe Van Parijs, interprets a UBI from the perspective of a left-libertarian position which he calls real-libertarianism (Van Parijs, 1995). A UBI is an institutional proposal for the realisation of the egalitarian libertarian concept of justice based on two basic tenets. First, real freedom is dependent on ownership of resources, and equal opportunity requires redistribution of a certain basic level of material provision. Secondly, real freedom of the individual presupposes the basic right to self-ownership, so that people are not coerced or required to provide certain services or activities to others.[13] Specifically, Van Parijs seeks through his UBI proposal to ensure real freedom for all and reassess the prevailing paradigm of paid work as the primary socially valued activity. He argues that it does not reflect current developments, where stable paid employment is becoming a scarce resource and the idea of full employment has proven to be unfeasible. Van Parijs explicitly supports the demands of the feminist movement as an argument in support of implementing a UBI. He claims that a UBI aims to overcome deficiencies in current social systems which derive social security from participation in the labour market, and, thus, to a certain extent, restrict the access of unemployed persons to social security, while also stigmatising the recipients of social welfare benefits.[14]

When it comes to both of these aspects, women are clearly at a disadvantage when compared to men due to the gendered division of labour. First, they are entitled merely to lower social security payments because of lower earnings. Secondly, due to the current division of responsibilities in terms of care for dependent members of society, women are receivers of social welfare benefits to a greater extent and thus are a target of stigmatisation. From the feminist perspective, however, the fundamental deficiency of this conceptualisation of a UBI is its atomist ontology and the second tenet of the definition of justice on which real-libertarian proposition is based. Real-libertarian conceptualisation of self-ownership as a consequence establishes the socially unattached individual as a socially valued norm. It puts forward a distorted idea of isolated person without caring responsibilities and fully developed social relations of mutual recognition among people (see Anderson, 2013). Nevertheless, rejecting atomist ontology does not imply rejecting an individual approach to the definition of the subject of justice.[15] While the financial payment provided with a UBI is not conditioned on performing any duties, this justification does not require an atomist ontological position. The UBI based on intersubjective ontology can be justified as a realization of the right of people to a share of collectively owned social and natural resources which provides individuals with financial resources necessary (but not sufficient) to live their lives in intersubjective relations with others.[16]

The factor which most disadvantages women in contemporary (Western) society remains the gendered division of labour, a factor related to providing for the needs of dependent members of society (e. g. children, elderly, disabled, etc.). As such, in order to achieve gender equity, we need to rethink our ideal of autonomous self. Individual existence is always conditioned by mutual interdependency between members of society. We are all situated in interdependent relations with others which are, however, materialized differently in different relations ranging from the intimate to the impersonal. Feminist theorists have reformulated the ideal of individual autonomy as a relational concept (Held, 2006; Tronto, 1994; Young, 2000). The concept of relational autonomy is based on intersubjective ontology and comes from the presupposition that realising an individual project requires others; this does not imply non-intervention from other parties, but rather support from other parties with whom we are in relations of mutual interdependence, both material and psychosocial. Iris Young suggests that

the social constitutions of agents and their acting in relations of interdependence mean that the ability to separate and be independent of others is rare if it appears at all. … [The relational autonomy] entails recognizing that agents are related in many ways they have not chosen, by virtue of kinship, history, proximity, or unintended consequences of action. (Young, 2000, p. 231)

For example those who have paid employment are also dependent on others – employers, co-workers and those who look after them or allow them to opt out of their caregiving obligations.[17]

Given the increasing global interactions, the idea of relational autonomy implies also the need to take into account mutual interdependency of all people as citizens of a global society. This reformulation appears particularly fundamental because of global interconnectedness of people and social processes and the transferring of care work to migrant women. Defining a political community whose members are to be entitled to a UBI is also important in this regard. Provided that entitlement to a UBI would be based on political citizenship, a further deepening of social inequality between people on the basis of their origin would ensue. In this regard, it would be better to consider linking a UBI to residence within a particular territory, while ensuring border permeability, or, alternatively, the global implementation of a UBI. This issue is also voiced by O´Reilly who points out that often the proposal of a UBI excludes migrants by equating entitlement criteria with citizenship (O´Reilly, 2008).

Van Parijs argues that in regard to the feminist criticism of inequality between men and women, the strictly individual foundation upon which a UBI is based, allows women to realise their own freedom to a much greater extent than within a system that redistributes social welfare benefits at the household level and where the same power hierarchy which is institutionalized at a macro-social level is applied and leads to an unequal division of income within the household, much to the detriment of women (Van Parijs, 2000). Nevertheless, the adherence to atomist ontology helps to legitimize this unequal power hierarchy in the public and private spheres and even when women have unconditional basic income there are other forms of inequalities at the household level connected to the gendered division of labour and responsibilities for care, such as division of leisure time and the opportunities for self-fulfilment. If a UBI is based on atomist ontology, implementation of any supplementing policies is contingent, depending on a given ideological constellation of power. That´s why Taylor argues that an ontological basis is not innocent. A UBI may be based on an individual approach when defining the subject of justice, but if it is to contribute to gender equity, then the atomist concept of social ontology on which Van Parijs’s proposal of a UBI is based, must be redefined.

In order for implementation of a UBI to support gender equity, it must be accompanied by a change in the social norms which one-sidedly favour the model of an independent socially disembedded citizen over the model of a citizen positioned within relations of mutual recognition and dependence on others. Without this qualitative change, a UBI could instead result in the deepening of inequalities between men and women, the healthy and sick, etc. As such, a UBI needs to be accompanied by developing a public model of care which can secure accessible and high-quality childcare and nursery schools, care homes and public assistance for the elderly, the sick or disabled, health care for the sick. In this combination it can start the path of caring revolutionary transformation resulting in deep systemic changes through challenging the logic of today´s socioeconomic system.[18] In another form, assuming the dismantling of certain elements of a solidary society, a UBI would not result in an emancipatory effect.[19] Although it is possible to revoke certain social welfare benefits (depending on the amount of a UBI), the state should not transfer to the market the cornerstones of solidary society.

### Solvency—Individuation

#### Reframing the politics of care opens up new political formations based on horizontal relationships of equity and mutuality.

Woodly et al 21 – Associate Professor of Politics at the New School for Social Research. [Deva., Rachel H Brown, Mara Marin, Shatema Threadcraft, Christopher Paul Harris, Jasmine Syedulla, Miriam Ticktin. “The politics of care.” Contemporary Political Theory 20, 890-925 (2021). August 24, 2021.]

Care and the commons

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in care, one grounded in the belief that care can be retooled to address persistent forms of exclusion and domination. There are many animating forces for this reclaiming of ‘care’ as a concept, including new forms of need resulting from austerity and anti-immigration policies, ultra-right-wing forms of abandonment, and, most recently the world-changing COVID-19 pandemic and the deep racial stratification and violence it has revealed.

These kinds of care work to counter dominant liberal forms of political care, such as welfare or humanitarianism which have been imagined and enacted at the level of the nation-state, or of humanity, relying on exclusionary political frameworks. Welfare excludes non-citizens; as for humanitarianism, not all qualify as equally human. Furthermore, such forms of liberal care are driven by limited moral sentiments such as sympathy, pity, or compassion, which create hierarchies by distinguishing between deserving and undeserving individuals; indeed, they have worked in large part by saving those deemed ‘innocent’ but in so doing, they criminalize ‘perpetrators’ (Ticktin, 2011, 2017, 2020). In this sense, practices of care have (unintentionally) fed the carceral state, deciding whose lives deserve attention and whose do not.

In the contemporary, reworked versions, care is at once an affective state, a practice, and an ethicopolitical obligation (Tronto, 1993; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017; Martin, Myers, and Viseu, 2015; Stevenson, 2014). Increasingly scholars, anti-racist activists and Black and transnational feminists are reclaiming the power of care, as everyday and mundane, but with a revolutionary, transformative potential. People are returning to Audre Lorde (1988), who stated that, for those who are marginalized, care is a form of political warfare: to engage in care is to uphold the right to survive. Similarly, Saidiya Hartmann (2016) argues that the labor of care produced through the violent structures of slavery and subsequently exploited by racial capitalism is not exhausted by either of these violent formations: this care enables those who were never meant to survive to do just that, even in the most brutal of contexts.

While I have long critiqued forms of care such as humanitarianism (Ticktin, 2006, 2011), I join this interest in renewed and emerging forms of materially grounded care, insofar as they are co-constitutive of a new set of political formations – what I’m calling a decolonial, feminist commons. That is, there is a version of care at the heart of the commons, insofar as the commons are about radical resource redistribution and undoing forms of domination and enclosure to produce horizontal relationships of equality, mutuality and responsibility. Care is one of the methods used to imagine, prefigure and enact alternative ways of being together in a fundamentally non-exclusionary, non-sentimental manner. Indeed, we might say that, by enacting what Woodly (2020) calls ‘structural care,’ which is about healing social ills through social action based on a vision of everyone as interdependent, new political formations come into being; care helps to bring a new collective subject into being. In this contribution, I introduce the idea of the commons, and then illustrate these emergent political formations with two case studies.

The commons has come to mean many things (and is practiced by many different people, from indigenous communities to Black and Brown communities, to ecologists to anarchists), but it is often referred to as a struggle against enclosures, the privatization of spaces of freedom, exclusion, and, perhaps most importantly, private property. It can also mean the sharing of wealth and resources on the basis of collective decision-making; sometimes it is spoken of as grounded in social relations built on reciprocity, respect, mutuality, and responsibility (Hardt and Negri, 2009; Starblanket, 2017; Dardot and Laval, 2019; Federici, 2019).

Feminist scholar-activists like Silvia Federici (2019) emphasize the feminist nature of the commons in terms of the communing of reproductive activities – meaning the day-to-day activities that are producing people’s lives. Examples include the collective kitchen, urban gardens, and squats. Federici states that the commons is not just a site of reproduction and redistribution: it is also a site of struggle. It builds the grounds of resistance, refusing to separate the time of political organization from that of reproduction. Abolitionist politics arguably offers the strongest example of this, insisting on the interconnection between carework and political organizing, where, for example, mothers of those who are incarcerated model collective ways of being by taking responsibility for each other’s children, and extend their care to friends, neighbors and cell mates (Naber et al 2020). In this sense, the commons is also necessarily anti-racist and decolonial.

Black and Brown activists and scholars have reassured those who worry that the goal of equivalence in a (future) commons would erase or ignore existing differences in power; instead, young scholars like Maimuna Touray (2021) actually suggest that the commons could work as a method of reparation, while queer theorist José Estaban Muñoz (2020) argues for the ‘brown commons’ as a process of thinking and imagining otherwise in the face of shared wounding (p. 6). Touray envisions the commons as a set of connections to the land shared with indigenous communities that extend a notion of value anathema to capitalist enclosures and center responsibility, care and radical belonging. Believing that settler colonialism is a structure, not an event, Touray proposes the commons as a form of reparation beyond restitution or one-time payments, insofar as it expands a way of living in which enslaved people shared knowledge and decided collectively how to prioritize their well-being. After centuries of caring for and stewarding the land, commoning involves being claimed by the land, recognizing human interdependence with other life forms and with the earth. It ‘places the human in common with other-than-human-beings’ (Touray, 2021).

In this context, care is about a set of relational arrangements, not moral dispositions; it is grounded in the material. It is also necessarily non-innocent. That is, it moves away from liberal goals of purity and deservingness. To care requires admitting to and managing forms of violence, not trying to evict, expunge or expel it. Caring and killing can be intertwined: for example, people kill viruses; they eat plants and animals; and they burn forests to maintain them. As Métis-scholar-activist Michelle Murphy (2015) suggests, one of the definitions of care that is often overlooked is that of being troubled, worried, uneasy, unsettled. In this sense, to care in unsettling ways, and to be unsettled by care, means to work without a clear, normative vision, requiring instead to be attuned to relationships and to place, constantly improvising. Care is not necessarily clean; to care is to be creative, to be willing to imagine otherwise, to deal with messiness and contamination. Indeed, ‘unsettling’ means that it has radical transformative potential.

In what follows, I briefly mention two emergent forms of structural care that build, and build on, an idea of the commons. To be clear, to exist, the commons needs, as Harris argues in this exchange, to undo the world as we know it, and its inequalities and forms of domination; but it is important to acknowledge that commoning already exists all around us, if we look carefully – it grows in the uncaptured excesses of racial capitalism, and prefigures alternative ways of being. I describe two of these extant experiments, each taking place at a different scale: the first is global – for this, I discuss ‘no borders’ movements; the second is local, and here I discuss practices of mutual aid. They each have their own affective dimensions. And each does different work with relation to the commons: the first helps to form a common collective political subject and to rework space, the second furthers material redistribution.

I begin with the political forms being imagined and enacted by undocumented immigrants – renamed ‘people-on-the-move’ by these folks themselves, to get away from legal categories built on exclusion and hierarchy, like refugee, asylum seeker and economic immigrant – and the centrality of care to many of these movements. Indeed, one of the activists engaged in sanctuary work – which I see as part of a larger network of no-borders movements – stated that she thought of the project of sanctuary as the ‘embodied, collective action of care,’ where care is about spurring the imagination, and ‘training for the not-yet.’

Occupations are a key aspect of this embryonic politics of and by people-on-the-move: occupations of abandoned buildings and land. People are not just fighting for the freedom to move but the ‘freedom to inhabit’ (Paik et al., 2019, p.10). In particular, I have been drawn by people-on-the-move attempting to create space to live, in ways not condoned by forms of liberal capitalist governance.

I am aware of how troubling the term ‘occupation’ is, particularly in relation to settler colonialism. The question is if such acts can be repurposed toward freedom; that is, if no-borders movements can practice decolonial politics, working with indigenous communities against the nation-state to undo rather than further the settler colonial project (Fortier, 2017). The point is not to imagine or claim the land as empty or available, but precisely to refuse the authority of the state, challenging its right to decide who resides where. But even when evoked against the settler colonial project, the concept of occupation recalls violent histories. In this sense, commoning is necessarily a non-innocent practice – we all inherit and live in the wake of these histories, we are all shaped by violence, even if we are differently situated in relation to it. To claim innocence is a liberal aspiration; it is not a goal of the commons, where exclusion based on moral stratification is not an option.

People-on-the-move are re-imagining both space and how to be together, asserting their presence against experiences of dispossession and inequality, and doing so beyond judgments of deserving or undeserving, rescue and protection: beyond innocence or guilt. They are building alternative forms of governance against the state and against what they see as unjust treatment, including the lack of basic care and shelter. They do this by occupying liminal spaces, challenging regimes of private property. Togetherness is grounded on sharing resources, in ways that require reciprocity and mutuality, but not necessarily love – this is a form of care or concern that does not require liking those with whom one lives. It requires inclusion and respect. Whoever needs a home – and for however long – can occupy any welcoming, unlived in or abandoned space. These include border zones, hotels, monuments and churches. In many ways, these occupations are forcing a more equitable distribution of resources, and as part of this, they include the refusal of discourses and hierarchies of moral deservingness.

Occupations have taken different forms, from the now famous French sans papiers movement of the 1990s which occupied churches, to ‘the Jungle’ – the make-shift camp on the outskirts of Calais, France that lasted from January 2015 to October 2016 (Agier, 2018; King, 2019). But France is not the only place where such occupations are occurring. In the summer of 2018, as part of the Multiple Mobilities Research Cluster, I went to the occupied Plaza Hotel in Athens, Greece, one of about twelve occupied buildings which, under the new right-wing government, has now been shut down. Plaza is an example of the autonomous organization of people-on-the-move, without an NGO working top-down to manage them or provide services. These occupations originated in the dissident history of the district of Exarcheia, where abandoned buildings have been the site of collective living and action since the 1970s. ‘Refugees’ and locals worked and occupied the hotel together. Rather than being contained on the margins of the Greek polity, as with so many refugee camps, these people-on-the-move live in Athens, indistinguishable from the many who require shelter, particularly since Greece’s debt crisis. They were all houseless, out-of-place, and as such, they reclaimed space together.

Plaza challenged liberal models of care. For example, Plaza residents worked to enable children to go to school regardless of how long they would be in Athens, decoupling social services from nation-states – indeed, as one of the Plaza residents explained to me, the local teachers organized and went on strike to enable this. This was an experiment in how social services can be accessible to people beyond citizenship status or the state, beyond identity, as part of a larger commons, driven by participation, presence and mutuality.

In these circumstances, care is enacted by creating and sharing spaces to live, in a non-exclusionary manner; it manifests in other material concerns such as creating access to healthcare and education. In Plaza, there were communal kitchens, so people could prepare food and eat as a collective. Practices of care like these work to even out hierarchies, and create a world where people all have access to resources to live. This does not mean that such occupations work without violence or conflict. Rather, violence is something that people inevitably share from living under racial capitalism and imperialism. The idea is to learn to use an attuned, caring manner to resolve issues, rather than resorting to strategies like incarceration or expulsion. Starting from a situation of enforced marginalization and dispossession, people-on-the move and those in solidarity have created a series of transnational, commoning nodes – an emergent feminist decolonial commons – grounded on forms of radical care, respect and collective self-governance; in the process, they are prefiguring a new collective political subject.

My second example is an experiment in reworking material infrastructures to deepen connections between people at more local levels. This is the project of free community or ‘friendly’ fridges set up across all the boroughs of New York City. The first refrigerators were put in place in February 2020 by a group of anarchists working to combat hunger in underserved communities during the economic crisis and pandemic, but they have far exceeded that goal: they are resources that anyone can share in, anonymously, without giving reasons or showing deservingness. They trust people to take what they need and give back if they can. It creates a new set of relations grounded in material equality, not in exploitation and extractivism (Colyar, 2020; Rosa, 2020).

These fridges prefigure forms of politics grounded on the idea of care as simply about need and survival, not on a notion of ‘community’ that foregrounds only positive – and often exclusionary – affective ties. Even as they help to imagine an otherwise, these fridges build on the long and colorful histories of mutual aid, which are based on the idea of social solidarity and cooperation, and build new social relationships grounded in collaboration, participation, and equality (Spade, 2020a, b). Mutual aid is about radical collective care and it is feminist in that it works against forms of paternalism or top-down giving. Even as Indigenous communities may have the longest history of such practices, many Black feminists have claimed mutual aid as a key element of abolitionism. The care embedded in this project is about respect and reciprocity; resources are shared, regardless of who one is, what one does, and how one inhabits the world.

To be sure, just as mutual aid is not new, neither are ‘free’ projects: we need only think of the Black Panther Party’s survival programs, which included free breakfast, or Occupy encampments where resources were shared. There are many creative feminist examples, such as the ‘Eating in Public’ project by Gaye Chan and Nandita Sharma, which started with free stores and expanded to include fridges, as one part of a series of experiments in planting guerilla gardens, food trees, eating and teaching about weeds and holding ‘diggers dinners,’ all inspired by the seventeenth-century English commoners: serfs who were pushed off communal land at the outset of the private-property revolution, who engaged in activist planting to take back their commons and to eat (Ganaden, 2014). They distinguish their experiments from charity insofar as the free store and fridge are for everyone: rich and poor alike.

The affective ties cultivated by these forms of commoning are less about individuality than the collective, more about equality than hierarchy. Togetherness is about co-existing in ways that ensure everyone’s survival. ‘Care’ in these times looks like respect for everyone’s fear, anxiety, anger, and frustration. It looks like humility in the face of the unknown and uncontrollable, and openness to new imaginative possibilities. It also looks like a demand for collective responsibility, and what M4BL among others have prefigured as an ‘irresistible impulse to justice’ (McLeod, 2019, p. 267).

### Solvency—Liberal Subjectivity

#### Re-engagement with care as a political praxis creates new ways of living and governing beyond the traditional liberal approach.

Woodly et al 21 – Associate Professor of Politics at the New School for Social Research. [Deva., Rachel H Brown, Mara Marin, Shatema Threadcraft, Christopher Paul Harris, Jasmine Syedulla, Miriam Ticktin. “The politics of care.” Contemporary Political Theory 20, 890-925 (2021). August 24, 2021.]

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, discussions about the politics of care have proliferated within and beyond the academy. This welcome attention to care demands we revisit care in the context of ongoing and new forms of state violence. The present moment invites a re-engagement with care as a political theory, an ethic and a political praxis that reorients people toward new ways of living, relating, and governing. The 21st-century approach to the politics of care aims at unmaking racial capitalism, cisheteropatriarchy, the carceral state, and the colonial present. The politics of care is an approach to political thought and action that moves beyond the liberal approach which situates care as a finite resource to be distributed among autonomous individuals, or as a necessarily feminine virtue. Instead, those elucidating the politics of care for the contemporary era draw on rich interdisciplinary traditions and social movements to theorize and practice care as an inherently interdependent survival strategy, a foundation for political organizing, and a prefigurative politics for building a world in which all people can live and thrive.

The political theoretic genealogies that the authors of this exchange draw from include Black Feminisms, Indigenous and Decolonial Feminisms, and Social Reproduction Theory. These contributions argue that a politics of care seeks not only to exceed 20th century liberal frameworks but also to elaborate an abolitionist orientation that is capable of diagnosing, undoing, and building new political horizons. As an ethic, care does more than require a posture of mutual respect, responsibility, and obligation between individuals. As Christopher Paul Harris states in this Critical Exchange, ‘the only horizon of an ethics of care is a world undone’ – that is, ‘extracting ourselves and each other from the ideas, values, and institutions of Western modernity.’ Yet each contribution also suggests how a radical abolitionist politics of care is immanent within the present world – whether in maroon communities, public speeches at BLM actions, communal kitchens, or migrant organizing against borders, globally. Care is a collection of principles, practices, and laws that facilitate communal gathering and the governance of polities. The abolitionist politics of care takes as its central remit and function the self and community determination, provision, and distribution of responsibilities that is always required for human life. Therefore, the contributions that follow build non-ideal theories of care that see contemporary and historical liberation struggles as not only a gateway to but also preparation for a different kind of politics, one presenting us with new possibilities for living together.

The politics of care described here is not wholly new. Theorists of care enter the disciplinal conversation bearing the lessons of strains of political theory that have always been present but have often been marginalized. This tradition has presented care as an ethic, a relation, a form of labor, an element of cultural reproduction, and a building-block towards non-capitalist and non-dominative social relations. At the same time, we recognize that notions of care have often been paternalistic, dominative, and even violent. Joan Tronto’s foundational work calls our attention to the inequalities perpetuated by care, whether in the form of racialized and gendered worker/employer relations, or the replacement of democratic commitments with neoliberal market logics (Tronto, 1993). Held (1993) suggests how care is a political project beyond the interpersonal, while Gould (2004) applies this position to the global. Mignon Duffy (2005) shows how care, when conceived of as ‘nurturance,’ prioritizes white women to the exclusion of women of color. Patricia Hill Collins shows how an ‘ethic of caring’ is needed to undo ‘Eurocentric masculinist’ epistemologies through the centering of Black women’s concrete experiences, emotions, and knowledge claims (1990, p. 765). Kittay (1999), Nussbaum (2007) and Simplican (2015) examine care through the perspective of disability and dependency, while Engster (2006) connects debates on care to animal welfare. Feminist political theorists have called for greater attention to the concrete, embodied specificities of women as carers and (re)productive laborers beyond a universal, disembodied conceptualization of citizenship and a public/private heuristic (Hirschmann, 1992; Threadcraft, 2016; Young, 1990). Others have examined the politics of care and the transformation of ‘“common sense” logic’ in the arenas of social movements and democratic societies (Woodly, 2015, p. 5) and welfare retrenchment.

Beyond political theory, as an institutionally inscribed and politically constituted field of knowledge, care has long been theorized expansively as a resource for mutual aid, a colonial discourse, a method of non-capitalist world-building, a non-biological kinship arrangement, a collective survival strategy, a liberation politics, and a non-exploitative relation to land. Uma Narayan highlights ‘the self-serving collaboration between elements of colonial rights discourse and care discourse’ (1995, p. 133), while Dean Spade positions mutual aid as ‘an often devalued iteration of radical collective care’ allowing us to re-envision what is politically imaginable (2020a, b, p. 131). Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha (2018) calls for interlocking ‘care webs’ through a queer-of-color and disability studies lens, while in 1988 Audre Lorde famously called care for oneself ‘an act of political warfare’ in the context of anti-Black violence, misogyny and homophobia. Parvati Raghuram (2016) argues for a ‘multiplicity in care ethics’ beyond the Global North, and indigenous feminist scholars Melanie Yazzie and Cutcha Risling Baldy see care as a form of ‘radical relationality’ with human and non-human life alike (2018, p. 2).

Beyond the academy, collective care is a site of mutual aid, consciousness raising, and political organizing. The abundant examples include ACT UP organizing around HIV/AIDS, the Black Panther Free Breakfast for Children Program, Zapatista practices of community self-organization, and Palestinian food distribution programs under Israeli settler colonialism. Abolitionist organizers have used existing mutual aid networks to provide hygiene supplies to incarcerated populations since the onset of COVID-19, advocating the release of vulnerable individuals from prison as one step towards a dismantling of the carceral system.

The contributions included in this Critical Exchange draw on such examples to make normative claims about an abolitionist, anti-dominative horizon of care that is already immanent within radical spaces of organizing and political transformation. If Tronto’s path-breaking work (2013) points us to the lack of ‘caring institutions’ under late capitalism, our contributors build on and expand this theme, asking how various institutions themselves have been historically constituted by racism, colonialism, capitalism, imperialism, and cisheteropatriarchy. Going further, the contributors ask what kinds of questions and commitments would be required to unmake institutions to deliver more just relations of power and structural conditions. They use care as a method – a mode of systematic analysis, planning, and action – to identify, understand, and change the way we assess and engage the world we share, within and beyond the state. Stylistically varied and drawing on a range of genealogical traditions, they illuminate the necessity of theorizing the political beyond the bounds of abstracted ideal theory. They explore care as a practice that commons the reproductive tasks required for collective survival against state disinvestment and violence. They position care as an epistemic commitment addressing historic and ongoing forms of misrecognition. Finally, they inspire crucial questions about the places where care, rather than violence, is distributed; collective care as a form of place making; and how racialized and gendered spaces prescribe what gets counted as care.

Mara Marin begins our Critical Exchange by observing that, though the COVID-19 pandemic laid bare the necessity of care in all its forms, there is a contradiction at the heart of modern ideologies of governance, encouraging people and polities to applaud care while disparaging and/or misrecognizing its material value. Marin asserts that this misrecognition rests on a conceptual division between ‘menial and spiritual’ labor which maps onto and maintains a gendered and racialized division of care. Shatema Threadcraft argues, along with abolitionists like Davis, Gilmore, and Kaba that mass incarceration represents a colossal failure of collective care in both principle and practice. She illustrates this lack by exploring the example of ‘the sexual assault to juvenile detention pipeline,’ a phenomenon that subjects girls and women who have been victims of abuse to carceral punishment – rather than providing systems of support that could contribute to the recognition of the very conditions that produce their predicament and remedies that would enable them to live free and self-determined lives. Christopher Paul Harris highlights the sharp limitations of any ethics of care that does not purposely identify and divest from anti-Blackness, racial capitalism, and cisheteropatriarchy. He emphasizes that a useful ethic of care cannot be built on sentiment but must be invested in unsettling and undoing totalizing systems of knowledge that socially construct, politically maintain, and theoretically justify ‘the suffering of others.’ Miriam Ticktin underscores the immanence of this necessary undoing in our current politics. She suggests how a ‘decolonial feminist commons’ is a space of non-hierarchal care, respect, and mutuality where people, through their collective work, make living possible outside, and in defiance of, institutions that bar them from being able to care for themselves and others – including the institution of private property. Importantly, the commons are places where notions of deservingness are irrelevant because people’s entitlement to the means of living are not proscribed by their comportment, social status, legal citizenship, or other factors routinely disqualifying people from the narrow circle of neoliberal care. Care, by these lights, is material, practical and independent of moral dispositions. Jasmine Syedullah concludes this Critical Exchange with a meditation on abolitionist care as a classroom pedagogy, which draws on traditions in Black feminist thought to explore what she calls ‘congregational care’ methods of being and learning together. This form of care asks people to lean into their lived experience, embrace an improvisational orientation, and understand the essential and deeply generative space created when we admit that we do not know with certainty how to undo the world that creates structural conditions of suffering for most people, most of the time. In productive conversation with Threadcraft, this contribution suggests the limitations of political recognition, which requires legitimation by – and legibility to – the state, as a constitutively violent and anti-Black formation.

Taken together, these contributions set a new horizon for the vocation of political theory. The task before us, they argue, is one of colossal import: a collaborative, collective effort to exceed the world modernity made and discover a path forward toward a contemporary era – the name of which we do not yet know – based on the mutually affirmed conviction that we must make the road toward more just power relations and more flourishing societies, by leaning into our questions, relying on abolitionist principles, and discovering through imagination and improvisation, a practicable politics of care.

# Impact Turns

## AI/Cybernetics Good

### Oncology—1NC

#### Oncology- medication development, diagnosis, and effective treatment

**Kann 22** (Benjamin Kann, MD, “Steady Progress of AI Makes its Mark in the Clinic”, Targeted Oncology, January 30th 2022, <https://www.targetedonc.com/view/steady-progress-of-ai-makes-its-mark-in-the-clinic>, WC-NAS)

Only a few years ago, these imagined scenarios may have seemed far-fetched, but no longer. Increasingly, and with exponential pace, AI algorithms are finding their way into the oncology clinic. Here, I will review some of the promising ways in which these AI algorithms are poised to improve clinical cancer care for providers and patients. Understanding AI Overall AI is a field of research that began in the mid-20th century with the goal of developing machines that could perform tasks that previously only a human could do. Under this umbrella, “machine learning” was born several decades later, defined as the ability of algorithms to learn from data without explicit programming. Traditional machine learning algorithms, such as logistic regression, support vector machines, and random forest, generally take structured data inputs—variables such as age, cancer stage, smoking status, etc—and output predictions based on these features. Recently, major progress in medical AI applications has stemmed from “deep learning,” an advanced form of machine learning that uses neural networks to ingest, synthesize, and make predictions with large quantities of raw, unstructured data. These neural networks draw on, among others, imaging, EHRs, and genomics.1 When it comes to unstructured data analysis, deep learning approaches have been found to outperform most traditional methods allowing for the modeling of data types that were not previously feasible. Over the past decade, exponentially increasing quantities of digital patient data, the complexity of cancer care, advances in AI research, and the ubiquity of advanced computers have led to tremendous interest and opportunity for AI to make a large impact in oncology. How AI Is Impacting Oncology Now? The past decade has seen an explosion in the number of algorithms published for a variety of applications in oncology, including over 5500 in 2020 alone (an average of 15 per day, according to a simple PubMed search). Despite this, there are relatively few applications that have found real-world clinical adoption. Some reasons for this delay include the nascent state of the field, trust issues with algorithm results, and a lack of demonstration of value proposition with clinically meaningful end points. Regarding this latter point, although there are over 340 FDA-cleared medical AI applications, there have been very few randomized controlled trials (RCT) of AI applications in oncology. Notably, this number is also rapidly increasing, with more RCTs published in 2021 than all previous years combined. For these algorithms to truly make a difference in the clinic, they must cross the “translational gap,” which involves proving that these models can generalize to different demographic populations and treatment settings outside the setting in which they were developed.2 It also means showing clinically meaningful utility— improved resource utilization, patient quality of life, disease control, or survival—not just accuracy improvements. Finally, these algorithms need to be designed to fit into the daily oncology clinic workflow in such a way that they are user-friendly and easy to navigate. These tasks are often underappreciated during AI development, yet require a tremendous amount of attention for the potential promise of AI in cancer care to be fulfilled. As the number of algorithms and trials to assess their use in oncology increases, there are 3 major areas of oncology practice that AI is already affecting and improving. Streamlining Workflow and Replacing the Mundane Tasks that are simple yet redundant are low-hanging fruit for AI solutions. In radiation oncology, for example, contouring of organs that are at risk in radiotherapy planning is a relatively straightforward task that takes hours of time to complete per week. Now, there are multiple open-source and commercial applications based on AI that provide organ at risk contouring that is as accurate as human experts and quicker. Furthermore, some institutions have begun adopting end-to-end automated radiotherapy treatment planning for certain malignancies, like prostate cancer.3 AI is also being used for automated diagnosis of malignancy on histopathology, to support pathologists’ workflow and enable focus on more complex cases.4 Additionally, AI is a tool that can address the well-documented challenge of enrolling patients with cancer on to clinical trials. AI-driven software that combs and digests an ever-ballooning patient EHR has been implemented as a clinical trial autoscreening tool and shown to improve the identification of eligible trial patients.5 Improved Screening and Diagnosis There are now several FDA-approved platforms for CT-based lung cancer nodule detection that have been found to reduce false positive and negative results, compared with expert radiologists’ results.6,7 There are AI-assisted endoscopy devices that improve adenomatous polyp detection for colonoscopy screening, with several randomized trials showing improvements in detection.8,9 Additionally, automated mammography systems are now finding their way into clinical adoption, having shown improved sensitivity over experts10 and the ability to perform well in different patient groups from around the world.11 Clinical Recommendations and “Nudges” Traditional means of cancer prognostication, such as American Joint Committee on Cancer staging and clinical risk prediction models, although powerful, have limits in their ability to predict personalized outcomes. Machine learning has enabled a class of EHR-based platforms able to risk-stratify patients more effectively and guide treatment recommendations. For instance, 1 model predicts patients receiving chemoradiotherapy who are at high risk of hospitalization, and in a clinical trial found that, for those patients identified as high risk, more frequent routine clinic visits prevented hospitalization and emergency department visits.12 Another AI model that identified cancer patients with short life expectancy was found to increase the rate of serious illness conversations via physician nudges—cues and reminders to influence a behavior in a patient.13 Looking Beyond the Horizon of AI While AI has seen adoption in several cancer care path scenarios, most applications continue to trickle through the development stage. Slowly, these applications are demonstrating clinical utility via prospective testing and increasingly common randomized controlled trials that may lead to adoption over the next few years. For example, there is a tremendous amount of interest in using AI to predict treatment response. Immunotherapy response has been difficult to predict with traditional biomarkers and there has been significant progress using various machine learning algorithms to improve predictive performance. Imagingbased approaches, relying on quantitative imaging features [ie, “radiomics”],14 and genomic-based models have each demonstrated promise,15 but further validation is needed. Algorithms such as these may be able to guide and support treatment recommendations throughout the patient care path. AI has also demonstrated the ability to “see” things that the naked eye cannot. Through improved digital pathology analysis, AI has shown the ability to instantly deduce cancer mutational status simply from traditional tissue slides, which may replace the often weeks-long turnaround time for running genetic panels on tumor specimens to allow for quicker decision-making and treatment initiation.16 Our group has shown the ability for AI to accurately detect extranodal extension in head and neck lymph nodes on computed tomography, a difficult task for humans that is extremely important in choosing a surgical vs nonoperative management approach.17 Finally, anti-cancer drug development is an area where AI is making an impact. Al can accurately predict the mechanism of action of certain cancer metabolites,18 as well as predict combinations of drugs that may work synergistically, which may help guide preclinical and clinical study design.19

#### The impact is death

**Sleeman et al 21** (Katherine E Sleeman , Barbara Gomes, Maja de Brito , Omar Shamieh and Richard Harding, “The burden of serious health-related suffering among cancer decedents: Global projections study to 2060”, Palliative Medicine, Volume 35, 2021, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0269216320957561>//cpd)

Results By 2060, there will be an estimated 16.3 million people dying with cancer each year who experience serious health-related suffering (compared to 7.8 million in 2016), 80% of whom will be in low and middle income countries. The number of people who die from cancer and experience serious health-related suffering will increase in all world regions, but proportionately more in low income countries (407% increase 2016–2060 to 1.65 million people each year) compared to lower-middle income countries (169% increase 2016–2060 to 4.76 million people each year), upper-middle income countries (96% increase 2016–2060 to 6.67 million people each year), and high income countries (39% increase 2016–2060 to 3.23 million people each year) (Figure 1). Globally, the burden of serious health-related suffering among cancer decedents is projected to increase rapidly among people aged over 70 (Figure 2). By 2060, 67% of people who die with cancer and experience serious health-related suffering will be over 70 years old, compared to 47% in 2016. The proportion of people aged over 70 will be highest in high income countries, where, by 2060, 83% of people who die with cancer and experience serious health-related suffering will be over 70, compared with 71% in upper-middle income countries, 52% in lowermiddle income countries, and 38% in low income countries. By 2060, 54% of people who die with cancer and experience serious health-related suffering will be men, and of those over 70 years 57% will be men. In high and upper-middle income countries, lung cancer will be the single greatest contributor to the burden of serious health-related suffering among cancer decedents in 2060, though the number of people in high income countries dying with lung cancer who experience serious healthrelated suffering is projected to fall between 2030 and 2060. In low and lower-middle income countries, breast cancer will be the single greatest contributor to serious healthrelated suffering among cancer decedents (Figure 3).

### Oncology—2NC

#### AI=healthcare/hospital efficiency

**Olive 21** (Olive AI, “Working hand-in-hand with AI: The cybernetic future of AI in healthcare”, March 3rd 2021, <https://oliveai.com/resources/blog/working-hand-in-hand-with-ai-the-cybernetic-future-of-ai-in-healthcare?page=1>, WC-NAS)

Health systems and hospitals are constantly looking for new ways to improve efficiencies and remove friction from their operations. Yet healthcare workers today are drowning in a sea of data and programs. Burnout is soaring and COVID-19 has only exacerbated the need for efficiency and capacity. Health systems looking to do more with less are tapping into technology to help their workers navigate their jobs quickly and efficiently.  Health system executives are turning to AI – including automation and the growing field of cybernetics – to improve productivity and decision-making while reducing burnout. AI is delivering targeted information to workers to enable better, faster results across hospitals and health systems at a time when time is more valuable than ever.

Cybernetics plus intelligent automation will power our human workforces  
When health systems consider investing in artificial intelligence technologies, they typically look at robotic process automation (RPA) or [intelligent automation solutions first](https://oliveai.com/our-solution/). That’s because repetitive, high-volume workflows that provide high-value returns lay a solid foundation for a larger investment in your long-term AI strategy. Intelligent automation allows us to offload [routine, time-intensive data entry](https://oliveai.com/blog/11-operational-applications-for-healthcare-ai/)to machines so that our human workforces can focus on higher-level initiatives that require a human touch. Automation is fundamentally changing how hospitals and health systems manage healthcare operations, freeing up our human workers to focus on what matters most – delivering quality patient experiences. But giving more work to intelligent automation bots isn’t the only [operational application of AI](https://oliveai.com/blog/11-operational-applications-for-healthcare-ai/). After time-consuming, repetitive tasks are offloaded to automation, there’s enormous opportunity to improve the processes still requiring a human touch. That’s why health systems are augmenting the work that can’t be automated with cybernetics.   
Cybernetics is a quickly developing field that will become indispensable in helping employers maximize the ROI of their human workforce while also improving employee satisfaction and work-life balance.

The benefits of cybernetics for healthcare

Cybernetics fuels human productivity by reducing errors, improving efficiency, improving decision making and therefore increasing human ROI. Here are a few examples of how a cybernetic AI solution can work:  [Welcome Home Health](https://www.welcomehomehealth.com/) (WHH), a company that facilitates care transitions to improve patient adherence to care management plans, has created a cybernetic process to improve decision making. The WHH cybernetic model synthesizes each patient’s clinical needs with their diagnosis, acuity, social determinant and payer information to assign them to a specific WHH program and enrollment path (e.g., should the patient go to a skilled nursing facility or home?). By providing the appropriate level of care and support, WHH can help patients recover more quickly and reduce hospital readmissions.  At the Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center, cybernetics is being implemented in the scheduling department to help staff members schedule patients more quickly and with fewer errors. Included is a feature that automatically pulls up a patient’s weight when scheduling an x-ray or imaging appointment. This information is necessary, but can be embarrassing to ask a patient in-person or can require opening up another program and searching. Every time that a patient is scheduled, the information critical to that specific appointment can be whispered to the scheduler and then checked for accuracy before being set. Think about your own organization – what workflows often require real-time intelligence or outside references? What decisions could benefit from an unbiased recommendation based on data synthesization? Cybernetics is the way to get targeted, precise information into employees’ hands. Each time an employee doesn’t have to switch programs to look up information, you gain efficiencies. Each time a recommendation is provided by sophisticated analytics, you improve decision-making. Each time a typo is flagged, you reduce costly errors. Cybernetics, combined with automation, will help healthcare organizations do so much more with the resources they already have.

Artificial intelligence can change your healthcare organization today  
[Artificial intelligence is changing how we work today](https://oliveai.com/blog/ai-automation-and-the-future-of-work-in-hospitals/), not the distant future. But it's not the AI depicted in science fiction where robots take over our jobs. Artificial intelligence, including intelligent automation and cybernetics, has functional, cost-effective solutions now for healthcare. By shifting humans to human work and giving them an AI-powered sidekick to help them throughout the day, hospitals and health systems can maximize the productivity, ROI and impact of the human workforce.  Our cybernetic solution is Olive Helps,  an AI “sidekick” that lives on a healthcare worker’s computer. It’s a lightweight desktop application working alongside users that provides valuable information – at exactly the right time – using what we call Loops (think: apps in an app store.) By continuously learning from the cues in her environment, Olive Helps minimize the time required to complete critical tasks like patient verifications, billing and more. [See how cybernetics can improve your workforce ROI today.](https://oliveai.com/olive-helps/)

### Climate Change—1NC

#### Cybernetics and AI critical to predicting and preventing climate catastrophe

**ITU 21** (International Telecommunications Union, UN Specialized Agency for ICT’s, “AI expands scope of climate change”, July 13th 2021, <https://www.itu.int/hub/2021/07/ai-expands-scope-of-climate-science/>, WC-NAS)

Nearly 37 per cent of heat exposure around the world between 1991 and 2018 could be attributed to global warming caused by humans, Ban added, citing research published in [Nature](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01475-0#:~:text=Researchers%20have%20attributed%2037%25%20of,such%20as%20storms%20and%20droughts). Rising sea levels threaten the existence of many small island developing states, as well as some of world’s largest and most important cities, both rich and poor. “Climate threats do not discriminate,” he said. Climate change is one of the most serious challenges we face today, agreed Professor Philip Stier of Atmospheric Physics at the University of Oxford. But climate science is inherently complex, involving massive uncertainties and multiple feedback effects from different changes in our climate and environment. The webinar examined the many exciting capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) to help climate science see where we really are with global warming and assessing realistic mitigation options. Untangling the data While vast Earth observation datasets are at heart of climate science, only a small fraction of such data is currently used to “train” climate models, Stier said. AI could help to draw more value from those data sources. As one example, AI could extend the analysis of climate datasets over longer timeframes, taking paleo-climate data from past eons into account, added Valérie Masson-Delmotte, Co-Chair of the “Physical Science Basis” working group of the [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)](https://www.ipcc.ch/). “There is a massive amount of historical information that exists, but sometimes it’s not readily available or not yet digitalized,” she said. Furthermore, AI can improve our understanding of feedback effects, narrow down uncertainties, and detect key signals from vast masses of unanalysed data, or “background noise”. With better-quality data and specialized inventories, it could help to unpack more of the interactions involved in climate change and further illuminate how the climate crisis could evolve. Exploring causality For years, international attention centred mainly on the effects of carbon dioxide (CO2), although [methane gas](https://unece.org/challenge) also drives warming. AI could also help to understand the key role of [oceans as heat and CO2 absorbers](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/09/200904090312.htm). The IPCC studies the causes and impact of climate change on a rigorously scientific basis, Masson-Delmotte said. Following the science, [recent IPCC reports](https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/), produced with 230 scientists from 160 countries, suggest a global imperative to cut CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions to net zero. As policy makers make tough choices on behalf of their citizens, algorithms can heighten space-time resolution and clarify stochastic aspects in climate modelling. Machine learning, for instance, helps to explore causality and capture dynamics at lower spatial and temporal resolution, explained Yoshua Bengio, Director of the Quebec AI Institute, Mila. But while machine learning can heighten our understanding of the crisis, countries must adopt accurate carbon pricing to reflect the true impact of all our activities, Bengio said. Effective carbon pricing, he noted, would include the cost of uncertainty. Numerous researchers are eager to help with improving the sustainability of transportation, discovering new production materials, stepping up conservation, and helping people better understand the changes that are coming, Bengio said. “New technologies,” added Masson-Delmotte, “can help build on local knowledge through citizen science and participatory approaches.” Calls for concerted action The Paris Agreement, signed by 195 nations worldwide, set out a clear game plan to fight rising emissions, spur climate-resilient development and foster greener socio-economic development. Over 60 other countries have set their sights on carbon neutrality by 2050, while the largest market, China, has pledged to become carbon-neutral by 2060. Multilateral action is vital, Ban reiterated. Houlin Zhao, Secretary-General of ITU, called for active partnerships to coordinate ICT innovation and address the global climate challenge.

### Climate Change—2NC

#### AI key to combatting climate change

**Russo 21** (Megan Russo, “How Artificial Intelligence Can Combat Climate Change”, The Regulatory Review, August 25th 2021, <https://www.theregreview.org/2021/08/25/russo-artificial-intelligence-combat-climate-change/>)

Unprecedented increases in global temperatures are unequivocally [caused](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf#page=6) by humans, according to the [United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/) (IPCC). A “strong and sustained reduction” in greenhouse gas pollution is necessary to limit further climate change, and every country must make unprecedented changes, [reports](https://www.ipcc.ch/2021/08/09/ar6-wg1-20210809-pr/) the IPCC. In an [article](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg), [Amy L. Stein](https://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/amy-l-stein), a professor at the [University of Florida Levin College of Law](https://www.law.ufl.edu/), [argues](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg) that artificial intelligence could play an important role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the electric power industry. Given that electric power [accounts](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=11) for almost 25 percent of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, Stein [sees](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=12) a role for artificial intelligence in optimizing the power grid, increasing energy efficiency, and enhancing reliability and resiliency. Furthermore, Stein [argues](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=38) for the use of regulation as a tool to offset limitations of using artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence—also known as machine learning and automated data analytics—can [optimize](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=12) the power grid’s energy use by helping utility companies manage an increase in renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power. Stein [explains](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=14) that artificial intelligence can identify factors that most impact energy demand and immediately optimize energy output. For instance, artificial intelligence can [learn](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=15) “the thermal properties of a home, the local weather conditions, the way these conditions impact heat flows of a home, and user preferences, as well as adapt energy consumption against real-time price signals.” Stein also [explains](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=17) how artificial intelligence can target energy inefficiencies. Nearly 68 percent of energy [produced](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=17) in the United States is “lost to the environment,” she observes. This lost energy often [takes](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=17) the form of “waste heat, such as the warm exhaust from automobiles.” Stein [suggests](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=18) that artificial intelligence can help isolate would-be rejected energy before it is lost, just as when Google [used](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=19) artificial intelligence to reduce its data centers’ excess heat production by 40 percent. Addressing energy inefficiencies, Stein [argues](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=20), can have “enormous impacts on carbon emissions,” perhaps reducing greenhouse gas pollution in half by 2050. Stein [says](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=20) that artificial intelligence can also help enhance the reliability and resiliency of the electric power grid. Blackouts [harm](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=21) the environment because they create “downtime” in the power grid that requires significant energy to overcome. Artificial intelligence can [predict](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=22) impending power outages by accurately forecasting weather patterns and rapidly assessing the power grid for weak spots. This assessment [reduces](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=21) “catastrophic” environmental harm because it allows utility companies both to prevent outages and respond more quickly when one occurs.

#### Climate change!

**Nelsen 21** (Arthur Nelsen, “How can artificial intelligence help fight climate change?”, August 5th 2021, Thomson Reuters Foundation, <https://news.trust.org/item/20210805153021-fp4sh/>, WC-NAS)

How can AI help combat climate change?

The technology is already [being used](https://news.trust.org/item/20210308082452-utr0s/) to send natural disaster alerts in Japan, monitor deforestation in the Amazon, and design greener [smart cities](https://news.trust.org/item/20200624080235-95zxs) in China.

AI applications could also help design more energy-efficient buildings, improve power storage and optimise renewable energy deployment by feeding solar and wind power into the electricity grid as needed.

On a smaller scale, it could help households minimize their energy use - automatically switching off lights not in use or sending power from electric vehicles back into the grid to meet anticipated demand.

By 2030, the tech could help cut global greenhouse gas emissions by 4%, according to a recent [study](https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/sustainability-climate-change/insights/how-ai-future-can-enable-sustainable-future.htmlhttps:/www.pwc.co.uk/services/sustainability-climate-change/insights/how-ai-future-can-enable-sustainable-future.html) by accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers for Microsoft, which is developing machine learning products for the climate change market.

Peter Clutton-Brock, co-founder of the Centre for AI and Climate (CAIC), a Britain-based think tank, said the technology was "pushing back boundaries" for climate modelling.

AI can process huge amounts of unstructured data like pictures, graphs and maps, opening "huge possibilities for understanding the dynamics around sea level rise and ice sheets," he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

Who will be able to use it?

The high cost of AI computational resources has pushed research largely into the private sector, where the market is "extremely vibrant," according to Chris Goode, Climavision's CEO.

Climavision's system uses a high-resolution radar network along with data from satellites and high-altitude weather balloons to fill in what the company says are "hundreds of gaps" in existing weather forecasting networks.

Energy and transport businesses, farmers, even the U.S. military will have access to "real-time elements of the atmosphere, what's happening at this very moment, because it's updated on a second-by-second mode," Goode said.

Ari Cohen, the external affairs director for TPG, which last week announced a new $5.4 billion [Rise Climate fund](https://therisefund.com/news/tpg-announces-54-billion-first-close-tpg-rise-climate-fund) to invest in "climate solutions around the world", said the AI market was likely to grow, as countries and corporations transition toward low-carbon energy.

From electricity grids to smart appliances, "data and AI-driven software will be integral to predicting market behaviour, balancing operations in real time and maximising energy yield," he said in emailed comments.

#### AI key to combatting climate change

**Russo 21** (Megan Russo, “How Artificial Intelligence Can Combat Climate Change”, The Regulatory Review, August 25th 2021, <https://www.theregreview.org/2021/08/25/russo-artificial-intelligence-combat-climate-change/>, WC-NAS)

Unprecedented increases in global temperatures are unequivocally [caused](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf#page=6) by humans, according to the [United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/) (IPCC). A “strong and sustained reduction” in greenhouse gas pollution is necessary to limit further climate change, and every country must make unprecedented changes, [reports](https://www.ipcc.ch/2021/08/09/ar6-wg1-20210809-pr/) the IPCC.

In an [article](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg), [Amy L. Stein](https://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/amy-l-stein), a professor at the [University of Florida Levin College of Law](https://www.law.ufl.edu/), [argues](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg) that artificial intelligence could play an important role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the electric power industry. Given that electric power [accounts](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=11) for almost 25 percent of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, Stein [sees](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=12) a role for artificial intelligence in optimizing the power grid, increasing energy efficiency, and enhancing reliability and resiliency. Furthermore, Stein [argues](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=38) for the use of regulation as a tool to offset limitations of using artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence—also known as machine learning and automated data analytics—can [optimize](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=12) the power grid’s energy use by helping utility companies manage an increase in renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power. Stein [explains](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=14) that artificial intelligence can identify factors that most impact energy demand and immediately optimize energy output. For instance, artificial intelligence can [learn](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=15) “the thermal properties of a home, the local weather conditions, the way these conditions impact heat flows of a home, and user preferences, as well as adapt energy consumption against real-time price signals.”

Stein also [explains](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=17) how artificial intelligence can target energy inefficiencies. Nearly 68 percent of energy [produced](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=17) in the United States is “lost to the environment,” she observes. This lost energy often [takes](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=17) the form of “waste heat, such as the warm exhaust from automobiles.” Stein [suggests](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=18) that artificial intelligence can help isolate would-be rejected energy before it is lost, just as when Google [used](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=19) artificial intelligence to reduce its data centers’ excess heat production by 40 percent. Addressing energy inefficiencies, Stein [argues](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=20), can have “enormous impacts on carbon emissions,” perhaps reducing greenhouse gas pollution in half by 2050.

Stein [says](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=20) that artificial intelligence can also help enhance the reliability and resiliency of the electric power grid. Blackouts [harm](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=21) the environment because they create “downtime” in the power grid that requires significant energy to overcome. Artificial intelligence can [predict](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=22) impending power outages by accurately forecasting weather patterns and rapidly assessing the power grid for weak spots. This assessment [reduces](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=21) “catastrophic” environmental harm because it allows utility companies both to prevent outages and respond more quickly when one occurs.

Despite the potential benefits of using artificial intelligence to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the electric power industry, Stein [concedes](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=27) that this technology does present some tradeoffs.

If not used efficiently, artificial intelligence can itself increase environmental harm. For instance, data processing centers [use](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=28) about 2 percent of the global electricity supply. By 2025, that number could rise to between 8 and 21 percent. Requiring researchers to disclose how much energy an artificial intelligence tool will emit, Stein [claims](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=30), can temper negative environmental impacts.

One way to limit artificial intelligence’s negative effects would be to [create](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=31) certification requirements, similar to the regulations used to label organic food. Stein [explains](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=31) that regulators could create a system that labels “carbon-neutral artificial intelligence as ‘green’ and non-carbon-neutral artificial intelligence as ‘red.’” She [posits](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=31) that these labels will increase transparency and encourage researchers to create more artificial intelligence that has a positive or neutral impact on the environment.

Stein [acknowledges](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=34) that artificial intelligence may also increase data privacy concerns. For example, smart meters—devices used to read energy-use patterns in homes—[reveal](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=35) behavioral patterns, such as bedtimes, work departures, and vacations. This information can be [exploited](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=35), such as for planning home invasions or identity theft.

To offset data privacy concerns, Stein [argues](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=36) that the government can mandate utility companies to anonymize certain data. For instance, the [Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act](https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html) requires that protected health information is “not individually identifiable.”

Stein further [explains](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=37) that data privacy concerns can be eased by regulating data ownership, use, and distribution. Colorado, for example, [regulates](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=38) the use of smart meter data by only allowing third party access in emergency situations. Stein [contends](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=38) that regulators can lessen data privacy concerns by creating policy that adequately weighs the public interest, industry concerns, and individual privacy protection.

Stein [acknowledges](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=38) that regulating artificial intelligence will be difficult because it requires administrative law to adapt as quickly as technology does. But in the end, she [concludes](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1565&context=yjreg#page=50) that the gravity of climate change combined with artificial intelligence’s promise make it “too important not to try.”

### Readiness—1NC

#### Cybernetics is inevitable and key to avoid future conflict

**Scott 21** (Dr Keith Scott, “Connected, Continual Conflict: Towards a Cybernetic Model of Warfare”, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK, 2021, <https://dora.dmu.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2086/20901/K%20Scott%20Revised%20Paper%20text.docx?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, WC-NAS)

The differences are striking; for some, this is a form of conflict which focuses on the disruption/destruction of a state’s informational assets through the application of non-kinetic, IT and AI-based tools (essentially a form of Electronic Warfare), while for others, it implies a much broader set of actions, where non-kinetic action generates effects (which may cause damage equivalent or identical to kinetic force) far beyond the informational realm. Furthermore, the actors in such conflict may be nation states or non-state actors, and the targets may be military and/or civilian, attacking critical national infrastructure, financial institutions, and the beliefs of the citizenry (Information Warfare). In short, it is a form of conflict where lots of things are done to lots of people in lots of different ways by lots of different actors; as a theoretical framework for analysis and action, this is less than helpful. The one common feature the definitions have is an insistence that this form of conflict relies on the use of IT- and/or AI-enabled attacks; in other words, ‘cyber’ resides firmly within the Fifth Domain or Fifth Dimension of warfare, the informational realm (Fogleman 1995). Such a model is, I would argue, so imprecise as to be useless; it neglects the key nature of modern conflict (and of the modern world in general) – connection. The belated move to Multi-Domain Integration in military thinking (see Section 2.0) marks a recognition of the fact that dividing the world into 5 discrete domains is both illusory and dangerous; we cannot see the domains as separate, and crucially, we must not assume that the informational realm can be confronted in isolation. For the purposes of this paper, then. ‘an act of cyber warfare’ should be taken to mean ‘any hostile action by a state or non-state equivalent actor launched against another state or non-state equivalent actor, which aims to cause kinetic and/or non-kinetic damage to the opponent’s human/material/intangible assets, and which employs IT-based tools, networks and/or assets.’ ‘Cyber’ has become a catchall term for ‘anything involving computers’; this is both too vague and too precise; *computers* are not the important element, rather the system of integrated elements which make up the informational network which underpins and penetrates the modern world. Some of these elements are electronic, some are mechanical, some physical, some abstract (software does not ‘exist’ as a concrete artefact) – and many of them are human. The theoretical bedrock of this paper, and of the argument it advances, is that ‘cyber’ is meaningless; the term it derives from is what is important. We must turn, or return, to a cyber*netic* framework. The reason for this is simple; cybernetics offers a system-based model for understanding the informational network(s) within which Cyber Warfare operates, and it focuses on interconnection, and the interreactions within these networks of non-human and human elements. ‘Cybernetics’ may seem just as vague a term as ‘Cyberwarfare’, but that is to neglect an essential feature of the discipline; it is less a model for understanding a particular system (electronic, human, mechanical…) than a way of thinking about systems in general. The term was first used by Ampère (1834) to refer to political (i.e. human) governance, while the subtitle of Wiener’s seminal text Cybernetics (1948) discusses ‘control and communication in the animal and the machine’ (my emphasis). By its very nature, cybernetics is interdisciplinary, and offers a model for analysing the interplay and interconnection of the various components of any system; it is, as Beer (1973) puts it, ‘the science of effective organization’. As such, the adoption of a ‘cybernetic mindset’ as the basis for the consideration of contemporary and future conflict seems not only advisable but essential. As will be argued, both in terms of the complexity and protean nature of warfare in the Information Age, and in the growing convergence of human and non-human actors in the battlespace (human-machine teaming, autonomous weapons systems and augmentation of combat troops all falling within this ambit), the holistic, systems-based worldview offered by cybernetics seems to be unavoidable if we are to stand any chance of overcoming the threats we face. As with any discipline, cybernetic military thinking can follow many different paths. on the one hand, we have the more traditional C2C-based ideas of informational superiority seen in Cebrowski and Garstka’s work on ‘network-centric warfare’ (1998); on the other, the work of Antoine Bousquet (2008a and b), whose theories of ‘chaoplexic warfare’ discuss the challenges of waging a war which is non-linear, dynamic, and self-organizing, and where the opposing forces reject traditional notions of hierarchy and chains of command. It is this latter perspective which seems to offer the best approach to what we see emerging on the contemporary battlespace, as the following section will argue. In many of today’s conflicts, there is no single ‘enemy’, rather a swarm of different groups and actors, sharing knowledge and resources, forming temporary alliances, and highly dynamic, ever-shifting formations. The cybernetic perspective, focusing on the network rather than individual agents/nodes within that network, is better equipped to respond to the current and future challenges. When conflicts operate across domains, collapse boundaries between state and non-state, private and public sector, military and civilian and kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, the Gestalt perspective of cybernetics offers a way of cutting through the complexity to understand the situation in its totality.

## Biotech Good

### CRISPR—1NC

#### CRISPR solves a laundry list of emerging problems – disease, crops, and sustainability. Good governance solves ethical issues.

Crawford 17 – Writer and Editor at MC2 Solutions LLC, MS Geology from the University of Toronto. [Mark. “8 Ways CRISPR-Cas9 Can Change the World.” American Society of Mechanical Engineers. May 31, 2017]

Genetic engineering is on the cusp of transformational change, thanks to CRISPR-Cas9, a genome-editing tool that came to the forefront in 2012. Created by co-inventor Jennifer Doudna, a molecular biologist at University of California-Berkeley, CRISPR-Cas9 allows scientists to alter the DNA of different organisms with high speed and precision (until just recently, engineering genes was a time-consuming and laborious procedure that often ended in failure).

CRISPR works by injecting a DNA construct into a living organism. The construct is composed of the Cas9 enzyme that cuts or deletes a segment of DNA, a sequence of RNA that guides the Cas9 to the correct location to cut, and a new DNA template that repairs the cut and alters the gene.

“We are getting to a point where we can investigate different combinations of genes, controlling when, where, and how much they are expressed, and investigate the roles of individual bases of DNA,” states Nicola Patron, a molecular and synthetic biologist at the Earlham Institute in the UK, in a recent article on vox.com. “Understanding what DNA sequences do is what enables us to solve problems in every field of biology from curing human diseases, to growing enough healthy food, to discovering and making new medicines, to understanding why some species are going extinct.”

Eight Impacts of CRISPR

Below are eight ways that CRISPR will likely impact the world:

1. Remove malaria from mosquitos. Scientists have created mosquitoes that are resistant to malaria by deleting a segment of mosquito DNA. The altered mosquitos passes on the resistance genes to 99 percent of their offspring, even when they mated with normal mosquitos.

2. Treating Alzheimer’s disease. CRISPR-based platforms have been developed to identify the genes controlling the cellular processes that lead to neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer's and Parkinson's, hopefully leading to new treatments.

3. Treating HIV. The HIV virus inserts its DNA into the cells of the human host. CRISPR has been successful in removing the virus’s DNA from the patient’s genome. Other genetic sequences will likely be found that eliminate HIV, herpes, hepatitis, and other dangerous viruses.

4. Develop new drugs. Pharmaceutical companies such as Bayer AG are investing hundreds of millions of dollars to develop CRISPR-based drugs to treat heart disease, blood disorders, and blindness.

5. Livestock. CRISPR/Cas9 has been utilized in China to delete genes in livestock that inhibit muscle and hair growth to grow larger stock for the country's commercial meat and wool industries. This could become a common way in the future to expand livestock industries.

6. Agricultural crops. Researchers are using CRISPR to discover new ways to improve crop disease resistance and environmental stress tolerance in plants. If successful, this could result in new crops to help feed the global population.

7. Develop new cancer treatments. CRISPR can modify immune cells to make them more effective at targeting and destroying cancer cells. CRISPR can also be used evaluate how genes can be studied to determine their sensitivity to new anti-cancer drugs, thereby developing a personalized treatment plan with the best possibility of success.

8. Reduce our need for plastic. CRISPR can be used to manipulate a type of yeast that transforms sugars into hydrocarbons, which can be used to make plastic—greatly reducing the need to rely on petroleum-based resources for plastics, easing stress on the environment.

Editing Humans

Ethical issues abound for genetic engineering with CRISPR—especially in humans. Many people are concerned about the creation of "designer babies" with genetic enhancements. The technology could be used to create genetic discrimination through eugenics. “We could see the emergence of genetic haves and have nots, leading to even greater inequality than we already live with,” comments Marcy Darnovsky of San Francisco's Center for Genetics and Society.

The UK has formally approved gene editing in human embryos, for research purposes only. In the U.S., a science advisory panel formed by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Medicine has shown for modifying human embryos with certain heritable diseases.

CRISPR has the distinct ability to alter the course of human evolution—to improve society for the greater good or, in the wrong hands, to diminish the human experience. Most genetic engineers agree that they must proceed with caution and good governance.

### CRISPR—2NC—Agriculture

#### \*\* repeat with cards in gmos good – these are the CRISPR specific ones

#### CRISPR genome-edited crops improve agronomic performance, final product quality, climate resilience, and food stability. Multi-year studies and expert opinion prove.

Lassoed et al 19 – Professional Research Associate in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Saskatchewan [Rim, Diego Maximiliano Macall, Hayley Hesseln, Peter WB Phillips, Stuart J. Smyth. “Benefits of genome-edited crops: expert opinion.” Transgenic Research 28, 246-256 (2019). March 4, 2019.

 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11248-019-00118-5]

Method

An online survey was conducted between January and April 2018 to gather expert opinions on potential benefits of NBTs. The survey was emailed to a panel of 507 international experts (scientists, government officials, agribusiness professionals, etc.) with related backgrounds and experience in biotechnology. The survey instrument is part of a multi-year survey project investigating expert opinions regarding the application of NBTs and their potential to enhance global food security. The expert panel was obtained from a contact database that was constructed using emails of participants for a number of conferences on biotechnology organized by the researchers over the past 15 years, and of experts from online searches (i.e. websites of universities, research institutions, biotech companies and government agencies). This panel allowed us to reach a large number of international experts in the field of study.

Our study (BEH 97) was deemed exempt from full ethics review by the Behavioural Ethics Board at the University of Saskatchewan on April 7, 2015, on the basis that the participants, as experts, were not themselves the focus of the research.Footnote1 Nevertheless, our online survey presented participants with a standard consent statement describing the study, identifying the absence of known risks associated with participation, and a reminder that participation was voluntary and responses would be anonymous and confidential. Upon expression of consent, participants were presented with the survey.

The survey included three opinion-based questions. The first and second questions were phrased as short statements, soliciting responses on a five-point Likert scale. Respondents were invited to provide their agreement with a list of different potential benefits of genome-edited crops compared to GM and CONV alternatives, along with their confidence level on a five-point Likert scale (1 being least confident and 5 being most confident). Benefits of genome-edited crops were measured using 15 agronomic, environmental, and socio-economic factors. We acknowledge that these benefits can be achieved ‘theoretically’ by any of these three technologies, however, feasible outcomes of some techniques are restricted by regulatory burden, high costs, lengthy process and low consumer acceptance. The third question asked about the anticipated significance (i.e. minor, moderate or major) of a number of potential regulatory events in influencing where and how genome editing will be developed and used in agriculture.

At the end of the survey, a hypothetical binary choice question was asked to test for temporal preferences (using a lottery prize). Participants were asked how they would use an imaginary prize of $5000: for a summer vacation or for retirement saving. The question was used to compare the benefits-related questions between two groups of experts: those who tend to exhibit long- versus short-term preferences. This question was used only for classification purposes and it is not intended as a substitute for theoretical discounting models. It was useful in the context of our study to have a simple, univariate measure of discounting that was not tied to any specific theoretical framework.Footnote2

Results and analysis

The survey was completed by 114 respondents, resulting in a response rate of 22.5%. The sample is dominated by male subjects (79%), aged between 45 and 65 years (70%). Fifty-three percent of participants reside in North America, 28% in Europe, and the remainder from the rest of the world (4% from Africa, 6% from Asia, 4% from Oceania and 5% from Central and South America). Sixty-three percent identified themselves as scientists and 37% as non-scientists (government officials, agribusiness delegates, etc.). Forty percent work for industry, 26% for university, and 20% for government.

As clarified earlier, not all genome-edited crops fall into the same category. Results of previous surveys within this project show that expert decision makers agree that some genome-edited crops are transgenic and thus should be regulated as GM while others should not (Lassoued et al. 2018). Having this result in mind, the analysis below compares site-specific genome-edited crops (free from foreign DNA) to GM and CONV counterparts. On average, the mean level of benefits of genome-edited crops compared to GM (CONV) alternatives was 3.6 (3.75) with a standard deviation (SD) of .73 (.73) on the one-to-five scale. This reveals that experts largely agree on the potential benefits of genome-edited crops in terms of agronomic performance (disease resistance, drought tolerance, high yields, etc.), final product quality (nutrition, shelf life, etc.), climate change resilience, and global food security (Table 1). More than half of the sample was undecided (neutral or cannot tell) about the impact of genome-edited crops on environmental sustainability (e.g. reduced agri-food waste, enhanced biodiversity) and economic advantages for farmers (i.e. higher returns). As for the impact of genome-edited crops on consumer confidence, environmental footprint and trade, a plurality tends to be neutral or cannot tell at 46%, 45% and 44%, respectively.

Table 1 Expert opinions of impact of genome editing compared to GM and CONV (N = 114)

Full size table

Similarly, the majority of experts believe that genome editing offers more opportunity than CONV to produce crops with improved agronomic performance, product quality, farmer profitability (lower production cost, higher income), climate resilience, and global food security. These advantages are derived from the accuracy and precision of genome-editing technology that some say could help save years of development time and lower the cost to produce certain traits in crops. Yet, opinions on socio-political and environmental questions are less consistent. While 68% of the participants agree/strongly agree that genome editing will enable breeders to lower agriculture’s environmental footprint, the sample is divided into those who are optimistic that genome editing could be more effective than CONV breeding in creating varieties that would reduce agri-food waste (49%) and enhance biodiversity (39%) and those who are neutral (41% and 42%). Experts are also divided about whether genome-edited crops will enhance consumer confidence or open foreign market access: 35% and 34% think it will not help at all and 40% and 34% are uncertain. Only about a quarter of the sample (26%) agree/strongly agree that genome-edited crops might help resolve trade restrictions and enhance consumer confidence. Genome editing is still a relatively new technology. Like any innovation, its effects are still somewhat speculative. Many panelists commented that while existing biotechnologies can deliver similar benefits to genome-edited crops, products of genome editing might gain better socio-political advantages.

Overall, experts converged on a consensus that genome editing would offer better agronomic performance and product quality than the alternatives. Yet this does not imply that genome-editing technology is the ideal substitute for GM and CONV breeding techniques—they can and probably will coexist. GM and CONV still deliver important benefits, but genome editing would appear to deliver certain benefits better and faster thanks to its precision (advanced knowledge in genomics) and the potential lower regulatory oversight. Innovative plant breeding does not necessarily mean abandoning earlier breeding methods as different technologies might perform better than others for different breeding targets. For instance, the GM approach, despite being less precise, has the potential to perform better than genome editing to control certain viruses (see e.g. Ali et al. 2016; Lassoued et al. 2018). Yet, GM technology has been facing several regulatory and social barriers that limited the agronomic (and subsequently socio-economic) potential in rice and wheat, the world’s most important staple grains.

#### CRISPR produced the second wave of GM crops. That resolves food insecurity by improving yields and managing negative traits and resolves the short comings of first gen GMOs.

Gupta et al 21 – Researcher in the department of Botany, School of Biological Sciences at Central University of Punjab. [Shweta, Adarsh Kumar, Rupali Patel, Vinay Kumar. “Genetically modified crop regulations: scope and opportunity using the CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing approach.” Molecular Biology Reports 48, 4851-4863 (2021). June 10, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11033-021-06477-9]

Why CRISPR/Cas9 edited crops are not considered GM crops?

Both mutagenesis and the CRISPR/Cas9 systems are considered equivalent as these approaches induce mutation. Using the CRISPR/Cas9 approach, no foreign DNA is left in the mutated plant that makes it exempted from the definition of GMO and its regulation. Also, the gRNA that is used in the CRISPR/Cas9 system is not rDNA (Recombinant DNA). The organism created by the oligonucleotide-directed mechanism is considered a GMO because introducing oligonucleotide is not a natural process. Thus, there is always confusion between genetically modified crops and genetically engineered crops which is also a consequence, of people not accepting GE crops. In GM organisms or traditional transgenesis, there is no control on site of gene introduction and about its amplification (copies,) while in GE organisms (using nucleases including CRISPR/Cas9) any gene can be introduced or deleted at a specific location that helps in the modification of DNA. Thus, this technique shows more advantages over first-generation GM due to its precision, controllable nature, and low target effects. Apart from this, all the editing process was done using single-locus so that it can be readily accessible and available to researchers for use in their area of research.

Crop improvement using the CRISPR-Cas9 technology

With the increasing population, food demand is also increasing. Crop improvement is an important endeavor for meeting this requirement. The CRISPR/Cas9 system acted as a revolutionary technology in crop improvement which mainly focuses on improving yields, stress management, and quality by knocking out genes showing undesirable traits. This technique is used to achieve powdery mildew resistance in Wheat (Triticum aestivum) and tomato by knocking out the MLO gene [24]. In Glycine max, the Fatty Acid Desaturase gene converts Oleic acid into Linolenic acid. The CRISPR-cas9 system can be applied to induce mutation in FAD2-1A and FAD2-1B that restricts the conversion into linolenic acid and thus enhancing its nutrition index and shelf life [25].

Constructs of sgRNA and Cas9 were used to deliver ripening inhibitor protein (RIN) to regulate fruit ripening in tomato [26]. Cas9 construct with HDR template is used to target an Aceto-lactate synthase (ALS) gene in rice to obtain bi-allelic mutation [27]. The CRISPR/Cas9 system is also a valuable tool for activation and repression for transcription of the targeted gene in any plant genome. Catalytically inactive dCas9, fused with gRNA, can activate transcription of anthocyanin pigment by targeting AtPAP1 [28]. The dCas9-VP64 has reversed the silencing effect of methylation of AtFIS2 in fertilization-independent seed in Arabidopsis. The use of these nucleases has allowed scientists to develop the desired plant varieties more efficiently and rapidly than conventional breeding. This technology also enhances the domestication of orphan crops including finger millet, groundnut, tef, yam, and cassava. In almonds, the CRISPR/Cas9 technology has been used to produce plants with sweet seeds but carries bitterness in other plants due to amygdalin. This domestication plays an important role in increasing global food security with the CRISPR/Cas9 technology. But with the advancement of these gene-editing technologies, it remains to know how the public perceives these crops and how regulatory realms will deal with them.

#### Criticisms of GM crops result from a lack of knowledge and trust *not* scientific backing. And, CRISPR resolves consumer fears of first gen gmos.

Gupta et al 21 – Researcher in the department of Botany, School of Biological Sciences at Central University of Punjab. [Shweta, Adarsh Kumar, Rupali Patel, Vinay Kumar. “Genetically modified crop regulations: scope and opportunity using the CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing approach.” Molecular Biology Reports 48, 4851-4863 (2021). June 10, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11033-021-06477-9]

Views of public towards GM and GE crops

The major problem faced by GM and GE crops is public acceptance. These engineered crops have been grown commercially since the 1990s and have expanded to various nations including the USA, Brazil, and India. But at the same time, some people are inadmissible about food products of GMs. The major reason for this may be the potential environmental and health risks due to unwilling genetic changes, lack of trust in multinational agrochemical companies, lack of knowledge about GE crops, ethical issues, adequacy of regulatory systems, and off-target mutations. Lack of trust in companies was clearly expressed both in a survey and in focus groups in a recent Norwegian study [52]. Similar attitudes have also been documented in Swedish reports [53]. Many surveys have also found that in European countries, consumers are more concerned about food security [37]. The consumers in European countries, also emphasized issues including origin and quality of food products (European [54]. In addition, the concern with naturalness in food production, exemplified by cisgenic modification is more acceptable than transgenic in public surveys [55, 56]. To overcome these challenges, people should be informed about the difference between GM and GE crops (Table 3) with the pros and cons of breeding techniques. GE crops are free of the transgene, thus no flow of transgene and do not affect biological diversity in overall. Major arguments in favor and against GE crops are also tabulated in Table 4. GE crops are very similar to wild species and so tagged with a DNA tag and should be assessed in the isolated field for their impact on the environment. Secondly, a global regulatory model is expected to fill this gap so that people do not wonder which regulation is superior over the other. The regulatory status must be amended so that people can trust and approve it without any hesitation. The regulations like SECURE in the USA help many plant breeders and companies to achieve small niches in GE crops creation. The government of different countries should surrogate between developers and the public to carefully consider the degree of health risk of each crop variety for which off-targets are also considered. Consumers should also consider the “right to know” if there is difficulty in acceptance of these new generation crops. Such endorsements will definitively help consumers to gradually accept genome-edited crops in near future.

Table 3 Enlisting differences between genetically modified (first generation) and genetically modified (second generation) crops

Table 4 Arguments in favour and against of Gene Edited Crops

Conclusions and future outlook

Novel genome editing techniques have shifted our focus from the insertion of protein-coding DNA towards DNA modifying enzymes and regulatory RNAs [30]. CRISPR/Cas9 has emerged as one of the revolutionary editing tools due to its unprecedented ability of precise editing, diverse applications, and minimum off-targets. Advances in gene-editing technologies have made it popular due to its diverse functions in crop improvement such as replacement, knock-out, knock-in, and point mutations, at any gene locus of crops. But at the same time, some questions are raised about its regulatory framework, especially concerning its integration into the GMO regulatory framework. The best GMO regulatory framework for plant breeding purposes is the regulatory framework of the USA The USA regulation has been documented with full optimization from scientific and social standpoints. The regulatory framework of Argentina is also very convincing with the concept of new plant breeding technology. The economy of India country that is based upon agricultural practices needs to redraft its regulation for breeders to develop new GE varieties to feed the 13.9 billion population of the world as soon as possible. The most important consideration for GMO is the assessment of health risks and food safety for all countries. Failing to adopt the GE technique has a major impact on research and foundations. Science and technology are heavily influenced by public opinion in many countries. In terms of genetic crop improvement, a decision in accepting the NPBTs is the major factor taken into consideration. Considering the NPBTs products especially created by the CRISPR/Cas9 technology under GMO will make the approval process more complicated. This practice will limit the commercial development of these techniques. However, exempting the GE varieties and utilization of already approved genes definitively encourage interesting opportunities for breeders as well as startup companies, to achieve certain niches in the creation of GE crops. At this stage, active engagement between developers and the public is highly needed so that researcher or developers and both eloquent their research to society and communicate that helps in eradicating the misconceptions regarding the genome editing technology in plants. Communication on research should also take place from beginning to end, with different stages of development [57] especially on the diverse application of these techniques and their effects and impacts on the public and environmental health. These attainments will definitively gradually help the consumer to accept genome-edited crops.

### CRISPR—2NC—Disease

#### CRISPR gene editing can treat disease inducing genes, even in previously untreatable conditions. It’s safe and effective!

Ledford 21 – Senior Reporter for Nature focused in biology in Medicine, PhD University of California Berkeley. [Heidi. “Landmark CRISPR trial shows promise against deadly disease.” Nature. June 29, 2021.]

Preliminary results from a landmark clinical trial suggest that CRISPR–Cas9 gene editing can be deployed directly into the body to treat disease.

The study is the first to show that the technique can be safe and effective if the CRISPR–Cas9 components — in this case targeting a protein that is made mainly in the liver — are infused into the bloodstream. In the trial, six people with a rare and fatal condition called transthyretin amyloidosis received a single treatment with the gene-editing therapy. All experienced a drop in the level of a misshapen protein associated with the disease. Those who received the higher of two doses tested saw levels of the protein, called TTR, decline by an average of 87%.

CRISPR gene therapy shows promise against blood diseases

The treatment was developed by Intellia Therapeutics of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Regeneron of Tarrytown, New York. They published the trial results in The New England Journal of Medicine1 and presented them at an online meeting of the Peripheral Nerve Society on 26 June.

Previous results from CRISPR–Cas9 clinical trials have suggested that the technique can be used in cells that have been removed from the body. The cells are edited and then reinfused back into study participants. But to be able to edit genes directly in the body would open the door to treating a wider range of diseases.

“It’s an important moment for the field,” says Daniel Anderson, a biomedical engineer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge. “It’s a whole new era of medicine.”

Treating the untreatable

Transthyretin amyloidosis is caused when molecules of TTR protein fold into the wrong shape and clump together, forming fibres that interfere with organ function. The disease principally attacks the heart and nerves. A hereditary form of the condition affects about 50,000 people worldwide; more than 100 mutations in the TTR gene have been linked to transthyretin amyloidosis.

The condition can cause heart disease, pain and death, and until recently there was little that doctors could do to treat it. “It’s an absolutely awful disease,” says Julian Gillmore, a nephrologist at the Royal Free Hospital in London who has treated people with various forms of amyloidosis for about 25 years. “Up until a few years ago, I just watched them get worse and die.”

But transthyretin amyloidosis has become a prime target for new medical technologies that aim to disable disease-causing genes. It is definitively linked to production of a particular protein — shut down production of that protein, and disease symptoms stop progressing and in some cases reverse.

CRISPR treatment inserted directly into the body for first time

In 2018, the US Food and Drug Administration approved two drugs to treat transthyretin amyloidosis, both of which reduce the production of TTR by targeting the messenger RNA that encodes it. But although these drugs reduce TTR by about 80% and prolong survival, they must be taken routinely to keep TTR levels down, and do not always halt disease progression.

Most TTR protein is produced in the liver, an organ that readily soaks up medicines from the blood. That feature is key: although CRISPR–Cas9 has been hailed as a revolutionary way to treat diseases, it has limitations. The technique requires a DNA-cutting enzyme, called Cas9, and a piece of RNA, called a guide RNA, to direct it to the proper place in the genome. These must be packaged in a way that shields them from degradation, and must be delivered to the site in the body where they are needed.

Intellia encased RNA molecules coding the guide RNA and the Cas9 protein in nanoparticles made of biomolecules called lipids, which can be taken up by the liver. The guide RNA sends Cas9 to snip the TTR gene; the cell’s DNA-repair processes then mend the break, but often make mistakes that can disable the gene and halt production of the TTR protein.

A month after treatment, TTR production was reduced in all participants. In one person who received the higher of the two tested doses, it fell by 96% — a result that Gillmore, who was an investigator on the trial, finds particularly exciting. Current treatments can reduce TTR by as much as 80%. But he says that a therapy that knocks TTR production down further would increase the chance that his patients’ symptoms would stop getting worse — and might even lead to improvement.

“When you get to numbers like 96%, that’s where you start to give the body a chance to clean up what has been deposited,” says John Leonard, president of Intellia.

Bone marrow and beyond

Researchers will anxiously await data from more participants, says Anderson, and will want to know how all the participants fare over a longer period of time. But the current results are enough to fuel hope that CRISPR–Cas9 will one day be able to help treat not only transthyretin amyloidosis, but other conditions, too.

Quest to use CRISPR against disease gains ground

Intellia has also shown that it can deliver CRISPR–Cas9 components to cells in the bone marrow in mice. Leonard says the company is keen to develop a method of treating sickle-cell anaemia that doesn’t require the arduous and risky bone marrow transplant used in ongoing gene-editing trials for the illness.

Another company, Editas Medicine in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has encoded CRISPR–Cas9 components into a disabled virus. Editas is testing this in people with a hereditary disorder that causes blindness, but the virus must be injected directly into the eye, where the gene editing needs to take place.

Techniques for delivering CRISPR–Cas9 components to various parts of the body are advancing rapidly, says Anderson. “The list keeps growing,” he says. “I’m optimistic that we’re going to see much broader application of genome editing.”

#### CRISPR has a laundry list of applications in genetic diseases. Genetic modification of disease inducing genes is a contingent good.

Shao-Shuai et al 20 – researcher in the key laboratory of growth regulation and transformation research at the School of Life Sciences at Westlake University. [Shao-Shuai Wu, Qing-Cui Li, Chang-Qing Yin, Wen Xue, Chun-Qing Song. “Advances in CRISPR/Cas-based Gene Therapy in Human Genetic Diseases.” Theranostics, 10(10) 4274-4382 (2020). Mar 15, 2020.]

Applications of CRISPR in genetic diseases

To date, CRISPR/Cas systems have been used to investigate target genes in genome modification, splicing, transcription and epigenetic regulation, and have been applied in a research setting to investigate and treat genetic diseases, infectious diseases, cancers, and immunological diseases , 30. Among the exciting advances, translational use of CRISPR/Cas in monogenic human genetic diseases has the potential to provide long-term therapy after a single treatment. In this section, we summarize the recent applications of the CRISPR/Cas system in the generation of disease models and in the treatment of genetic diseases in vitro and in vivo.

Disease modeling using CRISPR/Cas

The generation of disease models is necessary for understanding disease mechanisms and developing new therapeutic strategies. CRISPR/Cas has been widely used for creating disease-related cellular models, such as DMD 31, aniridia-related keratopathy (ARK) 32, brittle bone 33, X-linked adrenoleukodystrophy (X-ALD) 34, and Alzheimer's disease 35. Moreover, researchers have created a series of mouse models using CRISPR/Cas that recapitulate DMD 36, atherosclerosis 37, obesity and diabetes 38, RTHα 39, and Alzheimer's disease 40 (Table ​Table11). One example is the development of a mouse model for ryanodine receptor type I-related myopathies (RYR1 RM), which harbors a patient- relevant point mutation (T4706M) engineered into one allele, and a 16-base pair frameshift deletion engineered into the second allele of the RYR1 gene. Subsequent experiments demonstrated that this mouse model of RYR1 RM is a powerful tool for understanding the pathogenesis of recessive RYR1 RM, and for preclinical testing of therapeutic efficacy 41. CRISPR/Cas has also been used to generate disease models in large animals, including sheep 42, rabbit 43, pig 44, and monkey 45. For example, a monkey model was developed to study Parkinson's disease by introducing a PINK1 deletion and revealed a requirement for functional PINK1 in the developing primate brain 45. CRISPR/Cas technology offers a flexible and user-friendly means of developing disease models to explore the genetic causes of diseases and evaluate therapeutic strategies.

Disease correction using CRISPR/Cas in model organisms and clinical trials

Monogenic diseases affect a large population of patients. In the ClinVar database, more than 75,000 pathogenic genetic variants have been identified 19, 46. Here we summarize recent therapeutic applications of CRISPR/Cas in model organisms and in clinical trials (Table ​Table22 and Table ​Table33).

Hemoglobinopathies

Inherited blood disorders are good candidates for gene therapies because gene therapy can modify the causative gene in autologous hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs) and correct the hematopoietic system. β-thalassemia and sickle cell disease are two genetic blood diseases. β-thalassemia is due to various mutations including small insertions, single point mutations or deletions in β-globin gene, resulting in loss or reduced β-globin synthesis 47. Sickle cell disease is caused by a Glu->Val mutation in β-globin subunit of hemoglobin 48, 49, leading to abnormal hemoglobin S. Re-expressing the paralogous γ-globin genes is a universal strategy to ameliorate both β-globin disorders. The Bauer group applied CRISPR/Cas-based cleavage of the GATA1 binding site of the erythroid enhancer. This approach decreases erythroid expression of the γ-globin repressor BCL11A and in turn increases γ-globin expression. This strategy is therapeutically practicable to produce durable fetal hemoglobin induction 50-52 (Table ​Table22).

To date, three clinical trials aiming to treat patients with β-thalassemia and severe sickle cell disease by transfusion of CRIPSR/Cas9 edited CD34+ human HSCs (CTX001) have been initiated by CRISPR Therapeutics in 2018 and Allife Medical Science and Technology Co., Ltd in 2019 (Table ​Table33).

Inherited eye disease

Leber congenital amaurosis (LCA) is a rare genetic eye disease manifesting severe vision loss at birth or infancy. LCA10 caused by mutations in the CEP290 gene is a severe retinal dystrophy. CEP290 gene (~7.5 kb) is too large to be packaged into a single AAV. To overcome this limitation, Editas Medicine developed EDIT-101, a candidate genome editing therapeutic, to correct the CEP290 splicing defect in human cells and in humanized CEP290 mice by subretinal delivery. This approach uses SaCas9 to remove the aberrant splice donor generated by the IVS26 mutation. In the human CEP290 IVS26 knock-in mouse model, over 94% of the treated eyes achieved therapeutic target editing level (10%) when the dose of AAV was not less than 1 × 1012 vg/ml 53. Allergan and Editas Medicine have initiated a clinical trial of EDIT-101 for the treatment of LCA10 (Table ​Table33).

Autosomal dominant cone-rod dystrophy (CORD6) is induced by a gain-of-function GUCY2D mutation. CRISPR/Cas components delivered by AAV specifically disrupt the early coding sequence of GUCY2D in the photoreceptors of mice and macaques by NHEJ. This study was the first to successfully perform somatic gene editing in primates using AAV-delivered CRISPR/Cas (up to 13% editing efficiency of GUCY2D mutant gene in macaque photoreceptor), and demonstrated the potential of CRISPR/Cas to cure inherited retinal diseases 54.

Muscular genetic disease

DMD, caused by mutations in the dystrophin gene, is the most common form of progressive muscular dystrophy, and is characterized by muscle weakness, loss of ambulation, and premature death. Several groups have used NHEJ to bypass a premature stop codon in exon 23 and restore the expression of dystrophin in neonatal and adult mice after local or systemic delivery of CRISPR/Cas components by AAV 55-57. Similarly, CRISPR/Cas- induced NHEJ has been used to treat DMD in a DMD dog model after AAV-mediated systemic delivery of CRISPR gene editing components. 3 to 90% of dystrophin was recovered at 8 weeks after systemic delivery in skeletal muscle, the editing efficiency was dependent on muscle type and the muscle histology was improved in treated dogs 58. In addition, ABE was delivered locally by intramuscular injection of a trans-splicing AAV to cure DMD in a mouse model 59. These studies highlight the potential application of gene editing for the correction of DMD in patients.

Congenital muscular dystrophy type 1A (MDC1A), one of neuromuscular disorders, usually appears at birth or infancy. It is mainly featured by hypotonia, myasthenia and amyotrophy. MDC1A is caused by loss-of-function mutations in LAMA2, which encodes for laminin-α2. To compensate for the loss of laminin-α2, Ronald D. Cohn and his colleagues used CRISPRa to upregulate LAMA1, which encodes laminin-α1 and is a structurally similar protein to laminin-α2. Upregulation of LAMA1 ameliorates muscle wasting and paralysis in the MDC1A mouse model and provides a novel mutation-independent approach for disease correction 60.

Genetic liver disease

Hereditary tyrosinemia type I (HTI) patients with loss of function FAH mutations accumulate toxic metabolites that cause liver damage. CRISPR/Cas- mediated HDR has been used to correct FAHmut/mut in the HTI mouse model by hydrodynamic injection of plasmids encoding CRISPR/Cas components or by combined delivery of AAV carrying HDR template and sgRNA and of nanoparticles with Cas9 mRNA 61, 62. VanLith et al. transplanted edited hepatocytes with corrected FAH into recipient FAH-knockout mice and cured HTI mice 63. Song et al. have used ABE in an adult mouse model of HTI to correct a FAH point mutation 64. In addition to correcting FAH, several groups have knocked out hydroxyphenylpyruvate dioxygenase (HPD), which acts in the second step of tyrosine catabolism and is an upstream enzyme of FAH, to prevent toxic metabolite accumulation and treat HTI metabolic disease 65.

Patients with alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency (AATD) develop liver disease due to a toxic gain-of- function mutant allele, as well as progressive lung disease due to the loss of AAT antiprotease function. CRISPR/Cas-mediated NHEJ has been used to disrupt mutant AAT to reduce the pathologic liver phenotype 66, while HDR has been used to correct an AAT point mutation 67.

Congenital genetic lung disease

Congenital genetic lung diseases include cystic fibrosis and inherited surfactant protein (SP) syndromes 68. Monogenic lung diseases caused by mutations in SP genes of the pulmonary epithelium show perinatal lethal respiratory failure death or chronic diffuse lung disease with few therapeutic options. Using a CRISPR fluorescent reporter system, scientists precisely timed intra-amniotic delivery of CRISPR/Cas9 components into a prenatal mouse model with the human SP gene SFTPCI73T mutation to inactivate mutant SFTPCI73T gene through NHEJ. Prenatal gene editing in SFTPCI73T mutant mice rescued lung pathophysiology, improved lung development, and increased survival rate to 22.8%. For intra- amniotic delivery, the amniotic cavity of embryonic day 16 mouse fetus, in which fetal breathing movements are optimal for fetal lung editing, was injected. After prenatal CRISPR delivery, embryonic day 19 fetus achieved up to 32% SFTPC wild-type airway and alveolar epithelial cells in SFTPCI73T mice, rescued lung pathophysiology by immunohistology, improved lung development by reducing the synthesis of mis trafficked SFTPC mutant proprotein, and increased survival rate to 22.8% 69.

Cystic fibrosis is another life-threatening monogenic lung disease caused by mutations in CFTR gene 70. Researchers applied CRISPR to precisely corrected CFTR carrying homozygous F508 deletion (F508del) in exon 10 in the induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSC) separated from cystic fibrosis patients 71 and the overall correction efficiency is up to 90% using piggyBac transposase as selection marker. Xu group applied the electroporation of CRISPR/Cas RNP and achieved more than 20% correction rate in patient-derived iPSC cell line with F508del mutation 72. As expected, CRISPR-induced genetic correction leads to the recovery of CFTR function in airway epithelial cells or proximal lung organoids derived from iPSC.

#### CRISPR improves antiviral treatments. Targeted screening tracks viral spread and identifies molecules to stop replication

Vigliotti and Martinez 18 – Researcher at the Robbins Institute for Health Policy & Leadership at Baylor University; researcher at the Yale School of Public health. [Vivian S., Isabel. “Public health applications of CRISPR: how children’s health can benefit.” Semin Perinatol, 42(8), 531-536 (2018). Oct 2, 2018.]

Learning about influenza with CRISPR

Another application for CRISPR/Cas9 technology is to better understand how the influenza virus, a contagious respiratory illness causing up to 650,000 deaths/year,26 infects cells and replicates. Globally, lower respiratory infections are the 4th leading cause of death.27 CRISPR/Cas9 could be used as either an antiviral strategy or a genetic screening tool to reduce the prevalence of diseases such as influenza. One application of CRISPR/Cas9 technology that can have a tremendous impact on child health is the targeted use of CRISPR/Cas9 screening to identify and prevent influenza virus from replicating.28

Influenza is a widespread virus that is particularly difficult to eliminate. Seasonal influenzas (e.g. type A, B, C, and D) result in an estimated 3 to 5 million cases of severe illness and about 290,000 to 650,000 deaths each year.29 Severe cases are characterized by severe illness and hospitalization and are particularly prevalent among high-risk groups. 99% of deaths due to influenza in children <5 years old, occur in developing countries.29 Researchers have utilized CRISPR/Cas9 activation technology to identify influenza A virus (IAV) restriction factors.30 Their genome-wide overexpression screening found that an enzyme called B4GALNT2 exhibited inhibitory activity against every subtype of avian influenza.30 Thus, CRISPR was used to discovered a factor that can be utilized to eradicate infection by avian influenza viruses in humans.30

Researchers from the University of Chicago have identified not one, but two factors that allow the influenza virus to infect lung cells in humans.31 Their CRISPR/Cas9 genetic screening tool exposed human epithelial lung cells to the H5N1 flu strain and found two genes (SLC35A1 and CIC) common among the resistant cells, whose modified genome became resistant to the virus and was missing a necessary pathway for the virus to replicate (see Figure 2).31 Eliminating both genes using CRISPR/Cas9 prevented influenza virus infection. The gene CIC was also found to be important for all other strains of flu and various RNA viruses, including respiratory and non-respiratory viruses.31 This approach is not limited to the influenza virus, but has the potential to be used with a host of other genes for various viruses. Next steps include further research on available drugs that target necessary replication pathways for influenza or others viruses, so that the drugs can be repurposed as antiviral treatments.31

### CRISPR—2NC—Public Health

#### CRISPR can stop infectious diseases like malaria and Lyme’s disease at the source. That’s key to improve public health, especially for children under 5!

Vigliotti and Martinez 18 – Researcher at the Robbins Institute for Health Policy & Leadership at Baylor University; researcher at the Yale School of Public health. [Vivian S., Isabel. “Public health applications of CRISPR: how children’s health can benefit.” Semin Perinatol, 42(8), 531-536 (2018). Oct 2, 2018.]

Introduction

CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced palindromic repeats) is an easy to use and inexpensive gene editing technology that can be used to make highly precise changes to genetic sequences in order to protect human health. Therapeutic applications using CRISPR/Cas9 to correct disease-causing mutations are currently under development to treat cancer and heritable diseases, like Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) a genetic disorder with no cure that causes muscle degeneration and weakness, and eventual premature death.1–3 CRISPR-based therapies are also in pre-clinical development to treat other diseases of single-gene origin like cystic fibrosis or sickle cell anemia.4,5 However, here we will focus on non-human applications of CRISPR/Cas9 to microbes and animals and how these strategies could benefit children’s health by reducing the burden of vector-borne infectious diseases, microbial diseases, and lack of organ donations globally.

How CRISPR works

The CRISPR/Cas9 gene-editing platform employs small RNA sequences called guide RNAs to direct the system to matching sequences of DNA. Once the targeted DNA is located, Cas9, an DNA cutting enzyme, binds to and cuts the designated DNA to either shut off the targeted gene, add genetic sequences, or replace the targeted DNA with another sequence.6 CRISPR is unique because it also enables the engineering of CRISPR-based gene drives that function to rapidly propagate desired gene edits through sexually-reproducing plant or animal populations.7,8 Normally, during sexual reproduction there is only a 50% chance of gene inheritance in offspring. Thus, if one wanted to genetically alter a wild population to express a trait that limits an organism’s fitness, that gene edit would eventually become diluted in a wild population due to natural selection. Even a beneficial trait would take considerable generations, and thus time, to spread through a population. CRISPR-based gene drives instead have the potential to ensure desired genetic alterations can be passed to all offspring, even if the gene edit causes traits that are detrimental to an organism like sterility, to quickly spread a desired gene edit through a species population (see Figure 1).7, 9

Figure 1.

Mosquitoes and malaria.

CRISPR/Cas9 is different from other gene-editing technologies due to its use of a gene drive. A gene drive ensures that the altered gene is always passed on to the next generation, while normal inheritance results in the population eventually becoming diluted. This method is being used for Anopheles mosquitoes (pictured here) which transmit malaria.

Go to:

CRISPR applications to fight infectious diseases

Each year more than 700,000 deaths occur due to vector-borne disease transmission.10 CRISPR technology has important implications for children’s health by reducing infectious diseases by gene editing vectors of disease. Here we will discuss how CRISPR-based strategies could reduce mortality and morbidity of malaria and Lyme disease for children globally, especially in the case of malaria since it disproportionately affects children <5 years old.11

Malaria

In Africa alone, approximately 285,000 children <5 years old died from malaria in 2016,12 and nearly half a million individuals globally die from malaria every year.13 Malaria is a life-threatening infectious disease that children <5 years old are most vulnerable14 and is transmitted through the bite of an infected Anopheles mosquito carrying the Plasmodium parasite.15 Non-governmental organizations and academic institutes, like Target Malaria, are currently working to develop, but have not yet used, CRISPR-based gene drive strategies to reduce populations of Anopheles mosquitoes, and thus reduce malaria transmission.14 One of Target Malaria’s strategies uses CRISPR to inhibit expression of fertility genes in female Anopheles, with the aim of reducing the overall population of Anopheles mosquitoes and consequently malaria transmission.14

Another approach is being developed by scientists at Johns Hopkins University that utilizes CRISPR/Cas9 on Anopheles mosquitoes to prevent the activation of the protein (FREP1) necessary for Plasmodium survival.16 These gene-edited mosquitoes are less likely to carry Plasmodium parasites, providing an innovative approach to prevent malaria transmission for humans without impacting mosquito population size. Other scientists at the University of California experienced similarly positive results when testing the efficiency of a CRISPR/Cas9 gene-drive system that can spread antimalarial genes into a target vector population.17 The testing resulted in ≥98% efficiency,17 and further highlights the potential of a novel technology such as CRISPR/Cas9 in reducing the health burden of malaria for vulnerable populations such as children in low-income countries.

Lyme Disease

Ticks are the vectors responsible for transmitting Lyme disease and rodents serve as reservoirs for the bacterium Borrelia burgdorferi bacterium that causes Lyme disease.18 Lyme disease typically causes fever, fatigue, and a skin rash, and if left untreated, can spread to joints, the heart, and the nervous system of an infected individual.18 Lyme disease is most prevalent in the northeast and upper mid-western parts of the United States (US),19 with approximately 300,000 individuals diagnosed each year. Of these, 25% are children 5–9 years old.20 Lyme disease has become one of the most rapidly spreading diseases in the US,21 causing concern among parents regarding their children’s health due to the potential negative effect of pain and neurological symptoms associated with Lyme disease infection. White-footed mice serve as a primary reservoir for Lyme disease, which is why scientists are developing strategies to target white-footed mice to reduce Lyme disease transmission.

Researchers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, including Kevin Esvelt, are working to eliminate Lyme disease from the island of Nantucket in Massachusetts, U.S.A.; where over a quarter of inhabitants have been infected with Lyme disease.21 We should note that Esvelt and his team are not using gene drives on Nantucket due to public pushback. Instead, Esvelt and his team are working with island residents through their Mice Against Ticks program to develop a CRISPR-based approach to alter the DNA of white-footed mice to make them immune to Borrelia burgdorferi.21 Esvelt’s team works closely with local residents to share relevant information and produce space for public deliberation in terms of how and if their experiments should proceed. Making the mice immune to Lyme disease should reduce the transmission of the disease and consequently decrease the amount of individuals suffering from its harmful effects, such as arthritis, which is the leading cause of Lyme disease-associated morbidity in the US, affecting 60% of those infected.22 If field trials on uninhabited islands are successful then permission would be asked for the release of gene-edited mice on habited islands in Massachusetts, such as Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard.21 The potential to eradicate Lyme disease could offer children the ability to live a healthier life and decreases the parental worry of children enjoying the outdoors, especially during summer months.

#### Organ waitlists kill. CRISPR enables xenotransplantation and reduces the gap between organ supply and demand.

Vigliotti and Martinez 18 – Researcher at the Robbins Institute for Health Policy & Leadership at Baylor University; researcher at the Yale School of Public health. [Vivian S., Isabel. “Public health applications of CRISPR: how children’s health can benefit.” Semin Perinatol, 42(8), 531-536 (2018). Oct 2, 2018.]

CRISPR and xenotransplantation for children

CRISPR/Cas9 technology could decrease the shortage of available organ donations for children in need of liver, kidney, and heart transplants. In the US, 1 in 10 infants <4 year of age die while on the liver transplant list.32 Children aged 1 to 10 year olds are primarily on the waiting list for kidney and liver donations, followed by heart and infants under the age of one years old are mostly waiting for liver or heart transplants.33 Nearly 40% of children on organ waitlists must wait over a year for a transplant, a timeframe that immensely taxes child development and overall health.32 Though still in very early stages of preclinical development, CRISPR/Cas9 technology could provide an alternative solution for the organ transplant waitlist by providing the opportunity of xenotransplantation, transplantation of a non-human organ into a human.34 By making pig organs suitable for transplantation into human patients, CRISPR/Cas9 could be used to reduce the significant gap between the number of transplants children need and available organs that can be used for transplant donations.

Pig are being considered as an organ source for xenotransplantation due to the ease of breeding and because pig organs are also extremely similar to human organs in size and anatomy. Yet risks of porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) and organ rejection have inhibited the use of xenotransplantation for years. However, a world without organ shortage is becoming an eventual possibility thanks to innovative research that employs CRISPR technologies.34 Using CRISPR/Cas9, researchers successfully inactivated every PERV expressed by a porcine primary cell line. This research resulted in the production of PERV-inactivated pigs, meaning, in theory, that the risk of cross-species viral transmission associated with clinical xenotransplantation could be prevented, thus eliminating one safety concern associated with clinical xenotransplantation. 35 Scientists at eGenesis, a life sciences company focused on delivering safe and effective human transplantable cells, used CRISPR/Cas9 to remove all 62 copies of PERVs from the pig genome.36 In 2017, the first pig birth without any flu viruses occurred, in which all of its offspring could be utilized for human organ transplants (see Figure 3).36 CRISPR/Cas9 technology could potentially allow for the creation of individual organs for transplant from pig organs, instead of waiting for a perfect-match human organ to become available.

### Genetic Essentialism—1NC

#### Scientific discussions about genetics can reduce essentialist views that justify eugenics

Cheung et al 21 – lecturer and Indigenous Initiatives Coordinator at the Dept of Psychology at the University of British Columbia. [Benjamin Y. Anita Schmalor, Steven J. Heine. “The role of genetic essentialism and genetics knowledge in support for eugenics and genetically modified foods.” National Library of Medicine. Sept 30, 2021. Doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0257954]

In line with our preregistered hypotheses, the more people knew about genetics as assessed by our measure of Knowledge about Genetics, the lower they scored on measures of genetic essentialism, rs = -.35 and -.54 for Beliefs in Genetic Determinism and Genetic Essentialist Tendencies, respectively (ps>.001). Likewise, as preregistered, those people who knew more about genetics scored lower on eugenics acceptance, r = -.48. We also found that knowledge about genetics was negatively correlated with social dominance, r = -.40 (ps>.001), indicating that the more participants knew about genetics the less likely they viewed it as appropriate for some groups to dominate others. In addition, although not preregistered, we found that knowledge about genetics was positively correlated with GMO acceptance, r = .24, p < .001. That is, those participants who knew more about genetics tended to have more positive attitudes towards GMOs, a finding which converges with some other research [e.g., 26]. We also found that political conservatism was positively associated with genetic essentialist beliefs, social dominance, and eugenic support, but was negatively associated with attitudes towards genetically modified foods and with genetics knowledge.

General discussion

The results of these studies show that views on controversial topics related to genetics are predicted by the ways that people think about genes. Those who essentialize genetic concepts are more likely to view some groups as being inferior to others, support government eugenic policies to control who reproduces, and have fears about GMO foods. Given that GMO foods are widely viewed as safe by scientists, and social dominance orientations and eugenic beliefs are clearly harmful, genetic essentialist views can have pronounced costs.

Genetic essentialism involves an overly simplistic determinism between genotypes and their associated phenotypes [see 34] for a review); but genetic effects are far more nuanced and complex (for thoughtful reviews on this see [63, 64]). An underappreciation of this complexity may make eugenic ideas more appealing, leading people to condemn those who are assumed to have problematic genomes. Likewise, misunderstandings about genetics may render GMO foods as more threatening. While there are many reasons why people are cautious towards GMOs, a part of people’s concerns appears to hinge on GMOs seeming to violate the natural order of things and of crossing the perceived boundaries of essences [17, 25]. People with less essentialized views about genetics appear to share fewer of these concerns.

In addition to genetic essentialism, we found that knowledge about genetics also significantly predicted people’s views on these topics. It is encouraging that genetics knowledge was associated with less essentialist views, weaker support for social dominance and eugenics, and less negative attitudes towards GMO foods. This raises the possibility that some of people’s more harmful attitudes may be reduced by appropriate genetics education. Indeed, several efforts have revealed that many of the simplistic and problematic views about genetics can be reduced by curricula that consciously strive to counter them [e.g., 65–68]. The present research suggests that such efforts might help people to become more critical of eugenic and social dominance perspective [also see 69, 70], and may lead to become more open to some of the potential benefits offered by GMO technologies.

#### Research about genetics within debate is good. It forces students to question genetic essentialist narratives and misinformation in informal settings.

Donovan 21 – Senior Research Scientist at BSCS Science Learning, PhD in Science Education from Stanford University. [Brain M. “Ending genetic essentialism through genetics education.” HGG Advances. Oct 14, 2021. Doi: 10.1016/j.xhgg.2021.100058]

Implications for genetics education research

Since most genetics instruction emphasizes basic genetics literacy, and many genetics education experts advocate for more standard genomics literacy (and not humane genomics literacy),19,50,119,122 it is possible that contemporary genetics education does more to increase belief in genetic essentialism than to decrease it.4 Although no one has directly tested this hypothesis, syntheses of research on genetics education suggest that students bring their genetic essentialist biases into the classroom.19 Once in the genetics classroom, these biases interact with similar biases in teachers123 and textbooks19 to further exacerbate student belief in genetic essentialism.19 When students leave the classroom and make sense of genomic information in the media as adults, research also suggests that their belief in genetic essentialism grows,15,107,118,124, 125, 126 especially when they do not have the appropriate derived literacy to make sense of such media.15,19,118 Therefore, the most current evidence suggests that the system of K–16 genetics education inadequately inoculates students against belief in genetic essentialism.19 A consequence of this inadequacy is that students probably lack the ability to identify and critique genetic essentialist messages outside of school in the media. This prediction is warranted, because derived and fundamental literacies bidirectionally affect one another86 and because genetics education primarily focuses on basic genetics literacy.

Although this hypothesis is untested, it is consistent with studies of adults that explore how the public responds to genetic findings in the media.15,118,124, 125, 126 Simply put, there is no reason to expect our youth to develop into adults who disbelieve genetic essentialism if formal genetics education does not help youth to understand the flaws in genetic essentialism. Therefore, it should be unsurprising that some journalists continue to misconstrue the findings of population genetic studies to advance the argument that racial inequality is genetic.27,127,128 After all, genetics education rarely teaches students why they should be skeptical of this claim. Likewise, it should be unsurprising that American adults grow in their belief in genetic essentialism after reading the results of their own genetic ancestry test or those of others.15,124,125 After all, genetics education rarely helps students make sense of patterns of human genetic variation to refute essentialism. Nor should it be surprising that white supremacists continue to cloak their racial animus through genetic arguments about “human biodiversity.”129 After all, genetics education rarely helps students understand how Dobzhansky, Lewontin, Feldman, and other modern-day population geneticists have crafted arguments to challenge white supremacy. At best, genetics education does little to prevent genetic essentialism, and at worst it indirectly contributes to it through the kind of instruction it offers to students. While it is defensible to argue that some genetic essentialists will persist in their beliefs regardless of the genetics education that is provided to them, it is indefensible to claim that genetics education is irrelevant to genetic essentialism.

To better understand if and how genetics education influences broader social discourses about race in the United States, more research is needed on the interplay of derived and fundamental genomics literacy. School is not where most American adults learn most of their science.130 Many adults learn most of their science in informal settings—the news, the internet, television, movies, and social media.130 The ability to identify and dismiss essentialist misinformation in the media is therefore integral to preventing public belief in genetic essentialism. Yet, at the time of this writing (June 18, 2021), a search on google scholar including the terms “fundamental genomic literacy” or “fundamental genetic literacy” and “genetic essentialism” yields no publications matching these termsb. Thus, we know next to nothing about how students use genetics knowledge derived within school (i.e., derived genomics literacy) to comprehend, interpret, analyze, and critique genetic essentialist messages they encounter outside of school in science journalism or on social media (i.e., fundamental genomics literacy). Research on this relationship is so critical because it will tell us if and how genetics education leads students to believe in the genetic misinformation that is spread through social media by white supremacists as they recruit others to their cause129 or whether it helps them to criticize such media.

Of course, the previous argument implies that a relationship between derived and fundamental genomics literacy will be found if we go looking for it, and that genetics education can influence reasoning outside of school. Neither of these outcomes is guaranteed, because only 4% of high school science teachers report that they teach their students informational reading and writing strategies (i.e., fundamental literacy),131 and many educational studies have established that people have difficulty transferring their knowledge across reasoning contexts.87,132 Given these findings, it would be wise for any research program on scientific literacy, genetics education, and genetic essentialism to move beyond a positive test strategy that affirms the hypotheses laid out in this review. The positive test strategy in science involves designing studies that produce evidence consistent with one’s hypotheses.133 Most of the studies reviewed above used this strategy, because it is commonly used when exploring new hypotheses.133

### Genetic Essentialism—2NC

#### Genetic essentialism produces a reductive and eugenic view of race and difference, but new epistemologies of genetic research can deconstruct bias

Donovan 21 – Senior Research Scientist at BSCS Science Learning, PhD in Science Education from Stanford University. [Brain M. “Ending genetic essentialism through genetics education.” HGG Advances. Oct 14, 2021. Doi: 10.1016/j.xhgg.2021.100058]

The importance of genomics literacy in the development of genetic essentialism

Some adults believe that genetic essentialism is a self-evident, commonsensical, and objective way to view race.5 One reason why such adults make this error is because genetic essentialism of race is a form of a more widespread bias called psychological essentialism. Psychological essentialism is the belief that each living category (e.g., species, race, or gender) has an immutable and objective reality that cannot be observed directly (i.e., an essence) because it is internal to category members.59 This essence is believed to be responsible for the respective similarities and differences within and between categories.59 Consequently, a belief in essences leads people to infer that categories have an inductive potential, which, in turn, helps them to make predictions about how unknown individuals of a certain category will behave (e.g., stereotypes).59

Psychological essentialism emerges early in human development,59 and although it has been observed in several cultures,60,61 there is no direct genetic evidence that it is an inherited traita. Instead, several lines of evidence demonstrate that it is altered through language,6 culture, and schooling. A current working hypothesis is that psychological essentialism is built upon simpler cognitive biases (some of which may be innate) and that culture highly constrains the development of it.69 For example, young children (i.e., age 4–5 years) in different cultures are known to essentialize animal and gender categories,64,70 but there is cross-cultural variation in the timing of when children begin to essentialize racial or ethnic categories.61,63,64,71, 72, 73, 74 As far as we know, children (i.e., ages 3–5 years) in the United States tend not to conceptualize race in psychological essentialist terms64 like adults do.5 Psychological essentialism of race develops at different ages in the United States (and elsewhere) because of differential exposure to cultural content, and ethnic outgroups. Altogether, psychological essentialism of race appears to be more dependent on cultural input than essentialism of non-human categories or gender.63,64

During school, US children grow in their tendency to essentialize race and they begin to develop a belief in genetic essentialism of race. For instance, between the ages of 5 and 10 years, evidence suggests that US elementary schoolers stop thinking of racial identity as subjective and flexible and they begin to think of it as natural and stable.63,64 Although European American children exhibit these changes later in childhood than African American children do, racial essentialism becomes a stronger predictor of racial stereotyping in European American children during the course of elementary school as they realize that race is a salient concept for understanding society.65,67 Then, in middle school, when most students are formally introduced to Mendelian genetics during their science classes,77 adolescents begin to believe that essences are genetic.66 For example, adolescence is when people begin to favor genetic explanations for racially stereotyped traits like intelligence and athleticism rather than the environment or choice.66

By the end of high school, US teenagers who attend rural and relatively homogeneous schools are more likely to essentialize race than those who attend schools in diverse cities.64 However, the negative relationship between exposure to racial diversity and belief in genetic essentialism in European American high schoolers may be moderated by parental education,75 as this negative relationship does not appear to exist among adolescents parented by non-college-educated caretakers.75 Such moderation is probably due to the fact that exposure to racial diversity during college is associated with a reduction in belief in genetic essentialism in the European American undergraduate population.76 Therefore, K–16 schools may be a cultural context that promotes or prevents the development of psychological essentialism of race in the United States.65,67

Some scholars further argue that genetics education is a factor within schools that gives psychological essentialism a genetic “flavor.”4,18,19 Upon first analysis, it seems strange that an education in biology would have this effect. After all, genetic essentialism is a scientifically inaccurate view of intraspecific variation,4,6,19,78, 79, 80 and several studies have found that belief in species essentialism is positively correlated with misunderstandings of intraspecific variation and natural selection in children,81,82 undergraduates,79 and adults.82,83 A biology educator committed to the scientific literacy of their students should therefore view genetic essentialism as problematic for learning because it is antithetical to evolutionary thinking. Consequently, a scientifically literate biology student should understand why genetic essentialism is genetically flawed. Yet, even though scientific literacy has long been a goal of science education reforms,84,85 belief in genetic essentialism persists in US society. Why is this the case?

To answer this question, the concept of scientific literacy and its relationship to genetic essentialism needs to be examined in detail in the context of genetics education. Scientific literacy can be understood in two different senses: the fundamental sense and the derived sense.86 Reading and writing about scientific content is the fundamental sense of scientific literacy, and being knowledgeable about science is the derived sense of scientific literacy.86 While these two senses are distinctly different cognitive performances, they are intimately related, because knowledge production in science depends heavily on the production and consumption of texts.86

Fundamental literacy refers to the linguistic skills that individuals use to comprehend, interpret, analyze, and critique information in a scientific text.86 Derived literacy, on the other hand, refers to the scientific knowledge that readers and writers of science use when consuming or producing information in a science text.86 Knowledge is called derived literacy, because people can derive scientific knowledge by reading a scientific text.86 This means that individuals who possess greater comprehension, interpretation, analysis, and critical reading skills (i.e., fundamental literacy) are more likely to construct an accurate understanding of the concepts and phenomena described by a science text (i.e., derived literacy).86 Conversely, the comprehension, interpretation, analysis, and critique of information in a scientific text (i.e., fundamental literacy) depends heavily on whether a person has the prior knowledge to make sense of the information described by a text (i.e., derived literacy).87,88

From this perspective, fundamental genomics literacy is the ability to comprehend, interpret, analyze, and critique information in a genetics text, and derived genomics literacy is the genetic knowledge that facilitates this ability and ensues from it. This review summarizes research on the relationship between derived genomics literacy and genetic essentialism. It finishes by arguing for a need for more research on fundamental genomics literacy and genetic essentialism, because this body of research is nonexistent, yet critical to preventing the spread of white supremacy in the United States.

Derived genomics literacy can be broken down into the particular kinds of knowledge that students possess about genetics, which includes ontological and epistemic knowledge. Human genetic ontology broadly refers to the kinds of genetic phenomena that exist in humans and how these phenomena relate to, or cause, one another.89 Genetic epistemology broadly refers to the many different ways scientists have produced knowledge about human genetic ontology, as well as the strengths and limitations of this knowledge.90 Since there are several different ontologies and epistemologies in human genetics research,91, 92, 93, 94 since scientific concepts are used as tools to solve particular problems,95 and since educators have different purposes for teaching science,85 different combinations of ontologies, epistemologies, and purposes create different conceptions of derived genomics literacy. These conceptions, in turn, have different relationships with genetic essentialism. The three conceptions that are the focus of this review are basic genetics literacy, standard genomics literacy, and humane genomics literacy.16 The evidence reviewed below suggests that biology education does more to strengthen belief in genetic essentialism than to weaken it, because it is oriented toward basic genetics literacy and not humane genomics literacy. Table 1 outlines examples of the content that could be learned when developing each of these different conceptions of derived genomics literacy.

#### Basic genetics education fails to deconstruct biases. In depth research, debates, and exposure to complexity are good.

Donovan 21 – Senior Research Scientist at BSCS Science Learning, PhD in Science Education from Stanford University. [Brain M. “Ending genetic essentialism through genetics education.” HGG Advances. Oct 14, 2021. Doi: 10.1016/j.xhgg.2021.100058]

The influence of basic genetics instruction on belief in genetic essentialism

Evidence suggests that certain ontological content in the basic genetics curriculum could contribute to the development of genetic essentialism through the causal reasoning and social categorization mechanisms of genetic essentialism theory. Therefore, basic genetics instruction appears to be the wrong tool for reducing belief in genetic essentialism. Experiments have shown that reading basic genetics texts that include the blueprint metaphor for DNA106 and those that include “gene for” language107 cause elevated levels of genetic essentialism in adults because of changes in causal reasoning about genes related to specificity, proximity, and stability beliefs.11,16 Several other qualitative studies with students also support this hypothesis.19,108 Yet, there is also correlational evidence that adults with fewer basic genetics misconceptions are less likely to believe in genetic essentialism,14 and a study that explored the relationship between relatively high-quality basic genetics instruction and belief in genetic essentialism in adolescents found no relationship between the two.16 Therefore, learning about basic genetics concepts may not be the problem. Rather, ineffective basic genetics instruction that fails to redress a student’s genetic misconceptions may increase the risk that a student develops a greater belief in genetic essentialism.

A further escalation of this risk could occur when basic genetics instruction includes a discussion of racial difference. Three randomized controlled trials18,54,55 have demonstrated that when secondary biology students (i.e., middle and high school) learn from a curriculum describing the prevalence of monogenic disorders in different racial groups—a canonical basic genetics literacy phenomenon—it causes them to believe in genetic essentialism more. For example, Donovan54 compared 8th grade students (n = 43) who learned about genetic disease prevalence (e.g., sickle cell anemia) in different races to those who learned about it without race. He found that the group who learned with the racialized learning materials was significantly more likely to believe that races differed in their genetic potential for intelligence, science ability, and academic ability.54 Students inferred that if each race has its own disease, then each race must be genetically uniform, which makes races differ in many other ways because of their “unique” genotypes (i.e., discreteness beliefs). In two more double-blinded randomized controlled trials, Donovan then replicated these findings with 7th–9th grade students in biology classrooms.18,55 These studies show that when basic genetics instruction discusses racial difference, it can unintentionally increase belief in genetic essentialism among adolescent-aged students by interacting with beliefs implicated in social categorization.

Altogether, this literature suggests that belief in genetic essentialism will be increased when genetics educators discuss race in conjunction with ineffective basic genetics instruction that uses inappropriate language (i.e., “gene for”) and metaphors (i.e., DNA as a blueprint rather than a recipe). Educational experts argue that this is the modal approach to secondary and undergraduate genetics education.19,97 For example, the sciences of quantitative genetics and population/evolutionary genetics, which add complexity to the simpler stories of basic genetics literacy, tend to be described in a single chapter at the end of undergraduate genetics textbooks,109 and they tend to be absent from high school texts.19 Moreover, biology textbooks around the world tend to use gene-determinist concepts and language when describing genes.50,110, 111, 112, 113 And, the majority of American texts also discuss racial differences in the prevalence of genetic diseases.4,49,53

When this modal approach to genetics education is combined with the many cognitive demands of learning genetics, it becomes clear that basic genetics instruction is the wrong tool for reducing belief in genetic essentialism. Genetics is difficult to learn because it requires students to reason about the influence of genes across the cellular, organismal, and population levels.98 Yet, many studies have found that students enter and leave basic genetics instruction without being able to reason genetically across these levels.19 And, they also leave with their deterministic misconceptions intact.19 Part of the reason for this problem is that basic genetics instruction is often ineffective in helping students to integrate the models of molecular and Mendelian genetics,114,115 and it does not help students understand population-level variation in complex traits16. These failures of basic genetics instruction mean that students have difficulty understanding protein synthesis and the influence of proteins in the bodies of organisms.98 It also means that students develop little knowledge about how the environment gets into the body to moderate gene expression by interacting with proteins.116 If basic genetics instruction does not help students to reason across all levels of biological organization (i.e., cellular, organismal, population) to construct a multifactorial explanation of human difference, then why would it help students to disbelieve genetic essentialism?

The influence of standard genomics instruction on belief in genetic essentialism

Correlational and comparative studies on the relationship between standard genomics literacy and genetic essentialism yield inconsistent results. For example, in a sample of 427 Brazilian undergraduates, Gericke et al.117 found that standard genomics literacy was not correlated with belief in genetic determination. Yet, Donovan et al.17 found that standard genomics literacy had a weak, but statistically significant, and negative, relationship with belief in genetic essentialism in a geographically diverse sample of American high schoolers (n = 721, 9th–12th grade). With regard to comparative studies, Jamieson and Radick108 used a quasi-experimental design to explore if British undergraduates (n = 56) learning from a basic genetics curriculum or a standard genomics curriculum differed in gene determinist beliefs about human ability, a key component of the causal reasoning mechanism. Although their study was limited because of selection bias of participants into different treatment conditions, students did not differ in belief in genetic determinism before treatment. Yet afterward the students who learned from the standard genomics curriculum had significantly lower average belief in determinism on the posttest compared to the pretest, whereas those who learned from the basic genetics curriculum exhibited no significant pre-post change. Although the researchers argued that the learning conditions caused these effects, selection bias, measurement problems, and issues with the quality and transparency of their statistical analyses (e.g., insufficient reporting of statistics and conflating a within-subjects change with a between-condition effect) make this conclusion somewhat tenuous.

A reliably negative relationship between standard genomics instruction and belief in genetic essentialism is also tenuous, because at least one randomized trial has found that exposure to standard genomics information can increase belief in genetic essentialism in adults with low biology knowledge.118 For example, Morin-Chassé118 explored if belief in genetic essentialism in adults (n = 965) was affected after reading a text that explained that genes and the environment each influence human behaviors and that genes are a better explanation for intrapopulation variation than interpopulation variation. This is basically the content outlined in Table 1 under the column on multifactorial genetics. Morin-Chassé118 compared this treatment text to a control text that included no genetic information and found that adults with biology bachelor’s degrees in the control and treatment conditions did not differ in their post-experimental belief in genetic essentialism. Yet adults without biology bachelor’s degrees in the treatment condition had significantly greater belief in genetic essentialism than those without such degrees in the control condition.118 This result is consistent with the claim that the standard genomics text increased belief in genetic essentialism among participants who lacked the appropriate prior knowledge to understand it.

### GMOs—1NC

#### Genome-edited crops solve global food security—they improve agronomic performance, final product quality, climate resilience, and food stability. Multi-year studies and expert opinion prove.

Lassoed et al 19 – Professional Research Associate in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Saskatchewan [Rim, Diego Maximiliano Macall, Hayley Hesseln, Peter WB Phillips, Stuart J. Smyth. “Benefits of genome-edited crops: expert opinion.” Transgenic Research 28, 246-256 (2019). March 4, 2019.

 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11248-019-00118-5]

Method

An online survey was conducted between January and April 2018 to gather expert opinions on potential benefits of NBTs. The survey was emailed to a panel of 507 international experts (scientists, government officials, agribusiness professionals, etc.) with related backgrounds and experience in biotechnology. The survey instrument is part of a multi-year survey project investigating expert opinions regarding the application of NBTs and their potential to enhance global food security. The expert panel was obtained from a contact database that was constructed using emails of participants for a number of conferences on biotechnology organized by the researchers over the past 15 years, and of experts from online searches (i.e. websites of universities, research institutions, biotech companies and government agencies). This panel allowed us to reach a large number of international experts in the field of study.

Our study (BEH 97) was deemed exempt from full ethics review by the Behavioural Ethics Board at the University of Saskatchewan on April 7, 2015, on the basis that the participants, as experts, were not themselves the focus of the research.Footnote1 Nevertheless, our online survey presented participants with a standard consent statement describing the study, identifying the absence of known risks associated with participation, and a reminder that participation was voluntary and responses would be anonymous and confidential. Upon expression of consent, participants were presented with the survey.

The survey included three opinion-based questions. The first and second questions were phrased as short statements, soliciting responses on a five-point Likert scale. Respondents were invited to provide their agreement with a list of different potential benefits of genome-edited crops compared to GM and CONV alternatives, along with their confidence level on a five-point Likert scale (1 being least confident and 5 being most confident). Benefits of genome-edited crops were measured using 15 agronomic, environmental, and socio-economic factors. We acknowledge that these benefits can be achieved ‘theoretically’ by any of these three technologies, however, feasible outcomes of some techniques are restricted by regulatory burden, high costs, lengthy process and low consumer acceptance. The third question asked about the anticipated significance (i.e. minor, moderate or major) of a number of potential regulatory events in influencing where and how genome editing will be developed and used in agriculture.

At the end of the survey, a hypothetical binary choice question was asked to test for temporal preferences (using a lottery prize). Participants were asked how they would use an imaginary prize of $5000: for a summer vacation or for retirement saving. The question was used to compare the benefits-related questions between two groups of experts: those who tend to exhibit long- versus short-term preferences. This question was used only for classification purposes and it is not intended as a substitute for theoretical discounting models. It was useful in the context of our study to have a simple, univariate measure of discounting that was not tied to any specific theoretical framework.Footnote2

Results and analysis

The survey was completed by 114 respondents, resulting in a response rate of 22.5%. The sample is dominated by male subjects (79%), aged between 45 and 65 years (70%). Fifty-three percent of participants reside in North America, 28% in Europe, and the remainder from the rest of the world (4% from Africa, 6% from Asia, 4% from Oceania and 5% from Central and South America). Sixty-three percent identified themselves as scientists and 37% as non-scientists (government officials, agribusiness delegates, etc.). Forty percent work for industry, 26% for university, and 20% for government.

As clarified earlier, not all genome-edited crops fall into the same category. Results of previous surveys within this project show that expert decision makers agree that some genome-edited crops are transgenic and thus should be regulated as GM while others should not (Lassoued et al. 2018). Having this result in mind, the analysis below compares site-specific genome-edited crops (free from foreign DNA) to GM and CONV counterparts. On average, the mean level of benefits of genome-edited crops compared to GM (CONV) alternatives was 3.6 (3.75) with a standard deviation (SD) of .73 (.73) on the one-to-five scale. This reveals that experts largely agree on the potential benefits of genome-edited crops in terms of agronomic performance (disease resistance, drought tolerance, high yields, etc.), final product quality (nutrition, shelf life, etc.), climate change resilience, and global food security (Table 1). More than half of the sample was undecided (neutral or cannot tell) about the impact of genome-edited crops on environmental sustainability (e.g. reduced agri-food waste, enhanced biodiversity) and economic advantages for farmers (i.e. higher returns). As for the impact of genome-edited crops on consumer confidence, environmental footprint and trade, a plurality tends to be neutral or cannot tell at 46%, 45% and 44%, respectively.

Table 1 Expert opinions of impact of genome editing compared to GM and CONV (N = 114)

Full size table

Similarly, the majority of experts believe that genome editing offers more opportunity than CONV to produce crops with improved agronomic performance, product quality, farmer profitability (lower production cost, higher income), climate resilience, and global food security. These advantages are derived from the accuracy and precision of genome-editing technology that some say could help save years of development time and lower the cost to produce certain traits in crops. Yet, opinions on socio-political and environmental questions are less consistent. While 68% of the participants agree/strongly agree that genome editing will enable breeders to lower agriculture’s environmental footprint, the sample is divided into those who are optimistic that genome editing could be more effective than CONV breeding in creating varieties that would reduce agri-food waste (49%) and enhance biodiversity (39%) and those who are neutral (41% and 42%). Experts are also divided about whether genome-edited crops will enhance consumer confidence or open foreign market access: 35% and 34% think it will not help at all and 40% and 34% are uncertain. Only about a quarter of the sample (26%) agree/strongly agree that genome-edited crops might help resolve trade restrictions and enhance consumer confidence. Genome editing is still a relatively new technology. Like any innovation, its effects are still somewhat speculative. Many panelists commented that while existing biotechnologies can deliver similar benefits to genome-edited crops, products of genome editing might gain better socio-political advantages.

Overall, experts converged on a consensus that genome editing would offer better agronomic performance and product quality than the alternatives. Yet this does not imply that genome-editing technology is the ideal substitute for GM and CONV breeding techniques—they can and probably will coexist. GM and CONV still deliver important benefits, but genome editing would appear to deliver certain benefits better and faster thanks to its precision (advanced knowledge in genomics) and the potential lower regulatory oversight. Innovative plant breeding does not necessarily mean abandoning earlier breeding methods as different technologies might perform better than others for different breeding targets. For instance, the GM approach, despite being less precise, has the potential to perform better than genome editing to control certain viruses (see e.g. Ali et al. 2016; Lassoued et al. 2018). Yet, GM technology has been facing several regulatory and social barriers that limited the agronomic (and subsequently socio-economic) potential in rice and wheat, the world’s most important staple grains.

### GMOs—2NC

#### GM crops produce a laundry list of benefits – higher yield, disease reduction, pesticide reduction. And CRISPR solves inaccuracies.

Gupta et al 21 – Researcher in the department of Botany, School of Biological Sciences at Central University of Punjab. [Shweta, Adarsh Kumar, Rupali Patel, Vinay Kumar. “Genetically modified crop regulations: scope and opportunity using the CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing approach.” Molecular Biology Reports 48, 4851-4863 (2021). June 10, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11033-021-06477-9]

Genetically modified crops: a genome editing approach

GM crops were first commercialized in 1996 and by 2018 the area under cultivation has increased 113 times and is still growing. In the current scenario, GM crops are projected to grow in the marketplace over the next decade. These crops appeared to be the fastest adopted crop in the history of modern agriculture with reduced pesticide use [9]. Initially, GM crops such as insect-resistant Bt-cotton and pest-resistant crops were introduced for commercial cultivation. These crops are beneficial for the growers due to their better yield. In preference to consumer’s benefit, some crops like golden rice, containing high content of beta-carotene, and GM maize, in which ascorbate level has been improved to prevent scurvy diseases are introduced for large scale cultivation [10]. The GM crops are also very influential in reducing diseases like heart disease, cancer, and obesity [9]. The high oleic soybean oil that is commercially available through two companies, namely “Visitive Gold” from Bayer and “Plenish” from DowDuPont, has been found to be beneficial for persons with cardiac-related diseases in the USA Regarding regulation of GM crops, most countries are committed to risk assessment following the substantial equivalence law proposed by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Economic Cooperation and Development (ECD), World Health Organization (WHO), and some similar organizations. But the assessment is majorly considered inefficient for detecting the inadvertent effects of GM crops on the environment. In most cases, the health risk is the major disapproving factor for the commercialization of GM crops in many countries including India. It is stated that the development of high profiling techniques for evaluation can minimize unintended effects. The rapid progress in new generation gene-editing technologies like the CRISPR-cas9, TALEN, and ZFNs can make genetic modification more precise, and decrease the chances of undesirable mutations to reduce the health risk.

Gene editing is viewed as the second-generation technique with the latest is the CRISPR-Cas9 system. The idea behind this system is based on the bacterial immunity mechanism against invading viruses. The CRISPR-Cas system forms double-strand breaks that are repaired either by the homologous recombination or by the non-homologous end-joining cellular repair system. Also, the CRISPR-Cas9 system has been experimentally validated for deletion or insertion with precise targeting [4] . Generally, genome editing techniques are divided into three major categories as represented in Table 1. In traditional GM crops, the first generation has been developed by using different genetic components of plant pests including Cauliflower mosaic virus and Agrobacterium tumefactions for insertion of the gene of interest. In contrast, in the approach of edited plants with the CRISPR-Cas9 and other nucleases, it has been claimed that these are without any pest sequences (free of transgenes). In continuation, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has excluded several edited plants from the category of regulation of GM crops and allowed them to be marketed without pre-market field review as necessary for GM crops. As a whole, with more exemptions from GMO regulations, this revolutionary technique can be used for innovation in diverse fields, with more public acceptance.

Table 1 Different categories of genome editing techniques

Full size table

The Crispr-Cas9 genome editing system

A genome editing technology provides a platform for the characterization of different key regulatory genes of diverse functions and utilizes the generated information for improvement in crops by targeting multiple areas of research. Among genome editing tools, the CRISPR (Clustered regulated interspaced short palindromic repeat) and cas9 (CRISPR-associated protein 9) have emerged as a versatile tool for the introduction of targeted variations like gene insertions, deletions, replacements, and single base pair conversion into selected crops at a specific location. Two different independent research teams discovered that CRISPR sequence and Cas protein work together for precise editing in the genome of living organism. This technology is mimicked from the prokaryotic adaptive immune mechanism in bacteria and archaea against the virus by cleaving the invader’s genome. Based on the composition of CRISPR locus, this system has been divided into two classes as Class 1 requires multiple effector proteins having subtypes I, III, and IV while class 2 requires only a single effector protein having subtypes II, V, and VI. The CRISPR-Cas 9 system belongs to class II and has two main components named Cas endonucleases and guide RNA (gRNA). Also, CRISPR-Cas9 has two distinct domains, named RuvC and HNH, for RNA-guided double-stranded DNA recognition and cleavage. The gRNA is a gene-specific sequence and is twenty-nucleotides long [11]. Due to complementarity, each gRNA binds to a DNA sequence ending with 5′-NGG-3′, and this site is called protospacer adjacent motif (PAM). This motif is found in three base pairs downstream of the Cas9 endonuclease cleavage site and is crucial for the binding of Cas9 [12]. Also, a ~ 80 nucleotide long gRNA scaffold sequence, present adjacent to the 3′ end, is required for Cas9 binding [13]. After the formation of the gRNA-Cas9 complex, Cas9 forms a double-stranded cut at three base pairs before the PAM sequence [14, 15]. These breaks are repaired by non-homologous end joining (NHEJ) and homology-directed repair (HDR) which cause insertion of up to a single base and deletion of up to 100 bases. Multiple sites can be targeted at the same time using multiple gRNA targeting different targets.

The action of CRISPR-Cas9 is divided into three stages as adaptation, expression, and interference [16]. At the adaptation stage, a Cas integrase incorporates nucleic acid sequences as spacers, in the CRISPR array. At the expression or biogenesis stage, a precursor transcript generated from the CRISPR array is cleaved in the repeat sequence to form processed the CRISPR RNAs. These crRNAs contain a spacer and a minimum of one portion of the repeat sequence. In the interference stage, crRNA-guided Cas complexes recognize a specific site on target nucleic acids through complementary base pairing. This triggers Cas enzyme-catalyzed target cleavage [17].

This technique has provided a basis for editing plants and engineering traits that help them to resist different stress conditions and nutrition improvement. Another class that contains Cpf1 endonuclease (CRISPR from Prevotella and Francisella1) has recently proven to be a better alternative for the CRISPR/Cas9. It will work with only one type of RNA (crRNA) that binds upstream to PAM and cleave DNA adjacent to short T-rich PAM (5′-TTTN-3′) and have only RuvC domain [18]. It provides fewer errors with controlled insertions due to its sticky ends. It has also increased target gene insertion up to 8%. Using this technique, various genetic manipulations including live-cell imaging, controlling gene expression, and mutation pattern in the genome can be carried out [19]. CRISPR-mediated editing reagents including DNA, RNA, and ribonucleoprotein (RNPs) are delivered through Agrobacterium, particle bombardment, and protoplast mediation in the plant cells. Plant transformations rely on plasmids and mRNA-based expression, leading to gene disruption, potential off-site cutting, and potential mosaicism. These undesired changes can be overcome by DNA free genome-editing system using the CRISPR-Cas RNP complex in plants. RNPs are intact complexes consists of in-vitro transcribed gRNA and purified Cas9 protein. These RNPs can be used to deliver directly as functional complexes. Various vector-free techniques are used to transport the CRISPR-Cas9 RNPs into protoplasts including electroporation, microinjection, liposome-mediated, and polyethylene glycol-mediated transformation. In recalcitrant protoplasts, mesoporous silica nanoparticles and cell-penetrating peptides are used to transfer the constructs directly into the plant cells. The biolistic delivery of the Cas-gRNA RNP complexes was reported first time in maize embryo cells and that generated fertile plants with both mutated and edited alleles. These RNP complexes have the advantage of stimulating mutation frequencies in a precise manner over DNA vectors and also these complexes are cleared instantly by a degradation pathway that reduces the time for off-target activity [20]. The RNP strategy has been applied in several plant species including wheat, maize, and potato [20,21,22,23]. There is tremendous potential in the CRISPR technology and further, it can also be used for selective transcription or selective inhibition of transcription in DNA segments.

### GMOs—2NC—Environment

#### GM crops have cascading environmental benefits – reduce pesticides and greenhouse gas emissions

Brookes 21 – Agricultural economist, consultant to agricultural, agri-food, and agri-input sectors, owner of PG Economics, MA Agricultural Economics and European Economic Studies from the University of Exeter. [Graham. “Environmental Impacts of Genetically Modified (GM) Crop Use: Impacts on Pesticide Use and Carbon Emissions.” Plant Biotechnology, 87-101. August 31, 2021.]

Abstract

This paper estimates some of the key environmental impacts associated with using crop biotechnology (specifically genetically modified crops) in global agriculture. It focuses on the environmental impacts associated with changes in pesticide use and greenhouse gas emissions arising from the use of GM crops since their first widespread commercial use in 1996. The adoption of GM insect resistant and herbicide tolerant technology has reduced pesticide spraying by 775.4 million kg (8.3%) and, as a result, decreased the environmental impact associated with herbicide and insecticide use on these crops [as measured by the indicator, the Environmental Impact Quotient (EIQ)] by 18.5%. The technology has also facilitated important cuts in fuel use and tillage changes, resulting in a significant reduction in the release of greenhouse gas emissions from the GM cropping area. In 2018, this was equivalent to removing 15.27 million cars from the roads.

7.1 Introduction

GM crop technology has been widely used for more than 20 years in a number of countries and is mainly found in the four crops of canola, maize, cotton and soybean. In 2018, crops containing this type of technology accounted for 48% of the global plantings of these four crops. In addition, small areas of GM sugar beet (adopted in the USA and Canada since 2008), papaya (in the USA since 1999 and China since 2008), alfalfa (in the US initially in 2005–2007 and then from 2011), squash (in the USA since 2004), apples (in the USA since 2016), potatoes (in the USA since 2015) and brinjal (in Bangladesh since 2015) have been planted.

The main traits so far commercialised convey:

Tolerance to specific herbicides (notably to glyphosate and to glufosinate and since 2016 tolerance to additional active ingredients like 2,4-D and dicamba) in maize, cotton, canola (spring oilseed rape), soybean, sugar beet and alfalfa. This GM Herbicide Tolerant (GM HT) technology allows for the ‘over the top’ spraying of GM HT crops with these specific broad-spectrum herbicides, that target both grass and broad-leaved weeds but do not harm the crop itself;

Protection against/resistance to specific insect pests of maize, cotton, soybeans and brinjal. This GM insect protected/resistance (GM IR), or ‘Bt’ technology offers farmers protection/resistance in the plants to major pests such as stem and stalk borers, earworms, cutworms and rootworm in maize, bollworm/budworm in cotton, caterpillars in soybeans and the fruit and shoot borer in brinjal. Instead of applying a broad-spectrum insecticide for pest control, an insecticide, far more specific (usually to an insect level) and recognised as safe for humans and other animals is delivered via the plant itself through ‘Bt’ gene expression.

In addition, the GM papaya and squash referred to above are resistant to important viruses (e.g., ringspot in papaya), the GM apples are non-browning and the GM potatoes (planted in 2016) have low asparagine (low acrylamide which is a potential carcinogen) and reduced bruising.

This paper presents an assessment of some of the key environmental impacts associated with the global adoption of these GM traits. The environmental impact analysis focuses on:

Changes in the amount of insecticides and herbicides applied to the GM crops relative to conventionally grown alternatives and;

The contribution of GM crops towards reducing global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions.

It is widely accepted that increases in atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are detrimental to the global environment (see for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2006). Therefore, if the adoption of crop biotechnology contributes to a reduction in the level of greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture, this represents a positive development for the world.

### GMOs—2NC—Pesticides

#### Genetically modified crops decrease pesticide use and environmental impact. Critiques are politicized and antiscientific!

Lassoed et al 19 – Professional Research Associate in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Saskatchewan [Rim, Diego Maximiliano Macall, Hayley Hesseln, Peter WB Phillips, Stuart J. Smyth. “Benefits of genome-edited crops: expert opinion.” Transgenic Research 28, 246-256 (2019). March 4, 2019.

 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11248-019-00118-5]

GM crops

In 1953, the molecular structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the chemical carrier of genetic information, was published (Watson and Crick 1953). Just over two decades later, Cohen et al. (1973) described the method with which functional foreign DNA could be inserted into another organism. This breakthrough became the foundation of genetic modification, arguably one of the most important recent developments in science, especially to modern agriculture. Thus far, genetic modification has primarily been used to introduce foreign DNA into target crops to make them insect resistant or herbicide tolerant, with these two traits often being ‘stacked’ (ISAAA 2017).

Globally, over the past two decades GM crops have provided farmers in adopting countries an array of economic, environmental, and health benefits (Smyth et al. 2015). GM crops have contributed significantly to the reduction of environmental impacts from herbicide and insecticide use. Since 1996, the use of pesticides on the GM crop area has decreased by 671.4 million kg of active ingredient relative to the amount expected had conventional crops been employed on the same area (Brookes and Barfoot 2018). In addition, relative to conventional crops, 2945 million kg of carbon dioxide have not been released into the atmosphere, because of the fuel saved from fewer runs needed to spray GM insect-resistant maize and cotton (Brookes and Barfoot 2018). Despite this, for a diversity of reasons, some still regard the technology with suspicion, thus giving cause for greater technological regulatory delays and more barriers to international trade, which usually result in forgone benefits (Smyth 2017b). To a certain extent societal concerns regarding the safety of food derived from GM crops is understandable, given the public’s limited knowledge (Popek and Halagarda 2017). It would be overly optimistic, to expect the general public to be able to differentiate between GM and genome-edited crops in the absence of transparent information or public education efforts. Furthermore, the politicization of risk has created a divergence of regulatory approaches: the major crop exporting nations (e.g. North America, Australia, Argentina, Brazil) use a pragmatic, science-based approach while importers (e.g. the EU and others) have been more cautious, using science tempered by political considerations (Smyth and Phillips 2014).

Genome editing

Mutagenetic technologies advanced rapidly in the 2000s into what is now known as genome editing, which refers to point-specific mutations in the genome, such as site-directed nucleases (SDN) and oligo-directed mutagenesis (ODM). The SDN technology includes a number of variants with analogous function: transcription activator-like effector nuclease (TALEN), zinc-finger nucleases (ZFN) and meganucleases, culminating in the discovery of CRISPR (Doudna and Charpentier 2014). SDNs allow for the introduction of small precision modifications (SDN 1 and 2) of larger pieces of DNA or introduction of complete genes at a predetermined location (SDN3). Genome editing has numerous advantages over earlier technologies, most significantly that it allows for targeted, single gene mutation across the entire plant genome. The CRISPR suite of breeding tools offers an easier, more versatile and accurate form of mutagenesis that facilitates transfer of the desired trait to progeny without losing any efficacy (Georges and Ray 2017). This technology is able to perform mutations to a specific site within the targeted gene, making the effects on the plants more significant (Song et al. 2016), as it can be programmed to target specific segments of genetic code or edit DNA with greater accuracy (Barrangou 2015). In addition to crop breeders, this is particularly attractive to animal and medical scientists as they anticipate the potential for treating disease through genome editing. Importantly, it holds great potential for public sector plant breeding in developing countries, allowing for local and regional solutions to improving food security. For example, a Chinese research group (Miao et al. 2018) has already made use of CRISPR/Cas9 technology to create a rice variety that yields 25–31% more output than conventional varieties. This could have profound implications for food security.

Nonetheless, for all the benefits CRISPR/Cas9 seems capable of providing, Smyth (2017a) identifies that not all governments will embrace this technology. One reason is that applications of genome editing yield different outcomes. Some modifications (SDN 1 and SDN 2) can be generated by chemical mutagenesis, radiation or natural mutations, with the resulting organisms similar to those obtained by traditional breeding or classical mutagenesis (e.g. glyphosate-resistant CRISPR rice for weed control). Other repair mechanisms involve delivering foreign DNA (SDN 3), with the outcome that the resulting products would be viewed as transgenic for regulatory risk assessments. In 2016, in response to a lawsuit launched by nine non-governmental organizations, a French court referred a request to regulate genome-edited varieties as GMOs to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for an interpretation of European Law pertaining to new plant breeding techniques, especially CRISPR/Cas9. On 25 July 2018, the CJEU ruled that mutagenic crops are subject to the European Union’s regulatory system in the same way as transgenic GM organisms (CJEU 2018). The ruling refers to modern forms of mutagenesis, and it did not clarify any genome-editing exemption. Regrettably, additional clarity will not be forthcoming as in January 2019 the European Commission announced that no new legislation regarding the regulation of crop technologies is planned, resulting in the CJEU ruling being binding in its current form (Livingstone 2019).

#### Herbicide tolerant GM crops reduce pesticide use and produce net environmental improvements

Brookes 21 – Agricultural economist, consultant to agricultural, agri-food, and agri-input sectors, owner of PG Economics, MA Agricultural Economics and European Economic Studies from the University of Exeter. [Graham. “Environmental Impacts of Genetically Modified (GM) Crop Use: Impacts on Pesticide Use and Carbon Emissions.” Plant Biotechnology, 87-101. August 31, 2021.]

7.2 Environmental Impacts of Insecticide and Herbicide Use Changes

Assessment of the impact of GM crops on insecticide and herbicide use utilises two measures: the amount of herbicide or insecticide active ingredient used and Cornell University’s Environmental Impact Quotient (EIQ) indicator (Kovach et al. 1992). This integrates various environmental impacts of individual pesticides into a single ‘field value per hectare’ and therefore can be readily used to make comparisons between different production systems across many regions and countries and provides an improved assessment of the impact of GM crops on the environment when compared to only examining changes in volume of active ingredient applied. This is because it draws on some of the key toxicity and environmental exposure data related to individual products, as applicable to impacts on farm workers, consumers and ecology.

7.2.1 GM HT Crops

A key impact of GM HT (largely tolerant to glyphosate) technology use has been a change in the profile of herbicides typically used. In general, a fairly broad range of, mostly selective (grass weed and broad-leaved weed) herbicides has been replaced by one or two broad-spectrum herbicides (mostly glyphosate) used in conjunction with a small number of other (complementary) herbicides (e.g., 2,4-D). This has resulted in:

Aggregate reductions in both the volume of herbicides used (in terms of weight of active ingredient applied) and the associated field EIQ values when compared to usage on conventional (non-GM) crops in some countries (e.g., herbicide use on soybeans in Canada), indicating net improvements to the environment;

In other countries (e.g., herbicide use in soybeans in Brazil), the average amount of herbicide active ingredient applied to GM HT crops represents a net increase relative to usage on the conventional crop alternative. However, even though the amount of active ingredient use has increased, in terms of the associated environmental impact, as measured by the EIQ indicator, the environmental profile of the GM HT crop has commonly been better than its conventional equivalent;

Where GM HT crops (tolerant to glyphosate) have been widely grown, incidences of weed resistance to glyphosate have occurred and have become a major problem in some regions (see www.weedscience.org). This can be attributed to how glyphosate was originally used with GM HT crops, where because of its highly effective, broad-spectrum post-emergence activity, it was often used as the sole method of weed control. This approach to weed control put tremendous selection pressure on weeds and as a result contributed to the evolution of weed populations dominated by resistant individuals. As a result, over the last 15 years, growers of GM HT crops have been (and are increasingly being) advised to use other herbicides (with different and complementary modes of action) in combination with glyphosate and in some cases adopting cultural practices (e.g., revert to ploughing) in more integrated weed management systems (Vencil et al. 2012; Norsworthy et al. 2012). Also, in the last 2–3 years, GM HT crops tolerant to additional herbicides (typically providing multiple tolerances in a crop) such as 2,4-D, dicamba and glufosinate have become available. At the macro level, these changes have influenced the mix, total amount, cost and overall profile of herbicides applied to GM HT crops. This means that compared to the early 2000s, the amount and number of herbicide active ingredient used with GM HT crops in most regions has increased, and the associated environmental profile, as measured by the EIQ indicator, deteriorated. Nevertheless, the amount of herbicide used on conventional crops has also increased over the same time period and that compared to the conventional alternative, the environmental profile of GM HT crop use has continued to represent an improvement compared to the conventional alternative (as measured by the EIQ indicator, see for example, Brookes and Barfoot 2018). It should also be noted that many of the herbicides used in conventional production systems had significant resistance issues themselves in the mid 1990s and this was one of the reasons why glyphosate tolerant soybean technology was rapidly adopted, as glyphosate provided good control of these weeds.

7.2.1.1 GM HT Soybean

The environmental impact of herbicide use change associated with GM HT soybean adoption between 1996 and 2018 is summarised in Table 7.1. Overall, there has been a small net increase in the amount of herbicide active ingredient used (+0.1%), which equates to 5 million kg more active ingredient applied to these crops than would otherwise have occurred if a conventional crop had been planted. However, the environmental impact, as measured by the EIQ indicator, improved by 12.9% due to the increased usage of more environmentally benign herbicides.

Table 7.1 GM HT soybean: summary of active ingredient usage and associated EIQ changes 1996–2018

Full size table

At the country level, some user countries recorded both a net reduction in the use of herbicide active ingredient and an improvement in the associated environmental impact, as measured by the EIQ indicator. Others, such as Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguayand Uruguayhave seen net increases in the amount of herbicide active ingredient applied, though the overall environmental impact, as measured by the EIQ indicator has improved. The largest environmental gains have tended to be in developed countries where the usage of herbicides has traditionally been highest and where there has been a significant movement away from the use of several selective herbicides to one broad spectrum herbicide initially, and in the last few years, plus complementary herbicides, with different modes of action, targeted at weeds that are difficult to control with glyphosate.

In 2018, the amount of herbicide active ingredient applied to the global GM HT soybean crop increased by 6.8 million kg (+2.4%) relative to the amount reasonably expected if this crop area had been planted to conventional cultivars. This highlights the point above relating to recent increases in herbicide use with GM HT crops to take account of weed resistance issues. However, despite these increases in the volume of active ingredient used, in EIQ terms, the environmental impact of the 2018 GMHT soybean crop continued to represent an improvement relative to the conventional alternative (a 10.6% improvement).

7.2.1.2 GM HT Maize

The adoption of GM HT maize has resulted in a significant reduction in the volume of herbicide active ingredient usage (−242 million kg of active ingredient) and an improvement in the associated environmental impact, as measured by the EIQ indicator, between 1996 and 2018 (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 GM HT maize: summary of active ingredient usage and associated EIQ changes 1996–2018

Full size table

In 2018, the reduction in herbicide usage relative to the amount reasonably expected if this crop area had been planted to conventional cultivars was 1.8 million kg of active ingredient (−0.9%), with a larger environmental improvement, as measured by the EIQ indicator of 8.4%. As with GM HT soybeans, the greatest environmental gains have been in developed countries (e.g., the US and Canada), where the usage of herbicides has traditionally been highest.

7.2.1.3 GM HT Cotton

The use of GM HT cotton delivered a net reduction in herbicide active ingredient use of 39.5 million kg over the 1996–2018 period (Table 7.3). This represents an 9.6% reduction in usage, and, in terms of the EIQ indicator, a 12.2% net environmental improvement. In 2018, the use of GM HT cotton technology cotton resulted in a 3.8 million kg reduction in herbicide active ingredient use (−14.5%) relative to the amount reasonably expected if this crop area had been planted to conventional cotton. In terms of the EIQ indicator, this represents a 17.7% environmental improvement.

#### Insect resistant GM crops have reduced insecticide use by upwards of 85%. That’s good.

Brookes 21 – Agricultural economist, consultant to agricultural, agri-food, and agri-input sectors, owner of PG Economics, MA Agricultural Economics and European Economic Studies from the University of Exeter. [Graham. “Environmental Impacts of Genetically Modified (GM) Crop Use: Impacts on Pesticide Use and Carbon Emissions.” Plant Biotechnology, 87-101. August 31, 2021.]

7.2.2 GM IR Crops

The main way in which these technologies have impacted on the environment has been through reduced insecticide use between 1996 and 2018 (Tables 7.5 and 7.6) with the GM IR technology effectively replacing insecticides used to control important crop pests. This is particularly evident in respect of cotton, which traditionally has been a crop on which intensive treatment regimes of insecticides were commonplace to control bollworm/budworm pests. In maize, the insecticide use savings have been more limited because the pests that the various technology targets tend to be less widespread in maize than budworm/bollworm pests are in cotton. In addition, insecticides were widely considered to have limited effectiveness against some pests in maize crops (e.g., stalk borers) because the pests occur where sprays are not effective (e.g., inside stalks). As a result of these factors, the proportion of the maize crop in most GM IR user countries that typically received insecticide treatments before the availability of GM IR technology was much lower than the share of the cotton crops receiving insecticide treatments (e.g., in the US, no more than 10% of the maize crop typically received insecticide treatments targeted at stalk boring pests and about 30–40% of the crop annually received treatments for rootworm).

Table 7.5 GM IR maize: summary of active ingredient usage and associated EIQ changes 1996–2018

Full size table

Table 7.6 GM IR cotton: summary of active ingredient usage and associated EIQ changes 1996–2018

Full size table

The global insecticide savings from using GM IR maize and cotton in 2018 were 8.3 million kg (−82% of insecticides typically targeted at maize stalk boring and rootworm pests) and 20.9 million kg (−55% of all insecticides used on cotton) respectively of active ingredient use relative to the amounts reasonably expected if these crop areas had been planted to conventional maize and cotton. In EIQ indictor terms, the respective environmental improvements in 2018 were 88% associated with insecticide use targeted at maize stalk boring and rootworm pests and 59% associated with cotton insecticides. Cumulatively since 1996, the gains have been a 112.4 million kg reduction in maize insecticide active ingredient use and a 331 million kg reduction in cotton insecticide active ingredient use (Tables 7.5 and 7.6).

In 2018, IR soybeans were in their sixth year of commercial use in South America (mostly Brazil). During this period (2013–2018), the insecticide use (active ingredient) saving relative to the amount reasonably expected if this crop area had been planted to conventional soybeans was 14.9 million kg (8.2% of total soybean insecticide use), with an associated environmental benefit, as measured by the EIQ indicator saving of 8.6% (Table 7.7).

Table 7.7 GM IR soybeans: summary of active ingredient usage and associated EIQ changes 2013–2018

Full size table

7.2.3 Aggregated (Global Level) Impacts

At the global level, GM technology has contributed to a significant reduction in the negative environmental impact associated with insecticide and herbicide use on the areas devoted to GM crops. Since 1996, the use of pesticides on the GM crop area has fallen by 775.4 million kg of active ingredient (an 8.3% reduction) relative to the amount reasonably expected if this crop area had been planted to conventional crops. The environmental impact associated with herbicide and insecticide use on these crops, as measured by the EIQ indicator, improved by 18.5%. In 2018, the environmental benefit was equal to a reduction of 51.7 million kg of pesticide active ingredient use (−8.6%), with the environmental impact associated with insecticide and herbicide use on these crops, as measured by the EIQ indicator, improving by 19%.

At the country level, US farms have seen the largest environmental benefits, with a 404 million kg reduction in pesticide active ingredient use (52% of the total). This is not surprising given that US farmers were first to make widespread use of GM crop technology, and for several years, the GM adoption levels in all four US crops have been in excess of 80%, and insecticide/herbicide use has, in the past been, the primary method of weed and pest control. Important environmental benefits have also occurred in Chinaand Indiafrom the adoption of GM IR cotton, with a reduction in insecticide active ingredient use of over 276 million kg (1996–2018).

### GMOs—2NC—Carbon Sequestration

#### GM crops reduce greenhouse gas emissions by lowering treatment and tillage. That sequesters carbon!

Brookes 21 – Agricultural economist, consultant to agricultural, agri-food, and agri-input sectors, owner of PG Economics, MA Agricultural Economics and European Economic Studies from the University of Exeter. [Graham. “Environmental Impacts of Genetically Modified (GM) Crop Use: Impacts on Pesticide Use and Carbon Emissions.” Plant Biotechnology, 87-101. August 31, 2021.]

7.3 Greenhouse Gas Emission Savings

Assessment of the impact of GM crop use on greenhouse gas emissions combines reviews on evidence of how GM crop usage has impacted on fuel use and tillage systems. GM crops contribute to a reduction in fuel use from less frequent herbicide or insecticide applications and a reduction in the energy use in soil cultivation. The application of GM HT crops has also facilitated a shift from a plough-based production system to a reduced tillage (RT) or no tillage (NT) production system (CTIC 2002). No-till farming means that the ground is not ploughed at all, while reduced tillage means that the ground is disturbed less than it would be with traditional tillage systems. This shift away from a plough-based, to a RT/NT production system has resulted in a reduction in fuel use. Secondly, the use of RT/NT farming systems increases the amount of organic carbon in the form of crop residue that is stored or sequestered in the soil and therefore reduces carbon dioxide emissions to the environment (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2006).

7.3.1 Reduced Fuel Use

The fuel savings associated with making fewer spray runs in GM IR crops of maize and cotton (relative to conventional crops) and the switch from conventional tillage (CT) to RT or NT farming systems facilitated by GM HT crops, have resulted in permanent savings in carbon dioxide emissions. In 2018, this amounted to a saving of 2456 million kg of carbon dioxide, arising from reduced fuel use of 920 million litres (Table 7.8). These savings are equivalent to taking 1.63 million cars off the road for one year.

Table 7.8 Carbon storage/sequestration from reduced fuel use with GM crops 2018

Full size table

The largest fuel use-related reductions in carbon dioxide emissions have come from the adoption of GM HT technology in soybeans and how it has facilitated a switch to RT/NT production systems with their reduced soil cultivation practices (78% of total savings 1996–2018). These savings have been greatest in South America.

Over the period 1996–2018, the cumulative permanent reduction in fuel use has been about 34,172 million kg of carbon dioxide, arising from reduced fuel use of 12,799 million litres. In terms of car equivalents, this is equal to taking 22.65 million cars off the road for a year.

7.3.2 Additional Soil Carbon Storage/Sequestration

As indicated earlier, the widespread adoption and maintenance of RT/NT production systems in North and South America, facilitated by GM HT crops (especially in soybeans) has improved growers’ ability to control competing weeds, reducing the need to rely on soil cultivation and seed-bed preparation as means to getting good levels of weed control. As a result, as well as tractor fuel use for tillage being reduced, soil quality has been enhanced and levels of soil erosion cut. In turn, more carbon remains in the soil and this leads to lower GHG emissions.

Based on savings arising from the rapid adoption of RT/NT farming systems in North and South America, we estimate that an extra 5606 million kg of soil carbon has been sequestered in 2018 (equivalent to 20,581 million kg of carbon dioxide that has not been released into the global atmosphere). These savings are equivalent to taking 13.6 million cars off the road for one year (Table 7.9).

Table 7.9 Context of carbon sequestration impact 2018: car equivalents

Full size table

The additional amount of soil carbon sequestered since 1996 has been equivalent to 302,364 million kg of carbon dioxide that has not been released into the global atmosphere. Cumulatively, the amount of carbon sequestered may be higher than this estimate due to year-on-year benefits to soil quality (e.g., less soil erosion, greater water retention and reduced levels of nutrient run off). However, it is equally possible that the total cumulative soil sequestration gains have been lower because only a proportion of the crop area will have remained in NT/RT. It is, nevertheless, not possible to confidently estimate cumulative soil sequestration gains that take into account reversions to conventional tillage because of a lack of data. Consequently, the estimate provided of 302,364 million kg of carbon dioxide not released into the atmosphere should be treated with caution.

Aggregating the carbon sequestration benefits from reduced fuel use and additional soil carbon storage, the total carbon dioxide savings in 2018 are equal to about 23,027 million kg, equivalent to taking 15.27 million cars off the road for a year. This is equal to 48% of registered cars in the UK.

### GMOs—2NC—Food

#### CRISPR produced the second wave of GM crops. That resolves food insecurity by improving yields and managing negative traits. GE resolves the short comings of first gen GMOs.

Gupta et al 21 – Researcher in the department of Botany, School of Biological Sciences at Central University of Punjab. [Shweta, Adarsh Kumar, Rupali Patel, Vinay Kumar. “Genetically modified crop regulations: scope and opportunity using the CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing approach.” Molecular Biology Reports 48, 4851-4863 (2021). June 10, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11033-021-06477-9]

Why CRISPR/Cas9 edited crops are not considered GM crops?

Both mutagenesis and the CRISPR/Cas9 systems are considered equivalent as these approaches induce mutation. Using the CRISPR/Cas9 approach, no foreign DNA is left in the mutated plant that makes it exempted from the definition of GMO and its regulation. Also, the gRNA that is used in the CRISPR/Cas9 system is not rDNA (Recombinant DNA). The organism created by the oligonucleotide-directed mechanism is considered a GMO because introducing oligonucleotide is not a natural process. Thus, there is always confusion between genetically modified crops and genetically engineered crops which is also a consequence, of people not accepting GE crops. In GM organisms or traditional transgenesis, there is no control on site of gene introduction and about its amplification (copies,) while in GE organisms (using nucleases including CRISPR/Cas9) any gene can be introduced or deleted at a specific location that helps in the modification of DNA. Thus, this technique shows more advantages over first-generation GM due to its precision, controllable nature, and low target effects. Apart from this, all the editing process was done using single-locus so that it can be readily accessible and available to researchers for use in their area of research.

Crop improvement using the CRISPR-Cas9 technology

With the increasing population, food demand is also increasing. Crop improvement is an important endeavor for meeting this requirement. The CRISPR/Cas9 system acted as a revolutionary technology in crop improvement which mainly focuses on improving yields, stress management, and quality by knocking out genes showing undesirable traits. This technique is used to achieve powdery mildew resistance in Wheat (Triticum aestivum) and tomato by knocking out the MLO gene [24]. In Glycine max, the Fatty Acid Desaturase gene converts Oleic acid into Linolenic acid. The CRISPR-cas9 system can be applied to induce mutation in FAD2-1A and FAD2-1B that restricts the conversion into linolenic acid and thus enhancing its nutrition index and shelf life [25].

Constructs of sgRNA and Cas9 were used to deliver ripening inhibitor protein (RIN) to regulate fruit ripening in tomato [26]. Cas9 construct with HDR template is used to target an Aceto-lactate synthase (ALS) gene in rice to obtain bi-allelic mutation [27]. The CRISPR/Cas9 system is also a valuable tool for activation and repression for transcription of the targeted gene in any plant genome. Catalytically inactive dCas9, fused with gRNA, can activate transcription of anthocyanin pigment by targeting AtPAP1 [28]. The dCas9-VP64 has reversed the silencing effect of methylation of AtFIS2 in fertilization-independent seed in Arabidopsis. The use of these nucleases has allowed scientists to develop the desired plant varieties more efficiently and rapidly than conventional breeding. This technology also enhances the domestication of orphan crops including finger millet, groundnut, tef, yam, and cassava. In almonds, the CRISPR/Cas9 technology has been used to produce plants with sweet seeds but carries bitterness in other plants due to amygdalin. This domestication plays an important role in increasing global food security with the CRISPR/Cas9 technology. But with the advancement of these gene-editing technologies, it remains to know how the public perceives these crops and how regulatory realms will deal with them.

### GMOs—2NC—AT: GMOs Bad

#### Criticisms of GM crops result from a lack of knowledge and trust -- *not* scientific backing. And, CRISPR resolves consumer fears of first gen gmos.

Gupta et al 21 – Researcher in the department of Botany, School of Biological Sciences at Central University of Punjab. [Shweta, Adarsh Kumar, Rupali Patel, Vinay Kumar. “Genetically modified crop regulations: scope and opportunity using the CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing approach.” Molecular Biology Reports 48, 4851-4863 (2021). June 10, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11033-021-06477-9]

Views of public towards GM and GE crops

The major problem faced by GM and GE crops is public acceptance. These engineered crops have been grown commercially since the 1990s and have expanded to various nations including the USA, Brazil, and India. But at the same time, some people are inadmissible about food products of GMs. The major reason for this may be the potential environmental and health risks due to unwilling genetic changes, lack of trust in multinational agrochemical companies, lack of knowledge about GE crops, ethical issues, adequacy of regulatory systems, and off-target mutations. Lack of trust in companies was clearly expressed both in a survey and in focus groups in a recent Norwegian study [52]. Similar attitudes have also been documented in Swedish reports [53]. Many surveys have also found that in European countries, consumers are more concerned about food security [37]. The consumers in European countries, also emphasized issues including origin and quality of food products (European [54]. In addition, the concern with naturalness in food production, exemplified by cisgenic modification is more acceptable than transgenic in public surveys [55, 56]. To overcome these challenges, people should be informed about the difference between GM and GE crops (Table 3) with the pros and cons of breeding techniques. GE crops are free of the transgene, thus no flow of transgene and do not affect biological diversity in overall. Major arguments in favor and against GE crops are also tabulated in Table 4. GE crops are very similar to wild species and so tagged with a DNA tag and should be assessed in the isolated field for their impact on the environment. Secondly, a global regulatory model is expected to fill this gap so that people do not wonder which regulation is superior over the other. The regulatory status must be amended so that people can trust and approve it without any hesitation. The regulations like SECURE in the USA help many plant breeders and companies to achieve small niches in GE crops creation. The government of different countries should surrogate between developers and the public to carefully consider the degree of health risk of each crop variety for which off-targets are also considered. Consumers should also consider the “right to know” if there is difficulty in acceptance of these new generation crops. Such endorsements will definitively help consumers to gradually accept genome-edited crops in near future.

Table 3 Enlisting differences between genetically modified (first generation) and genetically modified (second generation) crops

Table 4 Arguments in favour and against of Gene Edited Crops

Conclusions and future outlook

Novel genome editing techniques have shifted our focus from the insertion of protein-coding DNA towards DNA modifying enzymes and regulatory RNAs [30]. CRISPR/Cas9 has emerged as one of the revolutionary editing tools due to its unprecedented ability of precise editing, diverse applications, and minimum off-targets. Advances in gene-editing technologies have made it popular due to its diverse functions in crop improvement such as replacement, knock-out, knock-in, and point mutations, at any gene locus of crops. But at the same time, some questions are raised about its regulatory framework, especially concerning its integration into the GMO regulatory framework. The best GMO regulatory framework for plant breeding purposes is the regulatory framework of the USA The USA regulation has been documented with full optimization from scientific and social standpoints. The regulatory framework of Argentina is also very convincing with the concept of new plant breeding technology. The economy of India country that is based upon agricultural practices needs to redraft its regulation for breeders to develop new GE varieties to feed the 13.9 billion population of the world as soon as possible. The most important consideration for GMO is the assessment of health risks and food safety for all countries. Failing to adopt the GE technique has a major impact on research and foundations. Science and technology are heavily influenced by public opinion in many countries. In terms of genetic crop improvement, a decision in accepting the NPBTs is the major factor taken into consideration. Considering the NPBTs products especially created by the CRISPR/Cas9 technology under GMO will make the approval process more complicated. This practice will limit the commercial development of these techniques. However, exempting the GE varieties and utilization of already approved genes definitively encourage interesting opportunities for breeders as well as startup companies, to achieve certain niches in the creation of GE crops. At this stage, active engagement between developers and the public is highly needed so that researcher or developers and both eloquent their research to society and communicate that helps in eradicating the misconceptions regarding the genome editing technology in plants. Communication on research should also take place from beginning to end, with different stages of development [57] especially on the diverse application of these techniques and their effects and impacts on the public and environmental health. These attainments will definitively gradually help the consumer to accept genome-edited crops.

### Laundry List—1NC

#### Biotechnology solves a laundry list of problems – sustainable agriculture, fuel production, and food security are key to societal stability.

Ranjha et al 22 – researcher at the Institute of Food Science and Nutrition at the University of Sargodha. [Muhammad Modassar Ali Nawaz., Bakhtawar Shafique, Waseem Khalid, Hafiz Rehan Nadeem, Ghulam Mueen-ud-Din & Muhammad Zubair Khalid. “Applications of Biotechnology in Food and Agriculture: A Mini Review.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, India Section B: Biological Sciences 92, 11-15 (2022). Jan 11, 2022.]

Introduction

Products from natural sources are being used from centuries [1,2,3]. Processing the natural products to get significant benefits have been the priority in every era of science [4,5,6,7]. Biotechnology is an advanced, yet developed, technology that develops or modifies a product for some applied purpose utilizing living organisms and/or substances from these. It can be extended to all organism genera, i.e., from less complicated genera like viruses and bacteria to more complicated genera like plants and animals. So, biotechnology has become a major feature of modern industry, agriculture and medicine. Modern biotechnology provides a number of methods that scientists use to recognize and control the genetic structure of species for use in agricultural product development or processing [8].

The implications of biotechnology includes, breeding of plants for raising and stabilizing yields by improving their ability to confront various pests, insects and other possible threats, to fight various conditions like drought and counter diseases that could attack and cold and soil acidity, biotechnology is also being applied for nutritional enhancement of various foods [9, 10].

Disease-Free Plants

Disease-free plants are a very practical applications of biotechnology, these could be produced by micropropagation method. One of the examples of such plants is banana. Bananas are typically grown in countries where they emerge to be major source of income/employment and/or food. Micropropagation is a way to regenerate disease-free plantlets of bananas from tissues of healthy banana plants. It has all the possible benefits of being a revolutionary technique that is relatively inexpensive and easy to use [11].

Agriculture on acid soils

Lime can be applied to the soil to preserve the pH of the soil. This process emerges to be excellent but is expensive and temporary as well. Alternatively, it is possible to grow improved cultivars which are tolerant of aluminum [9].

Fortification of Crops

In developing countries or countries where there is a lot of shortage of food, fortified crops emerge to be an excellent food source which are supplemented with nutrients for rising malnourished children. One of the examples of such fortified crops is 'Protato'. This, genetically modified potato, is being widely cultivated and used in India and provides approximately one-third to one-half more protein than a common potato. In addition, this genetically modified potato also contains significant quantities of all essential amino acids, such as lysine and methionine. This 'Protato' could be a very potential food source in countries where potato is a major staple food [12]. Another example of such crops is golden rice. These genetically modified rice has a higher content of beta-carotene [13]. The grains and leaves of cowpeas are considered to be used as side or relish dishes. The cowpea is being consumed as staple food in various countries. The varieties of cowpeas with genetically modification has been grown in Tanzania [14]. The fortification of nutrients to enhance the nutritional status of crops, developed by genetically modified organisms with the major difference has been reported in Table1.

Table 1 The GM crops with major nutritional difference from original crops breeding

Full size table

Animal Feed

Genetically modified crops are practically being used in developed countries. Such kind of crops have a very significant potential to provide more nutrients than the normal [22].

Reproduction in Aquaculture

Biotechnology has emerged to have great practical applications in aquaculture, biotechnology has helped to maximize the growth and production in the aquaculture. Research is being continued in this field for better and harmless production of aquatic organisms suitable for human consumption [23].

Pest Resistant Crops

Pest attack is one of the very common problem in a number of different crops all around the globe, these crops may include fodder crops or other crops for the purpose of getting food. One the example of such crops is BT-Cotton. The genes of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), a very common, are inserted in cotton crop in order for development of certain protein in it. The protein is very toxic to a number of different insects. With this aid of biotechnology, the developed BT-Cotton leads to a less pest attack ultimately leading to a significant more production [24].

Drought Resistant Crops

Targeted and short gun methods are two different two different but main techniques in genetic engineering. These techniques are applied in order to obtain transgenic plants that will possess the ability to confer drought resistance [10].

Biofuel

The prosperity of future is mainly based on the supply of equitable, secure, sustainable and affordable energy. Production of biofuel is one of the emerged trends in recent years. Biofuel could be an emerged and reliable substitute of fossil fuels. Six microalgae’s strains were photosynthetically produced in a photobioreactor. Among these six microalgae, the Chlorella vulgaris strain is most dominant for the production of biodiesel. The Chlorella vulgaris has been used as feedstock. The quality of biofuel and productivity of lipids could be measured as a criterion for the selection of species to produce biodiesel [25].

Vaccine Development

Biotechnology has developed potential platform for scientists to develop wide ranges of vaccine in cheap and reliable ways and in mass production for all scales [26].

Fermentation

Fermentation is a predominant process to synthesize breweries. At commercial level, several strains of yeast are being utilized for the production of breweries. The light wine can be made through the mechanism of genetic engineering. Foreign gene encoded with glucoamylase has enabled to modify yeast. The glucoamylase is expressed through yeast during the fermentation process by which conversion of starch into glucose has been reported [27]. The strains of yeast are used for synthesis of wine which are capable of initiating malolactic fermentation. Synthesis of wine is comprised of two steps: 1) Primary fermentation uses yeast to convert the glucose into alcohol. 2) Secondary fermentation results in the production of lactic acid with the maximum acidity level using bacteria. The costly divergent strategies are applied to overcome this issue. The malolactic gene such as Lactobacillus delbrueckii is inserted into the strain of industrial yeast to resolve this problem. This gene depresses the conversion of malate hence minimizing the wine acidity level [27].

Enzymes

Enzymes are specifically used in processing and production of different items of food at industrial level. In 20th century second last decade, companies are being using enzymes to process food. The production of food is done by developing the technique of producing organisms through genetically modification. These enzymes contain carbohydrases and proteases. The maximum production could be achieved by the cloning of genes for these in minimum time period. These enzymes are specifically used for producing curd, cheese and flavoring items of food. Maximum percentage of enzymes are used in the industry of food. The more than 50% quantities of carbohydrases and proteases are being utilized in the USA industry of food. These enzymes comprise of α-amylase and rennin [27].

Use of Biotechnology to Improve Yield

Milk is being consumed all over the world as a beneficial food with high nutritional value. The pituitary gland releases bovine Somatotropin hormone which increases the production of milk. Formerly, the calves were being slaughtered to extract this hormone from their brain. Nevertheless, that method results in the less hormone quantity. Scientists utilized Escherichia coli for the insertion of gene with encoded bovine Somatotropin in it. Now, this hormone results in the production of more quantity. This hormone obtains 10–12% increase in the production of milk. In 2050, the world’s population will be reported nine billion. Consequently, on the same land, higher yield will be required. Potentially, biotechnology is the best technology to combat various food yield problem [27]. The greater level of hunger and poverty is reported in Africa. The malnutrition and hunger causes consequences in the case of in diseases such as rickets and kwashiorkor. These diseases result higher deaths. Africa can get rid of starvation, diseases, malnutrition and hunger with maximumly potential usage of biotechnology. It can improve standard of health and decrease rate of mortality. Three countries of Africa: Egypt, South Africa and Burkina Faso have been already profited through biotechnological adaptation of numerous methods of cultivation. For instance, 0.1 million Burkina Faso’s farmers elevated the cotton yield by 126% with the potential use of GM technology of food. The technology of GM food is adopted which is required for the commercial system. It causes the products of GMO release, allergenicity tests, toxicity and digestivity of GM food. In that particular area, European Union and USA should assist Africa. Many countries of Africa deficient in the system of biosafety. African should develop biosafety laws and make sure their approval their as priority for the easily adoption of system. The deficiency of education is another obstacle in the technology of GM food’s adoption. Kenyan people are much concerned about technology of GM food as they made protest against it. The lack of education is the major factor of the adverse attitude of people of Kenya toward biotechnology of food. People should be aware of advantages and disadvantages of GM technology of food through conveyance of message in seminars by scientists [28].

Shell Life

Various juice of fruits possesses minimum shell life. For instance, tomato is being consumed all over the world. Tomatoes should be harvested at stage of mature green in order to transportation. They are exposed to ethylene for earlier ripening and then picking. The quick ripening of tomatoes is due to more temperatures although, their taste could be destroyed at low temperature. A company of California named Calgene engineered genetically tomato to resolve that problem. They produced Flavr Savr variety of tomatoes in order to sort out the issue. An enzyme which is named as polygalacturonase causes the breakdown of pectin to ensure ripening. Scientists modified genetically tomatoes to decrease the quantity of enzyme. Antisense RNA is used for that specific purpose [28]. Low quantity of that enzyme shows consequences in the case of breakdown of cell wall and pectin in stronger tomatoes. These Flavr Savr variety possess tomatoes of firmer quality with increased shell life and later support transport [29].

### Pseudoscience—1NC

#### Genetic engineering is not perfect, *but* sweeping criticism lapse into pseudoscience that precludes reform and jeopardizes lifesaving innovation

Folta 18 – professor of Horticultural Sciences at the University of Florida. [Kevin M. “Chapter 5 – Food-o-science Pseudoscience: The Weapons and Tactics in the War on Crop Biotechnology.” Pseudoscience, Kaufman and Kaufman. 2018.]

Dinner, an Easy Target for Charlatans

The topic of food cooks up frequent morsels of pseudoscience—from fad diets to unfounded fears to age-old traditions that social archaeologists trace back to their ancient foundations in 1972. In recent times it is hard to find a more flaming insult to the sci- entific method than the loose claims centered on the topic of food. Within that space the tools of genetic engineering (GE; the scientifically precise term for what is famil- iarly referred to as “GMO”) are among the most maligned of food technologies. The ability to cut and paste DNA sequences from one organism to another has been with us for almost half a century and is universally considered a revolutionary technology— and you ain’t seen nothin‘ yet. We have been using such technologies to make drugs like insulin, enzymes for cheesemaking, and all kinds of compounds ranging from vitamins to nutritional supplements to chemotherapeutic agents. Even the most ardent activ- ists do not express too much concern about such applications, as they expand healthy options that enrich our lives. In many cases they make life itself possible; not only that, they give us cheese. The world does not have enough slaughterhouse floor pancreases to meet the modern demand for insulin. Genetic engineering makes the availability of therapeutic drugs like insulin safer and more reliable. The decreased medical demand for pancreases probably keeps hotdog prices down too. -But apply GE technology to crops that produce food ingredients, and the conversation drastically shifts.

Most commercial applications of GE have been in the area of agronomic crops, where

over eighteen million acres of GE plants are grown worldwide (Fernandez-Cornejo, Wechsler, and Milkove, 2016). As of today the major crops that end up in the human diet are field corn (not sweet corn, the other stuff fed to cows and car engines), canola (for canola oil), sugar beets (for sugar), and soybeans (National Academies of Sciences, 2016). The products derived from these GE crop plants end up in about 80 percent of grocery store products in North America. Essentially these ingredients represent the dusting of corn starch, sugar, or oil used in mass-produced foods. If you really think about it, although the plants are engineered to do something atypical (like resist insects or herbicides), the engineering process does not directly influence the end products that go into our mouths. While the plants are engineered, the products we purify from them are exactly identical to those from non-GE counterparts, except possibly for a nanogram speck of stowaway DNA or maybe the protein it encodes. The sugars, oils, and starches are chemically identical to those that were derived from non-GE plants. That is the majority of ingredients from GE plants in human food. Plenty of GE cotton is grown for fiber, and a rapidly expanding acreage of GE alfalfa is grown for cattle feed. In the United States there are a few GE plants that produce food for humans, such as sugar from sugar beets, and those products are identical to those from conventional or organic counterparts (except they cost less). There also is a tiny acreage of virus- resistant papaya in Hawaii and a few acres of virus-resistant squash around that nobody cares about, because people do not really like squash much. New products like safer, nonbrowning potatoes and nonbrowning apples have been approved and their parent companies are simply ramping up plant numbers before the products are widely avail- able. Just in these first paragraphs a few myths have been busted.

Among scientists, there is remarkable consensus that these products are safe (Fahlgren

et al., 2016; Nicolia, Manzo, Veronesi, and Rosellini, 2014), and they allow farmers to pro- duce more food with fewer inputs (like insecticides), which translates into larger profits on the farm (Klümper and Qaim, 2014). Since their first implementation in 1996, there has not been a single case of illness or death related to these products in humans or other animals (Panchin and Tuzhikov, 2016; Van Eenennaam and Young, 2014), a bril- liant safety record that underscores the success of careful design and stringent regula- tory hurdles (Strauss and Sax, 2016).

Certainly science recognizes some limitations and even negative environmental impacts of overdependence on some GE strategies (Lombardo, Coppola, and Zelasco, 2016). The emerging problems of herbicide-resistant weeds and insect resistance to plant-produced insect controls are very real indeed. Those of us working in science when the products were released did not need crystal balls to make such bold predic- tions. Anytime in life that we rely on a single strategy to solve a problem we end up cre- ating more problems, and herbicide and insect resistance to GE solutions is certainly a problem. With costly regulation’s hands around the neck of progress, the three to four chemistries that should have been developed were not, leaving farmers with no easy way to rotate herbicides in a manner that would kill weeds yet leave crops unmolested. The emergence of resistant weeds and insects is a residue of a well-financed pseu- doscientific tsunami that has paralyzed new product development. When we create a paranoid development environment rife with manufactured risk, we oftentimes spawn new issues by deploying half-solutions. However, even with these shortcomings, the benefits of GE crops far outweigh the risks (Kathage and Qaim, 2012; Klümper and Qaim, 2014). Many environmental benefits have been made possible in light of the limitations (Brookes and Barfoot, 2015), and the promise of these technologies holds great potential to solve some of the world’s most critical food security and environmen- tal impact issues of growing food.

Despite the widespread adoption and paucity of harm, there is a burgeoning public controversy afoot (Blancke, Van Breusegem, De Jaeger, Braeckman, and Van Montagu, 2015). What would possibly lead people to ignore good data, double down on kludge evidence, rally around the words of Internet food celebs, and condemn the words of credentialed scientists? Manufactured risk. It is fomented from a vocal and well- financed movement sworn to ending the sustained use of truly sustainable technology. Extremists want to end any form of tinkering with plant genetics; they wish a return to the pastoral charm of isolating insulin from pancreases pulled from gut piles and human growth hormone extruded from buckets of cadaver pituitaries—the stuff grand- dad waxed fondly about. Others hold anticorporate or antiquated farming agendas, and want the use of GE expunged from the farmer’s field even though they enjoy its benefits with a Coke at Chipotle or a wedge of cheddar made with enzymes from GE microbes. Condemning GE’s use and enjoying its utility are incompatible ideas but consistent themes in the anti-GE movement.

Objection to new technology is not unnatural. Humans have shown time and time

again that the emergence of a novel and powerful breakthrough frequently travels with the gremlin of ill-placed skepticism. Major paradigm shifts, from the Earth traveling around the sun to human conception in a petri dish, have always broken scientific harmony with a sour note of dissent. In the modern day this pushback against prog- ress manifests as pseudoscientific claims that oftentimes are difficult to decipher from actual science. Examination of the literature over the last twenty years uncovers some startling trends. Politically motivated “sortascience” and the emerging trend of preda- tory publishing abuses (see Beall, this volume) allow soft claims to creep into scientifi- cally weak publication venues that appear legitimate. Consumers and casual readers are challenged to separate actual science from something sloppy that looks science- shiny. The Internet is no friend to that foggy clarity. A well-orchestrated and typically well-financed manipulation of Internet space amplifies pessimistic messages of gloom, translating illegitimate science into a format for wide distribution and credulous con- sumption. This is why consumers are in the confusing place they are today, and why so many are concerned about their food.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the flimsy science that pollutes the sci-

entific discussion of genetic engineering, a technology that unfortunately shared a birth and toddlership with the Internet. These were two good technologies, poised to change the world. But today one is used to malign the other, and their relationship is only becoming more contentious as they transition into adolescence. The chapter will demonstrate the role of poorly designed science, lofty misinterpretations, or even deliberate misrepresentation of legitimate science to bolster an ideological or political food, or anticorporate agenda. Discussion of blatantly bogus claims and the effects of the pseudoscience around agricultural biotechnology will be presented. Ultimately the thesis of this work is that GE is a powerful technology that, like any technology, has the ability to do many good things. It certainly could be used for malevolent acts if one was so inclined. Like any technology it has things it does well and things it could do better. It is not magic, it is not doom, and it is not a panacea. However, we are over twenty years into its widespread deployment. Where science should be dominating the discus- sion of future application, crank pseudoscience in the popular press clouds the public discussion of risk and benefit and slows deployment of potentially useful technologies, with profound effects on those in desperate need. We miss an opportunity to soothe the needs of farmers, the environment, and those frozen in poverty, as well as the affluent industrialized world consumer. Time will show that the pseudoscience used to conjure risk around this sound technology has left a considerable body count and unfortunate environmental footprint.

### Pseudoscience—2NC

#### Critiques of biotechnologies are antiscientific. They rely on the same dangerous logic as vaccine denialism!

Hotez 20 – Dean for the National School of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, Professor in the Depts of Pediatrics and Molecular Virolocy & Microbiology at Baylor College of Medicine. [Peter J. “Combating antiscience: Are we preparing for the 2020s?” PLoS Biol, 18(3). Mar 27, 2020.]

The last decade was remarkable for a rise in antiscience activities, especially in the areas of climate change, air pollution, and synthetic chemicals, to name a few. In the biological and biomedical sciences, vaccines and vaccination programs became targets, as did gene editing, genetically modified crops, and other biotechnologies. Antiscience activists linked illnesses such as cancer or Lyme disease to conspiracies and cover-ups. In parallel, several populist governments worked to enact restrictions or slash budgets to imperil the future of research institutions in Brazil, Hungary, Italy, and the United States [1–3]. Some have voiced concerns that we might enter a new “post-truth” era [4], which could mean an expansion of attacks on both science and scientists.

One of the most prominent and visible antiscience movements is active in North America and Europe and focused on discrediting vaccines. As both a vaccine scientist and autism advocate for my adult daughter Rachel, I have been targeted by antivaccine activists for more than 2 decades. However, these harassments accelerated around the time leading up to the 2016 presidential election campaign and then reached new levels in 2019 as public health deteriorated due to declines in vaccinations [5–7]. Here, I give a first-hand account of my experiences (as a type of case study) and use them to propose potential reforms in graduate and postdoctoral science training as a mechanism for countering antiscience.

The year 2019 was a bad one in terms of the return of vaccine-preventable diseases to the US and Europe. Measles cases in Europe exceeded 100,000 and surpassed 1,000 in the US because of sharp declines in immunizations with the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine, while thousands of teenagers were denied cancer prevention through the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccinations, and we saw many pediatric flu deaths among unvaccinated children despite recommendations [8–10]. The decline in vaccinations is the result of several factors, but in the US and many European nations, it is strongly linked to a strengthened, empowered, and emboldened antivaccine movement [9, 11–13]. Whereas in the past the antivaccine movement was mostly a fringe element, it gained strength and critical mass to a point where it has affected public health. It now dominates the internet with hundreds of misinformation websites, amplified on social media and with political links to populist movements [14]. Their major assertions are as follows: (1) vaccines can cause autism or chronic illnesses; (2) these conditions represent a form of “vaccine injury”; (3) vaccines are unregulated and not adequately tested for safety; (4) vaccines contain toxic ingredients; (5) parents must assert their “health freedom”; and/or (6) there is a conspiracy between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and vaccine manufacturers to “push” vaccines on an unsuspecting public. In 2019, the World Health Organization listed “vaccine hesitancy” as a leading global health threat [15].

Too often, the public health community has been slow or halting in its response to the antivaccine movement. In the US, for example, the US Congress held hearings on the antivaccine movement in February and March of 2019, but they produced few, if any, tangible outcomes. In the meantime, the media and political activities of the antivaccine movement continue to expand and run mostly unopposed.

Go to:

Defending science

As a pediatrician scientist who develops vaccines for poverty-related neglected diseases, and as the parent of an adult daughter with autism, I felt uniquely positioned to both defend vaccines and counter the fake messaging coming from the antivaccine lobby. In 2018, I wrote a book, entitled Vaccines Did Not Cause Rachel’s Autism: My Journey as a Vaccine Scientist, Pediatrician, and Autism Dad (Johns Hopkins University Press), to fill a void in the literature–explaining the genetic underpinnings of autism as well as the data refuting its links to vaccines. I felt that adding a personal story to the public dialogue on this issue might ultimately bridge a gap for both the community of scientists and the families dealing with the realities of the autism spectrum [16].

I hoped that by explaining the science of autism—how it begins in early fetal brain development through the actions of dozens if not hundreds of autism genes and epigenetic mechanisms—it would help make the evidence showing that vaccines did not cause autism easier to grasp. For example, through whole-exome sequencing on Rachel, my wife Ann, and myself, we identified a potentially new autism gene possibly belonging to a larger group of recently published autism genes encoding neuronal cytoskeleton proteins [17].

I also felt it was important to put a face on science and scientists. A study conducted by Research!America finds that almost no US citizens can name a living scientist, and the few who did would name individuals such as Bill Nye and Neil deGrasse Tyson. I’m a fan of both Nye and Tyson, but for me, the survey essentially said that the typical working scientist–who struggles daily with complicated lab meetings and experiments, revising scientific papers, resubmitting grant applications, and presenting at scientific meetings in front of critical audiences—is mostly invisible. The US public has little knowledge about what scientists actually do.

Although Vaccines was not my first book, it was certainly the most personal, exposing my family and myself to public scrutiny. I felt this was important to do in order to be effective at communicating to worried and vaccine-hesitant parents. So far, the book has been relatively well received by the scientific community and several academic societies, and I have gotten many heartfelt emails and letters from parents thanking me for my candor, scientific explanations, and willingness to speak out and defend vaccines. Beyond the book, I have also since written several op-eds and given both public lectures on the topic (including at annual meetings of academic societies and at universities) and done interviews and podcasts. It is difficult to measure the impact of my vaccine advocacy, but based on correspondence and interactions with parents and healthcare professionals across the country, I get the sense that for many, my public remarks are often the first time they are hearing a positive message about vaccines and their first interaction with an actual scientist.

There was, however, a downside of this public engagement: intense exposure to an antivaccine media machine. It pelts my Amazon.com site with one-star reviews or makes outrageous statements on social media. What has been more worrisome has been the stalking or protests at meetings where I speak and some specific postings by leaders of the antivaccine movement. In December of 2019, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. posted to his Instagram account a statement claiming that I am an “industry shill” for the multinational vaccine companies [18]. His evidence is that I receive grant funding from the Gates Foundation and other sources, including a start-up biotech in the 1990s, perhaps not understanding that principal investigators require grant funds to support research scientists, experiments, and reagents. He also digressed about Jonas Salk, saying that he is one of my scientific heroes, which is true, but then went on to falsely accuse Dr. Salk of nefarious activities. My worry is that one of Mr. Kennedy’s many followers might believe his posting and try to escalate their attacks.

Go to:

A larger response to antiscience

The antivaccine movement is highly visible, but it is not the only antiscience movement gaining in strength and access. I loosely define an “antiscience movement” as an organized and funded rejection of science and scientific principles and methods in factor of alternative views, often linked to the targeting or harassment of individual scientists. We are now seeing this play out in other areas, including those highlighted earlier. I am especially concerned that biomedicine’s latest and cutting-edge biotechnologies such as OMICs and CRISPR gene editing will come under attack and block scientific progress that require these approaches. Without substantial efforts to counter them, I believe that organized antiscience movements will continue to gain ascendancy in the coming decade of the 2020s.

There has been some progress. In 2018, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences issued an important report on The Perceptions of Science in America, which is part of a larger Public Face of Science Initiative [19]. Its major findings include the somewhat reassuring message that public confidence in science and scientific investments have remained stable over the last 3 decades, although levels of confidence can vary significantly depending on educational attainment, race, age, and political ideologies; also, there is a need to understand why science skepticism is particularly strong among certain groups [19]. Moreover, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) both feature important discussions and workshops on the rise of antiscience, particularly as it pertains to agencies of the US federal government, while the former hosts the important Center for Public Engagement with Science and Technology. Both the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Committee of Concerned Scientists have worked to defend us from attacks. Prominent science historians and philosophers have also addressed the rise of organized antiscience [20], and there is an entire journal devoted to the public understanding of science [21].

Ultimately, combating antiscience movements and their organized activities will require a complex response and, likely, the involvement of major governments working in public–private partnerships. For the biomedical sciences, and possibly other fields, I believe that a critical element must include expanded visibility for scientists themselves, who are both “in the mix”—meaning active in their fields, publishing papers, writing grants, and speaking at scientific meetings—and simultaneously comfortable with engaging the public and who are versatile in using modern tools of written and oral communication.

#### Pseudoscience kills. Anti-biotech movements impede the use of life saving technology. That’s bad!

Folta 18 – professor of Horticultural Sciences at the University of Florida. [Kevin M. “Chapter 5 – Food-o-science Pseudoscience: The Weapons and Tactics in the War on Crop Biotechnology.” Pseudoscience, Kaufman and Kaufman. 2018.]

Dinner, an Easy Target for Charlatans

The Danger of Soft Sortascience

Opponents of biotechnology will claim that the technology is simply a vehicle for a handful of multinational corporations to obtain great wealth and ultimately control the food supply. However, these technologies have actually been shown to principally benefit farmers (Areal, Riesgo, and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 2013; Brookes and Barfoot, 2014), and have been extremely valuable in the developing world (Azadi et al., 2015; Azadi et al., 2016). Genetically engineered papaya is a splendid example of how these technol- ogies can help farmers and the environment, with the most conspicuous benefit being saving the productivity of a small local industry (Gonsalves, Lee, and Gonsalves, 2004). GE eggplant seeds are freely distributed among farmers in Bangladesh and change hands royalty-free every single day (Giri and Tyagi, 2016). Promises from the laboratory show potential solutions for the developing world, where supplying a single nutrient may deter blindness and death (Beyer et al., 2002). A small genetic tweak can (well, in theory; the technology has not been deployed yet) supply micronutrients needed for healthy babies, normal neural development, and general health (Kiekens et al., 2015; Naqvi et al., 2009; Saini, Nile, and Keum, 2016). These applications of biotechnology innovation are not pie-in-the-sky dreams. They are proven technologies that exist and have been tested—and shelved. Shelved on a high shelf of overblown precaution with no step stool in sight.

Their hindered deployment drags an anchor on public sentiment, an anchor

attached by the “good guys” in the well-fed industrialized world. Some of these folks would rather construct an imaginary demon before allowing technology to serve one desperate child. This pseudoscience has a body count, and therein lies the supreme irony. Those claiming harm where none exists are perpetuating harm where it does exist. Those standing up and proclaiming themselves to be champions of people are actually the ones killing them. The soft or false claims issued by the anti-biotech move- ment impede the dissemination of sound technologies, which prompts the necessity for this chapter.

### Vaccines—1NC

#### Biotech created COVID vaccines – that’s good! And it’s key to adapt to variants and decreasing immunity.

Lundstrom 22 – CEO of PanTherapeutics, research in cancer therapy applying viral vectors, PhD Molecular Genetics from the University of Helsinki [Kenneth. “Chapter 12 – Biotechnology strategies for the development of novel therapeutics and vaccines against the novel COVID-19 pandemic.” Biotechnology in Healthcare, pgs. 205-226; ISBN 9780323898379. April 1, 2022]

Abstract

The devastating COVID-19 pandemic has in an unprecedented way accelerated the development of novel therapeutics and vaccines. Repurposed and novel therapeutics have been evaluated for antiviral therapy against SARS-CoV-2. Clinical benefits of remdesivir have led to its approval for treatment of COVID-19. In contrast, drugs such as hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin have not proven therapeutically superior to placebo in clinical settings. Monoclonal antibodies have demonstrated promise, especially for combination therapy cocktails. Vaccine candidates based on inactivated virus, recombinant SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, viral vectors, and nucleic acids have been evaluated in preclinical animal models eliciting strong immune responses and providing protection against challenges with SARS-CoV-2. Furthermore, clinical trials have demonstrated neutralizing antibody titers superior to those found in convalescent COVID-19 patients. RNA- and adenovirus-based vaccines have been approved for use in humans resulting in mass vaccinations around the world.

The current COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in more than 271 million infections, 5.3 million deaths globally, and has generated economic and social destruction (Global Health Policy, 2021). It is therefore no surprise that major financial and scientific investments have been dedicated to treat and prevent COVID-19. At the time of the outbreak in Wuhan, China no efficient antiviral drugs or vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 were available. The alarming spread of infections, increase in death rates, strict lockdowns and confinements and shutdown of the global economy, brought on accelerated efforts to developed drugs and vaccines against COVID-19. In the context of antiviral COVID-19 drugs, much activity was dedicated to repurposing drugs showing efficacy against other viruses, parasites, and even neurological disorders (Yousefi, Mashouri, & Okpechi, 2021). Numerous efforts have also been dedicated to computational biology, structural biology, and screening programs (Lam, Lombardi, & Ouanounou, 2020). Vaccine development, due to its potential for disease prevention, has received plenty of attention related to COVID-19 based on inactivated viruses, protein subunits and peptides, viral vectors, and nucleic acids (Lundstrom, 2020a). In this chapter, drug and vaccine development against COVID-19 are presented.

12.1. Antiviral COVID-19 drugs

In the context of drugs against COVID-19, two main approaches have been pursued. Due to similarities between different viruses, it has been appropriate to repurpose existing approved antiviral drugs. The obvious advantages of this approach relate to the immediate availability of these drugs and their approval for human use. The disadvantages are the unknown effects of the repurposed drugs on SARS-CoV-2 and any adverse effects they might have on COVID-19 patients. Novel antiviral drugs developed based on computational biology, structural biology, and high-throughput screening can target novel signaling pathways and explore novel molecules for inhibition of viral attachment, entry, and replication. Examples of repurposed drugs for COVID-19 are presented below and summarized in Table 12.1. Evidently the most famous repurposed drugs are chloroquine (CQ) and hydroxychloroquine (HCQ), originally developed as antimalarial drugs (Krogstad & Schlesinger, 1987). In parasites, HCQ interferes with the endocytosis and proteolysis of hemoglobin resulting in inhibition of lysosomal enzymes. Furthermore, HCQ inhibits stimulation of the toll-like receptor 9 (TLR9), which can result in inhibition of cytokine production and modulation of costimulatory molecules. Despite initial promising reduction in viral load in COVID-19 patients (Gautret, Lagier, & Parola, 2020), it quickly became evident that the study design was poor and the results unreliable (Lundstrom, 2020c). Recently, a systematic meta-analysis, 12 observational and 3 randomized trials including 10,659 patients, revealed that HCQ did not generate a significant reduction in mortality, time to fever resolution or clinical deterioration and development of acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) (Elavarasi, Prasad, & Seth, 2020). On the other hand, there was a higher risk of ECG abnormalities/arrhythmia after HCQ treatment.

Table 12.1. Examples of drugs for COVID-19 treatment.

RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) has also been a common target for the development of RdRp inhibitors as antiviral drugs against influenza virus, hepatitis C virus (HCV), Zika virus (ZIKV), and coronaviruses (Wang, Anirudhan et al., 2020), justifying evaluation in COVID-19 patients. For instance, a molecular docking study demonstrated the potency of remdesivir (RDV), ribavirin (RBV), favipiravir (FPV) sofosbuvir, galidesivir, and tenofovir as antiviral drugs against SARS-CoV-2 due to their high binding affinity to RdRp (Elfiky, 2020). In the case of RDV, therapeutic efficacy has been previously shown against Ebola virus (EBOV) in rhesus monkeys (Warren, Jordan, & Lo, 2016). Related to coronaviruses, RDV antiviral activity against HCoV-229E, HCoV-OC43, SARS-CoV, and MERS-CoV was demonstrated in human cell lines and primary cells (Sheahan, Sims, & Graham, 2017). Reduced viral loads for SARS-CoV-2 and MERS-CoV (de Wit, Feldmann, & Cronin, 2020) were seen in mice and macaques, respectively.

In the case of SARS-CoV-2, RDV blocked infection of Vero E6 cells (Wang, Cao et al., 2020), and reduced virus titers and lung inflammation in rhesus monkeys (Williamson et al., 2020). In clinical settings, RDV has proven efficient in reducing the time of recovery of hospitalized COVID-19 patients, having a positive impact on mortality rate decrease, and reduction in respiratory tract infections (Beigel et al., 2020). The FDA approved the use of RDV in hospitalized COVID-19 patients in October 2020 (Rubin et al., 2020).

The guanine analogue FPV selectively inhibits viral RdRp demonstrating a broad antiviral range including influenza virus A, B and C, EBOV, and Lassa virus. Combination of FPV with interferon-α (IFN-α) showed fewer adverse events, shorter viral clearance time, and improvement in chest computed tomography compared to lopinavir/ritonavir (LPV/RTV) in a phase I clinical trial (Cai et al., 2020). In another study, FPV treatment led to significantly higher recovery rates in comparison to umifenovir (arbidol) treatment (Chen et al., 2020). Furthermore, FPV treatment of COVID-19 patients provided clinical improvement in a retrospective observational clinical trial in Thailand (Rattanaumpawan et al., 2020). Early FPV administration showed better viral clearance in hospitalized COVID-19 patients in Japan (Doi et al., 2020). Although the benefits need to be confirmed in large randomized, controlled clinical trials, FPV has been approved for commercial use in Russia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia (Joshi et al., 2021).

RBV is another guanosine analogue, which has demonstrated inhibition of SARS-CoV-2 in Vero cells (Unal et al., 2020). Hospitalized COVID-19 patients treated with RBV, IFN-β-1b, and LPV/RTV in an open-label, randomized, phase II study showed a significantly shorter time (7 days) from start of treatment to negative nasopharyngeal swab test compared to LPV/RTV therapy (12 days) (Hung et al., 2020). However, another comparative study on intravenous RBV and supportive therapy in patients with severe COVID-19 indicated neither improvement in negative conversion time nor in mortality rates (Tong et al., 2020).

The potent RdRp inhibitor sofosbuvir was superior to RBV in a phase I study showing a significantly shorter hospital stay and lower mortality rates (Eslami et al., 2020). Compared to standard care alone (67%), the clinical recovery was much better for COVID-19 patients receiving sofosbuvir/daclatasvir (88%) and the duration of hospitalization 6 days compared to 8 days for the control group (Sadeghi et al., 2020). However, in another phase I trial, sofosbuvir/daclatasvir combined with RBV showed no reduction in the duration of hospital stay, the number of admissions to the intensive care unit (ICU) or the number of deaths when compared to standard of care (Abbaspour Kasgari et al., 2020).

The adenosine nucleoside analogue galidesivir blocks viral RNA polymerase, showing promising inhibition of SARS-CoV-2 in preclinical studies (Ataei & Hosseinjani, 2020). However, results from early clinical evaluation did not provide a benefit of galidesivir compared to placebo, which led to termination of the study (BioCryst, 2021). The ribonucleotide analogue EIDD-2801 inhibited SARS-CoV-2 replication in cultured human epithelial cells and in mice (Sheahan et al., 2020). Moreover, EIDD-2801 showed significant reduction in viral load in the upper respiratory tract in a ferret model (Cox et al., 2021). The EIDD-2801 was well tolerated showing no serious adverse events in the first-in-human phase I study in healthy volunteers (Painter et al., 2021). Recruiting is in progress for a multicenter, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled phase II clinical trial in hospitalized COVID-19 patients (The Safety of Molnupiravir, 2021).

Proteases such as 3-chymotrypsin-like protease (3CLPro) (Moody & Ho, 2021), papain-like protease (PLpro) (Klemm, Ebert, & Calleja, 2020), and helicase (Lpro) (White, Lin, & Cheng, 2020) play a vital role in SARS-CoV-2 replication. 3CLPro presents an attractive target for COVID-19 drugs as no human homologue has been identified. In this context, boceprevir and calpain inhibitors inhibited SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 replication in Vero cells (Ma et al., 2020). Other potential 3CLPro inhibitors are ombitasvir, paritaprevir, tipranavir, ivermectin, and micafungin (Moody & Ho, 2021). Particularly, ivermectin has received attention due to its antiparasitic and antiviral activities. Treatment of SARS-CoV-2-infected Vero cells with ivermectin showed over 90% reduction in viral RNA levels after 24 h increasing to approximately 5000-fold after 48 h (Caly et al., 2020). In a pilot, double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trial in nonsevere COVID-19 patients no difference in the proportion of PCR positive individuals were seen 7 days after treatment with ivermectin and placebo (Chaccoura et al., 2021). A systematic review and meta-analysis based on 15 clinical trials showed neither reduced mortality nor reduced recovery time in patients treated with ivermectin (Castañeda-Sabogal et al., 2021). The design of the studies was far from optimal with a high risk of bias and very low certainty of evidence. Therefore due to insufficient certainty and poor quality of evidence ivermectin cannot be recommended for COVID-19 prevention and treatment. Furthermore, the FDA has not approved ivermectin for prevention and treatment of COVID-19. In fact, the FDA has issued a warning that ivermectin is a veterinary product and should not be used for human therapy (Bray, Rayner, & Noel, 2020).

In another approach, the X-ray structure of SARS-CoV-2 3CLPro allowed the design of the 13a and 13b pyridine-containing α-ketoamides, which displayed favorable pharmacokinetic properties and strong lung tropism in mice (Zhang, Lin et al., 2020). In addition to subcutaneous administration, 13b subjected to inhalation provided high and long-lasting concentration in mouse lung tissue. Moreover, the combination of structure-based drug design, virtual drug screening and high-throughput screening identified the N3 3CLPro inhibitor showing irreversible inhibition of SARS-CoV-2 (Jin et al., 2020). High-throughput screening of the organo-selenium compound ebselen demonstrated antiviral and cell protection activity in SARS-CoV-2-infected Vero cells. Moreover, the peptidomimetic aldehydes 11a and 11b exhibited significant antiviral activity in SARS-CoV-2-infected Vero cells without any significant cytotoxicity (Jin et al., 2020). Computer-aided drug discovery identified the antipsychotic drug ziprasidone and antimigraine drug telcagepant as covalent inhibitors of SARS-CoV-2 3 CLPro.

Another approach for COVID-19 drugs is to develop inhibitors against PLpro, due to its vital involvement in viral replication. In a data mining exercise of FDA-approved drugs, 147 potential SARS-CoV-2 inhibitors were identified (Kouznetsova, Zhang, & Tatineni, 2020). Furthermore, ubiquitin, interferon-stimulated gene product 15 (ISG15), and naphthalene-based PLpro inhibitors inhibited coronavirus replication in Vero E6 cells (Bhati, 2020) and GRL-0617 reduced viral replication in Caco-2 cells (Bhati, 2020).

In the context of the SARS-CoV-2 helicase Lpro, virtual screening of 970,000 chemical compounds identified lumacaftor and cepharathine as potent inhibitors with IC50 values of 0.3 and 0.4 nM, respectively (White et al., 2020). Lumacraftor has been postulated to act as a chaperone for protein folding and cepharanthine has previously demonstrated antiviral activity against SARS-CoV. Similarly, bananins are potent SARS-CoV helicase inhibitors with IC50 values of 0.5–3 µM. The high homology of 99.8% between SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 helicases makes helicase inhibitors potential targets for COVID-19 (Shin, Mukherjee, & Grewe, 2020). Moreover, flavonoid phytomedicines such as caflanone, equivir, hesperitin, and myricetin inhibit helicases and have been suggested for therapy against COVID-19 (Lee et al., 2009). In this context, quercetin (Lee et al., 2009), 7-O-arylmethylquercetin derivatives (Park et al., 2012), and myricetin (Yu et al., 2012) have demonstrated IC50 affinities between 2.7 and 8.1 µM against SARS-CoV helicase. However, the poor bioavailability of flavonoids has restricted their use in vivo (Thilakarathna & Vasantha, 2013), which has been addressed by engineering nanoparticles or nanodrones for delivery (Zhang, Cui, & Qu, 2019).

Herbal medicines, especially traditional Chinese medicines, have been previously used for antiviral therapy and are currently investigated for the treatment of COVID-19 (Pan, Dong, & Yang, 2020). For instance, glycyrrhizic acid (GA) from the Chinese herb Glycyrrhizae radix has demonstrated direct antiviral effect on hepatitis B virus (HBV) and has shown some inhibitory effect on HIV proliferation (Sun et al., 2019). Moreover, a retrospective clinical study in 73 SARS patients indicated that GA improved the symptoms of dry cough, chest tightness, and shortness of breath (Sun et al., 2019). Combination therapy of GA and vitamin C has been approved for the treatment of COVID-19 in a clinical trial in China (Zhao et al., 2020). Moreover, the active ingredient shikonin in Arnebiae radix has demonstrated good inhibitory effect against SARS-CoV-2. Traditional Chinese medicines such as Huoxiang Zhengqi (HXZQ), Jinhua Qinggan Granule (JHQG), Xuebijing, and Huashi Baidu (HSBD) possess antiviral activity and have been applied in COVID-19 patients for relieving severe COVID-19 symptoms (Zhao et al., 2020). However, additional well-designed clinical trials are needed to confirm safety and efficacy.

Another interesting target for COVID-19 therapy comprise the transmembrane protease serine 2 (TMPRSS2), which has previously been demonstrated to activate envelope glycoproteins of various viruses such as EBOV, influenza virus, MERS-CoV, and SARS-CoV required for membrane fusion and host cell entry (Sternberg et al., 2020). TMPRSS2 was shown to be involved in SARS-CoV-2 spike (S) protein priming and S protein-driven cell entry (Yamaya et al., 2015). Camostat mesylate can partially inhibit SARS-CoV and HCoV-NL63 infection in HeLa cells and significantly reduced SARS-CoV-2 infection in human lung Calu-3 cells (Hoffmann, Kleine-Weber, & Schroeder, 2020). Moreover, nafamostat mesylate inhibited infection in SARS-CoV-2-infected Vero cells. In a case series, combination therapy of nafamostat mesylate and FPV in 11 critically ill COVID-19 patients in Japan resulted in successful removal of seven patients from mechanical ventilation and release of seven and nine patients from hospital and ICU, respectively, and only one death (Doi, Ikeda et al., 2020). Moreover, nafamostat mesylate treatment of three elderly COVID-19 patients needing supplementary oxygen showed improvement (Jang & Rhee, 2020).

The SARS-CoV-2 S protein is certainly the main target for vaccine development, but computational methods have also indicated that several small molecule compounds acting as antihypertensive, antifungal, antibacterial, and anticoagulant drugs show potent binding affinity to the S protein, although not to the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) binding region making them less attractive as targets against COVID-19 (Wu, Liu, & Yang, 2020). Superimposing of the S protein receptor-binding domain (RBD)–ACE2 complex on the hesperidin–RBD complex, however, indicated that hesperidin may disrupt the RBD–ACE2 interaction and interfere with SARS-CoV-2 entry. Hesperidin, present in citrus fruits, has been previously used as herbal medicine possessing antioxidant, antiinflammatory, and antiviral activities (Haggag et al., 2020).

12.2. Monoclonal antibodies against COVID-19

One area of COVID-19 drug development that has received much attention lately is therapeutics based on monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) (Shanmugaraj, Siriwattananon, & Wangkanont, 2020) (Table 12.2). The mAb CR3022 previously developed against SARS-CoV has been analyzed for its cross-reactivity to SARS-CoV-2 (Tian, Li, & Huang, 2020). Despite no overlapping with the SARS-CoV-2 S RBD, CR3022 showed potent binding (Kd 6.3 nM) suggesting that CR3022 alone or combined with other neutralizing antibodies could find prophylactic or therapeutic applications against COVID-19. On the other hand, potent ACE2-targeting SARS-CoV-specific neutralizing antibodies presented no binding affinity for SARS-CoV-2 S. Therefore SARS-CoV-2 S-specific novel mAbs have been engineered from a collection of 51 SARS-CoV-2 S hybridomas from immunized H2L2 mice (Wang, Li et al., 2020). The 47D11 human mAb neutralized both SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 in Vero cells as well as vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV)-pseudotyped SARS-CoV. Moreover, 47D11 was shown to target the RBD of both SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2. At least 14 mAbs or mAb cocktails have entered clinical trials, of which 5 are currently in phase II/III studies (Tuccori, Ferraro, & Convertino, 2020). The S309 antibody identified from a convalescent patient, who had recovered from SARS in 2003 (Pinto, Park, & Beltramello, 2020) also neutralized SARS-CoV-2 as it binds to a highly conservative epitope in the S protein. The VIR-7831 mAb was engineered to improve the pharmacokinetic features and to extend the half-life of S309. Another mAb, VIR-7832 has been engineered to act as a T-cell vaccine to kill SARS-CoV-2-infected cells (Vir Biotechnology and Biogen Execute Agreement to Manufacture SARS-CoV-2, 2021). The COMET-ICE phase II/III trial for VIR-7831 is currently recruiting patients with early-stage COVID-19 (VIR-7831, 2021). In the lead phase, 20 patients with early symptoms of COVID-19 will be enrolled and then the study will be expanded to 1300 patients globally.

Table 12.2. Examples of monoclonal antibody-based therapy against COVID-19.

The fully human neutralizing IgG1 mAb LY-CoV555 (bamlanivimab) targeting the SARS-CoV-2 S RBD showed the highest binding affinity among more than 500 antibodies (Tuccori et al., 2020). Moreover, the LY-CoV016 (etesevimab) targeting another SARS-CoV-2 S epitope was engineered (Etesevimab and Bamlanivimab, 2006). The safety, tolerability, pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics of intravenous LY-CoV555 have been evaluated in a phase I trial in 24 hospitalized COVID-19 patients (A Study of LY3819253, 2021). Furthermore, interim results from the phase II BLAZE-1 study in 452 outpatients diagnosed with mild or moderate COVID-19 indicated that doses of 700, 2800, or 7000 mg of LY-CoV555 accelerated the natural decrease in viral load (Chen et al., 2021). In a phase II/III clinical trial, 577 nonhospitalized COVID-19 patients receiving either LY-CoV555 monotherapy or combination therapy with LY-CoV016 showed no difference in viral load between LY-CoV555 therapy and placebo (Gottlieb et al., 2021). In contrast, combination therapy with LY-CoV555 and LY-CoV016 provided statistically significant reduction in viral load. Moreover, in the phase III ACTIV-3 clinical trial, no significant differences in safety between LY-CoV555 and RDV were recorded, but the study was discontinued due to the absence of improvements in hospitalized COVID-19 patients (ACTIV-3, 21, Bamlanivimab, 21). However, in November 2020, the FDA issued emergency authorization for LY-CoV555 treatment of mild-to-moderate COVID-19 in adult and pediatric patients (Coronavirus COVID-19, 2020).

High-throughput single-cell sequencing of convalescent blood samples from recovered COVID-19 patients identified the BGB-DXP593 mAb (Cao, Su, & Guo, 2020). Although the SARS-CoV-2 neutralization mechanism of BGB-DXP593 is unknown, mAb binding has been proposed to the RBD of the S protein. The safety and tolerability of three doses of BGB-DXP593 will be evaluated in 180 patients with mild-to-moderate COVID-19 in a phase II study (Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, 2019).

In another approach, the REGN-COV2 mAb cocktail comprising REGN10987 (imdevimab) and REGN10933 (casirivimab) mAbs, which bind simultaneously to different epitopes of SARS-CoV-2 S RBD, aims at providing both protection against SARS-CoV-2 infections and treatment of COVID-19 patients (Hansen et al., 2020). Favorable results were obtained from preclinical studies in golden hamsters and rhesus macaques, where REGN-COV2 greatly decreased lung titers and reduced viral loads, respectively (Baum et al., 2020).

In two phase II/III trials in adult hospitalized (Safety, 2021a) and nonhospitalized (Safety, 2021b) COVID-19 patients, the efficacy of REGN-COV2 virus shedding is compared to placebo. Interim results based on data from 275 nonhospitalized patients demonstrated a good safety profile and reduced viral load with greater efficacy in patients whose immune response had not yet been initiated or who had a high viral load at baseline (Weinreich, Sivapalasingam, & Norton, 2021). More data from additional 524 outpatients confirmed that REGN-COV2 provided a 10-fold reduction in viral load compared to placebo (Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, 2020). The phase III RECOVERY trial will evaluate the impact of the REGN-COV2 mAb cocktail in comparison to LPV/RTV, HCQ, corticosteroid, and azithromycin treatment on hospital stay and mortality (Mahese, 2020). At least 2000 patients will be enrolled in the trial and because the two mAbs in REGN-COV2 target different domains in the SARS-CoV-2 S protein the ability of mutant viruses escaping treatment will be closely monitored.

The CT-P59 mAb binds to the SARS-CoV-2 S RBD, but with a different orientation compared to other neutralizing mAbs (Kim et al., 2021). Moreover, CT-P59 neutralizes the SARS-CoV-2 D614 G mutant. A randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled phase I trial in 32 healthy volunteers to evaluate the safety, tolerability, and pharmacokinetics of CT-P59 has demonstrated some positive interim results (Study to Evaluate the Safety, 2021a). Moreover, another phase I trial in 18 patients with mild COVID-19 symptoms is in progress (Study to Evaluate the Safety, 2021b). Recently, a phase II/III was approved by the Korean FDA for safety and efficacy evaluation in 1020 patients with mild-to-moderate COVID-19 disease (Study to Evaluate the Safety and Efficacy of CT-P59, 2021). Moreover, phase I clinical trials for other mAbs targeting the SARS-CoV-2 S protein such as JS016, TY027, BRII-196, BRII-198, and SCTA01 have been initiated (Yang, Liu et al., 2020).

12.3. Vaccines against COVID-19

Related to prevention of COVID-19, vaccine development has played an essential role. Different approaches include vaccines based on inactivated or attenuated SARS-CoV-2, protein subunits and peptides, viral vectors, and nucleic acids. At least 162 vaccine candidates have been subjected to preclinical studies, 52 vaccine candidates to clinical evaluation, and 6 vaccines have received emergency use authorization (EUA) globally or in limited countries. The current status is summarized below and in Table 12.3.

Table 12.3. Examples of vaccines candidates against COVID-19.

Phase I: study in progress Clinical Trial to Assess the Safety of a Coronavirus Vaccine in Healthy Men and Women (2021)

Ad, adenovirus; Ag, antigen; ChAdOx1, simian adenovirus; CLPs, capsid-like particles; EP, electroporation; EUA, Emergency Use Authorization; LV-DC, lentivirus-transduced dendritic cells; MA-S, membrane-anchored S protein; MV, Measles virus; MVA, modified vaccinia virus Ankara; nAb, neutralizing antibody; NDV, Newcastle disease virus; saRNA, self-amplifying RNA; VLPs, virus-like particles; VSV, vesicular stomatitis virus.

12.3.1. Inactivated and attenuated viruses

The inactivated vaccine candidate BBIBP-CorV induced robust SARS-CoV-2 specific neutralizing antibodies in mice, rats, guinea pigs, rabbits, and macaques (Wang, Zhang et al., 2020). Protection against SARS-CoV-2 challenges was established in rhesus macaques after immunization with two doses of 2 mg inactivated SARS-CoV-2 vaccine. Another inactivated SARS-CoV-2 vaccine candidate induced neutralizing antibodies against 10 representative SARS-CoV-2 strains in mice, rats, and primates (Gao, Bao, & Mao, 2020). Immunization of macaques with 3 and 6 μg of inactivated SARS-CoV-2 provided partial and complete protection, respectively. In clinical settings, an interim report from phase I and II trials demonstrated only a low rate of adverse events and robust immunogenicity responses in 96 individuals in the phase I part (Xia, Duan, & Zhang, 2020). Six hundred participants are enrolled in the phase II part of the trial. In another study, 144 participants were immunized with the inactivated SARS-CoV-2 vaccine candidate (Zhang, Zeng, & Pan, 2021). The vaccination on days 0 and 28 generated seroconversion of neutralizing antibodies in 114 of 117 (97%) individuals receiving 3 μg of the vaccine candidate, in 118 of 118 (100%) individuals immunized with 6 μg, and none of 59 individuals in the placebo group. Furthermore, a phase III, randomized, multicenter, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial in 12,688 healthcare professionals (PROFISCOV) is in progress (Palacios, Patiño, & de Oliveira Piorelli, 2020).

In the context of attenuated vaccines, a codon-deoptimized SARS-CoV-2 vaccine candidate (COVI-VAC) has been subjected to a phase I clinical trial to assess the safety and immune responses, where 48 healthy adults aged 18–30 years old will receive 2 doses of COVI-VAC 28 days apart, 2 doses of placebo, or 1 dose of COVI-VAC and 1 dose of placebo (Safety and Immunogenicity of COVI-VAC, 2021).

12.3.2. Protein- and peptide-based vaccines

Recombinant protein expression technology has substantially facilitated protein-based vaccine development. The SARS-CoV S RBD expressed in Pichia pastoris yeast cells has been produced and purified under GMP conditions (Chen, Du, & Chag, 2014). Immunization with the purified RBD2919-N1 vaccine candidate elicited neutralizing antibodies and protected mice against challenges with the SARS-CoV MA15 strain. Due to high overall amino acid similarity between SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 S proteins and their RBDs, RBD2919-N1 might be repurposed for SARS-CoV-2. In another approach, the multimeric repetitive assembly of capsid-like particles (CLPs) used as molecular scaffolds for soluble vaccine antigens (Aves, Goksøyr, & Sander, 2020) demonstrated that a CLP-based vaccine candidate expressed in Drosophila D2 insect cells induced high levels of SARS-CoV-2 S RBD-specific neutralizing antibodies in the same range as has been detected in COVID-19 patients (Fougeroux, Goksøyr, & Idorn, 2021). After booster vaccination, the virus neutralization titers exceeded those obtained after natural infection. A phase I/II clinical trial in 42 volunteers has been approved for safety evaluation (https://www.adaptvac.com/news. Moreover, the SARS-CoV-2 S and the S-RBD subunit expressed in human Expi293 cells have been used for immunizations applying homologous or heterologous prime-boost regimens in mice and primates (Tan, Juno, & Lee, 2021). The S protein was highly immunogenic in mice, whereas the RBD subunit showed poor immunogenicity. In contrast, both the S and RBD vaccine candidates were immunogenic in macaques at levels superior to those found in convalescent COVID-19 patients.

Molecular clamp technologies have enhanced the immunogenicity of HIV Env and influenza virus HA antigens by immunosilencing of a highly immunogenic protein trimerization domain (Kim, Erdos, & Huang, 2020). The experience from the codon-optimized MERS-CoV S1 subunit vaccine fused with a foldon trimerization domain (Liang, Su, & Song, 2021) supported the expression of the SARS-CoV-2 S1 subunit trimer in HEK293 cells, and the design of a microneedle array (MNA)-delivered SARS-CoV-2 S1 subunit trimer vaccine (Richmond et al., 2021). Potent antigen-specific antibody responses were induced in immunized BALB/c mice.

In another approach, a native-like trimeric subunit vaccine candidate, S-Trimer, based on the Trimer-Tag technology has been developed for SARS-CoV-2 (Zhou et al., 2006). Vaccination with the oil-in-water emulsion adjuvant As03 or the alum adjuvant CpG108 elicited robust neutralizing antibodies and Th1-biased cellular immune responses in mice and macaques. Furthermore, immunization with S-Trimer and adjuvant provided protection against SARS-CoV-2 in macaques. The S-Trimer vaccine candidate (SCB-2019) showed good safety and tolerability in a phase I dose-finding clinical study in healthy volunteers in two age groups (18–54 years and 55–75 years) (Study of Recombinant Protein Vaccine Formulations Against COVID-19 in Healthy Adults 18 Years of Age and Older, 2021). Coadministration of AS03 or CpG108 adjuvants elicited high antibody titers, superior to titers in convalescent COVID-19 patients.

The baculovirus expression system was used for the expression of a full-length and a truncated version of SARS-CoV S in insect cells (Zhou et al., 2006). Immunization of mice with purified full-length and truncated SARS-CoV S formulated with an aluminum hydroxide adjuvant induced strong neutralizing antibody responses. Baculovirus-based SARS-CoV-2 S has been subjected to phase I/II clinical trials in volunteers aged 18–49 years old and in 55 years and older (Meng et al., 2021). Although robust immune responses were obtained in the age group 18–49 years, impaired dose levels generated lower levels of neutralizing antibodies in older individuals, which required redesign of a planned phase IIb study.

In another strategy, the SARS-CoV-2 S RBD has been expressed in Nicotiana benthamiana tobacco plants (Rattanapisit et al., 2020). Currently, recruiting is in progress for a phase I clinical trial for the purified SARS-CoV-2 RBD subunit vaccine KBP-COVID-19 administered together with the CPG adjuvant in healthy volunteers aged 18–49 years and 50–70 years (KBP-201 COVID-19, 2021).

Furthermore, the recombinant tandem-repeat dimer SARS-CoV-2 S RBD vaccine candidate ZF2001 expressed in CHO cells has been subjected to two phase I and II clinical trials (Yang, Li et al., 2020). Neutralizing antibodies were found in all participants in phase I independent of used dose (25 or 50 µg). In phase II, neutralizing antibodies were detected in 97% of the individuals receiving a dose of 25 µg and in 93% receiving 50 µg of ZF2001. The neutralizing antibody titers exceeded those detected in convalescent COVID-19 patients. The ZF2001 vaccine candidate has been registered for a phase III study in 29,000 adults in China (A randomized, double-blind, 2021).

The most advanced COVID-19 protein subunit vaccine candidate NVX-CoV2373 comprises the prefusion-stabilized full-length SARS-CoV-2 S protein expressed in Sf9 cells and administered with the Matrix-M1 adjuvant (Tian et al., 2021). Immunization of mice resulted in high titers of anti-SARS-CoV-2 S IgG, which inhibited ACE2 receptor binding, neutralized SARS-CoV-2, and protected against SARS-CoV-2. Multifunctional CD4+ and CD8+ T cells, CD4+ T-follicular helper (Tfh) cells, and antigen-specific B cells were elicited. Immunization of baboons elicited high titers of anti-SARS-CoV-2 S antibodies, inhibition of ACE2 binding and neutralization of SARS-CoV-2 infection. In a phase I/II clinical trial two intramuscular injections of 5 and 25 µg of NVX-CoV2373 with or without Matix-M1 adjuvant administered 21 days apart showed good safety and immunogenicity in healthy volunteers (Keech et al., 2020). The adjuvant enhanced immune responses. Interim results from a phase III study indicated that the NVX-CoV2373 vaccine was 95.6% effective against the original SARS-CoV-2 Wuhan strain, but also showed good protection against the UK B.1.1.7 (85.6%) and the South African B.1.351 (60%) variants (Mahese, 2021).

Peptide-based vaccine development has been subjected to immune-informatics and comparative genomics approaches, so far. The SARS-CoV-2 envelope (E) protein was targeted for designing T-cell epitope-based peptide vaccines (Abdelmageed et al., 2020). Ten potential vaccine candidates were identified, which showed MHC class I and class II binding and should be next validated in animal models. In another approach, a multipeptide vaccine candidate based on computational data contains an adjuvant, CTL, helper T-lymphocyte (HTL), and B-cell epitopes of SARS-CoV-2 joined by linkers (Kalita et al., 2020). The 33 epitopes in the vaccine candidate originate from the SARS-CoV-2 S, nucleocapsid (N), and membrane (M) proteins, which have prominent roles in host receptor recognition, viral entry, and pathogenicity. Based on in silico analysis, the vaccine should be nontoxic, nonallergic, thermostable, and should elicit humoral and cellular immune responses. Furthermore, molecular dynamics simulation confirmed the stabilization of the vaccine candidate, which should next be evaluated in vivo.

12.3.3. Viral vector-based vaccine

Viral vectors have been frequently applied for vaccine development against COVID-19 (Lundstrom, 2021). In preclinical settings, the adenovirus type 5 (Ad5) vector expressing the codon-optimized SARS-CoV-2 S protein (Ad5-S-nb2) induced systemic and cell-mediated immune responses and protected macaques from challenges with SARS-CoV-2 (Feng et al., 2020). Moreover, expression of full-length SARS-CoV-2 S elicited strong RBD-specific induction of mucosal IgA, neutralizing antibodies, Th1-biased CD4+ and CD8+ T cells in intranasally immunized mice (King et al., 2020). In the case of Ad26 expressing the full-length SARS-CoV-2 S protein, a single immunization of hamsters protected against pneumonia caused by SARS-CoV-2 (Tostanoski et al., 2020). Furthermore, a prime-boost regimen with Ad26 and Ad5 expressing the SARS-CoV-2 S protein (rAd26-S/rAd5-S) elicited robust immune responses in preclinical animal models (Logunov et al., 2020). The strategy of using two different Ad serotypes was to prevent immune reaction against the Ad vector for the second immunization and to provide strong antigen production. The simian adenovirus ChAdOx1 expressing the full-length SARS-CoV-2 S protein elicited robust cellular and humoral responses and protected immunized macaques against SARS-CoV-2 (Van Doremalen et al., 2020).

The first-in human adenovirus-based COVID-19 phase I clinical trial showed good safety, tolerability, and robust T-cell and humoral responses after intramuscular administration of Ad5-SARS-CoV-2 S particles (Zhu, Li et al., 2020). Furthermore, strong neutralizing antibodies were obtained in a phase II trial with 5×1010 and 1×1011 Ad5-SARS-CoV-2 S particles (Zhu, Guan et al., 2020). Two phase III trials in 40,000 and 500 healthy volunteers, respectively, are in progress (Clinical Trial of Recombinant Novel Coronavirus Vaccine, 21, Phase III trial of a COVID-19, 21). The Ad26-based vaccine was subjected to a phase I/II study using only a single administration of 1×1010 or 5×1010 Ad26.COV2 S particles, which showed strong immune responses in healthy volunteers (Sadoff et al., 2021). Furthermore, at least 2 phase III trials with more than 60,000 participants are in progress (A study of Ad26.COV2.S for the prevention of SARS-CoV-2-mediated COVID-19 in adult participants (ENSEMBLE), 21, A study of the Ad26.COV2.S vaccine candidate for the prevention of SARS-CoV-2-mediated COVID-19 in adults, 21). The vaccine candidate rAd26-S/rAd5-S showed good safety with only mild adverse events and robust immune responses in a phase I/II study (Clinical Trial of Efficacy, Safety, and Immunogenicity of Gam-COVID-Vac Vaccine against COVID-19 RESIST, 2021). Several phase III trials have been initiated (Clinical Trial of Efficacy, Safety, and Immunogenicity of Gam-COVID-Vac Vaccine against COVID-19 in Belarus, 21, Logunov et al., 2021) and interim results from a phase III trial in 16,500 individuals showed good tolerability with 91.6% efficacy against COVID-19 (Logunov et al., 2021). ChAdOx1 expressing the full-length SARS-CoV-2 S protein (ChAdOx1 nCoV-19) showed good safety and strong immune responses in 32 of 35 vaccinees based on preliminary results from a phase I/II study (Folegatti et al., 2020). After a booster immunization all vaccinated individuals developed humoral and cellular immune responses. In a phase II/III clinical trial 18–55 years old, 56–69 years old, and 70 years old and older individuals were immunized with 2.2×1010 particles of the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine candidate (Ramasamy et al., 2021). Interim results demonstrated that adverse events were more common in younger adults than in individuals older than 56 years. Similar levels of neutralizing antibodies were detected in all age groups after two immunizations. Immunization with two standard doses of 5×1010 ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 particles resulted in 62.1% efficacy, whereas administration of a lower dose of 2.2×1010 particles followed by a standard dose showed 90.0% efficacy (Voysey et al., 2021). The ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine received an EUA in December 2020 by the regulatory authorities in the UK (Regulatory Approval of COVID-19 Vaccine AstraZeneca, 2021). Similarly, the Ad26.COV2.S vaccine was granted an EUA by the FDA in February 2021 (Ad26.COV2-S FDA Approval Status, 2021).

In addition to adenovirus, lentivirus (LV) vectors have been applied for vaccine development. Systemic administration of LV vectors expressing SARS-CoV-2 S elicited strong antibody responses and provided partial protection against SARS-CoV-2 in ACE2-humanized mice (Ku et al., 2021). However, intranasal injection resulted in 3 log 10 decrease in viral loads in mice lung and reduced local inflammation. A phase I/II study applying a minigene-based LV vaccine is currently recruiting healthy volunteers to evaluate safety and immunogenicity of subcutaneous administration of 5×106 LV transduced dendritic cells (DCs) in combination with intravenous antigen-specific CTLs (Immunity and Safety of Covid-19 Synthetic Minigene Vaccine, 2021). Influenza virus vectors have also been engineered as COVID-19 vaccine candidates by replacing the neuraminidase (NA) gene by a membrane-anchored version of the SARS-CoV-2 S RBD (Loes et al., 2020). A single intranasal administration of the ΔNA(RBD)-Flu vaccine candidate elicited levels of SARS-CoV-2-specific neutralizing antibodies comparable to those detected in COVID-19 patients. Recently, the DelINS1–2019-nCoV-RBD-OPT1 influenza virus vector expressing the SARS-CoV-2 S RBD was registered for intranasal delivery in a phase I clinical trial in China (A Phase I Clinical Trial of Influenza virus Vector COVID-19, 2021). In addition, the intranasal spray approach was registered for a phase II study (A Phase II Clinical Trial of Influenza virus Vector COVID-19 Vaccine for intranasal Spray DelNS1–2019-nCoV-RBD-OPT1. ChiCTR2000039715, 2021).

Poxviruses have been frequently used as vaccine vectors and they have therefore been considered for COVID-19. The modified vaccinia virus Ankara (MVA) strain has been engineered for the expression of the full-length SARS-CoV-2 S protein, which elicited strong SARS-CoV-2 specific humoral and cellular immune responses and protected humanized K18-hACE2 mice from SARS-CoV-2 challenges (García-Arriaza et al., 2021). Furthermore, the first-in-human phase I clinical trial with two doses of 1×107 and 1×108 infectious units (IU) of MVA-SARS-CoV-2 S is recruiting healthy volunteers (Safety, 2021c). In another application, a chimeric Newcastle disease virus (NDV) vector expressing the SARS-CoV-2 S protein generated strong binding and neutralizing antibody responses and provided protection in immunized mice and hamsters (Sun, McCroskery et al., 2020). Expression of full-length and membrane-anchored SARS-CoV-2 S proteins from NDV elicited high levels of neutralizing antibodies and rendered immunized mice resistant to SARS-CoV-2 infections (Sun, Leist et al., 2020).

Measles virus (MV) vectors have been engineered for the expression of the full-length SARS-CoV-2 protein and immunization of mice-elicited Th1-biased antibody and T-cell responses (Hörner et al., 2020). The MV-SARS-CoV-2 vaccine candidate TMV-083 was envisioned for a phase I trial in 90 volunteers for the evaluation of safety, tolerability, and immunogenicity. However, initial findings indicated that the immune responses in the vaccinees were weaker than those seen in COVID-19 patients, which led to the discontinuation of the study (Merck Discontinues Development of SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 Vaccine Candidates, 2021).

Immunization of mice with replication-competent VSV vectors expressing SARS-CoV-2 S generated neutralizing antibodies and offered protection against SARS-CoV-2 (Brett et al., 2020). However, the VSV SARS-CoV-2 S vaccine candidate V590 showed inferior immune responses compared to levels seen in COVID-19 patients in a phase I clinical trial, which led to the termination of the study (Merck & IAVI, 2021). In another approach, the replication-competent VSV-ΔG with VSV G replaced by the SARS-CoV-2 S protein-induced neutralizing antibodies and provided protection in immunized golden Syrian hamsters (Yahalom-Ronen et al., 2020). The VSV-ΔG vaccine candidate has been scheduled for a phase I/II dose-escalation study in 18–55 years old volunteers (Evaluate the Safety, 2021).

12.3.4. DNA-based vaccines

DNA plasmids have been attractive vaccine vectors although innate immune response against DNA and insufficient responses against expressed antigens have limited their clinical application (Silveira, Schmidt Garcia Moreira, & Mendonca, 2021). DNA-based expression of the SARS-CoV-2 S protein generated robust expression in cell lines and elicited neutralizing antibody responses in immunized mice and guinea pigs (Smith et al., 2020). Electroporation has significantly enhanced the delivery efficacy of DNA-based COVID-19 vaccines (Xu et al., 2020). Moreover intradermal-electroporation (ID-EP) of DNA vaccines enhanced immune responses through direct transfection of dermal DCs destined for migration to draining lymph nodes (Amante, Smith, & Mendoza, 2015). In another study, robust anti-N titers were induced in New Zeeland White rabbits immunized with a DNA plasmid expressing the codon-optimized SARS-CoV-2 N gene (Ahlén et al., 2021).

The bacTRL platform applies genetically modified probiotic bacteria for oral administration for colonization of epithelial cells in the gut for plasmid-based constitutive replication and expression of antigens (Huo, Le Bas, & Ruza, 2020). The bacTRL platform was employed for a bifidobacterial monovalent SARS-CoV-2 S DNA vaccine (bacTRL-Spike) to elicit SARS-CoV-2 S-specific cellular and humoral immune responses and inhibition of SARS-CoV-2 infections (https://www.symvivo.com/covid-19). In addition, a trivalent vaccine candidate composed of SARS-CoV-2 S, N and M proteins (bacTRL-Tri) has been engineered.

A dose-escalation phase I/II trial for the EP-aided GX-19 (SARS-CoV-2 S) DNA vaccine candidate showed excellent safety, tolerability, and immunogenicity (Safety and Immunogenicity Study of GX-19, 2021). A preliminary report from a phase study for the INO-4800 DNA vaccine showed either humoral or cellular immune responses, or both, in all 38 participants (Tebas et al., 2021). Recently, the INO-4800 vaccine candidate has been subjected to phase II/III clinical trials applying intradermal administration and electroporation to investigate safety, immunogenicity, and efficacy (Safety, 2021d).

12.3.5. RNA-based vaccines

RNA-based vaccines are easily and rapidly engineered allowing adjustments to novel variants and potential emerging viruses (Lundstrom, 2020b). However, RNA is sensitive to degradation and requires low storage and distribution temperatures. The RNA stability has been enhanced by prefusion-stabilizing mutations, chemical modifications, and encapsulation in lipid nanoparticles (LNPs) (Corbett et al., 2020). The prefusion-stabilized mRNA-1273 LNP vaccine candidate, which encodes the SARS-CoV-2 S full-length protein-elicited potent SARS-CoV-2 S-specific neutralizing antibody responses (Corbett et al., 2020). Moreover, CD8+ T-cell responses were obtained, and immunized mice were protected against SARS-CoV-2. Immunization of nonhuman primates with 10 or 100 µg of the mRNA-1273 vaccine candidate induced superior neutralizing SARS-CoV-2-specific antibody responses compared to those seen in convalescent COVID-19 patients (Corbett, Flynn et al., 2020). Immunized primates were protected against SARS-CoV-2.

In another approach, two vaccine candidates containing nucleoside-modified mRNA have been formulated in LNPs (Vogel et al., 2021). BNT162b1 encodes the soluble secreted trimerized SARS-CoV-2 S RBD and BNT162b2 the full-length SARS-CoV-2 S protein. A single intramuscular injection of either vaccine candidate elicited strong dose-dependent antibody and Th1 CD4+ and CD8+ T-cell responses. Prime-boost immunization of macaques showed 8.2–18.2 times higher neutralizing antibody levels compared to titers detected in convalescent COVID-19 patients. Moreover, immunization protected macaques against SARS-CoV-2 challenges. LNP-RNA with customized 5′ and 3′ end untranslated regions and the open reading frame of SARS-CoV-2 mRNA ensured optimal translation efficacy of the CVnCoV vaccine candidate, which elicited robust SARS-CoV-2-specific neutralizing antibodies in animal models (https://www.curevac.com/covid-19). Another mRNA-LNP formulation, ARCoV, encoding the SARS-CoV-2 S RBD elicited robust SARS-CoV-2-specific neutralizing antibodies in immunized mice (Zhang, Li et al., 2020). Th1-biased cellular responses were obtained in both mice and primates. A prime-boost regimen provided complete protection of mice against SARS-CoV-2. The liquid formulation of ARCoV can be stored at room temperature at least for a week. RNA vaccines based on self-amplifying Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus expressing the prefusion-stabilized SARS-CoV-2 S gene was formulated in LNPs (McKay et al., 2020). Intramuscular immunization of BALB/c mice induced higher titers of SARS-CoV-2-specific neutralizing antibodies than seen in COVID-19 patients.

A dose-escalation phase I trial for the mRNA-1273 vaccine identified no trial-limiting safety issues, and SARS-CoV-2-specific immune responses were induced in all participants (Jackson et al., 2020). The phase I trial was expanded to include 40 older adults, which showed only mild adverse events and elicited superior binding and neutralizing antibody titers with 100 µg of mRNA-1273 compared to a dose of 25 µg (Anderson et al., 2020). The safety and immunogenicity were further confirmed in a phase II study in 600 participants (Chu et al., 2021). A phase III trial with 30,240 participants presented no safety concerns, only mild transient local and systemic reactions, and the mRNA-1273 vaccine showed 94.1% efficacy, providing prevention of severe COVID-19 (Baden et al., 2021).

The BNT162b1 and BNT162b2 vaccine candidates have been subjected to several clinical trials. A phase I/II trial in 45 adults receiving 10, 30, and 100 µg of BNT162b1 showed dose-dependent mild-to-moderate transient local and systemic reactions (Sahin et al., 2020). The immunization elicited dose-dependent RBD-binding IgG and SARS-CoV-2-neutralizing antibody responses. The neutralizing antibody titers were 1.9–4.6 times higher compared to titers from convalescent COVID-19 patients. In another phase I/II trial in healthy 18–55 years old volunteers, two doses of 1 or 50 µg of BNT162b1 elicited robust CD4+ and CD8+ T-cell responses (Mulligan et al., 2020). The SARS-CoV-2-specific neutralizing antibody titers were 0.7-fold (1 µg of RNA) and 3.5-fold (50 µg of RNA) higher than in serum from convalescent COVID-19 patients. BNT162b1 and BNT162b2 were evaluated in parallel in a phase I study in younger and older adults (Walsh et al., 2020). Immunization with BNT162b was associated with a lower incidence and severity of systemic adverse reactions than BNT162b1 although they both elicited similar dose-dependent SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing titers. Based on these data and previous studies, BNT162b was selected for phase II/III clinical trials. In a phase III trial, 21,720 individuals were immunized with BNT162b2 and 21,728 received placebo (Polack et al., 2020). Seven days after the second immunization 162 COVID-19 cases were detected in the placebo group and only eight cases in individuals vaccinated with BNT162b2. The efficacy of COVID-19 prevention was 95%. In subgroups defined by age, sex, race, ethnicity, baseline body mass index and preexisting conditions the vaccine efficacy was between 90% and 100%. Both the mRNA-1273 and BNT162b2 vaccine candidates have received EUAs in the USA, the EU, and many other countries (Dolgin, 2021). The LNP-mRNA CVnCoV vaccine candidate has been subjected to a dose-escalation phase I study for the evaluation of safety, reactogenicity, and immunogenicity with doses of 2, 4, 6, 8, and 12 µg (A Study to Evaluate the Safety, 2021c). Moreover, a phase II dose-confirmation trial is in progress at doses of 6 and 12 µg (A dose-confirmation study to evaluate the safety, 21). A phase II/III trial for CVnCoV with 35,000 participants in Europe and Latin America started in December 2020 (A Study to Evaluate the Safety and Immunogenicity of Vaccine CVnCoV in Healthy Adults in Germany for COVID-19, 2021). Finally, a phase I clinical trial is in progress for the LNP-saRNA vaccine candidate, which is administered at doses of 0.1, 0.3, and 1.0 µg (Clinical Trial to Assess the Safety of a Coronavirus Vaccine in Healthy Men and Women, 2021).

12.4. Conclusion

Since the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 at the end of 2019 more than 5.3 million lives have been lost. At the start of the pandemic there were no antiviral drugs or vaccines available for efficient treatment and prevention of COVID-19. However, today, several repurposed drugs can reduce the severity of disease and shorten hospital stays. Engineering of mAbs has provided promising results as therapeutics for COVID-19. The approval of two mRNA-based vaccines globally and three adenovirus-based vaccines regionally is a breakthrough to finally overcome the pandemic. Unfortunately, the story does not end here. Concerns have been raised about not only the efficacy of the current vaccines, but also their durability. In a recent study, vaccinees followed for 119 days after receiving 100 µg of mRNA-1273 showed a slight expected decline in titers, the vaccine provided durable humoral immunity (Widge, Rouphael, & Jackson, 2021). Another issue relates to novel SARS-CoV-2 variants/mutations for which vaccine development needs to play catch-up with. Finally, cases of vaccine-induced immune thrombotic thrombocytopenia (VITT) have been detected after vaccinations against COVID-19 (Lundstrom, Barh, & Uhal, 2021). Although the cases are rare and significantly lower than SARS-CoV-2-induced thrombocytopenia in COVID-19 patients, it is an issue that needs to be addressed and thoroughly investigated. As VITT has been detected after vaccination with both adenovirus-based (Greinacher et al., 2021, Muir et al., 2021) and mRNA-based (Lee, Cines, & Gernsheimer, 2021) vaccines, various hypotheses have been postulated, including the effect of the SARS-CoV-2 S protein, a common factor for both types of vaccines. These are areas where we can demonstrate the power of biotechnology in healthcare in the near future!

### Vaccines—2NC

#### Biotech enables second and third wave vaccines. New vaccines are transformative for public health and improve efficacy.

Massabni and da Costa Borges 20 – Professor of Biotechnology, Regenerative Medicine and Medicinal Chemistry at the University of Araraquara; PhD student in Biotechnology, Regenerative Medicine and Medicinal Chemistry at the University of Araraquara. [Antonio Carlos, Marco Antonio. “Biotechnology and vaccines.” International Journal of Advances in Medical Biotechnology, Vol 2 No 2 (2019). Feb, 28, 2020.]

Introduction

Biotechnology, according to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),1 can be defined as any technique that uses living organisms (or their parts) to obtain or modify products, improve plants and animals, or develop microorganisms for specific uses. Modern Biotechnology has a wide application in the health industry, attracting interest from scientists for production of drugs and vaccines, thus contributing to the economic development and, especially, to growth of pharmaceutical industry

Science and technology complement each other, integrating basic and applied sciences with other technologies such as molecular biology, cellular biology, immunological techniques, biochemistry and microbial fermentation processes

Advances in the industrial sector has brought many benefits to society, but it is worth saying that, among several consequences, massive migration of the population from countryside to urban centers has occurred, diminishing quality of life due to lack of basic sanitation and, consequently, causing more diseases for people and animals. In the 19th century, 80% of children died of various diseases before their 10th birthday.3 In addition, millions of deaths have been recorded as a result of human contamination by viruses and bacteria, causes of diseases such as yellow fever, pertussis, smallpox, tetanus, diphtheria, measles, polio, rubella, hepatitis, bubonic plague, cholera, rabies, chickenpox, and mumps, which are among the most well-known diseases.

In order to control and prevent infections and diseases, scientists discovered vaccines, which were based on the principle that the individual’s contact with the antigen produced an immune response.4 As a result, several studies have been conducted to develop more effective vaccines. Genetic manipulation established by modern Biotechnology has modified in different ways research and development of these vaccines, which have been classified as first second and third generation.

First generation or traditional vaccines are produced with live attenuated microorganisms, i.e., the weakened pathogen itself is inoculated into the patient. Vaccines against smallpox, polio, measles, rubella, adenovirus and tuberculosis can be included in this type. Second-generation vaccines arose from the idea that vaccines can be obtained by toxins produced by microorganisms that cause diseases. These toxins, called toxoids, can be inactivated and become recognized by the host’s immune system. They can also be produced with purified polysaccharides. The recombinant proteins are used as a source for the antigens to be incorporated into the formulations.5 In the 1990s, third-generation vaccines emerged, in which the material inoculated into the patient is not the attenuated or dead pathogen, but its DNA containing the gene that encodes an antigenic protein. However, it is necessary to have an agent that introduces DNA into the patient’s cells, which are called DNA vectors, for the vaccine to present any effect.

The history of vaccine, from its discovery by Edward Jenner in the late 18th century7 until the present day, has provided the world’s population with greater safety, health, and has undoubtedly saved billions of people from various diseases. Vaccine production in Brazil deserves special consideration, as the country is a global reference due to the efforts of the National Immunization Program, Butantan and Fiocruz Institutes

It is important to remember that the first vaccine reported was for smallpox, discovered in 1789. This vaccine arrived in Brazil almost one century later, in 1887, and, only in 1922, the Oswaldo Cruz Institute began to produce it. Smallpox eradication became a goal by the World Health Organization from the 1950s onwards, but it was eradicated only in the 1970s. The BCG vaccine was discovered in 1909 and only began to be used in Brazil in 1925. Production and use of the vaccine against yellow fever started to be produced in 1937 in Brazil. Currently, Fiocruz is the largest producer of this vaccine. The vaccine against poliomyelitis, discovered in 1949 by Jonas Salk, was later developed for oral application by Albert Sabin and started to be used in 1961. The discovery of the vaccine against rubella occurred in 1969. In 1963, the vaccine against measles was developed. In Brazil, this vaccine was effectively implemented in 1973 with the National Immunization Plan (NIP), but only in 1992 the fight against this disease was defined as a public health policy priority. The second dose of the triple viral vaccine (measles, rubella and mumps) was introduced in 2004

In addition, Brazil has adopted a successful vaccination strategy.8 Brazil’s National Immunization Program (NIP) is considered one of the most comprehensive among developing countries. For example, Brazil received the poliomyelitis eradication certificate in 1994 and also pioneered the introduction of rotavirus, conjugate pneumococcal, meningococcal meningitis, and conjugate C serogroup vaccines in 2007, and vaccination against the H1N1 pandemic influenza in the second half of 2010.9 Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the vaccination calendar in Brazil for children, teenagers, pregnant women, and travelers, respectively. Table 5 shows the calendar of national vaccination campaigns.

Table 1-5 omitted\*\*

Objectives

The objectives of this work are to present the first-, second- and third-generation vaccines as well as to make an analysis of the use of these vaccines in Brazil.

Methodology For this review work, a survey of the articles with the highest number of accesses and easy acquisition within databases such as Google Scholar and PubMed was carried out. The method of bibliographic research related to the subject was used and then the most relevant data of the main themes related to Biotechnology and vaccines were collected. The keywords used were: biotechnology, medicine, immunology and vaccines.

Development Biotechnology Biotechnology has contributed to a number of significant changes in the area of biology and health, especially in the field of genetics. Gene manipulation techniques, such as gene sequencing, have altered scientific research for the health sector in different ways. Some areas to which research is currently focused are: synthetic biology (creation of “customized” organisms), three-dimensional bioprinting and uses and applications in the area of neurotechnology.1

The insertion of Biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industry has enabled an increase in the number of therapeutic compounds, greater knowledge of the processes causing diseases, more accurate diagnoses and more efficient delivery mechanisms, such as recombinant DNA for therapeutic protein production, hybridization for monoclonal antibody production and techniques for cloning and manipulation of stem cells.

Another area of health that has benefited from technological advances is the area of vaccines. Biotechnology has brought changes in the way vaccines are produced, such as the discovery of new antigens, adjuvants, vectors or delivery systems. The production process of a drug or vaccine can be briefly divided into three stages: a) production of the active ingredient, which is the substance responsible for the therapeutic action; b) formulation, a phase in which the active ingredient is mixed with other substances (adjuvants) in order to adapt characteristics of the final product, such as solubility, effect duration, stability, and absorption and elimination by the body; and c) packaging, i.e., the packaging of the finished product in quantities for final consumption.

Many vaccines are still administered by methods created in the past centuries. It is expected from biotechnological advances that safer and more effective vaccines will be produced and made available to an increasing number of people

The development of the third-generation vaccines (called DNA vaccines) was possible due to technological advances in Biotechnology. Although their use in humans is not yet approved, such vaccines have been applied against diseases such as cancer.4

Vaccine concepts Vaccination or immunization is the process of developing the body’s immunity or defense against infections with antigens (substances that stimulate the body to produce antibodies against the infectious agent – viruses, bacteria or parasites). Vaccines can be produced from dead or attenuated microorganisms or from their components (first generation). However, in some cases, the disease may occur due to a toxic substance produced by the microorganism. Then, the vaccine needs to neutralize this toxin (second generation). In other cases, however, the problem is not the virus or the bacteria, but the quantity of them inside the host. Therefore, its multiplication must be controlled.13 Figure 1 shows the three generations of vaccines

#### Biotechnology produces plant-based vaccines. That targets diseases like influenza, tuberculosis, anthrax, and pneumonia at a low cost.

Kumar 21 – Researcher in the Department of Life Science, College of Life Science and Biotechnology at Dongguk University. [Manu, Nisha Kumari, Nishant Thakur, Sashi Kant Bhatia, Ganesh Dattatraya Saratale, Gajanan Ghodake, Bhupendra M. Mistry, Hemasundar Alavilli, D.S. Kishor, Xueshi Du, Sang-Min Chung. “A Comprehensive Overview on the Production of Vaccines in Plant-Based Expression Systems and the Scope of Plant Biotechnology to Combat against SARS-CoV-2 Virus Pandemics.” Plants 10(6), 1213 (2021). June 15, 2021.]

3.2. The Present Situation of Vaccines Produced by Plant Biotechnology That Target Respiratory Disease

For respiratory disease, many plant-bases vaccine candidates are available for a disease like Bursal disease virus, influenza, Respiratory syncytial virus, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Bacillus anthracis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and asthma [84]. These vaccines are safe and can be generated at a low cost by using low-cost bioreactors. It can be administered orally; hence, no antigen purification is needed, saving considerable production costs.

A plant-based vaccine against infectious Bursal disease virus used transient expression of VP2 in Nicotiana benthamiana [85]. Plant-based vaccine for influenza used haemagglutinin (a surface glycoprotein that is involved in influenza virus infection) and M1 protein (most abundant structural matrix protein in the viral core) [86,87,88]. A pioneering study in the plant by D’Aoust et al. [88] reported the production of enveloped influenza VLPs. It opened the path for the large-scale production of a VPL-based plant-based vaccine for H5N1 influenza with a potential yield of up to 1500 doses per kg of infiltrated leaves [88,89]. Another study reported the formation of VLPs by expression of HAs from the strains A/Indonesia/5/05 (H5N1) or A/New Caledonia/7/2009 (H1N1). They were transiently expressed in N. benthamiana [90].

Another study reported enhanced immunogenicity of recombinant HA in an enveloped VLP over soluble antigen [91]. Further studies expressed different, HA antigens from A/Brisbane/59/07 [HAB1 (H1)], A/Brisbane/10/07 [HAB1 (H3)], B/Florida/4/06 [HAF1 (B)], and A/California/04/09 [HAC1], respectively) transiently in N. benthamiana. 400–1300 mg protein obtained from 1 Kg of fresh infiltrated leaf tissue [92]. Another study reported good immunogenicity and safety profiles of HAC1 and HAI-05 in animal pre-clinical studies [93].

Clinic trials of the HAC1 vaccine for the H1N1 virus were safe and well tolerable with mild adverse events compared to placebo. This vaccine was also immunogenic with the highest seroconversion rates based on virus microneutralization antibody titers and serum hemagglutination-inhibition [94].

One of the studies used a combination of a silica nanoparticle-based (SiO2) drug delivery system with a plant-produced H1N1 influenza hemagglutinin antigen (HAC1) and the mucosal adjuvant candidate bis-(3’,5’)-cyclic dimeric guanosine monophosphate (c-di-GMP). This vaccine induces systemic humoral immune responses in intratracheally vaccinated mice [95].

The respiratory syncytial virus causes illness in the lower respiratory tract in adults and children [96,97,98,99]. Recently, expressing the RSV fusion (F) protein gene in transgenic tomato plants, a fruit-based edible subunit vaccine against RSV was developed. In ripening tomato fruit, the F-gene was expressed under the control of the fruit-specific E8 promoter. Ripe transgenic tomato fruit orally administered to mice led to the induction of mucosal and serum RSV-F specific antibodies [100].

Diseases caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae (the pneumococcus), Haemophilus influenzae, and Neisseria meningitidis are responsible for almost two million deaths each year the children are under five years old [101,102]. Disease caused by S. pneumoniae remains high despite the extensive use of pneumococcal vaccines. It is mainly due to the absence of serotypes in the vaccine [103]. A recent study reported that plants could be engineered to synthesize bacterial polysaccharides, and these polysaccharides can provide protective immunity. They also demonstrated this principle using the serotype 3 capsular polysaccharide (a frequently isolated serotype from disease cases) of S. pneumonia [103]. Mice that are immunized with the extracts from recombinant plants were performed better with a lethal dose of pneumococci in a pneumonia mouse model, and the immunized mice display significantly elevated antibodies of serum anti-pneumococcal polysaccharide. This study provides evidence that plant biotechnology tools can successfully synthesize bacterial polysaccharides, and the recombinant polysaccharides produced from them could be used as potential vaccine candidates to protect against life-threatening respiratory infections [103].

Anthrax is another disease for which plant-based vaccines were effective. A Gram-positive bacterium, Bacillus anthracis, causes anthrax. Its spores remain viable even in the extreme environment for centuries. Within the host cells, these spores produce three-component anthrax toxins: edema factor (EF), lethal factor (LF), and protective antigen (PA) [104]. Inhalation of spores leads to B. anthracis via the respiratory tract leads to severe respiratory distress causing cyanosis, shock, and death [105]. Many studies related to the heterologous expression systems, including bacterial, viral, or plant systems, have been reported for vaccines [106,107,108,109]. Due to their natural bio-encapsulation protection from digestive enzymes, plant-based vaccines improve immune response in the gut system by gradually releasing the antigen [110,111]. PA is the main virulence factor to cause anthrax. Expression of PA in tobacco and tomato generates lethal toxin neutralizing antibodies in a murine model by intraperitoneal immunization [112,113]. Recently PA has been expressed in mustard by Agrobacterium-mediated transformation since mustard is commonly used as a stem and leaf vegetable and fodder meant for cattle in various parts of the world. In orally immunized groups, a specific mucosal immune response was observed.

Furthermore, in-vitro lethal toxin neutralizing potential indicated by the antibodies conferred in-vivo protection against toxin challenge. The immunoprotective response was observed in mice during oral immunization [114]. They use agroinfiltration plant transient expression systems for engineered, expressed, purified, and characterized full-length PA (pp-PA83) in tobacco plants. Immunization with these vaccines protected all the rabbits from the lethal aerosolized B. anthracis. The vaccine antigen formulated with Alhydrogel retained immunogenicity even after two-week storage at 4 °C and was stable (essential for clinical use) [115]. Anthrax protective antigen (PA-D4) domain-4 epitope has a vital role in enhancing protective immunity against virulent B. anthracis. One study successfully reported a recombinant protein that comprised the antigenic PA-D4 integration into the c/e1 loop of HBcAg in transgenic tobacco. Plant-derived purified HB/PA-D4 protein injected into mice, and its sera display significant anti-HBcAg and PA-specific IgG titers [116].

Plant biotechnology-based vaccines are also made to prevent the infectious disease tuberculosis. Mycobacterium tuberculosis causes tuberculosis [117]. It can transmit from human to human via droplets expelled into the air via an infectious person. Death caused by TB even exceeded HIV, making it a more significant epidemic than expected. To date, seven oral plant biotechnology-based TB vaccines have been extensively evaluated either in experimental or pre-clinical and phase I clinical trials [117]. In Potato, Ag85B, ESAT-6, MPT64, and MPT83 antigens are expressed [118]; in tobacco, Acr, and Ag85B antigens are expressed [119]; in Arabidopsis thaliana, ESAT-6 fused to LTB and antigens are expressed [120,121]; in carrot CFP10 and ESAT-6 antigens are expressed [122]; and in lettuce and tobacco, Mtb72F (Mtb32/Mtb39) and ESAT-6 fused to CTB and its antigens expression in the chloroplast [123] (Table 4).

Table 4. Plant-based vaccines against respiratory disease.

Table

Asthma is also a chronic inflammatory disorder, where a plant-based vaccine is effective. Asthma affects about 300 million people worldwide. It is estimated that by 2025 asthma will affect an additional 100 million people [126]. In one study, a genetically modified narrow-leaf lupin (Lupinus angustifolius L.) expressing a potential allergen (sunflower seed albumin) (SSA-lupin) gene was examined whether it can suppress the development of asthma. The result indicated that SSA-lupin consumption promoted an Ag-specific IgG2a Ab response via CD4+CD45RBlow T Cell and IFN-γ -dependent mechanism [124].

In another study, transgenic Tg rice plants express in their seeds a fragment (residues 45–145) of Der p 1 containing the significant human and mouse T-cell epitopes. Oral administration of the Tg rice seeds to mice inhibits the allergen-specific IgE responses and allergen-specific T helper 2 (Th2) cytokine synthesis (IL-4, IL-5, and IL-13). This induction of oral tolerance was linked with inhibition of bronchial hyper-responsiveness (BHR) [125]. In tobacco leaves, the recombinant chimeric allergen R8 was successfully expressed. In the herbaceous leaf extracts, a pro-peptide was observed. This protein displays properties the same as tobacco with respect to IgE immune reactivity or the parental allergen ProDer f 1 that is expressed in Escherichia coli [127].

Since SARS-CoV2 is also a respiratory disease, developing a new plant-based vaccine study mentioned above can significantly impact it. There are already some applications by Medicago Inc., using the same virus-like particle platform, which it has used for a plant-based vaccine for H5N1 influenza in the study mentioned earlier.

Plant biotechnology-based vaccines are becoming a reality, even though their progress has been slower than expected. It is particularly true in oral vaccines, having the main drawbacks of poor reproducibility, a question mark in antigen stability, and bioavailability [128,129].

Plant biotechnology allows foreign protein expression in plants and projects a short-term approach for a potential vaccine candidate for SARS-CoV-2. The method of this expression will depend upon the nature of the targeted antigen. In the following section, we have discussed the idea of using a plant biotechnology bases platform as a possible approach for SARS-CoV-2 vaccine development (Figure 2).

Plants 10 01213 g002 550Figure 2. The applications of plant biotechnology-based production of diagnostic reagents and vaccine candidates against the SARS-CoV2. (A) Plant-based production of diagnostic reagents indicated by blue arrows. (B) Plant-based production of vaccine candidates against the SARS-CoV2 indicated by black arrows. A tobacco plant is shown as a model plant for both transient expression and stably transformed transgenic plants as a large-scale production platform. Genetic engineering approaches express target antigens by either stably or transiently transformation, enabling scientists to use different immunization approaches. The transient transformation method enables high antigen protein yields in the transformed plants purified to obtain injectable vaccines or therapeutic monoclonal antibodies. In a stable genetic transformation method, the edible plant species can provide oral vaccine formulations such as; capsules or tables with antigens from freeze-dried leaves. They can also be applied as a boosting agent. This figure is prepared by using Biorender (https://biorender.com/, accessed on 12 June 2021).

#### Synthetic biology is the future of vaccines. It produces cheaper vaccines that are more response to pathogens and easier to circulate globally.

Kitney et al 21 – Professor in the Department of Bioengineering at Imperial College London, Co-director of the EPSRC Center for Synthetic Biology and Innovation at Imperial College London. [Richard I., Jennifer Bell, Jim Philp. “Build a Sustainable Vaccines Industry with Synthetic Biology.” Trends in Biotechnology, Vol 39, Issue 9, pages 866-874. Jan 8, 2021.]

The vaccines industry has not changed appreciably in decades regarding technology, and has struggled to remain viable, with large companies withdrawing from production. Meanwhile, there has been no let-up in outbreaks of viral disease, at a time when the biopharmaceuticals industry is discussing downsizing. The distributed manufacturing model aligns well with this, and the advent of synthetic biology promises much in terms of vaccine design. Biofoundries separate design from manufacturing, a hallmark of modern engineering. Once designed in a biofoundry, digital code can be transferred to a small-scale manufacturing facility close to the point of care, rather than physically transferring cold-chain-dependent vaccine. Thus, biofoundries and distributed manufacturing have the potential to open up a new era of biomanufacturing, one based on digital biology and information systems. This seems a better model for tackling future outbreaks and pandemics.

The Vaccine Production Model Needs to Change

The COVID-19 crisis has cast the vaccines industry into scrutiny [1]; an industry that has been silently beleaguered for decades

A United States National Academy of Sciences study from 2003 [2] concluded that the amount that the nation spent on vaccines ‘appears to be insignificant compared with that spent on other medical and social interventions that may have lesser social benefits.’ Large company numbers that supply vaccines have steadily reduced [3]: some 80% of vaccines arise from five multinationals. At the heart of the problem is a tension between relatively poor financial returns to the vaccine industry and the high costs in production and R&D [4].

Compared to small molecule pharmaceuticals, centralised vaccine production facilities are capital intensive [5]. Fixed costs are high [6], especially for new vaccines. For example, the need for eggs for production is at least 70 years old, is expensive and time-consuming, but difficult to replace [7]. In past high-income countries have paid a higher price until the fixed costs are amortised. Then lower-income countries have adopted vaccines as the price has dropped after paying the fixed costs. However, there is now tremendous pressure for a COVID-19 vaccine to be available for all who need it, effectively everyone.

Distributed Manufacturing, a More-Sustainable Vaccine Model

The long distribution chains of centralised vaccine production are patchy, resulting in incomplete geographical coverage [8] (Box 1). Even if there is no overall shortage, there may be where they are needed most. Centralisation of labour and production has been the norm in many industries, but in 2015 the World Economic Forum (WEF, see Glossary) put distributed manufacturing in its top ten emerging technologies for the year (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/top-10-emerging-technologies-of-2015-2/). In essence, production is done close to the final customer, and much of the material supply chain is replaced by information [9]. It appears unsuited to high-production-volume industries, such as commodity chemicals and the automotive industry. However, vaccine production, already suboptimal for economies of scale [10], needs a different model, and distributed manufacturing is a good fit.

Box 1

Scaled-Down Manufacture and Supply Chain Close to Points of Care

Although revenues from vaccine sales are higher in developed countries, greater volume of sales occur in low- and middle-income countries. Nevertheless, vaccine manufacturers in developing countries already supply over half of the vaccines in their immunisation programmes [50,51], so this initiative is far from needing to be started from scratch.

Given the large number of doses that are possible from small volumes of product, final production could happen in a variety of locations if they comply with regulations: adapted university laboratories; laboratories at university teaching hospitals; and small company facilities at science parks and medical campuses. As cold chain operations are especially challenging in remote locations, it may even be possible to manufacture in mobile laboratories (Figure I), extending their capabilities of early warning, reconnaissance, on-site investigation, verification and response that already exist [52]. German company CureVac is developing a mobile production unit, the RNA Printer (https://www.curevac.com/en/technology/production/) that will be deployable to hospitals, potentially even into mobile laboratories. A joint patent application has been filed between CureVac and Tesla, the electric vehicle manufacturer, for this ‘Bioreactor for RNA In Vitro Transcription’ [53].

In one scenario, the vaccine sequence could be sent electronically across a telecommunications network from a biofoundry that has designed the sequence to another biofoundry that is the manufacturing facility. The second biofoundry then produces the liquid vaccine preparation for transportation. Further transportation could then be achieved using a mobile vaccination facility built into a mobile truck unit specially kitted out for this purpose. A recent example of this has been achieved by the Dutch company, Lamboo Mobile Medical, in partnership with Phillips (https://www.mobile-medical.eu/projects/mobile-primary-care-truck-unit-delivered-south-africa). A similar facility could be designed for local vaccine transportation to the point of immunisation. Any attempt to use mobile laboratories or production plants in multiple locations during a pandemic would require manufacturing best practices, like those outlined in good manufacturing practice (GMP), harmonised standard operating procedures and certification [52]. Training of staff in the correct use of a mobile biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory has in past been sponsored by the WHO (https://www.afro.who.int/news/who-supports-mobile-bsl-3-lab-re-qualification-and-training-experts).

The thermal stability of vaccines for worldwide distribution is a major problem, particularly in developing countries and outlying geographical regions. The ideal situation is for a vaccine to be stable for long periods at ambient temperatures. However, in reality, estimates vary widely for different types of vaccines regarding storage and transport temperatures. A big disadvantage of RNA vaccines is that their stability is lower than traditional vaccines [54]. Thus, their production close to the end user is especially pertinent.

Figure I

Download : Download high-res image (430KB)Download : Download full-size image

Figure I. Mobile Laboratory Configuration for the Diagnosis of Ebola Virus Disease.

In 2014, a mobile Biosafety Level-3 (BSL-3) laboratory was sent from China to Sierra Leone during an Ebola virus disease outbreak to rapidly diagnose the disease using quantitative real-time PCR. In a 2-week period, 1635 patients were evaluated and none of the laboratory staff members became infected. Communication, ventilation, and electricity and gas supply formed part of this infrastructure, comprising three vehicles. This infrastructure could include distributed manufacturing functions. Image adapted from [55].

Nucleic acid vaccines would be produced in kilogrammes rather than tonnes. An mRNA vaccine may have a low-cost, cell-free, egg-free production process [11] that is highly scalable and is easier to build and run than a facility handling virus particles. The actual production process could be relatively simple, consisting of a small number of standardisable molecular biology steps, purification by HPLC and final drug formulation [12]. Upon delivery to the patient, the process is completed there, with translation of the message to immunogenic protein in ribosomes, which then encounters the host’s immune system. While an oversimplification, compare this with standard vaccine production processes that might involve hundreds of complicated steps.

Economically, locating production close to the end user has the highest potential to capture value, particularly for emergency preparedness and response [13]. The need for a cold chain, prone to logistics malfunctions and temperature excursions (https://pelibiothermal.com/resource/active-versus-passive-shipping-containers-making-optimum-choice) [14], is almost completely removed. Most importantly, a small production facility situated close to an outbreak site can, potentially, fill the gap between routine production and precipitous need at the onset of outbreak creating a stockpile in a short timeframe [15]. The design and manufacture of mRNA vaccines also offers the critical advantage of being a fully synthetic platform process [16] for multiple targets [12]. This will be an important aspect of creating a future industry that is economically viable. It may then be a quicker process to optimise the product for the next virus outbreak.

The Synthetic Biology Approach Lends Itself to a Distributed Vaccine Industry

Vaccine technology is decades old and in need of modernizing. One of the problems is that, while many nonbiological drugs are produced using standardised chemical engineering processes, vaccine production, especially with whole cells, has been less amenable to standardisation and is thus less predictable. To break the economies-of-scale model for vaccine manufacturing, cost savings have to be made through strain engineering and molecular design [17]. This is fertile breeding ground for the emerging synthetic biology industry [18].

Vaccine production would benefit from the systematic workflow approach of synthetic biology [19]. The technology of mRNA is amenable to optimisation through almost limitless combinations of derivatives [12]. Likewise, the biofoundry is an obvious vehicle for generation of these combinations. Systematic workflow increasingly involves the use of biofoundries. Biofoundries are highly automated facilities that comprise the extensive and coordinated use of laboratory robots that are programmed to perform specific tasks according to a workflow [20]. Typically, different platforms within the biofoundries perform different tasks; for example, liquid handling, genetic assembly, characterisation functions. Biofoundries are based on information infrastructures that allow the robots and other equipment within the biofoundries to be programmed to follow detailed, complex workflows [21].

The combination of biodesign tools (BioCAD) and biofoundries is rapidly producing a new type of biology – digital biology – that could revolutionise the production of vaccines and many other areas of biomedicine. The approach chimes with the distributed supply chains and distributed manufacturing that could be transformative in dealing with COVID-19 and future pandemics throughout the world. The potential of the approach was demonstrated by Crone and co-workers [22] who showed that an automated SARS-CoV-2 clinical diagnostics platform designed and developed in a biofoundry can be quickly deployed and scaled.

Software allows the simultaneous investigation of a range of experimental factors or variables to rapidly optimise design of an industrial production. The recently formed Global Biofoundries Alliance [23] has publicly funded biofoundries in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, which could be brought to bear for the design of new vaccines, as needed. As pointed out by Crone and co-workers [22], the protocols and workflows they developed can be quickly incorporated and modified as necessary by members of the Global Biofoundry Alliance. Box 2 shows front-running approaches to vaccine production that are highly amenable to the synthetic biology approach. They are all ripe for public–private cooperation.

Box 2

Vaccines Amenable to the Synthetic Biology/Distributed Manufacturing Approach

RNA vaccines work by introducing a biodesigned mRNA sequence into muscle or other cells. The mRNA is specifically designed to produce the exact antigens required to counteract the target virus. There are a number of advantages of this approach. Production/manufacture can be achieved directly in the laboratory, cell free and egg free. One litre of SARS-CoV-2 vaccine could be enough to produce at least 1 million doses. The big potential advantage of the method is that it is amenable to synthetic-biology-based biodesign, where knowing the genome of the virus allows the direct design of an RNA vaccine. Ulmer and co-workers [56] described a proof of concept for the production of a self-amplifying mRNA influenza vaccine, from gene synthesis to formulation and release, in 13 days, which they anticipated could be reduced to 5 days.

DNA vaccines are also amenable to synthetic biology design but production is more complex than RNA vaccines if there is a dependence on amplification of plasmids in bacterial or cell cultures. Both DNA and RNA platforms use similar established production processes and facilities. An entirely synthetic, in vitro process for mRNA vaccines is inherently simpler and easier to monitor. However, the arrival of enzymatically produced linear DNA provides some key advantages, not least being speed of production free of bacterial sequence [57], and may herald new opportunities for DNA vaccines.

Programmable and modular synthetic gene circuits can be introduced into adenoviral vectors for immunotherapeutic purposes [58]. The COVID-19 vaccine under development at the University of Oxford is an adenovirus vaccine vector (ChAdOx1). The Oxford group had previously developed a successful vaccine for SARS. The strategy was that, as SARS is another form of coronavirus, it should be possible to modify that vaccine for COVID-19. The advantage of the methodology is that conventional production techniques should be readily modified for the production of the new vaccine.

A virus-like particle (VLP) is an engineered viral structure with the immunoprotective traits of a native virus but is noninfectious. When synthetic biology techniques are applied to the rational design of VLPs greater precision and predictability is achievable. It is now possible to screen for pathogen-specific antigens with high immunogenic potential for inclusion in the design [59].

Rapidly multiplying a little-known plant virus (cowpea mosaic virus, CPMV) in plants is a potential solution to vaccine production [60]. CPMV is used to produce a noninfectious viral shell VLP. In the case of influenza, genetic information from the human virus decorates the shell with influenza surface proteins. In relation to COVID-19, the Canadian biopharmaceutical company Medicago, having produced the appropriate VLPs for coronavirus, began testing its plant-based coronavirus vaccine in an early-stage clinical trial in July 2020. The production ‘factory’ is a plant related to the tobacco plant. Using plants as the production factory could prove more rapid and scalable than conventional methods. Medicago recently announced the construction of a facility to grow plants with a capacity for 40–50 million planned doses of flu vaccine per year [61].

Improvements in synthetic biology are currently increasing exponentially, and data from the design, build, test, learn (DBTL) cycle are being used to train machine learning algorithms to reduce human interventions [24] – a hallmark of modern engineering.

#### Plant biotechnology can produce new vaccines for COVID and other diseases. They’re faster to develop, cheaper, and more effective!

Kumar 21 – Researcher in the Department of Life Science, College of Life Science and Biotechnology at Dongguk University. [Manu, Nisha Kumari, Nishant Thakur, Sashi Kant Bhatia, Ganesh Dattatraya Saratale, Gajanan Ghodake, Bhupendra M. Mistry, Hemasundar Alavilli, D.S. Kishor, Xueshi Du, Sang-Min Chung. “A Comprehensive Overview on the Production of Vaccines in Plant-Based Expression Systems and the Scope of Plant Biotechnology to Combat against SARS-CoV-2 Virus Pandemics.” Plants 10(6), 1213 (2021). June 15, 2021.]

4. Scope of SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine Development Using Plant Biotechnology Platform

Nanoparticles (NPs) and virus-like particles (VLPs) are the protein structures that have similarities with native viruses but do not contain a viral genome nor have any infectious ability, thus creating a safer platform for vaccine candidates [130]. Both NPs and VLPs constitute self-assembling proteins that display the epitope of interest at a higher density at their surface. Nanoparticles must have the antigenic epitopes repetitive and so that the innate humoral immune system and B cells are activated [131,132,133]. NPs/VLPs support antigen uptake by antigen-presenting cells (APCs), enhancing the immune system’s adaptive arms [134]. In the 21st century, many platforms for NPs/VLPs design have been evolved, including the usage of site-specific ligations-driven covalent links of individual folded proteins, viral core proteins, and non-covalent intramolecular formation of de novo protein nanostructure via intermolecular interactions. Both self-assembled protein NPs and VLPs offer highly stable, ordered, and monodisperse vaccine formulations and upscale production with bio farming. For the new vaccine development, NPs/VLPs are currently recognized as the most studied promising molecular carriers [130]. To develop VLPs Medicago Inc. (Quebec City, QC, Canada) used the Nicotiana benthamiana plant [135]. Medicago’s plant-derived COVID-19 vaccine candidate along with GlaxoSmithKline’s (GSK) pandemic adjuvant have entered into the phase 2/3 clinical trials. Medicago’s plant-derived vaccine candidate against COVID-19 uses Coronavirus-Like-Particle (CoVLP) technology in which vaccine composed of recombinant spike (S) glycoprotein and is expressed as virus-like-particles (VLPs). It is co-administered with GSK’s adjuvant. Two doses of 3.75 micrograms of CoVLP are administered 21 days apart. Data shows that the combination of the vaccine candidate and GSK’s pandemic adjuvant-induced a significant humoral immune response after two doses. Similar antibody responses were observed in younger and middle-aged adults, as well as elderly adults. (https://www.medicago.com/en/newsroom/; https://ir.ibioinc.com/press-releases; https://news.cision.com/expres2ion-biotechnologies, accessed on 12 June 2021) [136]. Kentucky BioProcessing, Inc. (KBP) (formally known as Large Scale Biology Corp.) candidate vaccine, COVID-19 Subunit Vaccine KBP-201, is in the 2nd phase of clinical trials. They have used Nicotiana benthamiana as a host plant/expression system. Both candidate vaccines have two doses scheduled after 21 days gap. They can be administered via the intramuscular route (Table 5). There are four other candidate vaccines from iBio, Inc. (New York, NY, USA), Akdeniz University (Turkey), Shiraz University (Iran), and Baiya Phyto-pharm/Chula Vaccine Research Center (Thailand) that are in the pre-clinical stage and have used the plant as an expression system. Many reports explain the role of NPs in SARS-CoV-2 in detail [136,137,138,139,140,141,142].

Table 5. Current status of WHO listed plant-based vaccine candidates for COVID-19 under trial stages.

Table

For the production of VLPs, several studies target Poliovirus, hepatitis B virus, human papillomavirus, influenza virus, Norwalk virus, human immunodeficiency retrovirus 1, rift valley fever virus, and foot and mouth disease virus [132,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158]. Earlier experience of forming VLPs for MERS and SARS-CoV-1 antigens heterologous expressed in recombinant systems provides us the best platform for developing a vaccine against SARS-CoV-2. A study reported that in morphology, developed VLPs were similar to the virions of SARS-CoV-1. Another report stated that envelope proteins (E) and membrane (M) are sufficient enough for the efficient formation of virus-like particles, and they could be visualized by electron microscopy [159]. VLPs formed by membrane proteins of different origins activated immature dendritic cells (DCs) and enhanced the secretion of cytokines and co-stimulatory molecules’ expression [160].

Mucosal routes have emerged as attractive and promising routes for the vaccination of respiratory diseases. Mucosal immune response for VLPs is an essential aspect of vaccine success. In one study, mice were immunized with VLPs plus cytosine–phosphate guanosine (CpG) and VLPs intranasally. Both of them induced IgG specified to SARS-CoV1 [161].

Given that HA protein expression in plant-made VLPs vaccine successful, similarly, it is believed that for the development of SARS-CoV-2 VLPs, S protein expression might be necessary. Considering this, targeting the trans-Golgi secretion route by nuclear expression might yield a protein that, via secretion and glycosylation process, can produce VLPs for SARS-CoV-2 [162]. Forty-seven plant-based candidate VLPs vaccine has been developed for a wide range of disorders [163].

5. Concluding Remarks and Future Direction

There are a few risks that might be involved with the plant biotechnology platform-based vaccine [164]. Their risks include (1) Oral tolerance; if the antigen is delivered too frequently, the mucosal immune system becomes desensitized to the candidate vaccine, and the vaccination might no longer tackle susceptibility to the target disease. (2) Allergenicity; compared to the natural pathogen in plants, a transgenic product might be undergone by different post-translational modifications, which might induce new allergenic responses in the host during vaccination. Along with this, the use of oral adjuvants for mucosal linings stimulation might induce hypersensitive responses to other food proteins [165,166]. (3) Gene transfer; transfer of the antigen to the conventional food supply through genetic engineering could lead to oral tolerance. (4) Detrimental effects on the environment; natural loss and degradation of a gene during selection within the environmental system. The transgene is randomly inserted into the genome during gene transfer, which can lead to positional effects. These events make expression levels unpredictable, and the loss of endogenous genes is also a possibility that might leads to toxicity or allergenicity implications. Advancements in technologies can solve these limitations by providing alternative methods to achieve site-directed mutation through many mechanisms [78]. (5) Inconsistent dosage; an insufficient amount of antigen might not produce the desired immune response needed to protect against the deadly disease. Incorrect frequency or wrong dosage could lead to tolerance and reduce vaccine effectiveness in some candidates [167,168]. To overcome this limitation, proper clinical trials in animals and humans must determine the doses to generate a proper immune response.

COVID-19 outbreak led to a global health emergency that demands new vaccines to cope with this pandemic. Plant biotechnology-based vaccine candidates offer an alluring approach for containing this virus. The available expression platform offers relevant directions for developing a candidate vaccine for COVID-19. The deconstructed viral vectors transient expression system is one of the alternative approaches for vaccine production where the tobacco as a host plant will allow for fast exploitation of plants as efficient large-scale biofactories for injectable vaccine candidates. A major disadvantage of this strategy is the potential loss of exogenous genes and ultimately loss of systemic infectivity. However, this can be prevented by using a subgenomic promoter derived from a different virus. It will lead to heterologous genetic recombination. Currently, six front-runner plant-based vaccines are based on this platform (Table 5). VLPs vaccine is another alternative option that provides an attractive approach for producing safe and efficient vaccines, which lacks replicative capacity, preserve antigenic determinant, and have high immunogenicity. VLPs based vaccines platform cannot be used for all types of viruses, which might be a major drawback for this technology. However, if its advantage is taken into consideration, the VLPs vaccine has vast potential. VLPs platform already has a proven track record in the case of earlier SARS-CoV-1. Hence, VLPs development based on different SARS-CoV-2 structural proteins is an excellent approach against COVID-19. Another approach is to develop vaccines based on edible plant species that are transformed at the nuclear level and administered as oral vaccines. It will provide mucosal immunity.

In 2020, the market size of global plant-based vaccines was estimated to be valued at 927.0 million USD, and in the next six years, it is expected to witness a growth rate of over 11.7%. Existing key players and new entrants in the plant-based vaccines market now focus on extensive clinical trial studies to develop plant-based vaccines for numerous therapeutic applications, including the COVID-19 vaccine. For example, Medicago Inc., a clinical-stage Canadian biotechnology company, uses plant-based technologies to develop and produce many novel vaccines and antibodies by cultivating several tobacco plants (Nicotiana tabacum) at its Durham’s Research Triangle Park in North America. This facility will be used in the testing and large-scale production of the flu vaccine. To develop the flu vaccine, Medicago conducted phase 3 clinical trials in March 2018. It is expected to be launched in the market soon during influenza season.

It requires almost five to six weeks to produce a plant-based vaccine compared to a five to six-month period preparing the vaccine in chicken eggs, which the various vaccine manufacturers are currently practicing. Along with these developments, monoclonal antibody production in plants can also provide another alternative plasma transfusion strategy. Antibodies developed in plants will be affordable and have safer intravenous treatment for critically ill patients (Figure 2). There are already approved plant-based vaccines for influenza that give hope to the potential of plant-based anti- COVID-19 vaccine. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) estimated that global vaccine manufacturing capacity would be only 2–4 billion doses annually, and by 2023–2024, not enough vaccines can be manufactured to meet global demands. This capacity might also be product-specific, along with some limitations: for example, whole-inactivated virus vaccines must be manufactured in a facility with biosafety level 3-capability. In addition to this administrative, the regulatory process of licensing, technology transfer, and the scale-up of vaccine manufacturing, purification or formulation might be time-consuming, and fulfilling these requirements in a time-bound manner will remain challenging. A plant-based vaccine platform can fill the gap and help maintain the demand/supply ratio. The coming years will be crucial to see the real potential of a plant-based vaccine for COVID-19 or any other pandemic.

## Cybersecurity Good

### Leadership—1NC

#### Cybersecurity is good. It reforms Cold War era approaches and combats rising Chinese, Russian, and Iranian threats. International cooperation is key.

Gordon and Rosenbach 22 (Sue Gordon, Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She served as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence from 2017 to 2019, after nearly three decades at the CIA; Eric, Co-Director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He served as the Pentagon’s Chief of Staff from 2015 to 2017 and as U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security from 2014 to 2015. “America’s Cyber-Reckoning: How to Fix a Failing Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, January/February, Accessed via UMich databases, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-12-14/americas-cyber-reckoning>, AK)

A decade ago, the conventional wisdom held that the world was on the cusp of a new era of cyberconflict in which catastrophic computer-based attacks would wreak havoc on the physical world. News media warned of doomsday scenarios; officials in Washington publicly fretted about a "cyber-Pearl Harbor" that would take lives and destroy critical infrastructure. The most dire predictions, however, did not come to pass. The United States has not been struck by devastating cyberattacks with physical effects; it seems that even if U.S. adversaries wanted to carry out such assaults, traditional forms of deterrence would prevent them from acting.

Behind those mistaken warnings lay an assumption that the only alternative to cyberpeace must be cyberwar. But in the years since, it has become clear that like all realms of conflict, the domain of cyberspace is shaped not by a binary between war and peace but by a spectrum between those two poles--and most cyberattacks fall somewhere in that murky space. The obvious upside of this outcome is that the worst fears of death and destruction have not been realized. There is a downside, however: the complex nature of cyberconflict has made it more difficult for the United States to craft an effective cyberstrategy. And even if lives have not been lost and infrastructure has mostly been spared, it is hardly the case that cyberattacks have been harmless. U.S. adversaries have honed their cyberskills to inflict damage on U.S. national security, the American economy, and, most worrisome of all, American democracy. Meanwhile, Washington has struggled to move past its initial perception of the problem, clinging to outmoded ideas that have limited its responses. The United States has also demonstrated an unwillingness to consistently confront its adversaries in the cyber-realm and has suffered from serious self-inflicted wounds that have left it in a poor position to advance its national interests in cyberspace.

To do better, the United States must focus on the most pernicious threats of all: cyberattacks aimed at weakening societal trust, the underpinnings of democracy, and the functioning of a globalized economy. The Biden administration seems to recognize the need for a new approach. But to make significant progress, it will need to reform the country's cyberstrategy, starting with its most fundamental aspect: the way Washington understands the problem.

SHOTS FIRED

The first known cyberattack occurred in 1988, when Robert Morris, a graduate student in computer science, released a small piece of software--eventually dubbed "the Morris worm"--that created outages across the still nascent Internet. During the two decades that followed, cybersecurity remained the concern mostly of geeky hackers and shadowy intelligence operatives. That all changed in 2010 with the Stuxnet operation, a devastatingly effective cyberattack on centrifuges that Iran used to enrich uranium. U.S. leaders soon began sounding the alarm about their own country's vulnerability. As early as 2009, President Barack Obama had warned of cyberattacks that could plunge "entire cities into darkness." Three years later, while briefing the Senate Armed Services Committee, Keith Alexander, the director of the National Security Agency (NSA), said it was only a matter of time before cyberattacks destroyed critical infrastructure. Around the same time, Senator Jay Rockefeller, Democrat of West Virginia, claimed that "the prospect of mass casualties" made cyberattacks "as dangerous as terrorism."

These warnings seemed prescient when, in 2012, Iranian operatives targeted the oil company Saudi Aramco with malware, wiping out data on 30,000 computers. Two weeks later, Iran targeted the Qatari company RasGas, one of the largest natural gas producers in the world, in a similar strike. These cyberattacks were by far the most destructive in history and marked the first time a government had employed an offensive operation in cyberspace against a U.S. partner. The strikes rattled world energy markets. To signal support for the Saudis, Washington deployed a team of Pentagon cybersecurity experts to Riyadh.

Two months after the Iranian attacks, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta gave a high-profile speech in which he warned of other countries or terrorists using cyberweapons to derail passenger trains or freight trains loaded with lethal chemicals, contaminate water supplies in major cities, shut down the power grid, or disable communication networks and military hardware. Americans, Panetta declared, needed to prepare for a kind of "cyber-Pearl Harbor: an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life [and would] paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability." Panetta also attempted to outline the U.S. strategy for deterrence in cyberspace, arguing that "improved defenses alone" would prove insufficient. When the U.S. national security services detected an imminent cyberattack of significant consequences, he said, they would need "the option to take action." And so, he explained, the military had developed "the capability to conduct effective [offensive cyber-]operations to counter threats to [U.S.] national interests in cyberspace."

From 2012 to 2014, the National Security Council staff held dozens of senior-level meetings to draft a complicated set of policies--known as Presidential Policy Directive 20--that established guidelines for when the United States could launch offensive cyber-operations to deter future attacks. At the Pentagon, the Joint Staff devoted several straight months to developing strict protocols for when the secretary of defense could approve an "emergency cyber action"--a targeted cyberattack to neutralize and counter an adversarial attack on the homeland.

That planning was put to the test in 2014, when North Korean operatives conducted the first-ever destructive cyberattack on U.S. soil, exfiltrating heaps of confidential information from servers belonging to Sony Pictures, which was planning to release a film that mocked the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. The hackers spread the information, including embarrassing emails, throughout the Internet; knocked out Sony's digital networks; and threatened to carry out further "terrorist attacks" in cyberspace. For weeks, the U.S. intelligence community feared that North Korean operatives had prepositioned cybermunitions inside American critical infrastructure and would soon detonate them.

That did not happen, and in many ways, the Obama administration's response to the attack was sophisticated and effective. The president directly called out the North Koreans for the hack, and the administration immediately levied economic sanctions, the first ever imposed in response to a cyberattack. The combination of public attribution and sanctions seemed to deter Pyongyang from conducting additional attacks. But the most important takeaway was that even after two years of planning and development, the U.S. military did not have the cyber-response capabilities Panetta had promised.

LESSONS NOT LEARNED

Part of the problem was that the Obama administration took an old-school approach to cyberspace that was stuck, in some ways, in an archaic, Cold War-style paradigm according to which cyber-operations could quickly escalate into a full-blown war. This perspective carried over into the Pentagon's decisions when it came to building a force structure for the cyber-domain: in 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates established U.S. Cyber Command, which is subordinate to the four-star commander of U.S. Strategic Command, the notoriously slow-moving organization that oversees the country's nuclear weapons. This structure suggested that the administration saw conflict in the cyber-domain as analogous to nuclear conflict or military activities in outer space, rather than as a dynamic sphere of operations more akin to counterterrorism or the world of special forces. Gates also determined that the new command would not carry out so-called information operations designed to influence the perceptions, thoughts, or beliefs of foreign actors in ways that would serve U.S. strategy.

These decisions delighted Washington's Russian adversaries. During a 2013 meeting between senior U.S. defense officials and their Russian counterparts, a high-ranking officer in the Russian military, General Nikolai Makarov, taunted the Americans. "One uses information to destroy nations, not networks," he said. "That's why we're happy that you Americans are so stupid as to build an entire Cyber Command that doesn't have a mission of information warfare!" At the time, defense leaders didn't consider that the United States might be one of the nations that Makarov had in mind. After Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election three years later, his remarks took on an even more sinister cast.

Cyber Command's structure and mission had serious consequences in the years that followed, especially in the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). The Pentagon had structured the new organization and designed its capabilities based on existing war plans that focused on rival countries; as a result, Cyber Command had very few resources dedicated to counterterrorism. During the first two years of the conflict, poor leadership at the top, a lack of operational capability, and an unwillingness to risk intelligence sources and methods resulted in Cyber Command's failure to disrupt ISIS operations. In 2015, this debacle led a top military commander of the U.S. effort against ISIS to declare, "I only wish that Cyber Command could inflict as much pain on ISIS as DISA does on me!" (DISA, the Defense Information Systems Agency, provides tech support to the U.S. military.)

Beneath these flawed decisions on organization and mission lay a deeper failure to learn the lessons of the 2014 North Korean hack of Sony: cyberattacks require an immediate response, public attribution, and diplomatic confrontation. In the wake of that attack, China and Russia each carried out an increasingly bold and insidious wave of cyberattacks. In the spring of 2014, for example, a group of operatives linked to the Kremlin attempted to derail the Ukrainian presidential election with a potent combination of hacking, disinformation, and denial-ofservice attacks. Ukrainian cybersecurity experts narrowly prevented the assault from succeeding. But the White House was unwilling to confront Russia or provide Ukraine with any type of support in the cyber-domain.

Then, in December 2015, Russianbacked operatives attacked Ukraine's electric grid, leaving parts of the country without power for days in the midst of winter weather. Once again, the Obama administration stood by without responding. This likely contributed to Russian President Vladimir Putin's calculus that he could conduct cyberand information operations to interfere with the U.S. presidential election in 2016 without fear of reprisal. He was right: the Obama administration did little to push back against Russian meddling during the summer and fall of 2016--until it became a crisis and hit the front page of The New York Times.

The Obama White House proved similarly unwilling to confront China over its transgressions in cyberspace. This was of a piece with the administration's emphasis on building stable economic relations with Beijing, which also overrode concerns about Chinese human rights abuses and China's aggressive military moves in the South China Sea. Even before North Korea's Sony attack, China had taken advantage of this passivity to steal American intellectual property on a massive scale between 2008 and 2013, to the tune of between $200 billion and $600 billion of value per year. The strategic impact of this theft is difficult to prove empirically, but it almost certainly gave a huge lift to Beijing's Made in China 2025 initiative, which seeks to advance China's domestic production of artificial intelligence systems, telecommunications, clean energy technology, aerospace products, and biotechnology.

Later, in 2014 and 2015, Chinese intelligence operatives penetrated networks belonging to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and exfiltrated the personnel files of around two million former or retired federal employees and more than two million current ones, including information on nearly all the background investigations of Americans who held security clearances at the top-secret level. Prodded by intense congressional pressure and media scrutiny, Obama confronted Chinese President Xi Jinping during a September 2015 meeting at the White House. Obama offered to not publicly attribute the OPM hack to China, and in exchange, Xi agreed to stop intelligence operations against U.S. firms and to establish a diplomatic working group to discuss issues related to cyberspace. Immediately following the summit, the volume of Chinese intellectual property theft plummeted, and Beijing and Washington held a round of talks about cybertheft. This positive outcome clearly demonstrated the importance of challenging China--but it also served as a reminder that the administration had waited far too long to take action.

U.S. President Donald Trump took office in 2017 with a more assertive, combative tone than that of his predecessor. His administration's approach to U.S. rivals was inconsistent and unpredictable, but in 2018, the White House approved the elevation of Cyber Command to full combatant command status, which freed the organization from the constraints of working through U.S. Strategic Command. Later that year, National Security Adviser John Bolton announced that the administration would take a more aggressive approach to offensive cyberoperations by permitting the military, with the approval of the secretary of defense, to conduct operations below the legal threshold of an "armed attack." This policy, known as National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, set the foundation for cyber-operations, such as denial-of-service attacks and information operations, targeting the Internet Research Agency, a Russian "troll farm," and may have prevented the group from interfering in the 2018 congressional midterm elections. These moves demonstrated the effectiveness of low-level, proactive cyber-tactics and drove home the idea that when it comes to cyberspace, deterrence need not take place on the level of grand strategy: low-tech, low-risk, targeted operations can do the trick.

The Trump administration's approach to Russia's cyber-campaigns was by no means an unqualified success, however, owing to the behavior of the president himself. Trump's bizarre genuflection toward Putin undermined any coherent strategy against Russia, and Trump's unwillingness to stand up for U.S. interests vis-a-vis Russia posed a genuine threat to American democracy. From his public invitation to the Russians to hack his 2016 opponent, Hillary Clinton, to his endorsement of Putin's nonsensical proposal to create a joint U.S.-Russian "impenetrable cybersecurity unit," Trump repeatedly undermined the efforts of his own country's law enforcement agencies, intelligence organizations, and military to protect U.S. national security.

OWN GOALS

But Trump is hardly the only American who has damaged U.S. cybersecurity in recent years. In 2013, an NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, perpetrated one of the most significant leaks in U.S. history when he provided journalists--and, according to some accounts, Chinese and Russian intelligence services--with thousands of highly classified documents revealing the expansive reach of the NSA's global operations, including its eavesdropping on senior government officials of countries allied with the United States. It is difficult to overstate the negative impact these disclosures had on U.S. efforts to secure cyberspace. Washington essentially lost all credibility on the world stage when it came to issues regarding cyberspace. After learning that the NSA had spied on heads of state, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, European governments were in no mood to work with Washington against Chinese or Russian cyber-operations. "Trust needs to be rebuilt," Merkel said at the time.

In the wake of the revelations, a wide range of governments--from U.S. allies in Europe to China--labeled Washington as the greatest threat to cybersecurity in the world. The fallout from Snowden's leaks also dealt a devastating blow to the cooperation between the U.S. government and the private sector, an essential aspect of defending U.S. interests in cyberspace. Owing to a fear of bad publicity and the risk of losing business in China, U.S. technology companies that had previously collaborated on unclassified cybersecurity initiatives with the federal government decided to completely halt such cooperation.

Things got worse a few years later when the NSA lost control of some of its most sensitive hacking tools. In two separate incidents, employees of an NSA unit that was then known as the Office of Tailored Access Operations--an outfit that conducts the agency's most sensitive cybersurveillance operations--removed extremely powerful tools from top-secret NSA networks and, incredibly, took them home. Eventually, the Shadow Brokers--a mysterious hacking group with ties to Russian intelligence services--got their hands on some of the NSA tools and released them on the Internet. As one former TAO employee told The Washington Post, these were "the keys to the kingdom"--digital tools that would "undermine the security of a lot of major government and corporate networks both here and abroad."

One such tool, known as "Eternal-Blue," got into the wrong hands and has been used to unleash a scourge of ransomware attacks--in which hackers paralyze computer systems until their demands are met--that will plague the world for years to come. Two of the most destructive cyberattacks in history made use of tools that were based on EternalBlue: the so-called WannaCry attack, launched by North Korea in 2017, which caused major disruptions at the British National Health Service for at least a week, and the NotPetya attack, carried out that same year by Russianbacked operatives, which resulted in more than $10 billion in damage to the global economy and caused weeks of delays at the world's largest shipping company, Maersk. In the past few years, ransomware attacks have struck hospitals, schools, city governments, and pipelines, driving home the severe nature of the cyberthreat.

HOW TO DO BETTER

Washington's decade spent in thrall to an outmoded conception of cyberconflict, the Obama administration's excessive passivity, the Trump administration's inconsistency, and the damage caused by leaks and sloppiness meant that when U.S. President Joe Biden took office earlier this year, he inherited a mess. Getting U.S. policy back on track will require his administration to substantially change the way that Washington conceives of and carries out cybersecurity. That will be particularly challenging given the current security environment, which is being shaped by China's rollout of the "digital yuan," the meteoric rise in the value and impact of cryptocurrencies, the flourishing of disinformation, and the sharp increase in ransomware attacks. Meanwhile, as nuclear negotiations with Iran intensify, the regime in Tehran will likely experiment with new cyber- and information operations to gain leverage at the negotiating table, and China and Russia will almost certainly test the relatively new administration with cyberattacks within the next year.

In this climate, the most important thing the Biden administration can do is embrace the notion that countries that can conduct destructive cyberattacks are not likely to be deterred by Washington's own cyber-capabilities but can still be deterred by the United States' conventional military power and economic might. When it comes to cyberspace, Washington shouldn't try to fight fire with fire--or at least not with fire alone. The United States, after all, has many more effective ways to contain and extinguish the flames.

With that in mind, the first practical step the administration should take is to prioritize the defense of data. Working with Congress, Biden must redouble efforts to pass a national data security law that will provide citizens with the right to take legal action against companies that fail to protect their data, similar to the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation. The United States is one of the only major democracies in the world that does not have such a law. As a result, an extraordinarily complex patchwork of state-level privacy and data security laws have sprung up, inhibiting the development of a secure informationbased economy. The current effort on Capitol Hill to require companies that provide critical infrastructure--including those in the manufacturing, energy production, and financial services sectors--to notify federal authorities of data breaches represents a promising development. But it is not nearly enough.

The administration should also make the rapid public attribution of cyberattacks a core component of its strategy, even in politically complex situations. The conventional wisdom used to hold that it was difficult to attribute cyberattacks with a high level of confidence. But over the past five years, advanced digital forensics have allowed intelligence agencies and private-sector cybersecurity firms to conclude with reasonable certainty who is behind most cyberattacks. That evolution is important: attribution alone has proved to be an effective, if short-lived, way to deter U.S. rivals from carrying out attacks.

Better U.S. policy will also require some organizational shifts. For starters, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency established in 2018 within the Department of Homeland Security must become the true center of gravity for domestic cybersecurity operations; the final authority over such operations should not be granted to intelligence organizations, law enforcement agencies, or the military. In the past three years, CISA has developed important capabilities to combat election interference and disinformation campaigns. Now, it must improve its defense of federal government networks, speed the sharing of threat indicators with the private sector, and offer expertise and operational support to the providers of critical infrastructure that face threats from ransomware. To do all that, CISA will need more funding: the organization's current annual budget of $3 billion should be tripled over the next four years, and it should eventually equal that of the NSA.

Law enforcement still has an important role to play, particularly when it comes to domestic defensive cyberoperations to thwart ransomware attacks. The FBI recently undertook an effective and creative effort to remove malicious tools implanted by Chinese intelligence services in hundreds of servers across the United States. In a novel and precedentsetting step, the bureau obtained warrants to unilaterally identify and delete the Chinese malware without the consent of the equipment's owners. The legal authority for that operation was established by an update to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; the administration should seek additional innovative updates to laws that will allow the FBI to take more proactive measures.

The U.S. military must also continue to adapt to the cyber-era. Biden should shape Cyber Command into something more akin to today's nimble, flexible Joint Special Operations Command and less like the lumbering Strategic Air Command of the 1950s. Cyber Command has relied too much on the NSA to create unique, nonattributable cybertools, which can take years to develop; to increase its agility, Cyber Command should turn to less complex, "burnable" tools, that is, ones that are expendable because they are already publicly available, which means there is no need to conceal their origin. The Trump administration, to its credit, upped Washington's game by increasing the frequency of low-tech, publicly attributable offensive cyberoperations. This had the effect of bolstering U.S. credibility in the cyber-realm--even in the face of Trump's erratic personal conduct. For example, after Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shot down a U.S. surveillance drone in 2019, Cyber Command conducted a retaliatory attack on a database crucial to the group. The strike demonstrated Washington's ability to achieve strategic goals while avoiding escalatory tactics. New legislation and new approaches would go a long way toward fixing Washington's flawed cyberstrategy But the government cannot improve U.S. cybersecurity on its own: it must meaningfully engage with the private sector to build cyberdefenses and cyberdeterrence. Companies are in the cross hairs of hackers of many stripes, and corporate leaders have become de facto national security decision-makers. To create shared norms and encourage the independent enforcement of cyberprotection standards, at least by publicly traded companies, Congress should consider creating a cybersecurity analog to the Securities and Exchange Commission, which protects the integrity of markets, and a version for cyberspace of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, which shape the public disclosures that companies must make.

Even if Washington does everything right, it will still need global cooperation. Luckily, the geopolitical environment today is conducive to strong U.S. diplomatic leadership on issues regarding cyberspace. Washington has mostly recovered from the fallout of the Snowden and the NSA leaks, and the world has finally recognized that the Chinese and Russian models of Internet autocracy are antithetical to a liberal order and a globalized economy. Washington needs to take advantage of this state of affairs through intensive cooperation with like-minded countries, such as France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

The UN is not the place to do so, however: in that forum, China and Russia can advance their interests by entangling Washington and its partners in abstract debates about norms even as they wantonly violate those norms in the real world. Many strategists have suggested that NATO could serve as the center of gravity for cooperation in cyberspace between the United States and its allies and partners, but the organization was built for the Cold War and is too clunky to foster creative strategies. Instead, Washington should pursue a series of bilateral agreements to prevent the spread of black-market ransomware tools. One model might be the Proliferation Security Initiative, a multilateral effort inaugurated by the George W Bush administration to improve the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction.

If American policymakers have learned anything in the past decade, it is that cyberconflict is a murky business, one that resists black-and-white notions about war and peace. That lack of clarity in the battle space makes it all the more important for Washington to be clear about its goals and strategies. The cyber-realm will always be messy. But U.S. cyber-policy does not have to be.

### AT: Security Ks

#### Securitizing cyber threats is good. Our method secures vulnerabilities while preventing militarism.

Pickin ND (Matthew, King's College London, War Studies, Graduate Student in international relations and politics. “What is the securitization of cyberspace? Is it a problem?” Academia, <https://www.academia.edu/3100313/What_is_the_securitization_of_cyberspace_Is_it_a_problem>, AK) \*A note on the date: I can’t find it, but the article must be published after or during 2012 because it cites articles from then.

The 2010 National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment stated that the United States was under a severe threat of cyber-attacks (Blair, 2010). Due to the amount of infrastructure connected to the internet in the United States targets for cyber-attacks are nearly unlimited, as a superpower the United States presents a valuable target. “As the world’s hegemonic power, the United States is also the main target state that dissident groups, terrorists, and rogue states wish to damage (Valeriano & Maness, 2011, p. 145).” Therefore, the United States must have some defence, or offensive capability in order to protect itself from future conflicts and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Foreign Affairs William J Lynn the former deputy secretary of defence wrote that the centrality of information technology in the United States makes it a prime target. He argued that extending advanced cyber-defences was crucial for the American economy, and also stated that failure of critical infrastructure would compromise national defence, “Our assessment is that cyber-attacks will be a significant component of future conflicts (Lynn, 2011).” Therefore in order to protect the United States, the government has been forced to securitize the issue. According to William J Lynn an attack could compromise national defence; therefore the issue is very high in the national security agenda. In the article, he also addresses the critics who argue that cyberspace is at risk of being militarized and states that US cyber strategy has been designed to prevent this from happening, “Far from militarizing cyberspace, U.S. cyber-strategy will make it more difficult for military actors to use cyberspace for hostile purposes (Lynn, 2011).” In securitizing cyberspace and creating advanced cyber-defences and cyber-weapons the United States is preparing for any future conflict or attack. If such an attack or conflict is a real existing threat then it is beneficial to prepare through securitization, otherwise the disadvantages clearly outweigh any advantage.

The other main benefit of securitizing cyberspace would be tackling cyber-crime. According to the security company Sophos, in the first six months of 2010 it received 60,000 new malware samples every day. Apart from malware, cyber-crime covers many different areas such as financial, piracy, hacking and cyber-terrorism. These crimes are growing due to the constantly evolving communications system of social sharing of data, online data storage and social networking, “Although cybercrime has formed a hidden shadow and a kind of evil doppelganger to every step of the Internet’s long history from its very origins, its growth has suddenly become explosive in recent years by virtually any estimate (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 28).” Both Deibert and Rohozinski argue that the rise is cyber-crime has become a big problem for states, in 2011 counterfeiting and copying cost the Asia-Pacific region almost $21 billion. Certainly cyber-space has become a rewarding way to commit crimes with little risk of prosecution, “Cybercrime has elicited so little prosecution from the world’s law enforcement agencies it makes one wonder a de facto decriminalization has occurred (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 29).” Due to the trouble of cyber-crime, the only way of combating it effectively would be greater state regulation and intervention. With the whole of cyber-space effectively securitized by the United States due to the threat to national security by technological and social shifts, the government is asserting itself increasingly to counter these threats.

## LAWs Good

### Inevitable—1NC

#### Autonomous drones are inevitable. Technology is developed and can be used any time!

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Reading through the research on autonomous drones, one gets the sense that these are the inevitable successors of existing drones. For example, Ronald Arkin says: ‘The trend is clear: Warfare will continue and autonomous robots will ultimately be deployed in its conduct.’ 2 To some extent, weapon autonomy is inevitable and already being realized. Many weapons and vehicles are automated to a large degree and are even able to select and attack targets without any human intervention. Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS), like the Phalanx, Centurion, and AK-630, are prime examples of this. These are designed to attack aircraft or incoming missiles and are often capable of being controlled by a human operator or allowed to act independently based on target acquisition criteria. CIWS are often described as being ‘automatic’ or ‘automated,’ rather than autonomous, though they are autonomous in the sense that I use the term because they can select and attack targets without human control. I will distinguish CIWS by calling them ‘autonomous weapons’ rather than ‘autonomous drones.’ The latter term is best reserved for machines that can act more independently than CIWS, which are typically mounted on ships or in fixed defensive positions.

Some semi-autonomous drones that are currently in the late stages of development could be made fully autonomous or at least provide the foundation for building autonomous drones. The BAE Taranis drone is projected to be a semi-autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), though the extent of its independence is secret. Recent reports suggest that the aircraft will wait for approval from a pilot before fi ring at the targets it selects, but with the technology advanced to this level, it is easy to imagine a Taranis or a successor attacking without prior authorization. The US Navy’s X-47B is likewise capable of operating without any human control. Its ability to successfully take off from and land on aircraft carriers without human assistance is evidence that the drone could also be used to conduct attacks. Thus, there is little doubt that the technology needed to create autonomous drones exists and that armed forces could deploy these machines in future conflicts.

There is clearly a rush to develop weapons platforms that have greater independence, and it does seem likely that future wars will involve many different types of machines that will be able to move around battlefi elds and attack without human control. However, exactly what these machines will be like remains highly speculative. A persistent problem when talking about autonomous weapons is that the term ‘autonomous’ is contested. Although many commentators use this term, they tend to employ it in so many different ways that they often end up talking past each other. As I have defi ned them, autonomous drones are machines that can attack targets without being directly controlled by a human operator. Independent targeting marks a decisive shift in the character of drones by raising the possibility that they, rather than humans, could make decisions about matters of life and death on the battlefi eld. Yet it is essential to recognize that even when machines have the power to kill, they may be under human control to varying degrees. A drone could be autonomous and yet still be heavily restricted in terms of how this autonomy is expressed.

### Inevitable—2NC

#### Drones arms races are inevitable, preventing civilian causalities at war

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Drones are apt to create a security dilemma for states and non-state actors alike. This is ‘a situation in which each party’s efforts to increase its own security reduce the security of others.’ 37 Because most available drones are offensive weapons platforms that derive their capacities for risk management from their ability to launch attacks away from the areas where drone operators are based, they are particularly likely to prompt rivals to develop their own offensive drone capacities to counter any unmanned threat they may face. The USA is largely responsible for initiating this security dilemma and has been justifiably criticized for doing this without taking adequate steps to impose restrictions on drone operations. 38 However, now that multiple states and non-state actors are involved in developing drones, the groundwork for a multilateral drone arms race is firmly in place. States and non-state actors now have strong incentives to develop drones faster than their rivals and equally strong disincentives against unilaterally attempting to limit drone production.

A drone arms race is arguably already in progress, with many states and non-state actors making greater use of drones while also attempting to improve their capacities for building and maintaining drones domestically. We can see European states beginning to create their own drones, China unveiling drones that are closely modeled on American UAVs, 39 and Russian drones operating in Syria, 40 as well as US forces developing weapons that can destroy enemy drones. 41 Security dilemmas are usually a cause for concern as they may produce conflicts as a by-product of cycles of competition and escalation. Butterfield argues that ‘the greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm to the world’ simply because their efforts to provide for their own security may lead them into conflict. 42 If competition is carried out primarily, or even partly, through the development of drones, then one may wonder whether the pursuit of technological advantages in war could provoke dangerous escalations or even cause wars.

Fears of arms races increasing the likelihood of conflict and intensifying wars are well-founded because many arms races are driven by an urge to create more powerful weapons. Arms races that result in the introduction of more destructive and expensive weapons that are less suited for being used in accordance with just war restrictions are objectionable. The race to develop bigger and more powerful nuclear devices during the Cold War is a prime example of the negative repercussions this type of competition can have. It increased American and Soviet capacities for using force in immoral ways and caused repeated conflicts that risked escalation into an immensely destructive war.

I argue that drones are causing a much different kind of arms race. Thus far, the rush to develop drones has resulted in a proliferation of machines that are designed for reconnaissance and precise strikes against military targets—machines that allow belligerents to wage wars using more restricted levels of force and show heightened respect for non-combatant immunity. Moreover, the leading contenders in this race are armed forces that already have immensely powerful weapons, including nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). By arming themselves with drones, these belligerents are not increasing their existing capacities for immense destruction but rather developing the means of engaging in more limited and targeted acts of violence. This kind of arms race marks an encouraging improvement in weapons innovation as older and more destructive weapons are increasingly marginalized by the competition to introduce more precise weapons. ‘For the fi rst time, we are directing our defense laboratory wizardry along the azimuth of self-restraint.’ 43

Belligerents that do not wish to comply with the principle of noncombatant immunity may choose to develop drones for attacks on civilians. Drones could be fairly effective instruments of civilian victimization, but the incentives for using them in this way are not very strong. There are already countless varieties of ranged or indirect weapons, such as rockets, artillery, IEDs, and landmines that can be used to carry out cheap and terrifying indiscriminate attacks. These organizations hardly need drones to harm civilians and are apt to prefer powerful weapons that are better suited for mass casualty attacks.

One could argue that the character of the drone arms race could change and lead to the creation of weapons that are less capable of being operated in accordance with moral and legal restrictions, yet this does not appear likely for two reasons. First, part of the impetus for developing more powerful weapons in the past was due to the weapons’ inaccuracies. The Soviet Union developed far more powerful nuclear warheads than the USA and had a nuclear strike doctrine that was more heavily based on attacking civilian populations (‘countervalue targeting’ in the language of nuclear strategy). 44 This was partly due to the Soviet’s poorer targeting systems, which were unable to accurately hit American nuclear facilities and had to compensate for that weakness by delivering more destructive warheads. By contrast, the USA had more accurate targeting systems and correspondingly tended to favor strikes against enemy military targets (‘counterthreat targeting’). Drones make it possible to identify and attack targets with greater accuracy than ever before, thereby obviating the need for ‘countervalue’ strikes or for overpowered WMDs.

There is a chance that the current trends in drone innovation will not persist and that drones will one day become more destructive and indiscriminate weapons, despite indications to the contrary. It would be naïve to suggest that this is an impossible outcome, especially given the challenges inherent in predicting the unintended consequences of technological development. Nevertheless, this **risk is outweighed** by the potential for drones to mitigate wars’ destructiveness and can be managed politically. In recent decades, states have made unprecedented efforts to reduce stockpiles of, and prevent violence using, a broad range of morally questionable weapons, including nuclear weapons, landmines, weapons platforms in space, and chemical weapons. 45 As I will discuss in Chapters 7and 8 , efforts to regulate war and the use of particular weapons can also help to ensure that drone development continues on its current trajectory.

### Ethics—1NC

#### Critical scholarship overblows drone accidents and underestimates conventional warfare’s faults—autonomous weapons are net most ethical.

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

As I have argued, it seems unlikely that armed forces would produce autonomous drones that deliberately contravene ROE, or even ones that would have the freedom to develop their own desires and values. Nevertheless, one could argue that this level of autonomy is not necessary to make these machines morally dubious because technical malfunctions could lead any drone, even one with fairly limited freedom, to use unjustifi able violence. Garcia warns against a future in which autonomous drones resemble machines from The Terminator movies, turning against humans to create an unprecedented new security risk—and while he acknowledges that it is unlikely for drones to wage a war against humanity, he maintains that there is a high risk that they may be hacked or may malfunction. ‘[T]he risk of malfunctions from failed software or cyberattacks could result in new dangers altogether. Countries will have dissimilar computer programs that, when interacting with each other, may be erratic. Further, signal jamming and hacking become all the more attractive – and more dangerous – as armies increasingly rely on drones and other robotic weaponry.’

Malfunctions are certain to occur when autonomous weapons and drones are employed. The Phalanx CIWS has been involved in several instances of mistaken attacks and infl icted ‘collateral damage’ on friendly forces. During one training mission in 1989, a Phalanx not only destroyed a practice drone, but also sent rounds into a nearby American ship, killing one person and injuring another. 10 A similar incident occurred during the First Gulf War when four rounds fi red from a Phalanx mounted on the USS Jarrett struck the USS Missouri, though this attack did not cause any casualties.

This comes back to one of the concerns that was raised in Chapter 3 —the possibility that drones could have technical faults that would lead them to malfunction or make them susceptible to hacking. Although it is reasonable to be concerned that weapons could malfunction and it is certainly vital for armed forces to avoid deploying drones that have not been adequately tested, it is also unfair to have a zero-tolerance policy for technical faults or suggest that the possibility of some malfunctions provides a reason to oppose the use of drones in general. Human soldiers do not malfunction as a machine would, yet as I have emphasized, they do make mistakes, especially under the harsh conditions of war that impair their cognitive processes.

Holmes estimates that a high number of military casualties in previous wars were infl icted accidentally. For example, during the Vietnam War, around 846 soldiers died from negligent discharges of their weapons, with another 939 killing fellow soldiers in ‘accidental homicides.’ 11 And these estimates only account for the military deaths, saying nothing of the hundreds or thousands of civilians who may have been killed when soldiers accidentally fi red their weapons or struck civilians with their vehicles. These casualties are not due to malfunctions, yet they are analogous as they are casualties that are unintentionally infl icted outside of combat.

The 1989 incident of a Phalanx killing one sailor and injuring another was only one of several training deaths infl icted during that year, with others including a manned aircraft that accidentally dropped a bomb onto an American ship and a collision between two jets during an air show. Between October 11 and November 16 of 1989, 11 people were killed and 46 injured in US Navy accidents, only two of these from the incident involving the Phalanx. 12 And the record on CIWS operated by human controllers indicates that human error is at least as dangerous as autonomous targeting controls. In 1996 a Phalanx on board a Japanese ship shot down an American jet during a training mission, but the accident was caused by a gunnery offi cer who directed it to open fi re. 13 One of the worst disasters was the USS Vincennes’ attack on a passenger aircraft during the Iran–Iraq War, when a surface-to-air missile fi red by human controllers resulted in the death of 290 civilians. 14 This does not tell us anything about how many accidents we should expect from autonomous weapons in the future, nor does it exculpate negligent engineers or military personnel who employ these weapons without taking adequate precautions. However, it does suggest that we should expect some accidents and malfunctions to happen, and that we should judge these incidents in context, rather than condemning autonomous weapons based on an unrealistic standard of faultless performance.

The real test for drones—whether autonomous or non-autonomous— should be whether they increase or decrease the extent of accidental violence. It would be deeply regrettable for a drone to malfunction and attack soldiers and civilians, but if the overall extent of suffering is reduced by using the drone, then there is still good reason to prefer it over human soldiers or manned vehicles that might be used in its place. **Wars cannot be casualty-free.** Accidents will happen when armies and their weapons are deployed with the aim of killing. We must reject the false assurances that drones will produce risk-free wars, yet we should also remain committed to using weapons that can most effectively minimize the magnitude of wars, and especially civilian suffering, when war is unavoidable. The possibility that drones could malfunction highlights the need for rigorously testing these weapons platforms and of having mechanisms for punishing those who deploy autonomous drones without adequately testing them or implementing effective safety protocols. The chance of malfunctions provides prudential grounds for being skeptical about armed autonomous drones. Nevertheless, it fails to demonstrate that these machines are morally faulty or that it would be immoral to use them.

The challenge that drones face is that their malfunctions garner a disproportionate amount of attention even if they infl ict far fewer accidental casualties than human soldiers or manned vehicles. The hundreds of accidental killings perpetrated by human soldiers rarely make the news. As we saw in Chapter 5 , they are so infrequently discussed that even some critics of drones who specialize in military ethics research deny the extent of this problem. However, malfunctioning drones certainly would make the news and would attract attention even if an incident is exceptional. This bias in reporting makes it essential to make greater efforts to track the numbers of casualties that are infl icted in various ways, with an aim to facilitate empirically grounded judgments about the best way to restrict wars.

### Ethics—2NC

#### Drones are more neutral and ethical than humans – fears of collateral damage are overblown

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Second, I argue that most existing drones, as well as many types of drones that are in development, are defensible based on their latent potentials. Most drones do not create any new opportunities for misconduct beyond those that are already made possible by existing weapons. Drones may be used to target civilians or carry out disproportionate attacks. They may permit belligerents to initiate aggressive wars or fight without first testing available peaceful means of conflict resolution. Yet these risks are not substantially increased by drones. They are existing risks that are characteristic of a broad range of weapons, and the plausibility of these risks depends heavily on the balance of military forces between opposing belligerents. Many of these risks are apt to subside as drones become more widespread and reduce the US military’s current dominance in this form of warfare. Moreover, drones have technological characteristics that substantially increase the potential for morally justifiable uses of force, and this potential for increasing compliance with just war principles weighs in favor of using drones under many circumstances.

The most important moral advantage that drones introduce is that they make it easier to manage the risks that military personnel and civilians are exposed to. A perennial dilemma of war, which became increasingly serious over the course of the twentieth century, is how armed forces should balance the risks to their own forces against risks to civilians. Efforts to reduce risk to soldiers tend to heighten the risk to civilians, while efforts to reduce risk to civilians tend to heighten the risk to soldiers. High-altitude bombing campaigns can ensure that few soldiers are injured and killed, but they create serious risks of civilian ‘collateral damage.’ Conversely, soldiers constrained by strict ROE are less likely to attack civilians who are mistaken for enemy combatants and more likely to be killed or injured by non-uniformed combatants. The best way of resolving the risk dilemma is a central point of contention in the literature on military ethics and just war theory, and for good reason—decisions about the apportionment of risk help to determine the extent to which belligerents will abide by jus in bello restrictions.

Drones overcome the risk dilemma by obviating the need to protect soldiers. Because drones are proxies for human combatants, they allow their operators to make decisions without having to take their own safety into consideration. This grants drone operators greater opportunities for making disinterested decisions, limiting violence against civilians, and using minimal levels of force. It also creates opportunities for increasing the strictness of ROE without incurring any of the costs that have traditionally been associated with efforts to protect civilians, especially heightened chances of soldiers being killed or injured. This makes it possible for armed forces using drones to focus their efforts on reducing the risk to civilians. Moreover, audiences around the world may reasonably expect drone users to show greater respect for civilian immunity and have stronger grounds for condemning violence against civilians simply because the drone users have the technical capacity to increase their compliance with the tenets of just war theory.

The most significant decisions about the management of risk are made at strategic and operational levels, with soldiers at lower levels of the chain of command being left to act within the confines of rules that their superiors have established. However, even at the lowest levels of the military hierarchy, soldiers have some freedom to make decisions about the use of force that could expose them, their fellow soldiers, enemies, or civilians to the risk of being killed or injured. All soldiers have a right to self-defense that authorizes them to take reasonable steps to protect themselves from real or potential threats, which is typically acknowledged in soldiers’ ROE or their accompanying provisions. 37 Soldiers must have this right since denying it would constitute a serious injustice against these people, who are continually exposed to life-threatening conditions and who must be authorized to take reasonable steps to ensure their own survival. However, the authorization to act in self-defense can lead to serious moral problems as soldiers may apply lethal force to defend themselves in ways that endanger civilians. 38 The right of self-defense can provide an excuse for attacking enemy combatants that are hiding behind human shields or civilians who are misidentified as enemy combatants.

Drones free their operators from the demands of acting defensively. Whereas a soldier on the battlefield may have to react quickly to a threat— or even to an apparent threat that is misidentified—a drone operator can show restraint without personally experiencing any danger. Restraint would only endanger the drone itself, and because machines do not have a right of self-defense, the danger to them cannot provide grounds for threatening civilians. Drone operators’ safety makes it possible to subject them to stricter ROE, which can help to protect civilians and civilian property from being mistakenly attacked or incidentally harmed in attacks on enemy combatants. It likewise facilitates the proportionate use of force against clearly identified enemy combatants as it renders overwhelming attacks and suppressive fire unnecessary under most circumstances.

Removing soldiers from the battlefield may also have tangential benefits, aside from those associated with escaping the risk dilemma and the demands of acting defensively. Biased or impaired moral reasoning is a serious problem in any context; people have a tendency to import their biases into decisions and to apply moral standards in self-serving ways. However, bias is particularly likely during war because of the extreme circumstances in which soldiers have to make ethical decisions and the sharp divisions between competing groups. Soldiers may be affected by intense emotions, debilitating stress, fear, sleep deprivation, and other psychological conditions that can inhibit their moral reasoning capacities and lead them to act unethically. 39 Of course, soldiers operating drones are not neutral and can act unethically as well. They will want their own side to win, will have self-interested reasons for justifying their uses of force, and may experience a strong emotional connection to the human soldiers their machines operate alongside. Nevertheless, drone operators’ distance from the battlefield and security from immediate danger promote greater neutrality than can be expected from human soldiers who are personally exposed to the hazards of war.

#### Drones neither undermine deterrence nor spark wars. This line-by-lines the authors their cards cite!

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

One of the concerns critics have raised against drones is that they might make it easier to start wars or otherwise disrupt the series of steps that belligerents are expected to take before they decide to employ lethal force. Brunstetter and Braun argue that drones have the potential to alter calculations about last resort in ways that will lower inhibitions against fighting. As they see it, drones owe much of their popularity to their capacities for allowing wars to be waged with minimal risk and minimal force. Drones can carry out low-intensity attacks that are narrowly targeted at particular individuals, thereby giving the impression that they are not engaged in war at all. ‘To the extent they are successful, drones arguably raise the threshold of last resort of large-scale military deployment by providing a way to avoid deploying troops or conducting an intensive bombing campaign while still counteracting perceived threats.’ 25 They go on to say that ‘[b]ecause drones are seen as a level of force short of war, their use may also be seen as a measure to which the principle of last resort does not apply.’ 26

By most accounts, drones lower inhibitions against starting wars by circumventing feelings of casualty aversion that would ordinarily act as a barrier against fighting. 27 Research on casualty aversion draws much of its strength from efforts to explain the surprising loss of the USA in Vietnam. Some explanation was needed for why the world’s most powerful military was beaten, and by one account, the fault lies with the American public’s sensitivity to seeing its soldiers being killed and wounded. Since Vietnam, the phenomenon of casualty aversion has been credited with undermining the US military’s fi ghting capacity and limiting its wars, both in terms of when they are fought and in terms of how intense they may become. The withdrawal of US forces from Somalia following the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 is often cited as another prime example of the public’s low casualty tolerance prompting a de-escalation of force, 28 while the country’s reluctance to commit ground forces to stop the fi ghting in the Balkans during the 1990s serves as an example of expected casualty aversion preventing the deployment of military ground forces. 29

As these examples indicate, casualty aversion may constraint wars in several ways. First, civilians may oppose a prospective military operation when they anticipate that it is likely to incur a large number of casualties. Second, civilians may anticipate an increase in casualties when their leaders propose an escalation of hostilities, such as attacking another country during an ongoing war, opening a new front in the war, or using more destructive weapons. Third, support for an ongoing war may fall as more soldiers are injured or killed, leading to a more rapid cessation of hostilities.

Kaag and Kreps’ case against drones is largely premised on showing that these machines may make it easier for the USA and other countries to wage wars because of their potential to limit casualties. They contend that ‘drones create a “moral hazard” by shielding US citizens, politicians, and soldiers from the risks associated with targeted killings.’ 30 Without the chance of losing any American soldiers in combat, presidents are free to launch strikes whenever they want, with relatively low risk of provoking a strong backlash or compromising their prospects of being reelected. Some members of the public may oppose these strikes, but with no American casualties being sustained, most people will have little sense that a war is taking place and that people are being injured or killed. This would make it easier to initiate, escalate, and sustain wars without attempting to resolve confl icts in other ways, thereby subverting the principle of last resort.

Kaag and Kreps maintain that the moral hazard of drone warfare is concerning not only because it may lead to a greater incidence of war but also because it may disrupt democratic public life:

Ironically, the pressure from a democratic electorate to protect itself from the harms of warfare will not encourage policy makers to adopt peaceful or democratic methods…but rather methods of warfare that leverage technology in order to insulate citizen-soldiers from harm. The irony is this insulation creates the possibility that leaders will no longer, in a prudential sense, have to obtain popular permission to go to war. 31

Thus, by Kaag and Kreps’ account, drones not only bring about international instability but also processes of de-democratization that will produce a disengaged, complacent, and powerless citizenry.

P.W.  Singer reaches a similar assessment. He argues that one consequence of drone warfare may be that ‘the checks and balances that undergird democracy go by the wayside.’ 32 This will mean that ‘[a] leader needn’t carry out the kind of consensus building that is normally needed before a war, and doesn’t even need to unite the country behind the effort.’ 33 And Benjamin contends that ‘[w]ith drone warfare, there is no need to unite the country behind a confl ict, no need to call for shared sacrifi ce, no need for grueling debates in Congress.’ 34 Thus, these commentators suggest that lowering inhibitions against fi ghting not only threatens to violate the principle of last resort but also degrades the quality of democratic governance.

These and other accounts of how drones could circumvent casualty aversion in ways that would increase the incidence of wars raise reasonable fears, but they do not stand up to careful scrutiny for at least three reasons. First, they are contravened by the available evidence. The argument that drones lower the threshold for war suggests that the USA might not have launched its counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia if not for drones, yet this is clearly untrue. The USA has carried out hundreds of drone strikes in those countries, but it has also relied heavily on other weapons and tactics. Special operations forces have conducted covert raids in each country and have infl icted **higher numbers of civilian casualties**. For example, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that the 15–19 drone strikes conducted in Somalia between 2001 and 2015 resulted in 25–108 deaths, while the 8–11 other covert attacks killed 40–141 people, with higher numbers of confirmed civilian fatalities. 35 Based on these numbers, the preference for drones over alternative methods of attack seems to be fairly modest, and drones also appear to be inflicting more proportionate harm.

In the absence of drones, it is likely that cruise missiles or manned aircraft would have been used to carry out less precise strikes against at least some of the same people who were attacked by UAVs. The USA has demonstrated its willingness to use other weapons in previous wars and counterterrorism operations, such as in the cruise missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in August 1998 during Operation Infinite Reach. Those attacks were analogous to the ones conducted more recently by UAVs as they were also launched against suspected terrorists and their supporters. The attacks were widely considered to be a failure since they did not disrupt Al Qaeda’s operations or kill its top leaders, and probably caused civilian deaths. And this is only one instance among many when the USA and its allies used cruise missiles, aircraft, and special operations forces to carry out small strikes. 36

The US military was able to intervene in the Balkans, despite fears of sustaining casualties, by relying on manned aircraft. 37 These are nearly as effective as UAVs in preventing US military casualties, especially in more recent confl icts. No Coalition combat aircraft were shot down by enemy fi re during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or in the more recent attacks against Islamic State, making casualty aversion an unlikely deterrent against using manned aircraft to initiate hostilities. The same can be said of cruise missiles, which do not put any soldiers at risk of being killed or captured. Drones are roughly equivalent to these other weapons when it comes to circumventing casualty aversion, yet they also introduce many added benefits for conducting discriminate and proportionate attacks. Thus, even if drones do lower the bar for waging wars, they are far from unique in doing so and have compelling benefits over weapons and tactics that could be used in the same capacities.

Drones are not altering the course of US military operations so much as they are making it possible for existing policies to be carried out with greater precision. This suggests that UAVs have not had any clear effect on decisions about the resort to force. At most, we can conclude that drones are one method of attack among many others that allow belligerents to launch low-intensity attacks. And because the other means of doing this include special operations forces, private military contractors, manned aircraft, and cruise missiles, efforts to prevent wars by restricting drones are misdirected. We can **only realistically expect change via policy** reforms that would limit when and how states can launch low-intensity strikes of any type.

Second, and even more importantly, casualty aversion is a far more complex phenomenon than critics of drones seem to recognize. Much of the research on casualty aversion suggests that it either does not exist or that its importance has been greatly exaggerated. There are also instances of democracies suffering **high casualties** during a war while still maintaining fairly **high levels of public approval**. The most compelling studies of casualty aversion have demonstrated that even when public opinion is sensitive to losses, this is only one factor among the many that determine support for war. Larson finds that American civilians hope for low numbers of casualties, but that they expect some soldiers to be wounded and killed and are fairly open to this possibility. 38 Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifl er reach a similar conclusion. Their research reveals that casualty aversion does exist, but that it is only one of a collection of factors that influence support for war, the most important being expectations of success. 39

Third, **there is not a perfect link between public attitudes about war and the state’s ability to wage war**. Critics who blame drones for circumventing casualty aversion suggest that the public can easily block wars, and this is doubtful. Democracies routinely initiate wars that are only favored by a small majority or that lack majority support. One poll found that only around 36 % of people in the UK favored the 2003 invasion of Iraq, yet public opposition to the war failed to prevent it. 40 The leaders who enter, escalate, or fail to resolve unpopular wars risk losing the next election if they defy the public’s wishes, but they may consider a calculated risk to be worthwhile. The leaders who were responsible for the Iraq War were willing to contravene public opinion because they thought they would be vindicated and rewarded with a surge in popularity once they were victorious. 41 This kind of wishful thinking may blind policymakers to public opinion and prepare them to risk sustaining casualties—particularly if their casualty estimates are also unrealistically low as they were at the outset of the Iraq War. The lesson we can derive from this is that even if using drones may reduce public opposition to a war, it is implausible to think that some relatively small shifts in public opinion will be decisive in determining whether war will break out.

#### Drone warfare is preferable to human – fully constrained to ROE

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Equally worrying is the prevalence of accidental attacks on civilians who are mistaken for enemy combatants. Soldiers must operate under conditions of profound uncertainty—often having little knowledge of where enemies are and when an attack may come. This is particularly true during counterinsurgency operations, when opponents do not wear uniforms or occupy a clearly demarcated area. Uncertainty forces soldiers to make quick judgments about who to attack based on the limited information available. For example, those guarding convoys during the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan had to quickly evaluate approaching vehicles to decide which were potentially dangerous. In many instances, they were forced to make critical decisions about whether to use lethal force to defend themselves, despite having little sense of which vehicles contained civilians and which contained enemy fighters. 31 A car speeding toward a checkpoint could contain civilians who innocently failed to notice the checkpoint warning signs or it could contain suicide bombers. Soldiers only have a few seconds to guess about the occupant’s identity. This led to many mistaken attacks on civilians who inadvertently acted in ways that made them appear threatening and triggered soldiers’ right to act defensively.

A drone operator does not have to make decisions about whether to use suppressing fire or whether to attack potential threats that have not been clearly identified. Because drones allow their operators to escape the need to act in self-defense, they may be subjected to inviolable ROE. Whereas human soldiers are allowed to return fi re against enemy combatants when fighting within a populated area, drone operators may be forbidden from engaging enemies when there is a high risk of harming civilians without putting any human soldiers at risk. Not only can drones be employed without permitting any exceptions in the ROE, but also the moral logic of self-defense dictates that they must be used in this way. Machines do not have a right to self-defense or any comparable right that could plausibly override the rights of civilian bystanders, and no threat to these machines can trigger their operators’ defensive rights. Moreover, because drones are far more resilient than human soldiers, the effects of attacks on them will be milder. A human soldier could be killed or seriously injured by small arms fi re, but a drone that is designed to withstand intense gunfire might only have its armor damaged. In other words, drones not only lack defensive rights that could excuse deviations from ROE but also have increased survival capacities, which only add further reason to grant them no exceptions for acting in ways that could threaten civilians.

Thus, drones enable armed forces to employ much stricter ROE and tactics that shift the burden of risk away from civilians, while also making it possible to eliminate the possibility of soldiers invoking their right of selfdefense in ways that would allow them to escape the ROE. When taken together, the effect that drones have on resolving the balance of risks problem and eliminating occasions for self-defense provides the basis for holding belligerents to extremely demanding standards of jus in bello conduct.

#### Critics of autonomous drones cherry-pick theoretical drones, but autonomous drones are limited by human intervention

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Attempts to show that autonomous drones are inherently immoral are unconvincing since it is far from clear that they would be unable to distinguish between combatants and civilians, as Sharkey and other critics maintain. Claims that these machines would be immoral are only compelling if autonomous drones are inherently indiscriminate. They lack force if drones are as discriminate or more discriminate than human soldiers. Whether drones turn out to be better or worse at respecting civilians’ rights is yet to be seen, and it is diffi cult to show that these drones would be absolutely immoral without stronger evidence—particularly when existing autonomous weapons have been in service for years and performed fairly reliably.

As I discussed in previous chapters, it seems very unlikely that any nonautonomous or semi-autonomous drone could qualify as being inherently immoral. An inherently immoral machine would have to be incapable of being used discriminately and proportionately, likely to cause superfl uous suffering, or possessing a latent potential that strongly favors immoral or illegal conduct. Armed forces do not currently seem to have any interest in developing drones that have built-in moral faults. Just the opposite, they have introduced drones that are designed to conduct limited attacks at narrowly defi ned targets, setting higher standards than ever for using violence in ethically circumscribed ways. It is on this basis that we can say that non-autonomous drones are morally justifi able.

The same evaluative criteria can be applied to machines that can kill without being directly controlled by a human operator. Autonomous weapons and drones that have a low degree of independence, such as CIWS or even attack drones that seek their own targets according to carefully formulated protocols, may not have a person directly in control of the targeting decision, yet they do act in ways that have been established by human developers. Because these machines are designed by humans to fulfi ll specifi c purposes, and in ways that create latent potentials for action that may be subject to moral evaluation, these machines are akin to other weapons or drones. A human may not be directly responsible for ordering these kinds of autonomous drones to fi re at a particular target, yet **people create the guidelines for conducting attacks** and this leaves people fi rmly in control of how the weapons act.

Machines with a more substantive form of autonomy, such as those that Sparrow 8 describes being akin to human soldiers, would be a much different type of entity than machines that have limited freedom to deviate from established protocols. These would not merely be weapons platforms, but would rather have their own agency that could deserve moral valuation in itself. Nevertheless, machines possessing this type of agency could still be judged in terms of their latent potentials. After all, such machines would be autonomous based on parameters that were established by a human developer. Their agency would be rooted in a computer program that was written by a person, even though the programming sets the preconditions for acting beyond the scope of any initial operating rules. Such a machine could therefore be judged based on the extent to which its programming permits it to act in particular ways or develop certain tendencies. A machine that fi ts the description Sparrow provides could well be considered immoral for the same reason that poison gas is immoral—the weapon’s mercurial nature would make its effects unpredictable, thereby violating the principle of discrimination.

With these points in mind, we can see that it is impossible to classify all autonomous drones as being morally permissible or immoral for the same reason that it is impossible to classify all non-autonomous drones as being morally permissible or immoral. Whether autonomous or nonautonomous, drones should be classifi ed as being comparatively more or less moral than other weapons that perform the same task. An autonomous drone would only be inherently immoral on the same grounds that any other weapon or weapons platform could be inherently immoral—if there was little or no possibility of using the weapon according to the strictures of just war theory and international law. Certain versions of autonomous drones might be immoral in this sense, but this would only provide grounds for objecting to those specifi c versions and not for decrying autonomous drones that have greater potential for being used in responsible ways.

To a large extent, the debate over the morality of autonomous drones comes down to a disagreement over what latent potentials these weapons will have. Those who think that autonomous drones could be morally advantageous are typically very clear in saying that this holds true only under specifi c conditions: when the machines are programmed to rigidly adhere to ROE, have been rigorously tested, and are capable of being overridden by human commands. Conversely, those who object to autonomous drones describe them as being prone to malfunctions, having unreliable targeting protocols, and being capable of disregarding their ROE. Which side is right in this debate? It depends on what autonomous drones are actually like. If they have the characteristics attributed to them by their proponents, then autonomous drones would be morally permissible. If they have the characteristics attributed to them by their critics, then they would be immoral. At this stage of their development, the character of autonomous weapons is so highly speculative that we cannot say with any confi dence what these machines would actually be like, yet we can be fairly certain of the conditions under which an autonomous weapon would be permissible or objectionable.

We should give up on efforts to show that autonomous drones are either moral or immoral as a class of weapons platforms and instead pass judgment on specifi c machines based on their latent potentials. If it turns out that belligerents are negligent in their deployment of these drones or that most prospective variants of them appear to increase the likelihood of immoral conduct, then we would have a prudential basis for restricting the development and use of autonomous drones. If belligerents develop autonomous drones that are rigorously tested and programmed to strictly follow demanding ROE, then we would have reason to support their use.

### Disarm—1NC

#### Lethal autonomous weapons prolif is de-escalatory and causes global nuclear disarm—solves extinction.

Umbrello, et al, 20—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, 35, 273–282 (2020), dml) [LAWs=lethal autonomous weapons]

To begin, one of the most compelling reasons for opposing nuclear non-proliferation efforts is that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons increases the threshold of use (Jürgen 2008; Wilson 2012). Thus, only in extreme circumstances would rational actors deem their use to be either morally or strategically acceptable. This strongly contrasts with the case of LAWs, whose cost would be small compared to the cost of paying military personnel. Consequently, states could maintain stockpiles of LAWs that are far larger than any standing army. The low cost of LAWs would also make them more expendable than human soldiers (Jacoby and Chang 2008; Singer 2009a, b; Jenks 2010), and they could strike the enemy with greater precision than human scolders can currently achieve (Thurnher 2012; Ekelhof and Struyk 2014). These four properties—low cost, military effectiveness, expendability, and precision—could drive proliferation while lowering the threshold for use and, therefore, undermine geopolitical security. Incidentally, similar claims could be made about anticipated future nanotech weaponry (see Whitman 2011).

The attractiveness of LAWs is apparent in the US’s use of “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs, also known as “drones”) in Iraq and Syria. These semi-autonomous systems offer a cheap, effective, and relatively precise means for conducting surveillance and targeting enemy combatants [despite unsatisfied infrastructural needs to sustain the drone program] (McLean 2014). As a result, the US drone program has grown and the frequency of drone use against terrorist organizations like the (now-defunct) Islamic State has steadily increased in the past decade (Higgins 2017). Yet the proliferation of LAWs discussed in this paper is different in important respects from the proliferation of current UAV devices. LAWs are theoretically capable of becoming moral actors capable of making life and death decisions without human intervention. The absence of a human operator suggests that LAWs will be even cheaper than current UAVs and, as such, more vulnerable to proliferation. But this might not be undesirable given that, for example, ethical LAWs will—almost by definition—not serve to glorify or extend war efforts beyond the initial scope. Furthermore, UAVs still require human intervention and, as we will soon discuss, the emotional volatility of humans could lead to overspending and high death tolls.

More generally speaking, the growing use of UAVs in conflict situations is consistent with a broader trend toward high-precision weaponry and away from larger, more destructive weapons like those in the world’s nuclear arsenals (Wilson 2013). There are some reasons for welcoming this shift. For example, the use of high-precision weapons like LAWs to achieve a state’s military objectives could reduce the probability and proportion of indiscriminate harm, thus violating the LoW and “rules of engagement” (RoE) less than might otherwise have been possible. Even more, the “ease-of-use” of LAWs that are fully autonomous could enhance the “balance of terror” that prevents conflict from breaking out by providing a credible means for retaliation: “If you strike me first, I will unleash a swarm of LAWs that devastate your infrastructure, poison your streams, set fire to your farms, destroy your armies, and assassinate your leaders.”

The precision and effectiveness of LAWs could also accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament, seeing as the conception of LAWS regards them as agents capable of conventional weapons use rather non-conventional weapons platforms. First, consider that research on the potential climatic consequences of a nuclear war resulted in the replacement of MAD (“mutually-assured destruction”) with SAD (“self-assured destruction”). The reason is that an exchange of nuclear weapons—even a regional one [citation]—could initiate a “nuclear winter” that causes global agricultural failures, widespread starvation, the spread of infectious disease, and other catastrophic sequelae that cannot be contained within national borders (Mills et al. 2014; Xia et al. 2015). Consequently, a nuclear war would all but guarantee the self-annihilation of states involved. As Seth Baum (2015) notes, though, LAWs could provide a kind of “winter-safe deterrence” by providing states with a credible threat of retaliation without the global catastrophic risks of nuclear conflict. Thus, LAWs could render the world’s nuclear arsenals irrelevant and, in doing so, lower the overall risk of human annihilation.

### Disarm—2NC

#### Winter-safe deterrence outweighs the risks of LAW prolif.

Schulzke, 16—assistant professor in International Relations at the University of York (Marcus, “Evaluating Autonomous Drones,” *The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation*, Chapter 5, pg 149-171, SpringerLink, dml)

One could argue that the character of the drone arms race could change and lead to the creation of weapons that are less capable of being operated in accordance with moral and legal restrictions, yet this does not appear likely for two reasons. First, part of the impetus for developing more powerful weapons in the past was due to the weapons’ inaccuracies. The Soviet Union developed far more powerful nuclear warheads than the USA and had a nuclear strike doctrine that was more heavily based on attacking civilian populations (‘countervalue targeting’ in the language of nuclear strategy). 44 This was partly due to the Soviet’s poorer targeting systems, which were unable to accurately hit American nuclear facilities and had to compensate for that weakness by delivering more destructive warheads. By contrast, the USA had more accurate targeting systems and correspondingly tended to favor strikes against enemy military targets (‘counterthreat targeting’). Drones make it possible to identify and attack targets with greater accuracy than ever before, thereby obviating the need for ‘countervalue’ strikes or for overpowered WMDs.

There is a chance that the current trends in drone innovation will not persist and that drones will one day become more destructive and indiscriminate weapons, despite indications to the contrary. It would be naïve to suggest that this is an impossible outcome, especially given the challenges inherent in predicting the unintended consequences of technological development. Nevertheless, this risk is outweighed by the potential for drones to mitigate wars’ destructiveness and can be managed politically. In recent decades, states have made unprecedented efforts to reduce stockpiles of, and prevent violence using, a broad range of morally questionable weapons, including nuclear weapons, landmines, weapons platforms in space, and chemical weapons. 45 As I will discuss in Chapters 7 and 8, efforts to regulate war and the use of particular weapons can also help to ensure that drone development continues on its current trajectory.

#### Nuclear war is inevitable absent a shift to winter-safe deterrence—magnitude outweighs probability and you should treat the timeframe as instantaneous

Baum, 15—executive director, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Seth, “Winter-Safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence,” Contemporary Security Policy 36(1): 123-148, dml)

Another important point is that, as long as deterrence succeeds in avoiding conflict, nuclear winter is irrelevant, and large nuclear arsenals can be kept. The problem is that deterrence could fail. Indeed, deterrence becomes likely to fail over long periods of time.43 A careful reading of history suggests that nuclear deterrence has already failed or almost failed several times. For example, the Soviet nuclear arsenal did not deter Kennedy’s escalation during the Cuban missile crisis.44 Even since the end of the Cold War, false alarms have threatened to inadvertently trigger nuclear war, such as the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, suggesting an ongoing risk of inadvertent nuclear war.45 It is unreasonable to assume nuclear deterrence will never fail. Furthermore, even if the probability of nuclear war is low, the consequences are so severe that it constitutes a large risk.

At some point, nuclear deterrence could become unnecessary if nuclear weapon states cease to consider each other adversaries at a level requiring nuclear deterrence.46 Indeed, nonadversarial relations may be in the process of happening.47 But it is a slow process. Meanwhile, each successive year that nuclear weapons still exist is a year in which they could be used. Tensions can flare up at any time; the ongoing (at the time of this writing) Ukraine crisis is a worthy reminder of this. The possibility of inadvertent nuclear war from random false alarms suggests that nuclear war might even be possible during periods of low tensions. Faster solutions than achieving non-adversarial relations are worth pursuing.

Aside from abandoning the doctrine of deterrence and achieving non-adversarial international relations, there are at least two additional options for reducing nuclear winter risk. One option is to make preparations for surviving nuclear winter. This could include stockpiles of food and other necessities, or some means of producing them during the years of nuclear winter.48 It could also include shielding against UV radiation. Additional preparations regarding security and governance institutions, telecommunications, or other sectors may further be necessary and/or desirable. If such preparations are made, then nuclear winter might not be an especially severe global catastrophe. Such preparations would be additionally desirable by making human civilization more resilient to a variety of other local and global catastrophes.49 Perhaps nuclear weapon states could sponsor such preparations in exchange for keeping their nuclear weapons.50 At a minimum, nuclear weapon states would want such preparations for their own countries to keep their citizens alive, just as they would seek to provide gas masks, bomb shelters, and other civil defence measures. This may be enough to avoid a permanent collapse of global civilization, though it would still put civilization and its members in an uncomfortable position (to say the least) for a period on the order of 10 years.

The other option is deterrence with winter-safe weapons. Such weapons would achieve deterrence goals without threatening catastrophic nuclear winter, or any other global catastrophe. Given the enduring role of deterrence in security policy, the difficulty of quickly achieving nonadversarial international relations, the possibility that deterrence could fail, and the discomforts of surviving nuclear winter, winter-safe deterrence is worth consideration. While some people have claimed that nuclear weapons are the only viable deterrents,51 there has been little systematic evaluation of the available options.

The Search For Winter-Safe Deterrence

Winter-safe deterrence is military force that can (1) offer adequate deterrence, as judged by today’s nuclear weapon states, while (2) keeping the world safe from nuclear winter or other global catastrophes. Before diving into the details of specific weapons, it is worth considering important attributes of a deterrent. The essence of a deterrent is to dissuade other actors from taking certain actions: ‘If you do X, then I will do Y’. The deterrent must be perceived as threatening something that the other side values, such as military forces, political leadership, civil infrastructure, and the health and lives of civilians. The threat (Y) must be perceived as so bad that it outweighs the benefits of the initial action (X). Deterrence is ultimately psychological, and so actually threatening something is not strictly necessary, as long as there is the perception of threat. However, the forthcoming analysis focuses on what the various weapons actually threaten, under the assumption that the perceived threat is similar. Additional psychology is discussed when it is known, such as in the fears induced by certain types of weapons.

### Peacekeeping—1NC

#### Autonomous weapons will prolif incrementally, which ensures safe development and regulation—solves global peacekeeping—limiting development fails, but prevents effective regs and causes more dangerous prolif

Bento, 15—lawyer in New York specializing in international dispute resolution (Lucas, “'Killer Robots' Need Regulation, Not a Ban,” <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/killer-robots-need-regulation-not-a-ban/>, dml)

First, a ban would be unworkable in practice. It would ignore the practical complexities of international cooperation. Without the ratification of major military powers, a ban would be impossible to enforce. The temptation for states to cheat is also obvious. Given the sensitive nature of military technology, states may, despite a ban, preemptively develop autonomous weapons just to stay in the race. This of course is a classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma, and explains why a state would likely not cooperate with a ban, but instead heavily arm itself.

This dynamic is particularly true in this day and age where non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, are increasingly powerful and active on the international stage. As technology becomes more affordable and technical skill readily accessible, it is only a matter of time before non-state actors use automated weapons. U.S. authorities have already uncovered terrorist plans of drone attacks, and the New York Police Department is also taking these threats seriously.

In their upcoming book The Future of Violence, Professor Gabriella Blum and Benjamin Wittes argue that advances in cyber technology and robotics could mean more people than ever before have access to potentially dangerous technologies. The trend towards the dissemination of open source software, which could make a killer robots’ software widely available, coupled with the increased affordability and versatility of hardware makes that scenario all the more plausible.

Second, a toothless ban would undermine a more realistic alternative: to regulate the use and application of autonomous weapons through law and best practices. International humanitarian law (IHL) already regulates the means and methods of warfare. In order to comply with IHL, an autonomous robot would need to be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians and use force proportionally. These requirements are all within the ambit of technological possibility.

Unlike a human being, a robot can be programmed to comply with rules and codes free from fear, prejudice, and fatigue. It may thus be able to better process information, identify targets, and protect civilians. It could tap into big data to further improve its decisions. As an added method of accountability, robots could be required to wear a camera in order to monitor compliance with IHL.

Terminator-like robots are unlikely to be deployed on the battlefield anytime soon. Autonomous robots will likely first be used on very specific missions, thus controlling their scaling and impact, and will be developed iteratively, thus facilitating feedback and future improvements.

Finally, autonomous weapon systems can provide major benefits to international peace and security. Given the potential for machine learning, autonomous robots could be more precise, discriminate, and effective than other weapons. Alternative configurations of these systems could also be used in peacekeeping missions around the world. They may help safeguard humanitarian convoys, protect refugee camps, and assist hostage rescue missions.

#### Effective peacekeeping prevents extinction

Lund 9 (Michael S. Lund, Senior Specialist for Conflict and Peacebuilding, Management Systems International, Consulting Program Manager, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, taught at Cornell, UCLA, the University of Maryland, George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Affairs, Ph.D. Political Science, University of Chicago, B.D., Yale University, “15 Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice,” in *Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, eds. Zartman, Berkovitch, and Kremenyck, Sage, 2009, p.287-290, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Conflict%20Prevention-%20Theory%20in%20Pursuit%20of%20Policy%20and%20Practice.pdf> DOA 7-14-2018)KMM

The world seems to be getting more dangerous. Terrorism and the ‘war on terrorism’ are straining relations between Muslims and the West. Despite interstate wars being in decline, five attacks by a state on another have occurred in the new century. Competition for oil and other essential natural resources makes inter-state wars over territory, viewed as a thing of the past (John Mueller, 1989), more imaginable. Confrontations over nuclear weapons have arisen with North Korea and Iran. Longstanding arms control regimes are unraveling. Further intra-state conflicts could erupt, as closed regimes face violent oppositions; fledgling democracies destabilize; and post-conflict countries fall back into war (Gurr and Marshall, 2005). Trends such as environmental degradation, climate change, population growth, chronic poverty, globalization, and increasing inequality risk future conflicts (e.g., CNA, 2007). Facing such threats, governments and international bodies could be pursuing how to prevent escalation of emerging tensions into wars, thus avoiding the immense human suffering and problems that wars always cause, both for the countries involved and the rest of the world. 1 Compared to the huge costs of war, the costs of preventing it are dramatically less. 2 Many people are convinced the horrific human costs of the current Iraq War were avoidable. Statistical research on third-party diplomacy also supports the belief that acting before high levels of conflict intensity is better than trying to end them (Miall, 1992: 126; Berkovitch, 1986, 1991, 1993). 3 To try to head off more future conflicts seems possible, moreover, for armed conflict has declined since the end of the Cold War, in part because of an ‘extraordinary upsurge of activism by the international community that has been directed to conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding’ (Human Security Report, 2005: 155). 4 Indeed, conflict prevention is now official policy in the UN, the EU, the G-8, and many states (Moolak, 2005: G-8). It has been tried in places where the risk of conflict was present but they were averted, such as SouthAfrica, Macedonia, the Baltics, Crimea, and the South China Sea. 5 In short, prevention is not simply a high ideal, but a prudent option that sometimes works (cf. Jentelson, 1996; Zartman, 2001: 305f; Miall, 2007: 7,16,17). Given the evidence that inaction is wasteful and preventive labors can bear fruit, international actors could be collecting and applying what has been learned from recent experience to manage the tensions around the world from which future conflicts will emerge: mitigating sources of terrorism and extremism; averting genocides and other mass atrocities; buttressing fragile governments; reducing weapons of mass destruction; alleviating competition over oil and water; and defusing inter-state rivalries such as China– Taiwan and among the major powers. Yet these actors show little interest in building on recent accomplishments to reduce the current risks (e.g., the deterioration of Zimbabwe and possible renewed war between Ethiopia and Eritrea). 6 Why this apparent gap exists between the promise of conflict prevention and its more deliberate pursuit is the puzzle this chapter seeks to unravel. 7 The following sections seek to get beyond conventional answers by examining three facets of conflict prevention that define its current status: concepts, activities, and impacts. The conclusion sums up the state of the art and offers ideas to advance it. WHAT IS CONFLICT PREVENTION? A DISTINCT PERSPECTIVE As the idea has come into vogue, ‘conflict prevention’ and synonyms such as ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘crisis prevention’ are bandied about more loosely. New government units and non-governmental organizations have sprung up that tout the term in their logos. To be au courant, established organizations add it to mission statements. But though ‘conflict prevention’ may now be heard more often than the previously dominant ‘conflict resolution,’ it is not clear whether the activities carried out under this new rubric are actually new. Despite the ambiguity due to the idea’s rise to fame, however, close analysts have hammered out a core definition. Knowledge can cumulate when people use the same terms for inquiry. Conflict prevention applies to peaceful situations where substantial physical violence is possible, based on typical indicators of rising hostilities. Everyday spates where no blood is spilled, or public controversies that get so rancorous that social groups stop communicating are socially unhealthy, but much less grievous than states or groups about to kill each other with deadly weapons. 8 A coup d’etat is less grave than the genocide of hundreds of thousands of people. 9 Though thus narrowed to conflicts with potentially wide lethality (hereafter ‘conflicts’ for short), specialists’ definitions have varied in two main respects: a) the stage or phase during the emergence of violence when prevention comes into play; and b) its methods of engagement, which are geared to the differing drivers of potential conflicts that preventive efforts address. 10 Moments for prevention Conflict prevention has been distinguished from other approaches to conflict mainly by when it comes into play during a conflict, not how it is done. When UN Secretary General Hammerskjold first coined ‘preventive diplomacy’ in 1960, he had in mind the UN keeping superpower proxy wars in thirdworld countries from escalating into global confrontations. When the end of the Cold War brought unexpected intra-state wars such as in Yugoslavia, UN Secretary General Boutros- Ghali extended Hammerskjold’s term in an upstream direction to mean not simply keeping regional conflicts from going global, but from starting in the first place (UN, 1992). This conceptual breakthrough shifted the moment for taking action back to stages when non-violent disputes were emerging but had not escalated into significant violence or armed conflict. Just how far back in the etiology of conflicts might preventive action go to work? Leaving the pre-violent period open to a possible infinite regress might extend it to to causes as primordial as original sin or as dispersed as child-rearing practices, thus dooming the concept to impracticality. 11 To mark a beginning point when preemptive actions first become practicable, Peck (1995) usefully delineated early and late prevention. The former seeks to improve the relationship of parties or states that are not actively fighting but deeply estranged. Left unaddressed, such latent animosities might revert to the use of force as soon as a crisis arose. 12 Late prevention pertains to when fighting among specific parties appears imminent. Boutros-Ghali also extended conflict prevention downstream to actions to keep violent conflicts from spreading to more places. But because such ‘horizontal’ escalation seemed to go beyond averting the rise to violence (‘vertical’ escalation) and thus to include containing open warfare, some analysts worried that it implied suppressing physical violence at any subsequent stage in an armed conflict. This would conflate it too easily with actions in the middle of wars (even though Boutros-Ghali offered the separate term ‘peacemaking’ for those). Bringing prevention into the realm of active wars would eclipse its proactive nature behind the conventional interventions that occur late in conflicts, for which terms like conflict management, peace enforcement or peacekeeping were more fitting. This merging would vitiate the pre-emptive uniqueness of prevention compared to those other concepts (cf. Lund, 1996). It would forego the opportunity to test the central premise that had animated this new post-Cold War notion: that acting before violent conflicts fully breaks out is likely to be more effective than acting on a war in progress. To think of prevention as occurring while wars are already waging not only disregards most people’s connotation of ‘prevention,’ but would relegate the international community to remediating costly war after costly war in a perpetual game of catchup, foregoing the chance to ever get ahead of the game. While some analysts continued to apply prevention to any subsequent level of violent conflict (Leatherman et al. 1999), most now confine it to actions to avoid the eruption of social and political disputes into substantial violence, keeping the emphasis squarely on stages before, rather than during violent conflicts. In particular, the focus of this chapter is ‘primary prevention’ of prospective new or ‘virgin’ conflicts, where a peaceful equilibrium has prevailed for some years, but fundamental social and/or global forces are producing new controversies, tensions and disputes. 13 However, imperative later interventions are for minimizing loss of life, they are less humane and likely more difficult because the antagonists are organized, armed, and deeply invested in destroying each other. 14 Graph 15.1 locates this particular moment in conditions of unstable peace and distinguishes it from actions at other conflict stages. Methods of prevention Notions of prevention have also varied with regard to the means of engagement, but here too a consensus has emerged. The tools used depend on which causes of conflict are targeted, and thus which providers of tools get involved. Boutros-Ghali listed early warning, mediation, confidencebuilding measures, fact-finding, preventive deployment, and peace zones. But subsequent UN policy papers of the 1990s (e.g., ‘Agenda for Development’) greatly expanded preventive measures to a panoply of policies that address the institutional, socio-economic, and global environment within which conflicting actors operate – as diverse as humanitarian aid, arms control, social welfare, military deployment, and media. 15 It can now involve almost any policy sector, whether labeled conflict prevention or not. Recent UN usage of ‘preventive action’ (e.g., Rubin, 2004) is better suited to this range of potentially useful modalities. Direct and structural instruments To classify its array of methods, intercessory initiatives aimed at particular actors in manifest conflicts are distinguished from efforts to shape underlying socio-economic conditions and political institutions and processes. The former ‘direct,’ ‘operational,’ or ‘light’ prevention (Miall, 2004) is more time-sensitive and actor- or event-focused – for example, diplomatic demarches, mediation, training in non-violence, or military deterrence – and seeks to keep divisive expressions of manifest conflicts from escalating, and thus it targets specific parties and the issues between them. 16 Integral also is ‘structural’ or ‘deep’ prevention, meaning actions or policies that address deeper societal conditions that generate conflicts between interests and/or the institutional, procedural and policy deficits or capacities that determine whether competing interests are channeled and mutually adjusted peacefully. These more basic factors make up the environment within which contending actors operate and thus policies toward them can create constraints or opportunities that shape what the actors do. Diverse examples are reducing gross regional disparities in living standards, reforming exploitative agricultural policies, and building effective governing institutions. 17 These structural targets make prevention more than simply avoiding violence, or ‘negative peace,’ but rather aspiring to positive peace. In pragmatic terms, it means being able to meet the inevitable arrival of disruptive social and global forces with the ability to bring about change peaceably (cf. Miall, 2007). In recent years, for example, it conflict prevention has been integral to the larger post-Cold War agenda of creating peaceful democratic states out of societies in transition from authoritarianism and patrimonialism (Lund, 2006).

### Peacekeeping—2NC

#### The consilience of research indicates the overwhelming effectiveness of peacekeeping. Indicts cherrypick failures at the expense of rigorously evaluating the wider picture, and scholarly evaluations of policy scenarios are essential to correct peacekeeping’s flaws.

Walter, et al, 20—professor of political science at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and an adjunct professor in the UC San Diego Department of Political Science (Barbara, with Lise Morjé Howard, tenured Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, and President of the Academic Council on the UN System, and V. Page Fortna, associate professor of political science at Columbia University, “The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace,” British Journal of Political Science, November 24, 2020, dml)

Reality, however, tells a different story. Over the last twenty years, numerous empirical studies have examined the role of third-party peacekeeping in reducing violence around the world. The data overwhelmingly reveal that peacekeeping, especially UN peacekeeping, is surprisingly effective. Using different datasets and statistical models, leveraging different time periods and measuring peacekeeping in somewhat different ways, dozens of researchers at different universities, with diverse funding streams and different preferences, have all found that peacekeeping has a large, positive and statistically significant effect on reducing violence of all sorts. Despite the very real problems associated with UN peacekeeping, it is remarkably effective at bringing peace.

This review article has three goals. The first is to summarize the results of past empirical research to move the debate beyond the question of whether peacekeeping works to the more pressing questions of how, when and why it works. The second goal is to reveal the limitations of current quantitative studies in order to identify areas in which scholars can make big, new contributions to the field. The final goal is to propose a new research agenda that is heavily evaluative – one that informs policy makers about the specific practices, mission compositions, and mandates that work, and also identifies the local, regional, and international conditions that amplify or diminish peacekeeping's success. This type of research could help reduce the costs of peacekeeping operations (PKOs), eliminate some of the negative consequences of interventions and potentially save even more lives.

What the Current Evidence Reveals

Numerous large-n statistical studies have explored the relationship between third-party peacekeeping and different forms of violence (Dorussen 2014; Gizelis, Dorussen and Petrova 2016); Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Sandler 2017). What is most striking about these studies is the consistency of their findings. Almost all of them find that peacekeeping is highly effective at preventing violence before it begins, reducing violence in the midst of war and preventing violence from recurring once it has ended. All else equal, countries and regions that receive peacekeeping missions experience less armed conflict, fewer civilian and combatant deaths, fewer mass killings, longer periods of post-conflict peace and fewer repeat wars than those that do not receive peacekeepers. This relationship – between peacekeeping and lower levels of violence – is so consistent across different large-n analyses that it has become one of the strongest findings in the international relations literature to date.

The power of peacekeeping is all the more striking given that the UN tends to intervene in the toughest cases. Multiple scholarly studies have found that the UN Security Council tends to send peacekeepers to countries with more violence, particularly bad governments and ongoing conflict (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Costalli 2013; de Jonge Oudraat 1996; Fortna 2004a; Fortna 2008a; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hegre, Hultman and Nygard 2019 Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017). The most recent study by Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis (2018) found that UN peacekeepers are deployed to places experiencing active conflict. Using geographically and temporally disaggregated data on UN peacekeepers' deployment in eight African countries between 1989 and 2006, they find that peacekeepers tend to be deployed to the dangerous frontlines of a conflict. Their research did reveal some problems with deployment. Peacekeepers tended to arrive late and be sent to conflict zones near urban areas, ignoring violence further afield. But the fact that peacekeepers often go to the most demanding places (even if late and disproportionately urban) suggests that academic studies have probably underestimated the effectiveness of peacekeeping at reducing violence.

These findings do not imply that peacekeeping works all the time, or as efficiently and successfully as it could. There are many well-known cases such as Bosnia and Rwanda where UN peacekeeping failed. There are also additional cases such as those in South Sudan and Malí where peacekeeping missions are not progressing well (Autesserre 2010; Autesserre 2014; Day 2019; Howard 2008; Van der Lijn 2019).1 Moreover, we understand that the data and analyses of even the best quantitative studies are imperfect. Analysis of peacekeeping and violence is constrained by the messy and sometimes unreliable nature of data on death rates, the potentially untenable assumptions made by scholars in employing statistical models in cross-national and cross-conflict analysis, and the hard constraints (both practical and ethical) on scholars' ability to randomize treatments in ways that make airtight causal inferences possible. The findings in the quantitative literature can also appear mixed or contradictory on some topics, when in fact the disparity is due to different research designs and empirical strategies. This can be confusing and can also distract from the bigger and more important picture, which is that peacekeeping works amazingly well given its many challenges.

In what follows we present overwhelming evidence from more than two dozen studies that peacekeepers: (1) reduce civilian and military deaths, (2) prevent the spread of violence, (3) help belligerents achieve peace and (4) help countries maintain the post-conflict peace.2 We also provide an overview of the general problems related to peacekeeping that the qualitative literature explores.

Reducing Civilian and Combatant Killing in Civil War

Since 1999, all multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations have a mandate to protect civilians (Howard and Dayal 2018). Do peacekeepers protect by reducing violence against civilians and combatants in the midst of war? To date, more than a dozen quantitative studies have examined the effect of peacekeeping and outside interventions in protecting civilians, and the answer is yes (Costalli 2013; Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2018; Di Salvatore 2018; Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2018; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013; Kathman and Wood 2011; Kathman and Wood 2016; Bove and Ruggeri 2016; 2018; Kirschner & Miller 2019; Melander 2009; Phayal 2019; Phayal and Prins 2019).3 These studies examine somewhat distinct sets of cases and time periods, and measure key variables slightly differently. They also often use different research designs. Nonetheless, all find that peacekeeping or similar forces are associated with lower levels of violence against citizens.4

We start with a study of all intrastate armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa from 1991–2008 by Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013). They find a significant inverse relationship between UN peacekeeping and violence against civilians: the greater the number of UN peacekeepers committed to protecting noncombatants in these conflicts, the fewer civilians are killed.5 The effect is substantial. Their analyses show that, on average, deploying several thousand UN military personnel and several hundred UN police dramatically reduces the number of civilians killed in a conflict.6

Why do UN military personnel and police have these beneficial effects? Hultman, Kathman and Shannon theorize that military personnel and police save civilian lives by placing themselves between combatants, reducing direct hostilities and decreasing the incentives to target civilians as a tactic of war. They also suggest that robust peacekeeping forces can impose physical barriers between combatants and civilian targets, making violence a less attractive way for armed factions to extract support or resources from local citizens.

Carnegie and Mikulaschek (2020) also find that peacekeeping is strongly related to less violence against civilians when one looks at all UN peacekeeping missions deployed to ongoing conflicts between 1989 and 2010. What is particularly noteworthy about this study is that it deals with difficult endogeneity and selection bias issues by using an instrumental variable approach – in this case, variation in Security Council membership. They find that the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel (troops, police and military observers) reduces violence against civilians in civil wars, but only if that violence is perpetrated by rebels and not the government. This finding suggests that peacekeeping may constrain the bad behavior of rebels more than that of governments – a pattern that makes sense given that governments must consent to such missions. Phayal and Prins (2019) ask a similar question, using original geocoded data of UN deployments in four key African conflicts (Sudan/Darfur, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cote d'Ivoire). They find that peacekeepers react quickly to violence against civilians but are slower to act when governments perpetrate such violence.

Di Salvatore (2018) confirms that UN troops reduce civilian deaths. However, she finds that peacekeepers become less effective as the power asymmetries between armed ethnic groups grow. In examining the UN mission in Sierra Leone from 1997 to 2001, she finds that violence against civilians increased when one ethnic group was very strong and the other was quite weak.

A number of scholars look more closely at the composition of missions and whether it helps or hurts civilians. In a study of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa between 1991 and 2008, Bove and Ruggeri (2016, 2018) find that peacekeepers recruited from an ethnically and linguistically diverse range of countries and those who are culturally closer to local populations are more successful at reducing violence against civilians. They hypothesize that this type of diversity allows peacekeepers to communicate more effectively with the local population, helping to deter misconduct. This suggests that there may be an ideal composition of UN peacekeeping missions, which includes a combination of ethnolinguistically heterogeneous troops, police and observers who are also culturally similar to local citizens.

Other scholars explore additional questions related to peacekeepers’ characteristics. Haass and Ansorg (2018), for example, use monthly data on the make-up of peace operations and find that when one looks at similarly sized peacekeeping missions, those with a large share of troops from countries with higher-quality militaries (defined as well-trained and equipped soldiers with significant political support) are better able to protect civilians in conflicts.7

Do peacekeepers have a similar effect after a war has ended? Kathman and Wood (2016) evaluate the role of UN PKOs in protecting civilians after conflict has ended. In a study of twenty-six African countries between 1992 and 2010, they find that fewer civilians are killed if the UN is present, and that this is inversely related to the number of UN military troops. Once again, the size of the peacekeeping force appears to matter. Mirroring studies by Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013), they find that the opposite is true of UN observers: the greater the number of observers, the greater the number of civilians killed. Why is this the case? The authors argue that observers may signal that the UN is ‘not deeply invested’ in resolving the conflict, perhaps encouraging bad behavior. The bottom line, however, is clear: when UN missions are outfitted with more forces, fewer citizens are targeted and killed.

Melander (2009) looks at how peacekeeping conducted by any state, global or regional organization – not just the UN – influenced the risk of mass killings. This study includes a longer time period (1947 to 2004) and a larger number of civil wars than Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013). Melander finds that all forms of peacekeeping that included military and/or civilian personnel decrease the risk of mass killings during civil wars.8 In a study of a much broader category of military interventions by third parties between 1946 and 2005, Kathman and Wood (2011) find that outside military intervention designed to aid the government leads to an increase in government-led genocide and mass killing.9 The same was not true of neutral intervention, which tends to exacerbate genocidal violence in the short term but diminish it over time. This work suggests that military intervention may be able to reduce mass killings if the mission is impartial and is willing to remain involved over a longer period of time.

What about combatant deaths? Peacekeepers, particularly UN peacekeepers, also appear to reduce the number of soldiers killed during a civil war. In a study of all intrastate armed conflicts in Africa between 1992 and 2011, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014) find that increasing the number of UN armed military troops significantly reduces violence on the battlefield. When more troops are deployed, fewer soldiers are killed in combat. This relationship is confirmed by Beardsley, Cunningham and White (2018), who find that a greater number of peacekeeping troops in active African conflicts between 1989 and 2008 substantially reduces violence.10 The same is not true of police and observers, neither of which was found to reduce the intensity of fighting in a statistically significant way.

In sum, the quantitative literature on peacekeeping to date has consistently identified a positive and statistically significant relationship between the presence of UN peacekeepers and lower rates of civilian and combatant deaths in civil wars. It has also found that a larger presence of peacekeepers is particularly efficacious. When one looks at large patterns over long periods of time, the evidence is clear: the presence of peacekeepers in a country saves lives.

Preventing the Spread of Violence

A second challenge associated with civil wars relates to the spread of violence: such conflicts can move from one region of a country to another (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). They can also move across international borders, creating a ‘contagion effect’ (Braithwaite 2010; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Salehyan 2009). Three quantitative studies assess whether peacekeepers can prevent or reduce these types of expansion. All find that they do.

First, Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) explore whether peacekeepers can prevent violent conflict from spreading within a country during a civil war. Using geo-referenced conflict polygons between 1990 and 2010, the authors find that peacekeeping missions that deploy at least 1,000 military personnel can limit the spread of violence geographically.11 This is especially true as the number of deployed military troops increases: larger missions are the more likely to contain violence.12

Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) theorize that peacekeeping missions limit the geographic movement of violence in three ways: (1) peacekeepers make it more difficult for armed units from any side to move about the country undetected, (2) they establish protected areas against rebel attacks and (3) they decrease the willingness of government forces to use heavy-handed tactics to clear areas of rebels and their supporters.

A second, more recent investigation finds that peacekeeping can reduce local conflict (thus also reducing the possibility of a widening war) even when the overall war does not stop. Using spatially disaggregated UN peacekeeper deployment data for eight African countries between 1989 and 2006, Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis (2018) find that UN peacekeeping decreases the probability that subnational conflict (defined as conflict between a government and rebel forces in a particular locality) will continue for another year. This is true whether the UN deploys a small or large number of peacekeepers, although the authors find that the greater the number of peacekeepers sent, the more effective they are.

In a final study, Beardsley (2011) looks specifically at the problem of spillover across international borders. Using event history analysis of all states in the international system from 1946–2005, Beardsley finds that peacekeepers (defined as military personnel sent to a foreign state by the UN, a regional security organization or a group of states) deployed to a neighboring country can prevent conflict from dispersing. If a civil war broke out and peacekeepers were stationed in a neighboring state, the risk of spillover did not significantly increase. However, if no peacekeepers were sent, the expected risk of armed conflict increased by over 70 per cent. Beardsley posits that peacekeepers have this effect because they are able to reduce violence in two ways. First, peacekeepers make it more difficult for transnational insurgencies to move across borders. Secondly, they inhibit the ability of external patrons to supply nascent rebel groups, making it more difficult for them to continue to fight.

Taken together, these studies suggest that sizeable peacekeeping missions (those with at least 1,000 troops) play an important role in reducing the geographic spread of conflict, both across borders and within countries experiencing violence. In what follows, we explore whether they also help combatants reach and implement comprehensive peace agreements.

Reaching and Implementing Comprehensive Peace Agreements

What role, if any, do peacekeepers play in convincing combatants to sign and implement negotiated solutions to civil wars? Once again, the positive effect of external peacekeepers is striking. At least four major empirical studies have examined the role of peacekeepers on signing and/or implementing peace agreements. All find the same pattern: outside peacekeepers stationed in a country during the post-treaty period are key to the successful implementation of peace settlements.13

The first two studies examined all civil wars initiated between 1940 and 1992. Walter (1997, 2002) finds that combatants are significantly more likely to sign a negotiated settlement if a third party is willing to help verify or enforce the terms.14 When a third party steps in, negotiated settlements almost always bring at least five years of peace. When a third party does not, combatants almost inevitably return to war. Combatants appear to be looking down the road and factoring in the presence of peacekeepers when deciding whether to sign an agreement or continue to fight.

In the third study, Kathman and Benson (2019) also find that combatants are able to end their war sooner in a negotiated settlement when the UN commits more armed soldiers to a mission. Using monthly data on all minor and major armed conflicts between 1992 and 2004, they find that the greater the number of UN troops, the shorter the time to a negotiated solution.

Finally, Lundgren (2016) finds that peacekeepers can play an important role in resolving civil wars even before they arrive. In a study of all mediation attempts by international organizations between 1975 and 2004, he finds that combatants are much more likely to sign a peace agreement to end their war if they expect peacekeeping and monitoring forces to be sent. This suggests that even the prospect of peacekeepers can help end a civil war.

These findings are significant for two reasons. First, they reveal the crucial role that third-party interventions can play in resolving the difficult strategic challenges of post-conflict treaty drafting and implementation. Secondly, they demonstrate that the credible promise of peacekeepers can encourage combatants to sign settlements even before they are put in place. The knowledge that a third party, including the UN, is willing and available to help with implementation appears to motivate combatants to consider a negotiated outcome to their war.15

Maintaining Peace in the Aftermath of War

Quantitative studies have carefully examined whether peacekeeping prevents the resumption of civil war. Civil wars have a surprisingly high recidivism rate (Collier and Sambanis 2002). Of the 108 countries that experienced some form of civil war between 1946–2017, only 27 per cent avoided a subsequent return to war.16 How effective is peacekeeping in preventing a war from returning?

Nine large quantitative studies have attempted to determine the role of peacekeeping in maintaining the peace once civil war has ended (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004a; Fortna 2008a; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Sambanis 2008; Vivalt 2015). Additional studies assessed the role of peacekeeping in preventing renewed interstate war (Fortna 2003a; Fortna 2004b; Fortna 2004c). All find a strong relationship between peacekeeping and longer post-war periods of peace.

Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) examine the relationship between third-party enforcement of a peace agreement and at least five years of peace after the agreement is signed.17 In a study of all intrastate conflicts between 1945 and 1998, they find that peace agreements lasted significantly longer if a third-party enforcer was present to separate or protect former combatants from each other. These assurances could come from third-party states or from regional or international organizations.18

In a study of all civil wars from 1944–1997, Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006) find that multilateral UN PKOs (defined as those that include extensive civilian functions, economic reconstruction, institutional reform and election oversight) increase the likelihood that peace lasts 2–5 years after a war ends.19 For Doyle and Sambanis, this type of peacekeeping was effective because it signaled international interest in ending the conflict and offered badly needed aid and technical expertise to the parties. Both of these factors are believed to boost domestic capacities and reduce hostility.

Sambanis (2008) looks more closely at the effect of different types of UN peacekeeping on peace (observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping and enforcement missions). He finds robust results for the hypothesis that UN missions have a positive effect on peacebuilding outcomes, and the longer peacekeepers stayed in a country, the more likely the peace was to last.

Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) find a similar result. In a study of all post-conflict peace periods between 1960 and 2002, they conclude that the more money the UN spent on post-conflict peacekeeping per year, the longer the post-war peace lasted. The effect was large: doubling expenditures reduced the risk of renewed war from 40 to 31 per cent.

Fortna (2008a) analyzes whether different types of peacekeeping (broadly defined as observer, traditional, multidimensional and enforcement) extend the duration of peace and reduce the risk of another civil war.20 In a study of post-conflict countries between 1989 and 1999, she finds that each type of peacekeeping mission significantly reduces the risk of war.21 Fortna conservatively estimates that peacekeeping after the Cold War reduced the risk of repeat war by over half. Her less conservative estimates point to an even more dramatic effect, with the risk of war dropping by 75–85 per cent in cases where peacekeepers are deployed.22

Fortna also finds that Chapter VI consent-based missions (observation, traditional and multidimensional missions) are as effective as the larger and more robust Chapter VII enforcement missions at maintaining post-conflict peace. This is quite different from the findings noted above about missions designed to protect civilians, where bigger and stronger missions appear to be more effective. These results suggest that the size of a mission and its mandate may matter more if its goal is to protect civilians in the midst of war rather than to prevent war from restarting once it has stopped. They are consistent with qualitative evidence in Fortna (2008b) and Howard (2019) and quantitative evidence in Matanock and Lichtenheld (2017) that political and economic inducements are more important than military force for explaining how peacekeeping works to maintain peace.

Peacekeepers have also been quite effective at maintaining peace after interstate wars. In a study of all such wars between 1947 and 1997, Fortna (2003b, 2004b) finds that stronger peace agreements (defined as those with more formal mechanisms, such as the deployment of peacekeepers, a formalized agreement, third-party guarantees and dispute settlement procedures) lead to longer periods of post-war peace after a ceasefire agreement is signed. A related study of the effect of peacekeeping in interstate wars over the same period finds that peacekeeping ‘helps even the most deadly of adversaries to avoid war’ (Fortna 2004c, 481).

How reliable are these findings about peacekeeping and a durable peace? As discussed earlier, one potential criticism is that peacekeepers deploy to places where peace is likely to emerge with or without peacekeepers. However, studies that take this endogeneity issue seriously continue to find that the results hold up. Using matching techniques, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) confirm that UN peacekeeping missions significantly lengthen the post-war peace. Examining civil wars that took place between January 1988 and December 2003, they find that peace lasts longer in countries that experienced a UN intervention than in those that did not.23 Vivalt (2015) uses an instrumental variable approach to help identify the causal effect of peacekeeping on ending episodes of conflict and maintaining peace. She exploits the fact that membership on the Security Council rotates, and that peacekeeping is less likely in countries holding a seat on the council at the time. Her use of a more rigorous causal identification strategy confirms that peacekeeping significantly increases the duration of peace. This provides additional confidence that the relationship between peacekeeping and post-conflict peace is not spurious.

The over-riding conclusion from all these studies is that peacekeeping can play an enormous role in reducing and preventing violence.24 When one compares cases with peacekeeping to those without, measuring outcomes in different ways, and controlling for a wide variety of variables, a powerful and consistent picture emerges. Peacekeepers can contain the spread of conflict within and across borders, reduce civilian and military deaths, make settlements more likely and reduce civil war recurrence. In the end, the question is not whether peacekeeping works, but how the world can enable PKOs – especially those led by the UN – to do an even better job.

Mixed and Contradictory Findings

The findings from the qualitative literature tend to showcase peacekeeping's problems and tend to be more pessimistic in tone than quantitative studies.25 The qualitative literature has two general strands – one that engages directly with theoretical debates and another that is more policy oriented. Here we address the former, focusing on book-length studies that elucidate five sets of challenges that peacekeeping must address: (1) the difficulty target societies face in adapting to the new political and economic institutions introduced via peacekeeping, (2) the challenges of local ownership, (3) the tradeoffs involved with attempting to gain both internal and external legitimacy, (4) the organizational pathologies inherent in a multinational organization and (5) the difficulties associated with using force. We examine each in turn.

Paris (2004) wrote an early and influential critique of peacekeeping that examines fourteen large, multidimensional PKOs. In each case, the UN sought to promote rapid political liberalization and economic marketization. Paris concludes that quick, externally driven political and economic engineering on such a large scale tends to create new tensions and conflict. Some of Paris' observations have been prescient. For example, some post-conflict countries have massive crime and corruption problems (Aoi, de Coning and Thakur 2007; Cheng and Zaum 2011). However, fifteen years after publication, Paris' direst predictions have not come to pass.26 Of the fourteen cases, the UN has fulfilled its complex mandates in eleven, and none has returned to full-scale civil war (Howard 2019a).27

Secondly, issues of ‘local ownership’ have plagued peace operations from their earliest days. Pouligny's research (1999, 2005, 2006) has revealed how external peacebuilders often do not understand the local languages, customs and contexts in which they operate. This can lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations that reduce the helpfulness of peacekeeping. The solution, she argues, is to include more local agents in the peacebuilding process. Similarly, Autesserre (2010, 2014) attributes peacebuilding failures in the Congo and elsewhere to a peacebuilding culture that privileges national-level debates and state building over local-level issues and peacebuilding (see also von Billerbeck 2017). These criticisms have convinced the UN and other peacebuilders to incorporate greater local involvement in peacebuilding processes over time. It is too early to tell if this has enhanced UN effectiveness or not.

Other qualitative studies view internal and external legitimacy as the central dilemma in peacekeeping and state building. Coleman (2007) discusses an inherent tradeoff between multinational operations that tend to enjoy international legitimacy and local operations that have greater internal legitimacy. Zaum (2007) similarly points out the inherent paradox of state building: PKOs often compromise local sovereignty in order to establish a sovereign state (see also Whalan 2013).28 Relatedly, Barma (2017) illustrates how efforts to establish legitimate and effective political economies in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan have empowered post-conflict elites, unintentionally forging neo-patrimonial order rather than legitimate local democracy.

A fourth strand in the qualitative literature examines organizational pathologies and organizational learning. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) contend that in Rwanda, a bureaucratic and rules-obsessed UN Secretariat failed to recommend intervention to halt the genocide. Howard's (2008) qualitative comparison of all completed complex peacekeeping missions finds that some of these problems can be corrected through ground-level organizational learning. However, Campbell (2018) reveals that innovation at the local level often entails breaking with higher-level organizational practices.

A final set of qualitative studies examines the thorny issue of UN military force. Although many scholars and policy makers would like peacekeeping missions to become more ‘robust’, peacekeepers, by design, have neither the capacity nor the resolve to use compellent force (Howard 2019a). Peacekeeping is different from other forms of military intervention because of its three doctrinal rules of consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force (except in self-defense, and more recently in defense of the mandate). These rules mean that peacekeepers differ significantly from state military forces (Howard 2019b). For instance, peacekeepers in all UN missions hail from dozens of different countries. They do not train together before they deploy. They do not speak each other's languages, or share interoperable matériel. Paddon-Rhoads (2016) illustrates how contingents of different nationalities interpreted the mandate to use force differently in the Congo. Most importantly, UN peacekeeping forces do not employ a standard military chain of command and control: a force commander from one country cannot order a battalion from another to neutralize a rebel group unless the government of the battalion's sending country agrees (Findlay 2002; Howard 2019a). Nevertheless, more often than not, peacekeepers succeed at accomplishing their goals. Howard (2019a) argues that peacekeepers exercise power successfully not through the use of compellent military force, but rather through financial and institutional inducements, and non-material forms of persuasion. Howard traces causal mechanisms in both positive and negative cases, in contrast with much of the qualitative literature, which is concerned with failure alone.

There is a reason why the qualitative literature tends to be negative about peacekeeping while the quantitative literature is not: the two literatures ask different questions and analyze different sets of cases. Qualitative scholars often explicitly select cases of peacekeeping failure so as to examine and identify what went wrong. Quantitative scholars, however, tend to examine the full range of cases, including failures, successes, and cases where peacekeepers were not deployed in order to determine larger patterns over time and across cases. Both are necessary to fully understand the phenomenon.

Disaggregating and Expanding the Data on Peacekeeping

The quantitative literature could improve in two areas. The first is related to data. Most recent quantitative studies rely heavily on macro-level (country and yearly) data that are too blunt to offer detailed policy recommendations to practitioners. We still have almost no systematic evidence to help inform when peacekeepers should arrive in a particular conflict, what exactly they should do once they arrive, how long they need to stay, or how many personnel, and what types of personnel, are needed to have the greatest chance at success given conditions on the ground. If the UN Secretary-General were to ask scholars how best to design a mission – anywhere – all scholars could offer are generalities: ‘go early’, ‘leave late’ and ‘the bigger the force and mandate, the better’. From a policy perspective, this is not very helpful.

Disaggregating the data based on the different contexts in which peacekeepers operate and the different types of missions they undertake – which the qualitative literature is already doing – would help reveal what exactly works in specific environments (Gizelis, Dorussen and Petrova 2016). We have some evidence that peace is harder to generate and maintain when war is ongoing, when the government is winning, when contraband resources fuel the fight, and in identity-based or secessionist conflicts (Fortna 2008a, 18–46; Howard 2008; Costalli 2013). But this is still quite vague. PKOs are not monolithic institutions operating in consistent environments. It almost certainly matters whether peacekeepers operate in regions that are resource rich or poor, rural or urban, friendly or hostile, Muslim or Christian, clan based or tribal. Quantitative studies need to take into account the many ways in which local actors and conditions might matter (Gizelis, Dorussen and Petrova 2016).

Quantitative scholars are now starting to disaggregate data in ways that facilitate more granular analysis of different types of missions, mandates, contexts and time periods (Costalli 2013; Di Salvatore 2017; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2016; Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen 2013). Costalli (2013) was the first to analyze the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping using local-level data. In a study on violence and peacekeeping in the Bosnian conflict between 1992 and 1995, he found that the United National Protections Force (UNPROFOR) was unable to reduce violence in the ongoing war because it did not have a sufficiently clear mandate and enough manpower to stop the violence or influence the conflict dynamics. This is a big step forward in our understanding of peacekeeping, but much more work needs to be done.

Scholars have also begun to expand the types of outcomes they study to include the full range of problems peacekeepers are asked to address (Dorussen 2014). This includes offering humanitarian assistance, promoting human rights, establishing or re-establishing the rule of law, instituting free elections, and supporting economic development and social justice.29 This research, however, is still in its infancy and the findings inconclusive. For example, we still do not know whether peacekeepers enable good governance after a civil war. Research by Fearon (2010) and Walter (2010, 2015) found that the presence of peacekeepers in a country does not appear to improve the quality of governance. However, Blair (2019, 2020) finds that it does, at least when the data are disaggregated down to the mission level. He demonstrates that the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) – a peacekeeping force of over 16,000 military personnel, civilians and police officers, the goal of which was to monitor a ceasefire agreement – significantly improved governance in that country. Mvukiyehe (2018) also examines UNMIL and finds that citizens were more likely to participate in national politics if they had interacted with this mission, suggesting that positive peacekeeping experiences may strengthen the rule of law (see also Bara 2020). Further research is needed to tease out the precise relationship between peacekeepers and good governance.

Nor have macro-level studies been able to obtain a consensus on peacekeeping's effect on democratization, partly due to different operationalizations of democracy and democratic transition. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) argue that peacekeeping helps to foster at least a minimal level of democracy through the terms of the settlement they enforce. Sambanis (2008) also finds that peacekeeping has a positive effect on political openness, especially in the short term. Pickering and Peceny (2006) and Joshi (2013) also find empirical support for the notion that UN interventions foster transitions to democracy. Other studies, however, find that peacekeeping has a negligible, or no, effect on democracy. Gurses and Mason (2008) find no significant effect of UN peacekeeping on democratization. Fortna (2008b) finds that peacekeeping has no clear effect on post-war democratization, and argues that the positive and negative effects cancel each other out.30 In a more comprehensive study on the same theme, Fortna and Huang (2012) also find that peacekeeping has no effect. Qualitative studies that analyze peacekeeping's effect on democratization also suggest mixed effects (Sotomayor 2014; Von Hippel 2000; Zanotti 2011). These divergent results call out for additional work on this critical relationship.

Scholars have also begun to collect individual-level data on the effects of peacekeeping on average citizens. Gordon and Young (2017) use an original survey of a random sample of residents in Port-au-Prince, Haiti to determine if citizens are more likely to co-operate with peacekeepers if the intervening forces engage in positive activities such as security and relief activities rather than abuse. They find that they are. Mironova and Whitt (2017) and Kelmendi and Radin (2016) use surveys to explore how peace operations affect local attitudes toward peace attempts. These micro-level data offer more nuanced insights into questions of legitimacy that are believed to be key to peacekeeping's success.

Three related issues concerning gender in peacekeeping remain under studied, and ripe for better data and analysis: (1) sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) in peacekeeping, (2) the effects of gender equality efforts in peacekeeping, and (3) the effects of peacekeeping on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in civil wars. Since the early 1990s, women in countries where peacekeepers are deployed have attested that peacekeepers bring both peace and rape and increased prostitution, and wish the UN ‘had done it better, had been smarter and more thoughtful’ (Whitworth 2004). Nordas and Rustad (2013) offer the first quantitative study that compares variation in SEA levels by external forces, citing domestic factors such as low development and high sexual violence in the conflict as sources of variation. The findings, however, are limited because the data on SEA committed by external forces remain limited and poor. Rather than relying on mission reporting, Beber et al. (2017) draw on a randomized survey sample of Liberian women between the ages of 18 and 30, and find that more than half had engaged in transactional sex, mainly with UN personnel. The authors estimate that each additional peacekeeping battalion significantly increases the risk that a woman will engage in her first transactional sex. Looking more broadly at human trafficking across countries near peacekeeper deployments, Bell et al. (2018) demonstrate that deploying more peacekeepers increases the risk of sex trafficking. In an attempt to offset the problems that accompany peacekeepers, Karim and Beardsley (2016) argue that the greater the number of women in peacekeeping, the less SEA committed by peacekeepers, but they acknowledge that more and better data are needed. Not all of the news is disheartening. Kirschner and Miller (2019) show that the higher the number of UN peacekeepers, the less SGBV is committed during conflict. Johansson and Hultman (2019) report similar findings, noting that greater numbers of UN police reduce the risk of sexual violence committed by rebels. Nevertheless, questions remain: what are the best means of reducing SEA committed by peacekeepers? Which peacekeepers are most effective at reducing SGBV in civil wars? Does simply adding more female peacekeepers solve the problems?

The next wave of quantitative studies will almost certainly continue to embrace more fine-grained data at the mission and local levels to help policy makers determine where, when and how peacekeepers are having the most beneficial effect. Disaggregated primary data are now available through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the Peacekeeping Operations Location and Event Dataset (PKOLED) developed at the Department of Government at the University of Essex. New data on different dimensions of peacekeeping are also increasingly available, including data on personnel contributions to missions (Kathman 2013), gender composition (Karim and Beardsley 2016), mission leadership (Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2019; Bove, Ruggeri and Zwetsloot 2017) and georeferenced event data on PKOs (Cil et al. 2019; Dorussen and Ruggeri 2017).31 These data will allow scholars to trace the varying effects that different types of missions have on a wide range of security and non-security outcomes.

Better Research Designs

There is one glaring gap in our knowledge about peacekeeping: there is no consensus on why it is so powerful. Quantitative scholars, qualitative scholars and practitioners offer several different (and often conflicting) explanations of why peacekeeping is correlated with peace.

The next big advance in our understanding of peacekeeping and peace will thus likely come from carefully designed policy evaluations. We believe the best way to do this is through more evaluation research – ideally conducted in a policy lab focused on peacekeeping. Our vision is for a team of scholars to create the peacekeeping equivalent of the Poverty Lab at MIT, or the Immigration Policy Lab at Stanford. Such a lab would enable groups of collaborating scholars to amass primary data on numerous elements of PKOs in order to determine the causal pathways linking peacekeeping to peace. This would not necessarily tell us why peacekeeping works, but it would clearly elucidate what specific policies work in different contexts.

In an ideal world, a Peacekeeping Policy Lab would be created at a major research unit and would involve scholars working on the subject from around the world. Data would be housed centrally and be publicly available. Academics are perfectly situated to provide this important evaluative role. Scholars at major universities around the world could conduct the frank and realistic assessments of what is most effective at promoting a particular outcome without fear of publicizing unpleasant findings (Gowan 2019).

Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are one way to establish that a causal relationship exists even if they do not tell us how and why it exists. Peacekeeping troops, for example, might undertake pilot programs in randomly assigned villages in a given conflict area to allow researchers to study whether particular types of treatments are more successful than others at delivering order, stability, rule of law or peace. These trials could determine the exact effects of different mandates, force compositions, durations and timings of deployment, as well as locations, and outcomes.

On many key questions, however, RCTs, will not be feasible. These trials are difficult to implement, especially in conflict-affected environments. There are also numerous logistic and bureaucratic challenges associated with working with (and through) peacekeeping organizations. Finally, there are serious ethical issues to consider when offering to send peacekeepers to one village but not another, especially when there is evidence that peacekeepers save lives. Researchers will need to grapple with these challenges, which have also bedeviled RCTs in fields such as economic development. Nevertheless, when logistical and ethical considerations can be managed, the potential rewards of such trials could be high.

Meanwhile, additional types of experimental research are emerging that will help answer questions about the micro-level effects and causal processes of peacekeeping. Scholars are starting to engage in this research on their own in the form of randomized surveys (Myukiyehe and Samii 2012), field experiments and natural experiments. (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017). Blair (2019), for example, finds in a survey experiment that exposure to UNMIL increased Liberian citizens' willingness to go to state authorities to resolve serious incidents of crime and violence rather than non-state authorities. He also finds that exposure to the UN mission increased non-state authorities' reliance on legal over illegal mechanisms of dispute resolution. These findings suggest that UN peacekeeping reduces violence in part by strengthening the rule of law in participating countries.

Quasi-experimental methods could also help us better understand when and how peacekeeping works. A working paper by Mvukiyehe and Samii (2018), for example, presents the results of such an experiment on sets of communities in post-war Liberia. These communities were similarly likely to receive peacekeeping bases, but only some actually did. They use communities’ proximity to a base to study the effects of peacekeepers' presence. Their study finds that peacekeeping missions did not succeed by increasing local security, as many theories have surmised, but rather through mechanisms such as signaling and deterrence.

Lab experiments are another possible route. In a series of laboratory experiments with ethnic Serbs and Albanians under different third-party intervention treatments and peacekeeping environments in Kosovo, Mironova and Whitt (2017) found that third-party enforcement was more effective at promoting norms of trust between ethnic Serbs and Albanians than monitoring alone or no intervention at all.

Finally, the UN Security Council likely engages – unintentionally – in numerous natural experiments as it assigns peacekeepers to certain places and not others, often independently of the expected impacts. Budget cuts, changes in the composition of the Security Council, and changes in leadership at the Department of Peace Operations have all led the UN to adjust missions in ways that are unrelated to events on the ground. These shifts might allow us to assess, for example, how the behavior of target populations changed when the mandate was adjusted. All of these studies are well suited, in complementary ways, to move us beyond macro-level assessments of the effectiveness of peacekeeping to a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms at work.

Conclusion

Most people do not realize that peacekeeping is as successful as it is – hence the public relations problem discussed earlier. Its negative reputation stems in part from media coverage of UN missions that tends to spotlight failures and abuses rather than positive results. Most people know about the UN's fiasco in Rwanda but not about its achievements in Namibia. Newspaper accounts that focus on dramatic failures with little context make it easy for the public to conclude that the world should, perhaps, invest less in peacekeeping, not more.

The field of peacekeeping, however, is blessed with a mass of high-quality empirical studies that reveal just how critical peacekeeping is to peace. Almost every large-n study finds a strong, statistically significant relationship between peacekeeping and reduced bloodshed. These studies make it clear that without peacekeeping, we would see more violence around the world and costlier types of intervention would be necessary. A 2018 General Accounting Report commissioned by the US Congress found that a unilateral US deployment to the Central African Republic would cost ‘almost 8 times’ more than what the United States contributes to the current UN mission (Government Accounting Office 2018). UN peacekeeping is not only necessary to reduce and prevent violence; it is also a cost-effective way to do so.

We all know that the UN is slow to make decisions, often inefficient in its implementation, hamstrung by red tape, and vulnerable to corruption and scandal. These inefficiencies, however, reveal just how much more the UN could do if it were properly resourced and organized. Hegre, Hultman and Nygard (2019), for example, estimated that the UN could have significantly reduced the violence in an additional four to five major conflicts between 2001 and 2013 if the international community had been willing to spend more on peacekeeping and provide existing missions with stronger mandates. Less peacekeeping will not make the world safer. It will only facilitate more violence.

#### Conflict prevention empirically works – failure to support it risks extinction

Collin 17 (Katy Collin, post-doctoral research fellow in the Foreign Policy program, Brookings, Ph.D. international relations, American University’s School of International Service, M.A. international policy, Middlebury Institute of International Studies, B.A. history and peace and conflict studies, University of California, Berkeley, “The year in failed conflict prevention,” 12-14-2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/12/14/the-year-in-failed-conflict-prevention/> DOA 7-17-2018)KMM

In his first address to the United Nations Security Council in January 2017, the new Secretary-General António Guterres stated: “We spend far more time and resources responding to crises rather than preventing them. People are paying too high a price.” He stressed that a “whole new approach” to conflict prevention is necessary. Indeed, the world is paying a steep price for violent conflict. The United Nations’ 2018 appeal for humanitarian aid funding was record-setting: $22.5 billion to provide aid to 91 million people. Most need is preventable and caused by conflict. In 2015, the number of conflicts and fatalities spiked and has remained high, to levels unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. Terrorist attacks and their toll have followed a similar trend, peaking in 2014. Externalities are piling up. Forced displacement of civilians is at its highest since the U.N. began keeping track, and recipient and neighboring countries have experienced political destabilization even when the levels of migration have been moderate. Meanwhile, there has been a revival of proxy warfare and threats of interstate war, in addition to increasing difficulties in resolving large, ongoing wars. The United States, Russia, and China have been at odds in the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), reducing the efficacy of multilateral peace initiatives. Renewed thinking and focus on conflict prevention is urgent, as it is far more effective and less expensive to prevent conflict than respond to it. How can conflict prevention be applied in Myanmar, Venezuela, and North Korea today? DOES IT WORK? The primary short- or medium-term tools for preventing imminent war are economic sanctions, preventive diplomacy, and—in very rare cases—preventive deployments of military force. Sanctions, for instance, are credited with contributing to South Africa’s ending of apartheid or Myanmar’s recent democratic opening. Multilateral diplomatic initiatives, such as the U.N.’s Mediation Support Unit, have been effective in preventing conflict. In Macedonia between 1992 and 1999, the United Nations’ preventive deployment of peacekeepers helped that country avoid the wars of its former Yugoslav neighbors. Long-term prevention measures have also had remarkable impacts, though it can be hard to measure success. For instance, economic development addresses a common root cause of many civil wars. Global reductions in absolute poverty have been dramatic, and the U.N.’s Sustainable Development Goals explicitly link further efforts to conflict prevention. Transnational, systemic conflict prevention has been very successful, including non-proliferation regimes around nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, small arms and light weapons; or efforts to combat conflict diamonds and minerals such as the Kimberley Process or section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Successful conflict prevention requires robust international, multilateral commitments. Individual states, guided by self-interest, are unlikely to prioritize conflict prevention. There are few political rewards for success. Good conflict prevention is invisible, because violence does not occur. However, there may be political costs to engaging in talks or imposing sanctions. Multilateral approaches to conflict prevention activities can alter states’ incentives for getting involved in conflict prevention. Further, effective diplomacy, sanctions, or other prevention policies require coordinated, committed action. 2017 has been a year marked by dramatic failures in conflict prevention, including namely the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar; the economic, humanitarian, and political crises in Venezuela; and the degradation of diplomacy in managing North Korea. These failures demonstrate the difficulties of preventing conflict given an international system under stress. MYANMAR Since August 25, roughly 626,000 Rohingya (of a population of just over a million) have fled from Rakhine state to neighboring Bangladesh; tens of thousands are internally displaced. An unknown number have been killed within Rakhine. First-hand accounts of the violence include descriptions of widespread rape, arson, shelling, and killings. The United States, among many others, has identified this as ethnic cleansing. The U.N. has begun to speak of genocide. This violence was widely predicted. Governments, civil society, and the United Nations issued repeated warnings over several years. As recently as March 2016, the U.S. Atrocities Prevention Board detailed the vulnerability and targeting of the Rohingyas, describing violations of human rights and several surges of violence. The international community had sufficient advance information on the risks of state-sponsored violence against the Rohingya but failed to organize adequate preventive action. Complicating international response to the violence is the concern over disrupting Myanmar’s democratic transition and the fact that the civilian government, elected in 2015, has no control over the armed forces, while the military remains in a position to reverse reform. The ethnic cleansing of the Rohingyas is a failure of the international norm of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). R2P establishes the responsibility of states to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Mandates under R2P are established with a UNSC resolution, increasingly difficult to pass in a world of resurgent realpolitik. In November, China and Russia prevented the UNSC from passing a resolution condemning the violence against the Rohingya. The UNSC passed a non-binding presidential statement instead. This is the latest in a series of failures of the norm, including failures to protect civilians in Darfur, Syria, or the Yazidis in Iraq. Equally damaging may be the perception that R2P was invoked in Libya as a Trojan Horse for regime change. November’s UNSC presidential statement on Myanmar may have done less to make its government reconsider its actions against the Rohingya and more to demonstrate that the UNSC would not adopt stronger measures to stop the violence. VENEZUELA Once the richest country in Latin America, Venezuela suffered extreme fragility this year, if not state failure. Potential for civil war or coup is strong. Suffering debt default and hyperinflation, hunger and malnutrition, shortages of medicine, and violent political unrest, Venezuela’s economic crisis has become a humanitarian crisis. Acute child malnutrition rose precipitously. The average Venezuelan lost roughly 20 pounds this year due to food shortages. Infant mortality rose 35 percent; maternal mortality rose 65 percent. Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans sought refuge in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, while Panama has closed its borders. State institutions are in disarray. On March 29, the Supreme Court stripped the powers of the opposition-majority National Assembly. Three months of daily street protests followed, in which over 120 people were killed. President Nicolás Maduro’s response to demands for humanitarian aid and fresh elections was to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly at the end of July. The new body, full of Maduro loyalists, has supplanted the powers of the National Assembly. Russia has undermined regional governments’ efforts to coordinate a multilateral response aimed at isolating the Maduro regime. The Lima Group, composed of 12 American states, has been organizing multilateral sanctions and making joint statements. The European Union has imposed an arms embargo. However, last month, Russia provided a debt-restructuring package. In November, Russia and China boycotted a UNSC meeting on Venezuela, ruling out Security Council action. The roots of Venezuela’s crisis were echoed in political violence and instability around the world in 2017. Institutional and electoral manipulation has destabilized several countries this year. Examples include Kenya’s disrupted and delegitimized election and its attendant violence and Liberia’s interrupted elections. Honduras is in the grips of a violent response to what looks like electoral manipulation. Guatemala’s president failed in a bid to dismantle an anti-corruption institution but Congress has since re-affirmed his immunity from prosecution. Spain and Iraq suffered violence and a degradation of democratic governance in the face of secessionist referendums. Doubt has been cast on the impact and quality of electoral observation, the key tool for avoiding electoral violence. NORTH KOREA While diplomacy, sanctions, and targeted engagement have been successful in preventing conflict on the Korean peninsula for decades, 2017 marks decisive failures in terms of North Korea’s (or the DPRK) nuclear capacities. In September, North Korea tested an “advanced nuclear devise.” The explosive yield of this sixth North Korean nuclear weapons test was larger than the other five test-yields combined. On 29 November, the DPRK conducted a test of its most powerful missile. Experts estimate that the entire United States is, or will soon be, within range of intercontinental ballistic missiles which might carry nuclear weapons. In parallel, the United States and the DPRK have engaged in bellicose rhetorical brinksmanship, making war between the two states seem increasingly likely. This month, both sides have issued warnings that war is closer than it has ever been since the 1953 armistice. Public acceptance of the possibility of conflict within the United States has ballooned. Mechanisms to head off escalation caused by misunderstandings do not exist. The most effective channel of communication between Washington and Pyongyang may be Dennis Rodman. North Korea’s demonstration of advanced nuclear capability this year is a failure of the most successful systemic global conflict prevention of the post-WWII world order: disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. North Korea acquired its nuclear technology through the A. Q. Khan network, and the DPRK now poses a similar risk of further illicit proliferation. Trump has been impatient with multilateral, diplomatic containment of nuclear proliferation. In October, the president declined to re-certify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the multilateral agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. This repudiation of the Iran agreement limits the credibility of any talks on North Korea that might trade U.S. incentives or sanctions relief for a DPRK freeze on weapons testing or development. BACK TO THE FUTURE? These three cases highlight the inadequacy and indispensability of conflict prevention. These were lost opportunities for conflict prevention. Myanmar was widely predicted but not prevented. Venezuela and North Korea could be pulled back from the brink of civil or inter-state war, but suffered severely degraded conditions this year. The cases share failures to coordinate among the United States, China, and Russia. In Myanmar, China shielded a protégé regime from intervention. In Venezuela, Russia has undermined multilateral sanctions and blocked UNSC action. North Korea demonstrates the profound damage to international peace that results in the U.S. rejection of multilateralism. The sharp rise in war and violence is straining states and international organizations, and conflict prevention is more difficult now, perhaps, than it has been since it became a United Nations priority in the early 1990s. Given the requirement of unanimity at the Security Council and discord among the permanent members, the UNSC will likely continue to hinder prevention efforts. New coordinating mechanisms for conflict prevention are necessary. Despite systemic conditions that make conflict prevention difficult, Secretary-General Guterres is right to prioritize conflict prevention. Increased risks of inter-state war, including nuclear war, overlaid with de-stabilizing civil conflicts in multiple regions, make conflict prevention an increasingly existential imperative. Multilateral efforts to coordinate sanctions, arms embargoes, diplomacy, or implement stronger measures in response to mass atrocities need to be prioritized and incentivized. This is work that the secretary general can pursue within or aside from the Security Council. Ad-hoc organization, such as through the Lima Group, or the group of six countries coordinating diplomacy on North Korea, is a likely avenue forward. Finally, the United States, China, and Russia will need to either cooperate with or ignore effective conflict prevention campaigns. Diplomacy may start and end with these states, but these powers may also bear outsized costs for future failures.

### Framing Cards—2NC

#### None of their offense is unique—LAW prolif is inevitable and all the risks apply equally to humans—but, future development encourages exhaustive testing which solves all risks

Ackerman, 15—senior writer for IEEE Spectrum’s award-winning robotics blog, Automaton (Evan, “We Should Not Ban ‘Killer Robots,’ and Here’s Why,” <https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/we-should-not-ban-killer-robots>, dml)

The problem with this argument is that no letter, UN declaration, or even a formal ban ratified by multiple nations is going to prevent people from being able to build autonomous, weaponized robots. The barriers keeping people from developing this kind of system are just too low. Consider the “armed quadcopters.” Today you can buy a smartphone-controlled quadrotor for US $300 at Toys R Us. Just imagine what you’ll be able to buy tomorrow. This technology exists. It’s improving all the time. There’s simply too much commercial value in creating quadcopters (and other robots) that have longer endurance, more autonomy, bigger payloads, and everything else that you’d also want in a military system. And at this point, it’s entirely possible that small commercial quadcopters are just as advanced as (and way cheaper than) small military quadcopters, anyway. We’re not going to stop that research, though, because everybody wants delivery drones (among other things). Generally speaking, technology itself is not inherently good or bad: it’s what we choose to do with it that’s good or bad, and you can’t just cover your eyes and start screaming “STOP!!!” if you see something sinister on the horizon when there’s so much simultaneous potential for positive progress.

What we really need, then, is a way of making autonomous armed robots ethical, because we’re not going to be able to prevent them from existing. In fact, the most significant assumption that this letter makes is that armed autonomous robots are inherently more likely to cause unintended destruction and death than armed autonomous humans are. This may or may not be the case right now, and either way, I genuinely believe that it won’t be the case in the future, perhaps the very near future. I think that it will be possible for robots to be as good (or better) at identifying hostile enemy combatants as humans, since there are rules that can be followed (called Rules of Engagement, for an example see page 27 of this) to determine whether or not using force is justified. For example, does your target have a weapon? Is that weapon pointed at you? Has the weapon been fired? Have you been hit? These are all things that a robot can determine using any number of sensors that currently exist.

It’s worth noting that Rules of Engagement generally allow for engagement in the event of an imminent attack. In other words, if a hostile target has a weapon and that weapon is pointed at you, you can engage before the weapon is fired rather than after in the interests of self-protection. Robots could be even more cautious than this: you could program them to not engage a hostile target with deadly force unless they confirm with whatever level of certainty that you want that the target is actively engaging them already. Since robots aren’t alive and don’t have emotions and don’t get tired or stressed or distracted, it’s possible for them to just sit there, under fire, until all necessary criteria for engagement are met. Humans can’t do this.

The argument against this is that a robot autonomously making a decision to engage a target with deadly force, no matter how certain the robot may be, is dangerous and unethical. It is dangerous, and it may be unethical, as well. However, is it any more dangerous or unethical than asking a human to do the same thing? The real question that we should be asking is this: Could autonomous armed robots perform better than armed humans in combat, resulting in fewer casualties (combatant or non-combatant) on both sides? I believe so, which doesn’t really matter, but so do people who are actually working on this stuff, which does.

In 2009, Ronald C. Arkin, Patrick Ulam, and Brittany Duncan published a paper entitled “An Ethical Governor for Constraining Lethal Action in an Autonomous System,” which was about how to program an armed, autonomous robot to act within the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement. h+ Magazine interviewed Arkin on the subject (read the whole thing here), and here’s what he said:

h+: Some researchers assert that no robots or AI systems will be able to discriminate between a combatant and an innocent, that this sensing ability currently just does not exist. Do you think this is just a short-term technology limitation? What such technological assumptions do you make in the design of your ethical governor?

RA: I agree this discrimination technology does not effectively exist today, nor is it intended that these systems should be fielded in current conflicts. These are for the so-called war after next, and the DoD would need to conduct extensive additional research in order to develop the accompanying technology to support the proof-of-concept work I have developed. But I don’t believe there is any fundamental scientific limitation to achieving the goal of these machines being able to discriminate better than humans can in the fog of war, again in tightly specified situations. This is the benchmark that I use, rather than perfection. But if that standard is achieved, it can succeed in reducing noncombatant casualties and thus is a goal worth pursuing in my estimation.

One way to think about this is like autonomous cars. Expecting an autonomous car to keep you safe 100 percent of the time is unrealistic. But, if an autonomous car is (say) 5 percent more likely to keep you safe than if you were driving yourself, you’d still be much better off letting it take over. Autonomous cars, by the way, will likely be much safer than that, and it’s entirely possible that autonomous armed robots will be, too. And if autonomous armed robots really do have at least the potential reduce casualties, aren’t we then ethically obligated to develop them?

If there are any doubts about how effective or ethical these systems might be, just test them exhaustively. Deploy them, load them up with blanks, and watch how they do. Will they screw up sometimes? Of course they will, both during testing and after. But setting aside the point above about relative effectiveness, the big advantage of robots is that their behavior is traceable and they learn programmatically: if one robot does something wrong, it’s possible to trace the chain of decisions that it made (decisions programmed into it by a human, by the way) to find out what happened. Once the error is located, it can be resolved, and you can be confident that the robot will not make that same mistake again. Furthermore, you can update every other robot at the same time. This is not something we can do with humans.

I do agree that there is a potential risk with autonomous weapons of making it easier to decide to use force. But, that’s been true ever since someone realized that they could throw a rock at someone else instead of walking up and punching them. There’s been continual development of technologies that allow us to engage our enemies while minimizing our own risk, and what with the ballistic and cruise missiles that we’ve had for the last half century, we’ve got that pretty well figured out. If you want to argue that autonomous drones or armed ground robots will lower the bar even farther, then okay, but it’s a pretty low bar as is. And fundamentally, you’re then placing the blame on technology, not the people deciding how to use the technology.

And that’s the point that I keep coming back to on this: blaming technology for the decisions that we make involving it is at best counterproductive and at worst nonsensical. Any technology can be used for evil, and many technologies that were developed to kill people are now responsible for some of our greatest achievements, from harnessing nuclear power to riding a ballistic missile into space. If you want to make the argument that this is really about the decision to use the technology, not the technology itself, then that’s awesome. I’m totally with you. But banning the technology is not going to solve the problem if the problem is the willingness of humans to use technology for evil: we’d need a much bigger petition for that.

#### Status quo development will be incremental and safe

Toscano, 15—Navy Judge Advocate and 2014 LLM Graduate of the George Washington University Law School (Christopher, “Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 189 (2015), dml)

Over the next several decades, AWS development will likely continue, given the large-scale investment in research by the United States and other countries. As suggested by authors like Singer, Anderson, and Waxman, the employment of fully functional AWSs will be a gradual or incremental approach over time. 16 Current technologies will continually evolve, and with each progressive step, humans will slowly be removed from the loop.4 17 Unlike beliefs grounded in fiction, governments will not push a button unleashing an autonomous army tantamount to a "March of the Wooden Soldiers" approach at a given moment. 4 18 As stated earlier, the idea that AWS armies will fully replace humans or engage in bloodless wars is implausible, if for no other reasons than humanity's aggressive nature or an innate distrust of robots.4 1 9

In light of present limitations on technology (such as Al) and persistent criticisms over legality, technology companies will continue to research transitional technologies, such as robot-based devices that enhance human performance (e.g., Human Assisted Neural Devices). 420 For example, such companies will pursue man-machine "symbiotic systems," such as suits designed for pilots that let them "feel" parts of the plane. In this example, these systems will enable human pilots to feel vibration, heat, or heaviness in their corresponding arm if there is an overload in the plane's wing.421 Other examples include an exoskeleton program, where Raytheon's XOS2 Exoskeleton Robotics Suit allows human operators to carry heavier payloads or punch through heavy obstacles.422 Weaponizing and employing armor on such devices is not far-fetched.

Over time, incremental employment of AWSs will involve humans being supported by fully autonomous systems in logistical settings. Military personnel will work side-by-side with drones that will enhance lift capabilities no differently from manned machines. For example, DARPA has developed an "autonomous pack horse" known as the Legged Squad Support System, or BigDog.423 This autonomous quadruped can carry 400 pounds of military gear travelling at 7-8 miles per hour and is capable of quieter modes and voice recognition. More advanced versions include a strong arm capable of throwing cinder blocks across great distances.425 Carrying wounded soldiers out of combat appears plausible.4 2 6 DARPA's next generation robot, known as the WildCat, is being developed with the capability to run at speeds up to 50 miles per hour on all types of terrain.4 27 Such capabilities could enable faster resupply operations to troops in combat. Other possible enhancing options for similar platforms could involve smaller-scale versions capable of bomb or narcotics detection analogous to a military working dog. More aggressive versions could involve a weaponized quadruped robot.

Lastly, employing fully autonomous weapons systems working without human counterparts will be a gradual incremental step, once the technology and Al have fully matured. Technological advancement and field testing alone support this conclusion. However, given criticisms and DoD's own hesitancy to enable these lethal systems in fully autonomous modes, initial platforms will be more defensive in nature, resembling measures such as more advanced ballistic missile defense systems, perimeter security drones or anti-UAV robotics similar to a former DARPA program called Peregrine.4 28 Once these defensive capabilities establish reliability in preventing unnecessary loss of life or destruction, technological advancements will eventually graduate to fully autonomous offensive measures over time. However, in the near term, defensive and offensive AWSs will likely require that human operators approve any decision to use lethal force to avoid the dilemmas posed by critics.4 29 Moreover, employing AWSs to intercept missiles, drones, or similar unmanned devices is a logical progression.

#### Constraining LAWs development creates backlash and won’t deter the worst actors—only the fear of reciprocity solves restraint

Scharre, 18—Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Warfare Initiative at the Center for a New American Security (Paul, “Are Autonomous Weapons Inevitable?,” *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War*, Chapter 21, pg 350-351, dml)

This sets up a situation where NGOs and smaller states who are advocating for a ban would asymmetrically benefit, at least in the near term, and would not be giving up anything. This only generates resistance from states who are leaders in military robotics, many of whom see their technology development proceeding in an entirely reasonable and prudent fashion. The more that others want to take them away, the more that autonomous weapons look appealing to the countries that might build them.

This is particularly the case when ban supporters have no answer for how law-abiding nations could defend themselves against those who do develop fully autonomous weapons. Steve Goose acknowledged this problem: “You know you’re not going to get every country in the world to sign something immediately, but you can get people to be affected by the stigma that would accompany a comprehensive prohibition,” he said. “You have to create this stigma that you don’t cross the line.” This can be a powerful tool in encouraging restraint, but it isn’t foolproof. There is a strong stigma against chemical weapons, but they continue to be used by dictators who care nothing for the rule of law or the suffering of civilians. Thus, for many the case against a ban is simple: it would disarm only the law-abiding states who signed it. This would be the worst of all possible outcomes, empowering the world’s most odious regimes with potentially dangerous weapons, while leaving nations who care about international law at a disadvantage. Proponents of a ban have yet to articulate a strategic rationale for why it would be in a leading military power’s self-interest to support a ban.

Though they haven’t always succeeded in the past, great powers have worked together to avoid weapons that could cause excessive harm. This time, however, leading military powers aren’t trying, in part because the issue has been framed as a humanitarian one, not a strategic one. In CCW discussions, countries have heard expert views on the Martens Clause, which has never been used to ban a weapon before, but strategic considerations have gotten short shrift. A few experts have presented on offense-defense balance and arms races, but there has been virtually no discussion of how autonomous weapons might complicate crisis stability, escalation control, and war termination. John Borrie from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research is concerned about the risk of “unintended lethal effects” from autonomous weapons, but he acknowledged, “it’s not really a significant feature of the policy debate in the CCW.” This is unfortunate, because autonomous weapons raise important issues for stability. There may be military benefits to using fully autonomous weapons, but it would be facile and wrong to suggest that overall they are safer and more humane than semiautonomous weapons that retain a human in the loop. This argument conflates the benefits of adding automation, which are significant, with completely removing the human from the loop. There may be cases where their use would result in more-humane outcomes, provided they functioned properly, such as hostage rescue in communications-denied environments or destroying mobile missiles launchers armed with WMD. On the whole, though, the net effects of introducing fully autonomous weapons on the battlefield are likely to be increased speed, greater consequences when accidents occur, and reduced human control.

States have every incentive to cooperate to avoid a world where they have less control over the use of force. Mutual restraint is definitely in states’ interests. This is especially true for great powers, given the destruction that war among them would bring. Restraint doesn’t come from a treaty, though. The fear of reciprocity is what generates restraint. A treaty is merely a focal point for coordination. Is restraint possible? History suggests any attempt to restrain autonomous weapons must meet three essential conditions to succeed.

### AT: Accidents

#### Tech failure warrants cherry-pick certain situations and indict early technology

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Efforts to show that drones are objectionable because of their propensity to suffer from technical faults make the same mistake as those that are too heavily based on evidence drawn from drones’ use in the War on Terror. That is to say, these objections appeal to characteristics of a particular type of drone at a particular moment in time, even though these characteristics are probably transient. It is possible for those who produce and use drones to be guilty of negligence if they deploy machines that have been inadequately tested or that have known technical faults. Identifying negligence is particularly important if the faults make drones susceptible to capture by enemies or to attacking civilians. Nevertheless, claims of negligence can only be fairly directed against specific devices that have technical faults and not at drones as a class of technology. We might reasonably blame the manufacturers of a new type of drone for a faulty targeting system that leads to a mistaken attack on civilians, but such an incident would not demonstrate any fundamental flaw in drones that should lead to their prohibition as a class of machines. When it comes to American UAVs, there may be grounds for arguing that developers and military leaders were negligent in taking inadequate safety precautions, but the fault for this would lie with specific people and the faulty UAVs they employed, not with UAVs as such.

When it is framed as a general objection against drones, criticism of drones’ technological limitations depends far too much on a momentary lack of sophistication that is typical of new weapons and weapons platforms entering military service for the first time. The early tanks deployed on the Western Front during the First World War fell victim to mechanical faults in astronomical numbers. 4 Some early fighter planes were armed with machine guns that were mounted above the plane’s propeller, but pilots risked shooting themselves down if poorly synchronized bullets broke the propeller or ricocheted back at the pilot. 5 Even rifles can be faulty, as evidenced by the first version of the American M16, which was prone to jamming when it was first released during the Vietnam War. 6 In some instances, these mechanical problems caused deaths and injuries, but it would be inaccurate to say that there is something inherently wrong with tanks, aircraft, or rifles based on these initial faults. The same is true of drones, especially when they are at this nascent stage.

#### Neg warrant—provides an off-ramp for de-escalation

Leys, 18—JD Candidate, Yale Law School (Nathan, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Crises,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018, dml)

In this case, the United States would prefer not to launch military action against Russia. Regardless of the veracity of Russia’s claim of an accidental firing, the United States could call for a diplomatic resolution short of kinetic force (e.g. international inspections of the system, a withdrawal of air defense batteries in the area, etc.). Autonomy could afford the United States an off-ramp by providing a plausible cover: the potentially accidental nature of the violation of an ally’s sovereignty means a military response is neither legally required nor morally warranted.

In short, AWS could provide a face-saving alternative for leaders trying to de-escalate a crisis. The technical complexities of AI-enabled weapons and the possibility of malfunction add a new layer of fog to war. It may not be possible in such situations to determine whether an AWS malfunctioned or a redline was crossed—more importantly, it may not matter. AWS operating in conditions of uncertainty make it possible for a first shot to be fired, even if no person fires it. In an interesting twist on the debate about whom to hold responsible in the event of an AWS’s malfunction, the most life-saving answer in a crisis may be no one: If there is no one to blame, there is no one to bomb.63 On the other hand, national leaders may well hold the owners of the AWS system responsible regardless whether an attack was accidental. In this case, retaliation might seem desirable to maintain credibility.

### AT: Accountability

#### Accountability is possible even if humans don’t control every decision

Toscano, 15—Navy Judge Advocate and 2014 LLM Graduate of the George Washington University Law School (Christopher, “Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 189 (2015), dml)

First, some critics argue that AWSs raise accountability concerns over LOAC violations. Specifically, they argue about who should be held accountable in the event that an autonomous weapon causes civilian deaths. Philosopher Robert Sparrow (cited in the HRW report), argues that no one, including the machine as a sentient being, can "justly be held responsible for the actions of these systems, [and thus] it will be unethical to use them in war., 25 6 By his logic, many weapons currently considered lawful would be illegal if a human being isn't controlling every aspect of their use. Sparrow fails to acknowledge that AWSs always remain a weapons system that the commander ordered into action and for which the commander remains ultimately responsible. 7 Sparrow's argument fails to recognize that humans will develop, test, deploy, and maintain oversight for AWSs. Deficiencies in AWSs resulting from human error in design, manufacturing, and employment will dictate responsibility analogous to tort or criminal liability theory, as is done currently with non-AWSs.258 As will be discussed more thoroughly in Part VI, this article proposes that command responsibility in the AWS realm will actually improve by using current accountability notions.

\*Note: This Leys card is also in AT: Accidents

#### Even if they win this—lack of accountability is an off-ramp for de-escalation

Leys, 18—JD Candidate, Yale Law School (Nathan, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Crises,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2018, dml)

In this case, the United States would prefer not to launch military action against Russia. Regardless of the veracity of Russia’s claim of an accidental firing, the United States could call for a diplomatic resolution short of kinetic force (e.g. international inspections of the system, a withdrawal of air defense batteries in the area, etc.). Autonomy could afford the United States an off-ramp by providing a plausible cover: the potentially accidental nature of the violation of an ally’s sovereignty means a military response is neither legally required nor morally warranted.

In short, AWS could provide a face-saving alternative for leaders trying to de-escalate a crisis. The technical complexities of AI-enabled weapons and the possibility of malfunction add a new layer of fog to war. It may not be possible in such situations to determine whether an AWS malfunctioned or a redline was crossed—more importantly, it may not matter. AWS operating in conditions of uncertainty make it possible for a first shot to be fired, even if no person fires it. In an interesting twist on the debate about whom to hold responsible in the event of an AWS’s malfunction, the most life-saving answer in a crisis may be no one: If there is no one to blame, there is no one to bomb.63 On the other hand, national leaders may well hold the owners of the AWS system responsible regardless whether an attack was accidental. In this case, retaliation might seem desirable to maintain credibility.

### AT: AI Goes Rogue

#### This assumes robots act like humans, which is the whole damn point—testing and programming solves—they don’t assume future tech

Toscano, 15—Navy Judge Advocate and 2014 LLM Graduate of the George Washington University Law School (Christopher, “Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 189 (2015), dml)

Critics like Sparrow also contend that AWSs may "go rogue," killing innocent civilians "to strike fear into the hearts of onlooking combatants ... to test its weapon systems, or because the robot was seeking to revenge the 'deaths' of robot comrades. ''259 Sparrow attempts to analogize or promote the comparative notion of future AWS autonomy to human autonomy in a metaphorical or philosophical sense, thus conflating two separate understandings. He assumes that AWSs will make their own independent choices the way humans do and will therefore be unpredictable. 260 His argument is fatally flawed for several reasons. First, he accepts current technological notions as predictive of future outcomes. Sparrow accepts selected Al research as dispositive on how all AWSs will perform in the future. 261 Next, his argument assumes that developers will program AWSs with humanity's flaws.262 Further, he ignores the requirement that military and political leaders will demand programmed IHL and ROE constraints within the systems' Al architecture, as discussed earlier. While fully autonomous weapons will act without further input from their human counterparts, nothing suggests humanity will enable a fully autonomous/adaptive mode without the baseline restriction of "do no harm" to civilians as Arkin suggests.26 3 Lastly, his argument dismisses the extensive AWS testing to safeguard against mishaps that will occur before any AWSs would be employed.

### AT: Ambiguity/Escalation

#### This is backwards—unpredictable LAWs improve stability and prevent escalation

Scharre, 18—Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Warfare Initiative at the Center for a New American Security (Paul, “Playing With Fire: Autonomous Weapons and Stability,” *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War*, Chapter 18, pg 314-315, dml)

This suggests another way autonomous weapons might improve stability: the “mad robot theory.” If countries perceive autonomous weapons as dangerous, as introducing an unpredictable element into a crisis that cannot be completely controlled, then introducing them into a crisis might induce caution. It would be the equivalent of what Thomas Schelling has described as “the threat that leaves something to chance.” By deploying autonomous weapons into a tense environment, a country would effectively be saying to the enemy, “Things are now out of my hands. Circumstances may lead to war; they may not. I cannot control it, and your only course of action if you wish to avoid war is to back down.” Unlike the problem of credibly tying one’s hands by locking in escalatory rules of engagement, this threat does not require convincing the enemy what the autonomous weapons’ rules of engagement are. In fact, uncertainty makes the “mad robot” threat more credible, since deterrence hinges on the robot’s unpredictability, rather than the certainty of its actions. Deploying an untested and unverified autonomous weapon would be even more of a deterrent, since one could convincingly say that its behavior was truly unpredictable.

### AT: Asymmetry

#### Critiques of asymmetric drone warfare are wrong – 6 reasons!

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Despite the efforts that critics have made to show that there is something inherently wrong with asymmetric warfare, their arguments suffer from at least six serious problems. First, it is misleading to suggest that wars involving drones are inherently asymmetric. This comes back to the point I made earlier about mistaking the use of drones by the USA in the War on Terror for inherent characteristics of drone warfare. It is easy to imagine that future confl icts involving drones could be waged between opponents that both have drones or between drone users and opponents that have effective countermeasures, such as the ability to hack into the machines. It is also possible that drones will be ineffective in certain types of wars. Recall that one of the concerns that critics have raised is that drones are not effective weapons in counterinsurgency operations and that belligerents using them may undermine their own chances of victory. If this critique is accurate, then we have good reason to doubt that even asymmetric possession of drones will make a war’s outcome a foregone conclusion.

Second, critics who raise the asymmetry objection are mistaken in thinking that war must be a fair and equal contest. Neither just war theory nor international humanitarian law rests on this assumption. Asymmetry will sometimes be morally undesirable, such as when a powerful state acts aggressively toward a weak opponent, and it will sometimes be desirable, such as when a powerful state helps to protect a weak state against aggression. There is no a priori way of knowing whether symmetry or asymmetry between belligerents will promote just or unjust outcomes, and therefore, no reason to think that symmetry or asymmetry should be morally desirable or undesirable as a general rule.

Third, the moral justifi cation for killing in war does not require reciprocal risk between combatants, as Kahn claims, nor does it require that we treat just and unjust belligerents as being akin to police offi cers and criminals, respectively, as Strawser does. I agree with Walzer and others who think that we should avoid demonizing soldiers who fi ght on behalf of unjust causes. 67 The rights of combatants should be respected, regardless of which side they support. Nevertheless, if combatants’ rights and responsibilities are identical, they do not rest on soldiers posing a reciprocal threat to each other, as Kahn maintains. Soldiers are liable to attack during war because they are members of armed groups that intend to attack each other; they are part of an established social convention that joins opponents in relations of enmity. This makes combatants liable to attack until they choose to end that enmity through surrender or a negotiated settlement. This is part of the collective character of war. As Collins correctly notes, ‘[i]t is social organizations, rather than physical bodies and physical equipment, that is the object of the maneuverings of combat. Armies fi ght, not in order to kill soldiers, incapacitate weapons, and take ground, but to destroy the ability to resist.’ 68

It is legal, and morally justifi able according to virtually all accounts of just war, to attack soldiers who are sleeping or unarmed (e.g., those who transport supplies, drive vehicles, or help to operate crew-served weapons). This is why it is possible to launch surprise attacks, artillery barrages, and air strikes against enemy positions even though there is a high likelihood that sleeping or unarmed soldiers will become casualties. A soldier who is killed by artillery cannot defend himself or retaliate against his attacker— he is killed in a way that may seem profoundly unfair. Nevertheless, the killing is not immoral if the soldier is a participant in hostilities. Soldiers only regain their immunity from attack when they surrender, are incapacitated, retire from military service, or temporarily return to the civilian world while on leave. That is to say, they are liable to attack until they leave the relationship of enmity that constitutes involvement in war, whereupon they regain a right against being attacked.

Those who rely on the asymmetry argument typically frame their points in the language of just war theory, but this is misleading, as the permissibility of asymmetric violence is generally accepted among just war theorists. Walzer contends that combatants ‘are subject to attack at any time’ 69 and says of soldiers who refuse to attack non-threatening enemies that their actions ‘fl y in the face of military duty.’ 70 As he explains:

It is important to stress, however, that he [the combatant] has not been forced to fi ght by a direct attack upon his person; that would repeat the crime of aggression at the level of the individual. He can be personally attacked only because he already is a fi ghter. He has been made into a dangerous man, and though his options may have been few, it is nevertheless accurate to say that he has allowed himself to be made into a dangerous man. For that reason, he fi nds himself endangered. 71

Gross argues that ‘[c]ombatants are vulnerable regardless of the immediate threat they pose.’ 72 And Primoratz says of soldiers who are asleep that ‘[t]he soldier may be sleeping right now, but he will wake up later and resume his part in this business; therefore he is fair game even when asleep.’ 73 There is good reason for this attitude. If combatants could only attack each other when they posed a reciprocal threat, then attacks would only be morally justifi ed when they resemble a duel. Based on this reasoning that soldiers may be attacked and killed when they are not threatening, we can ascertain that it is permissible to attack enemy combatants using drones, even though the combatants may be just as vulnerable as if they were sleeping.

Fourth, contra Killmister and Enemark, there is nothing morally objectionable about forcing an enemy to surrender. If there were, war could never be justifi able. The objective of war is often to force an enemy to surrender—‘to destroy the ability to resist.’ 74 Forcing a belligerent to surrender does not deprive that belligerent of the right of self-defense— it only deprives that belligerent of victory and nothing in the right of self-defense guarantees that belligerents will always prevail during war. It would be logically impossible for opposing belligerents that have a right to wage war to also have a right to win. Killmister and Enemark are correct in thinking that weak belligerents could resort to terrorism in an effort to continue the fi ght when their conventional military forces are ineffective, but their opponents are not to blame for this. Belligerents are under no obligation to guarantee that their enemies always have a fi ghting chance, and belligerents that choose to engage in terrorism are blameworthy regardless of whether they are at a disadvantage in conventional military operations.

Fifth, those who make the asymmetry argument based on a right of selfdefense misunderstand what that right entails. The right to self-defense, as the name suggests, is a right to protect oneself against threats. The right does not guarantee that all acts of self-defense are successful. This would be impossible, especially during war. All combatants who are engaged in war have a right to self-defense that entitles them to use lethal force against those who pose an active or imminent threat, yet this right clearly does not guarantee that every soldier is successful in this. Some soldiers will fail to protect themselves even as they exercise their rights. The same is true for states. Opposing belligerents may each have a right to defend themselves and their citizens, but we typically expect that one side will fail in protecting itself. The loser’s right remains intact even if that belligerent is unable to win.

Finally, a strange feature of the debate over drones is that many who condemn drones alternate between claiming that these weapons will bring greater symmetry and claiming that they will bring greater asymmetry. Enemark criticizes the USA for waging risk-free war with its UAVs and expresses a concern that the US military will act with less restraint in the future because of its unprecedented technological dominance. Yet he also says that ‘[i]t will probably not be long, however, before the numerical and technical superiority of America’s armed drones comes to be challenged by other actors.’ 75 Singer similarly criticizes the use of drones to create radical asymmetries between powerful armed forces and weaker opponents even as he expresses concern over the prospects of weak states and VNSAs building their own drone forces that would make them more militarily effective. 76 Stranger still, either type of asymmetry is treated as being morally undesirable by both authors and by others who shift between these contrary positions. It is diffi cult to see how asymmetry and symmetry could both be morally undesirable at the same time. These are contradictory arguments that expose the inconsistencies underlying the asymmetry objection.

### AT: Attribution

#### Responsibility attribution systems exist now, and LAWs don’t magnify existing moral risk

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Robert Sparrow has come up with one of the most infl uential arguments against autonomous drones, which attributes their wrongness to the impossibility of identifying anyone who can be blamed for what they do. He argues that autonomy and moral responsibility are inextricably linked such that any agent that has one must have the other. Moreover, he thinks that an autonomous agent must have the sole and undivided responsibility for its own actions. ‘Where an agent acts autonomously, then, it is not possible to hold anyone else accountable for its actions. In so far as the agent’s actions were its own and stemmed from its own ends, others can not be held responsible for them.’ 15 The first problem Sparrow identifies with autonomous weapons is that they would be incapable of taking responsibility for their own behavior. Punishing a machine would be meaningless since machines lack the characteristics that would allow them to experience punishment as a human would. They cannot fear incarceration or feel the shame of being publicly reprimanded.

The obvious answer to this problem is that the engineers who create drones or the military commanders that send them into combat could be blamed for what autonomous drones do. Sparrow anticipates this objection and attempts to counter it by showing that responsibility for autonomous weapons cannot be distributed. As he sees it, there are grounds for holding the users of non-autonomous weapons responsible for how they are used. They are directly involved in launching attacks with those weapons and may be at fault for targeting civilians or attacking recklessly. By contrast, an autonomous machine is in control of its own actions and cannot be directed by any human operator in the same way a non-autonomous weapon might be. Thus, Sparrow says: ‘To hold the programmers responsible for the actions of their creation, once it is autonomous, would be analogous to holding parents responsible for the actions of their children once they have left their care.’ 16 He makes a similar case for not attributing responsibility to the political and military leaders that order autonomous drones into battle.

Other opponents of autonomous weapons have seized on Sparrow’s argument, advancing their own versions of it or incorporating Sparrow’s reasoning into their accounts of why these drones should be considered immoral. Chamayou says that ‘since the killer robot incorporates no driver, there will no longer be anyone directly responsible who can be blamed if anything happens.’ 17 O’Connell argues: ‘From the perspective of law, morality, and strategy, it seems essential that a human being who has training and conscience and who may be held accountable should always make the awesome, ultimate decision to kill.’ 18

Steinhoff counters Sparrow’s argument by attempting to show that there is no reason to think that someone must be able to be held responsible for autonomous weapons. As he correctly points out, the ability to assign blame is not generally included among the principles of just war theory. Just war theory has little to say about how those guilty of infractions should be punished or otherwise forced to pay for the consequences of their actions. Although Steinhoff is correct on this point, this response to Sparrow is not entirely satisfying. For one thing, even though just war theory does not require that someone be held accountable for misconduct, being able to do this does increase the enforceability of just war precepts. It may be easier to force belligerents to abide by the principle of discrimination, for example, if violence against civilians is punished than if it is not. And enforcement by holding actors responsible would be impossible from Sparrow’s perspective. This does not negate the moral point that Steinhoff makes, but it does suggest that there is more to Sparrow’s problem than this alone and that we should want to fi nd responsible actors even if this is not strictly required by just war theory.

Petrenko answers Sparrow’s argument by claiming that it would be possible to attribute responsibility for autonomous drones’ actions to human developers and commanders according to existing standards of product liability. 19 Developers and commanders may be guilty of negligence if they fail to protect against foreseeable misconduct by autonomous drones. They may also be held to a standard of strict liability, according to which they must be responsible for autonomous drones’ actions even when those actions were not foreseeable. By this standard, anything autonomous weapons systems do could be attributed to the humans involved in their production and use. ‘[W]hen the responsibility for harm is spread across a number of parties involved in the design, manufacturing, or sale of AWS [autonomous weapons systems], strict liability might be extended to all the parties involved in proportion to their involvement.’ 2

This is another promising strategy for refuting the responsibility concern, though it seems to raise additional questions. First, applying domestic tort law to war raises serious legal and conceptual problems. Domestic law may provide helpful analogies for international confl ict, but it is a fundamentally different condition. War is an exceptional state of affairs when some of the most basic moral and legal guidelines that govern domestic life are suspended. Moreover, unlike domestic disputes, wars are confl icts between political communities. This arguably raises a unique set of moral considerations that do not exist in domestic contexts, especially when using standards that are designed to regulate interactions between individuals or private organizations. Second, Petrenko’s suggestion to assign blame based on a person’s proportion of involvement is plausible, but he does not say how we actually do this. There needs to be some standard for identifying which actors may be considered blameworthy and determining their share of responsibility.

As I pointed out earlier in the chapter, Sparrow’s conception of autonomy is far too strong. He understands autonomy to mean that robots might become ‘full “moral persons.”’ 21 Sparrow’s argument is only compelling if drones are autonomous to this extent, which means that it would not apply to autonomous drones that locate and attack targets based on carefully scripted attack procedures. Armed **forces have powerful incentives to avoid** developing machines that have the degree of independence Sparrow describes, which makes it important to avoid interpreting his argument as one that would apply against the kinds of autonomous weapons that are currently in development or may exist in the foreseeable future. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that armed forces might create drones that fi t Sparrow’s description, the task of identifying humans responsible for misconduct would be fairly straightforward.

The responsibility problem facing autonomous drones is illusory because armed forces already have established procedures for attributing responsibility for the conduct of autonomous actors. 22 Human soldiers are autonomous fi ghters who are able to disobey orders, form their own opinions, and willfully engage in immoral actions. Human soldiers can be blamed for their actions, but they are rarely solely responsible. The military chain of command is a hierarchy that can help to determine responsibility for actions. At each level in the chain, civilian policymakers and members of the military set the structural conditions that permit or discourage immoral behavior. They create or eliminate possibilities, and this implicates them in the decisions that soldiers make when they are fi ghting.

It is helpful to consider this by way of example. If an American soldier in Iraq decides to torture a prisoner, the soldier bears personal responsibility for his actions and can be justifi ably punished for acting wrongly. However, the soldier is only in a position to act immorally because of countless decisions made by others in that soldier’s chain of command. Policymakers may bear some fault for starting the war that caused the soldier’s deployment, and would be even more clearly blameworthy if they issued directives authorizing prisoner abuse. Military commanders would be responsible for relaying orders to abuse prisoners or standing idly by while the abuse takes place as they have a duty to contest immoral and illegal orders. Moreover, they are obliged to provide ethics training, police their subordinates’ conduct, screen soldiers for predispositions toward misconduct, and ensure that effective oversight mechanisms are in place. This means that even if the prisoner abuse is not authorized by superiors—if it is perpetrated spontaneously by the soldiers who are directly involved—members of the military chain of command still bear responsibility for soldiers’ actions.

This example should not stretch our imaginations as it describes the infamous case of American soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib. The Abu Ghraib scandal showed that it is sometimes diffi cult to punish everyone in the civilian and military chain of command. Members of the Bush administration who had authorized torture were able to escape prosecution, as were some military personnel who were in a position to raise objections. It is, unfortunately, very diffi cult to actually punish those who are responsible for misconduct during wars, especially when they are protected by a military superpower. Nevertheless, the problem was not in identifying the responsible parties. Dozens of books and articles have exhaustively detailed the various ways in which people were indirectly involved in the abuse in ways that establish moral responsibility and that could be used to determine legal fault. This is clear evidence that wrongful acts perpetrated by autonomous actors do implicate others, contrary to Sparrow’s argument. The most serious challenge is not determining who is responsible, but designing institutions that are capable of punishing soldiers and civilian policymakers for misconduct. But this is a general challenge of military justice and not a problem that is unique to drones.

Apportioning responsibility raises the ‘many hands problem.’ When everyone is to blame for misconduct, then it is diffi cult to hold any individual accountable. Each person in a group may bear such a small share of the overall blame that their mistakes appear to be excusable or that it is diffi cult to actually punish anyone. Shared responsibility does have limitations when it comes to clearly identifying individuals for punishment, but it also has advantages when directing the conduct of entire organizations. As Osiel points out, sharing responsibility for misconduct in the military provides encouragement for more effective peer monitoring. ‘[W]hen a person knows that he can be held responsible for the conduct of his chosen associates, he is more likely to monitor their conduct closely, scrutinizing it for possible unlawfulness. Conversely, when a person knows that he can be held responsible only for his own acts, he is less attentive to the lawfulness of associates’ conduct.’ 23

If anything, the **basis for sharing responsibility is stronger with autonomous drones** than it is with human soldiers. First, to the extent that autonomous drones fall short of reaching the same level of autonomy as humans, they must rely on programming that was given to them by engineers, military commanders, and civilian policymakers. Second, no actor, no matter how autonomous, is completely detached from outside infl uence. It may be possible to coerce or infl uence a person to commit a wrongful act in various ways, without negating that person’s autonomy. Persuading someone to commit a murder, for example, would be wrong even if the person doing the persuading did not force the murderer’s hand. The same goes for drones, though here the infl uence is even clearer. There would be a strong causal link between an autonomous drone and those who are in a position to infl uence its behavior. Finally, autonomous drones would probably be heavily dependent on humans for acquiring the means to carry out attacks. A human can fi nd a rifl e and shoot a civilian without assistance from an accomplice, but existing drone designs suggest that these machines will depend on human assistance when being armed. For example, an autonomous UAV probably would **not be able to load missiles onto itself**. Humans can therefore be held accountable as accomplices that give drones the capacity to kill, especially if the drones are armed with weapons that reduce the chance of attacks satisfying the demands of the principles of discrimination and proportionality.

Thus, the responsibility objection against autonomous drones can be solved in several different ways, none of which require any great shift in our moral thinking. The moral and legal apparatus for evaluating negligence and shared responsibility is **already in place**. The real challenge when it comes to responsibility is designing more effective mechanisms of punishing people who are indirectly responsible for misconduct. Because this is a policy issue, it is best addressed through political reforms that are designed to facilitate investigations of misconduct and prevent offi cials in the chain of command, especially civilian policymakers, from evading punishment.

### AT: Dehumanizes War

#### This is science fiction—war is a human enterprise by nature

Toscano, 15—Navy Judge Advocate and 2014 LLM Graduate of the George Washington University Law School (Christopher, “Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 189 (2015), dml) [gendered language modifications denoted by brackets]

With the inevitable approach of AWSs, some believe that chivalry will be eliminated, that as machines engage other machines, war will become dehumanized.20 1 This does seem possible, given that UAVs will engage other UAVs in combat. Nevertheless, to quote Clausewitz, "war is nothing but the continuation of [humanity's] politics by other means. 20 2 In other words, war will always be instigated and carried out by humans who in turn seek to affect or influence other humans. Warfare will always be influenced by human political, legal, diplomatic, and economic factors- humanity's role as the decision maker will not change.20 3 The idea that international disputes will be determined by bloodless wars fought by AWSs duking it out in a boxing-ring setting, manned [staffed] by video game controllers is simply absurd- it is pure science fiction. Human civilians will always be the victims of war. This does of course raise the question of whether compassion or empathy will decrease as AWS usage further lengthens the distance between human combatants and the battlefield to a degree. It is also plausible that people will express fear and disgust with AWSs in the same manner they protested nuclear weapons in the twentieth century.20 4 Since human victims will always be central to warfare, chivalric values will likewise always be relevant, regardless of the technological advances.20 5 Governments must avoid dehumanizing enemies into the means that "fuel the cogs of war," by employing AWSs in a just and respectful manner consistent with the modern notions of chivalry incorporated into the U.S. military manuals and traditions.20 6

### AT: Der Derian/Stahl/Apel

#### Drones increase transparency via cameras, and distortion is endemic to governments not drones!

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

A related concern about drones is that they may raise new prospects for manipulating the civilian public. Because drones mediate war, placing machines between the human opponents on either side, they could arguably be used to create a distorted view of what war is like and what its effects are. This mediated vision of war could also influence civilian audiences’ attitudes about drones or about war in general by making it easier to selectively present information about how attacks are carried out and what costs they have. Civilians could not only be prevented from seeing the unfortunate consequences drone strikes may have on innocent people but might also be distracted from ever engaging in critical inquiry by the flashy videos of drones launching precise attacks against enemy military targets. Moreover, this influence could arguably be enacted via the kind of civil–military technology sharing I discussed in the previous section as civilian media producers are often complicit in creating the military spectacles for civilian audiences. 13

This concern is probably most effectively and famously expressed by James Der Derian in his discussion of the concept of virtuous war. 14 Der Derian does not focus on drones, but rather objects to a pervasive tendency in the representation of war that drones and other precision weapons participate in. As he sees it, contemporary wars and representations of war are marked by the logic of ‘virtuous war,’ which is a way of showing the action of combat without the consequences. Details like dead bodies, displaced populations, and ruined infrastructures are omitted to give the appearance that war is a relatively clean and casualty-free activity. This is a trend Der Derian thinks is increasing and that is closely related to robotic weapons. As he says, ‘[t]he low risk, high yield strategy of virtuous war has a logic of its own, in which the human role is shrinking in numbers and significance in an increasingly robotic battlespace.’ 15

Many others have expressed similar concerns, either by relying explicitly on the concept of virtuous war or by developing other accounts of the underlying phenomenon of the sanitization of war. Stahl highlights the extent to which drones are part of a larger process of merging entertainment and war, with the result that civilian culture becomes militarized. He argues that militainment has expanded dramatically in recent decades and has become more insidious as it has shifted from treating audiences as passive spectators to treating them like ‘virtual citizensoldiers’ who are active participants in simulated wars. For Stahl, drones are particularly important in this process because they make it possible to wage war in the manner of a ‘sci-fi dystopia.’ 16 The ethical problem he raises is that militarized culture encourages citizens, who should be critical judges of war, to become engaged in fantasies in which they are complacent members of the military. Military entertainment thus appears to be a way of subverting democratic accountability and ensuring that citizens will be too busy playing war to raise any concerns about real wars.

Finally, Apel argues that real information about war is presented in carefully constructed ways that are apt to mislead viewers. ‘Like video games, the footage of war experience edited and set to music appeals to the young and creates a decontextualized and depoliticized effect that heightens visceral sensations while derealizing the less entertaining effects of war.’ 17 Apel cites drones as a prime example of this tendency as she argues that videos of drone attacks posted online glorify the strikes by showing their technical precision for those who like to see ‘things blow up without seeing the blood and gore.’ 18 As with Stahl, this characterization of the persuasive effects of media identifies drones as being a particularly insidious tool for manipulating civilian audiences.

Those who object to biased ways of presenting war are correct in noting that there is something disconcerting about using drones or other technologies to conceal the costs of fighting. I agree with them in thinking that it is unethical to use drone footage or other types of imagery to deceive the civilian public or to escape regulative constraints. Citizens of democratic societies must have access to information about war; they need reliable information to make reasonable decisions about whether to support military actions, weapons procurements, and the policymakers who are responsible for making military policy. Without this information citizens may not be able to exert the pressure on elected officials that is essential for maintaining popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, as with the other problems I have discussed, this critique is an instance of legitimate fears being poorly framed.

This objection, like so many of the other criticisms raised against drones, picks out a few possible misuses of drones while ignoring the many ways in which drones might be used responsibly. It is true that drones could hide the costs of war from drone operators or the general public, and that some videos may have had this effect because they were carefully edited or framed inaccurately. But as I will discuss later, it is also possible for drones to be used to provide more accurate information and increase government accountability. Drones do not simply increase the prospects for dissimulation. Rather, they increase the prospects for dissimulation while also, and unavoidably, raising unprecedented prospects for accurately representing war. They may be used to mislead or to inform. Deciding which role they play is a political challenge that is best approached through the kinds of regulations I will discuss later. In particular, the possibility that drones may distort war highlights the importance of having independent oversight of drone use and ensuring that members of the military are not able to alter the videos before they are reviewed by oversight bodies.

Most weapons of modern warfare conceal the casualties they inflict. In fact, this critique of drones could be applied more accurately to the many weapons that not only fail to show the consequences of their use under certain conditions but may not even be able to show those consequences under ideal conditions. Bombers, artillery, mortars, and landmines are regularly used against unseen enemies without producing records of their consequences. That is to say, they naturally hide the costs they inflict even under ideal conditions because video records are not a normal byproduct of operating these weapons. Policymakers and members of the military may sometimes hide the costs of drone strikes, but they do this despite the fact that the mediated nature of drone operations makes them naturally amenable to creating video records. Drones’ latent potentials do not increase the scope of immoral conduct (the concealment of war), but do significantly increase the opportunities for disseminating information about war. We should not condemn drones for the misuse of the video records. Rather, we should recognize that drones increase the prospects of making battlefields more transparent and condemn the people who fail to take advantage of this capacity.

### AT: Disarm Impossible

#### LAW prolif kick-starts momentum for disarm by presenting a viable alternative to nuclear deterrence, that’s Umbrello—small steps towards minimizing the role of nukes like that create a virtuous cycle that makes disarm palatable

The Elders, 19—a council of important old people brought together by Nelson Mandela and chaired by Kofi Annan until his death (Mary Robinson, Martti Ahtisaari, Ban Ki-moon, Ela Bhatt, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Jimmy Carter, Zeid Raad Al Hussein, Hina Jilani, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Ricardo Lagos Graça Machel, Juan Manuel Santos, Desmond Tutu, and Ernesto Zedillo, “NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT,” <https://theelders.org/sites/default/files/The%20Elders%20Report%20Nuclear%20Position%20Paper%20A5%20Web.pdf>, dml)

Every nuclear-armed state will thus have to be persuaded that verification and – above all – enforcement arrangements are in place which will ensure absolutely that no state will be able to rearm without being detected in ample time, and that it can be stopped from going further.

The challenges to achieving the final elimination of nuclear weapons are daunting and will require significant amounts of political will and creative solutions to accomplish. But this is not a reason for despair.

Just as pessimism can feed on itself, so too can positive developments be self-reinforcing and become a virtuous circle. What seems unthinkable now is likely to seem much more achievable 10 years from now if the “minimisation agenda” being proposed by The Elders develops real momentum.

### AT: Distortion

#### Drones prevent distortion – surveillance, reflecting time, and alt causes to attacks

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Claims that distance or mediation cause an escalation of violence are not supported by evidence from previous conflicts. This could hardly be more obvious as the entire history of warfare until the twentieth century is a testament to how easily people can kill each other at close range and without any technological mediation. Soldiers have killed each other in droves with swords, spears, arrows, and blunt objects. A number of recent studies have shown that wars have actually inflicted far fewer casualties as violence has become more heavily mediated. 26 Moreover, even in an era when most weapons are used at long range and are in some way mediated, atrocities continue to be carried out when these supposed barriers are not in place. The most egregious humanitarian disasters of the past two centuries were largely carried out without help from distance or mediation. The Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, and the ‘killing fields’ in Cambodia come to mind as just a few of the many examples of atrocities perpetrated at close range.

It is interesting that Dave Grossman’s in-depth study of the psychology of killing has become the most commonly cited source of evidence that distance facilitates killing. 27 In some respects this is understandable. Grossman argues that people have a natural aversion to killing, especially at close range. This would appear to suggest that any weapon that is able to mediate or increase the range of violence would lead to more killing. Grossman’s argument is doubtful given the massive body of evidence to show that people can kill at any range and the empirical shortcomings of many of his cases. 28 However, even if we assume that there is a natural aversion to close-range combat, Grossman argues that this feeling is suppressed by military training. Indeed, many of his other writings are directed at showing how easily the aversion to killing can be overcome. He even goes so far as to argue that violent video games have desensitized players and turned them into killers. If this were true, then Grossman’s work could hardly be mobilized as evidence that close-range war is less violent or more ethical than remote war. On the contrary, he suggests that the real concern is the military indoctrination that cultivates a willingness to kill**, not a particular weapon**.

Of course, soldiers do sometimes empathize with their opponents— even to the extent that they refused to attack them. Soldiers’ narratives of battle are replete with moments in which a soldier decided not to shoot an enemy who was temporarily humanized. These moments appear to have much less to do with distance or mediation than with mutual recognition of shared humanity or feelings of pity. Michael Walzer discusses several examples of soldiers who decided not to attack opponents because these feelings were so profound that they outweighed the intense political forces driving the soldiers to kill each other. The soldiers he describes decided not to attack opponents who were naked, alone, or otherwise unable to fight—soldiers who appeared to be helpless and non-threatening. A passage from George Orwell is particularly effective in conveying this experience:

At this moment a man, presumably carrying a message to an officer, jumped out of the trench and ran along the top of the parapet in full view. He was half-dressed and was holding up his trousers with both hands as he ran. I refrained from shooting at him…I did not shoot partly because of that detail about the trousers. I had come here to shoot at ‘Fascists’; but a man who is holding up his trousers isn’t a ‘Fascist,’ he is visibly a fellow-creature, similar to yourself, and you don’t feel like shooting at him.

The absence of threat is the central theme across Walzer’s stories of soldiers who do not attack. Soldiers who are threatened by enemies must fight in self-defense, especially when they are at close range, while those who face non-threatening or distant enemies have **greater freedom to reflect on the act of killing** and consider whether it is warranted. These stories therefore indicate that having a significant advantage over opponents and being physically distant from them might actually increase the prospects of soldiers showing empathy because it allows soldiers to make ethical decisions without having to worry about being attacked by the enemy whose life is spared.

Concerns over drones eroding ethical sympathies through distancing and computer mediation also rely on incorrect assumptions about how wars are waged when drones are not involved. The assumption seems to be that, in the absence of drones, soldiers would fight each other on relatively equal terms in face-to-face combat. But of course, nothing could be further from the truth. Most soldiers already fight in ways that put them at great distances from their opponents or that rely on computer mediation. Pilots who fl y combat aircraft frequently drop bombs on unseen opponents from thousands of feet in the air or launch missiles at enemy aircraft that may only be visible as small blips on a radar. At times, strafing brings them close enough to see their targets, but only for brief glimpses. 30 They never have an opportunity to watch their opponents as intently as UAV pilots do. Soldiers who operate indirect fi re weapons like artillery, mortars, and long-range missiles are not only distant from their opponents but may also have little sense that they are fi ring at people at all. They direct their attacks against points on a map or grid coordinates relayed by soldiers in the field.

Even for soldiers who are physically present on the battlefield and not inside vehicles, it is often exceedingly difficult to experience the humanity of enemy combatants or to see those enemies in ways that might inspire some sense of empathy. During the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was more common for Coalition soldiers to be wounded or killed by improvised explosive device (IEDs) than by enemy fighters they could see. 31 As Bellavia, a veteran of fighting in Fallujah says, ‘[i]n modern warfare, that man-to-man challenge is often hidden by modern technology  – the splash of artillery fi re can be random, a rocket or bomb or IED can be anonymous.’ 32 During combat, soldiers are apt to seek cover and concealment, which further impede direct contact. They camouflage themselves to avoid being identified as humans. They fight from inside of buildings, trenches, or bunkers, shielding themselves from enemy fi re, as well as from any sympathetic view they might receive from their adversaries. They do everything they can to be invisible to the enemy, or at least to only become visible for that instant when they are fighting and not apt to inspire feelings of empathy.

If anything, it seems that drones might be able to generate more opportunities to empathize with opponents. Because UAV operators can loiter over target areas for hours without facing any personal risk, they may watch potential targets without fear of being attacked and have more opportunities to understand and even empathize with them. UAVs cameras may likewise provide a much more intimate perspective than a soldier could have otherwise. Their overhead view gives their pilots an excellent view of the people in the target area, and when those pilots spend hours or even days tracking a potential target, they understand that person and others who may be affected far more by an attack than they would in a brief close-range gunfight.

Other types of drones may not be able to match UAVs when it comes to giving operators a clear view. Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) will have limited visual fi elds as they move across the ground and may be seen by enemy combatants, who could attempt to avoid detection. Naval drones are likely to be employed for intercepting boats and aircraft, which provides little opportunity for visually identifying human opponents. Nevertheless, these constraints on visibility are due to the terrain these drones operate in and the kinds of threat they may face. Even when they lack the same ability to track potential targets as UAVs, it is at least clear that drones will uniformly reduce the costs associated with attempting to visually identify and track enemies, while also increasing the accuracy of visual identification with the assistance of optical equipment, which provides much higher resolution than a human eye.

Of course, the visibility of potential targets does not guarantee empathy. It is obviously possible for a drone operator to remorselessly kill enemies and civilians alike. My point is not that drones will make the battlefield more humane, only that their latent potentials are such that we should expect that they will not cause any new problems associated with dehumanization and that they may provide new opportunities for visual experiences that could generate feelings of empathy. Based on these latent potentials, it is unfair to blame drones for making it easier to kill or to commit atrocities.

### AT: Fem IR

#### Autonomous weapons can be repurposed towards feminist post-human goals. Anti-militarism doesn’t necessitate the elimination of technologies, but it requires intervention at a legal AND discursive level.

Jones 18 – *PhD from SOAS University of London, MA from University College London (UCL), LLB Law degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)* (Emily Jones, 8-1-2018, "A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Other Killing Machines," Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13200968.2018.1465333)//KH

Despite current trends in military technologies and the ways in which machines are already helping to make life/death decisions, neither algorithmic ‘independence’, nor AI which decides to kill, nor any type of superhuman soldier, would be covered under a pre-emptive ban of autonomous weapons. On the other hand, a posthuman approach to autonomous weapons would recognise the connections between the human and the machine. Such an approach would not fixate on autonomy but would instead work to break down the false dichotomies between autonomy–automation and human–machine, instead focusing on the ethical implications of killer systems across these lines.146 As noted above, whilst xenofeminism and posthuman feminism understand the dangers as well as the potentials of technology, xenofeminism in particular does not account for the power of militarism and the militarism–capitalism assemblage. It seems, therefore, that the risks of the technology–militarism–capitalism assemblage need to be further read into xenofeminism to ensure that it stays true to its own aims of using and appropriating technology to construct an intersectional feminist future.

Braidotti’s posthumanism pays attention to death and modes of dying while promoting an affirmative posthuman era in the face of the necropolitical.147 In contrast to the necropolitical politics of death itself,148 Braidotti proposes ‘a politics of life itself’149 which chooses to tackle the obstacles of the posthuman condition as they come. She thus states:

It is a constant challenge for us to rise to the occasion, to be ‘worthy of our times’, while resisting them, and thus to practise amor fati affirmatively. It is quite demanding to catch the wave of life’s intensities in a secular manner and ride on it, exposing the boundaries or limits as we transgress them … Death is the ultimate transposition, though it is not final, as zoe carries on, relentlessly.150

It seems hard, however, to read autonomous weapons in the affirmative when weapons technologies kill people in ever more removed and de-personalised ways. Autonomous weapons, are/will be the child of the military economy. As Braidotti notes, however, to analyse in the affirmative is not to deny the horror of our times. Affirmation ‘proposes a different way of dealing with’ such horrors.151

I propose that xenofeminism provides an affirmative blueprint for embracing the current times. I have noted how xenofeminist method works to appropriate technology and existing political structures, bending them to feminist aims.152 While the current form of xenofeminism does not fully account for the links between technology and militarism, this does not mean that xenofeminism cannot accommodate such concerns. Xenofeminist method is an affirmative approach in that it notes the contradictions and risks in the posthuman condition and works to deconstruct them.

Thus, taking an affirmative posthuman-xenofeminist perspective, one which understands the ways in which the human and the machine are deeply interconnected, I wish to use xenofeminist method – the **appropriation of technology for feminist aims** – to propose a posthuman-xenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons. While the XFM does not explicitly address the threat to life technology could pose, the wish to define and use technology for feminist aims, I have already suggested, inherently includes the wish to ensure that technology remains ethical. Taking this further, it is important to note that anti-militarism is a key part of the feminist project as exemplified by the Women’s Peace Conference of 1915, to the feminist activism of Greenham Common, to the ways in which Haraway, in her early foundational works, highlighted anti-militarism as a key feminist project.153 While there are many feminists who do not promote an anti-violence stance, **choosing to fight as part of their feminism**, for example, this **does not preclude an anti-militarism stance** in the realm of military technologies.154 Neither does an anti-militarism stance in this area wish to judge those who engage in fighting as part of their feminist project as ‘not feminists’, nor to associate feminism inherently with peace. Rather, in noting the history of anti-militarism within the international feminist project, I wish to suggest that there is a need to promote an ethics of anti-militarism at the international structural level. This is precisely because of the ways in which militarism structures the global order, working to structure technological innovation and development alongside forces such as capitalism, colonialism, and other power structures. Such a stance must therefore be contrasted to more contextual scenarios, where **fighting may indeed be the best form of feminist response.** In this sense, anti-militarism must be distinguished from an anti-violence position, with anti-militarism aiming to challenge the industrial, technologically crafted, capitalist-driven military complex and with an anti-violence position calling more broadly for peace and non-violence. It thus follows, given the links between militarism, technological advancements, and capitalism, that xenofeminism, as a project aiming to appropriate technology for feminist aims, must have regard for anti-militarism. A xenofeminist appropriation of technology must therefore include the desire to ensure that the technology of now and the future cannot be used either for military gains or for the taking of human or nonhuman life.155 Xenofeminist method provides an affirmative method for dealing with the current times and the issue of military technologies.

Drawing on the will to appropriate technology for feminist aims and to create the future from the present, manipulating, hacking, and coding the system, it seems that the appropriation of technology includes ensuring that technology can only be developed in ethical ways. Technology is dependent on a set of programming choices which will shape machine intelligence as technology advances. What choices are made now, what programming choices are made in these current times, could structure the entire future of technology and machine intelligence. **There is a need for feminist posthuman perspectives and xenofeminist infiltrations now.**

The xenofeminists know well that it matters who makes those programming choices. As Haraway puts it, ‘it matters which figures figure figures, which systems systematize systems’.156 Noting that ‘technology isn’t inherently progressive’, the xenofeminists call for an intervention in these choices.157 While intelligent machines could indeed be the end of humanity, such machines may not make such choices. It is important to get the now right in the hope of working towards a future where the machine and human can work together ethically. As Haraway notes,

‘the machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines: they do not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they’.158

The XFM advocates the **infiltration of multiple discourses**.159 I propose **this could include law.** I have argued that the discourse on autonomous weapons needs to be made posthuman, emphasising the links between the machine and the human and the ways in which seeing the **autonomous weapon as the machinic other is a fallacy**. Xenofeminist method calls for the appropriation of technology to promote, in Braidotti’s terms, affirmative aims: constructing the future from the now. While many of the groups calling for a legal ban of autonomous weapons may be overlooking some of the nuances in the debate and definitions, their larger goal – to seek legal frameworks to regulate these systems – is an aim which can remain useful. After all, legal regulation is a core manner in which profit-making tech creators may be forced to shape their innovations in ethical ways. In other words, a xenofeminist method may include not only the appropriation of technology itself but also the frameworks which regulate it. These frameworks are key in structuring future developments of technology, and thus work to appropriate technology through structuring the creation of technology from the outset. In line with xenofeminist method, therefore, I propose that a legal framework is needed to ensure that feminist ethics of anti-militarism, justice, and intersectionality remain central to technological innovation. A feminist posthuman understanding of technology is required here: to ensure that the dark sides of technology are evaded whilst **technology’s positive, subjectivity-challenging and capitalism-destroying potential is maintained**. There is a need to focus on the regulation of all technologies, given the real possibility that killer machines may be created in multiple ways.

There have been steps in other contexts towards creating broader ethical regulations for technology. This can be seen in the example of the European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017, which makes recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics.160 The Resolution is well thought out, considering a variety of issues around the legal regulation of technology and noting issues around liability, care robots, autonomous vehicles, and privacy issues.161 The Resolution calls for the urgent need to regulate technologies.162 While the Resolution opens up debate on these issues, it is non-binding and seeks to regulate non-military technologies, thus upholding a false binary between military and civil technologies despite the clear cross-overs. As noted above, many civil technologies were originally created for military purposes, and there also remains a risk that civil intelligent technologies may decide to kill or may be easily adapted to make them kill.163 In addition, the Resolution does not consider human enhancement technologies despite emerging developments in this area. This trend towards focusing on the immediate present and categorising military and non-military technologies separately is repeated throughout legal and policy attempts to regulate these technologies. There is an urgent need for a posthuman-xenofeminist infiltration of the discussions around the legal regulation of technology, working to promote a future-facing feminist posthuman perspective which understands the cross-overs between civil and military technologies, the human and the machine, and autonomy and automation. While technology may be largely controlled at present by a capitalist elite with strong ties to militarism, this does not mean this technology will inevitably remain in their hands and under their control. By ensuring that basic ethical principles are applied now, through the application of laws to regulate programming choices and technological innovation in the present, technology can be shaped, working towards a post-capitalist, fairer, more ethical and just, feminist world.

### AT: Full Autonomy

#### This is science fiction—humans will always be in the loop

Toscano, 15—Navy Judge Advocate and 2014 LLM Graduate of the George Washington University Law School (Christopher, “Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 189 (2015), dml)

Full autonomy is more complex and remains the subject of much debate at legal and philosophical levels.51 Full autonomy implies that the robot can act without human direction, assistance, or input, and can adapt to its environment independently. s 2 More extreme interpretations suggest that a machine that has full autonomy will become "self-aware" and may choose to go rogue because of free will.5 3 Undoubtedly, these interpretations are derived from the conflation of human with robotic autonomy, as unpacked in Part V. However, the DoD directive does not go to this extreme. The directive defines a fully autonomous weapons system as able to "select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.",5 4 Furthermore, the directive defines AWSs as inclusive of both "human-supervised [AWSs] that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system [and those that] can select and engage targets without further human input after activation. 5 5 Placing this in the context of autonomy scale and the loop, the directive implies that a human operator is on the loop for monitoring and overriding purposes, but sliding to the right, toward "out of the loop" where there is no human interaction.5 6 Still, the directive's overarching theme of human supervision involved in the development, testing, and operation of AWSs suggests that the DoD has no immediate plans to place itself “out of the loop.” 5 7

Clashing viewpoints have served to obfuscate and misrepresent the practical reality of the term "full autonomy" in current technologies, as applied to AWSs.i8 As we will see in Part IV, fully autonomous AWSs, as described by the DoD, will require a more sophisticated system architecture and artificial intelligence (AI) in order for the system to carry out its objectives without human intervention and be IHL compliant.5 9 This level of Al, let alone more advanced Al, where a robot is capable of exceeding human counterparts, is currently not available. 60 Recognizing this technological gap, which is compounded with the ongoing confusion surrounding robotic autonomy, the United States does not plan to pursue or employ out-of-the-loop machines in the near term, with the possibility of a policy change when technology evolves.61 In the interim, humans will remain involved to some extent in the machines' processes, if for no other reason than to monitor AWS progress. Even if AWS capabilities evolve to a sophisticated level exceeding human capabilities, humans will still be needed to design, program, deploy, and debrief AWSs. 63 Moreover, as a precautionary measure, AWS programming will undoubtedly include human-developed restrictions on the AWS Al to preclude mishaps or malfunctions leading to unnecessary death and destruction. Notions suggesting that evolved AWSs will become self-aware, "go rogue," or overtake humans in functions or policy decisions is pure science fiction; they should be disregarded in any serious AWS discussions.64 For the foreseeable future, humans will never be fully out of the loop and the term "autonomous weapons system" should be interpreted in light of the DoD's directive. 6s

### AT: Human Rights Law Fails

#### They don’t account for tech developments—they’re already solving human rights concerns and will only continue

Toscano, 15—Navy Judge Advocate and 2014 LLM Graduate of the George Washington University Law School (Christopher, “Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 189 (2015), dml)

A final criticism is that AWSs will undermine Human Rights Law (HRL), an argument put forth in a report published by HRW.2 87 The report contends that AWS use would violate HRL principles, many of which underpin or inherently exist within IHL.288 The report points out that during an armed conflict, IHL is the governing law (lex specialis); the report goes on to interpret certain human rights provisions.2 89 While it is true that HRL and IHL overlap in certain respects, the former does not comprise the latter. The IHL remains lex specialis - and that debate is beyond the scope of this article. Ignoring this consideration, their report first argues that AWSs will undermine the right to life by engaging in arbitrary killing. 90 In their words, the HRL understanding of arbitrary killing refers, by extension, to unlawful killing under IHL. 9 1 Second, HRW argues that AWSs will violate the right to a remedy because no one could be held accountable for AWS mishaps resulting in unlawful injury, death, or destruction and reiterates that current accountability measures are wholly inadequate. 92 Lastly, HRW posits that the use of AWSs violates the principle of dignity, further dehumanizing warfare by delegating the use of lethal force to inanimate objects.2 93

As with similar critiques, the problem with their entire analysis is that HRW makes notional and very speculative assumptions about the development, evolution, and employment of future technology not yet currently available. Furthermore, HRW assumes lawmakers' and commanders' decisions will arbitrarily allow wholly unpredictable or unmanageable weapons to be employed. Driven by this assumption, HRW calls for an outright ban on the technology and, by extension, immediately dismisses any possibility of collaboration that could shape AWS development toward greater humanitarian protections. Many of these considerations have already been addressed. Nothing in AWS technology alters the law or negates accountability, whether HRL or IHL. In fact, the role of humans will remain the key factor in this entire debate. Designers, developers, human operators and managers, regulators, and policymakers, will all set constraints on AWS actions.2 94 Giving humans some credit, the DoD has already institutionalized the need to keep humans in the AWS decision loop and the need for humans to thoroughly test AWSs to safeguard against mishaps.29 5 As the technology continues to progress, further U.S domestic legal or policy debate and revisions will likely occur.

### AT: Ks Of Just War Theory

#### Just war theory predates and has evolved away from Christian morality

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Finally, some argue that just war theory cannot live up to its own goals. Critics have questioned just war theory’s utility by arguing that it has failed to promote accountability, 24 that it legitimizes war, 25 or that it promotes the demonization of enemies. 26 These are serious charges as they suggest that just war theory could provide a false sense of moral certainty or that it may even intensify wars beyond what we might expect when they are governed by other norms or political conventions. If these critiques are right, then any effort to evaluate drones using just war theory may arguably perpetuate just war theory’s self-defeating tendencies and lead us to pass misguided judgments on new military technologies.

The impression that just war theory is a Western and Christian moral tradition has a degree of truth. Just war thinking was heavily influenced by its Christian origins and continues to have theological elements in some of its contemporary variants. 27 However, the ideas contained in just war theory are not unique to Christian theology or even Western moral theory. Some just war concepts predate Augustine and other Christian writers, 28 others have emerged from relatively recent secular just war theory, and many have parallels in other moral traditions. 29 As Martin Cook points out, ‘[t]he fundamental moral impulse behind just war thinking is a strong sense of the moral evils involved in taking human life.’ 30 And this is a commitment that transcends Western religious values. Just war theory’s theoretical strengths and the intuitive appeal of its underlying moral commitments have led it to become the dominant language for evaluating the morality of armed confl icts. 3

Just war theory is increasingly distancing itself from its intellectual origins. Since the late 1970s, commentators from around the world have attempted to systematically reevaluate virtually every element of just war theory. This has been the source of some major changes to the just war tradition, including fundamental reevaluations of its uniquely Western and Christian elements. Even more importantly, many of just war theory’s core tenets have been codifi ed in international law. 32 This places civilian politicians and military professionals under greater pressure than ever to abide by just war norms. It also raises the prospect of punishing deviations from those norms, either through informal mechanisms rooted in public condemnation or through formal legal processes.

### AT: Lowers Barriers To War

#### Empirically disproven—public opinion checks

Toscano, 15—Navy Judge Advocate and 2014 LLM Graduate of the George Washington University Law School (Christopher, “Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 189 (2015), dml)

Critics also argue that mere possession of AWSs will lower the barriers to warfare. Philosophy professor Peter Asaro argues that the aim of military technology is to develop tactical advantages while lowering combat risks and casualties.2 66 He contends that by reducing the negative consequences of war, governments with advanced technologies will be incentivized to start wars with other states.2 67 He further argues that every war begins with the actions of unjust nations, and that such nations will seek to use these technologies to impose their will on others.268 He states that nations will argue that using AWSs is a "safe" form of fighting that limits casualties, to strategically justify belligerence.2 6 9 Similarly, Sharkey argues that tyrannical despots or terrorists can use these weapons to kill civilians. 270 These arguments, however, are flawed for two reasons.

First, Asaro's argument ignores the greater political, economic, and legal implications associated with war.2 7 1 Technological superiority alone has never served as the impetus for war. If this were true, the United States would have engaged in expansive warfare simply for being technologically superior to other nations. Moreover, the power of public opinion has grown through the Internet, as mentioned earlier. Any loss of life through AWS warfare on either side can sway that public opinion. So while one party to the conflict may enjoy lower causalities through technological superiority, that nation's populace may still disapprove when it sees the results. Secondly, all military technological advancements have made the process of warfare easier.272 In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, crossbows allowed a peasant to kill a professional knight more effectively and from greater distances.2 73 Because of this, Pope Urban II banned the use of crossbows in 1096, and other leaders ordered that captured crossbowmen were either to be dismembered or killed.274 However, a weapon's ability to kill an opponent more effectively or from greater distances does not embolden terrorists or provide justification for war under jus ad bellum. Although AWSs offer the ability to kill at greater distances, that proposition would also be true for missiles or cannon fire. Similarly, if a terrorist or rogue state has the ability to develop an AWS, then it likely has the ability to develop any weapon, nuclear bombs included. In essence, AWSs are simply subject to the same "general problem of disarmament" applicable to all weapons.2 75 Arguments that the possession or usage of AWSs will in itself lower barriers to warfare or further embolden tyranny and terrorism are fatally flawed.

### AT: Moral Hazard

#### We impact turn this—moral hazard causes human error and miscalc—LAWs are net better

Umbrello, et al, 20—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, 35, 273–282 (2020), dml)

Yet, we would argue, such positions are predicated on an unfounded fear that taking control away from humans will enable robotic weaponry to demolish current, human-involved warfare practices. Extrapolating techno-development trends into the future, it is reasonable to expect future robotic weapons to acquire the capacity to reliably and accurately differentiate between combatants and noncombatants (Sharkey 2012; Egeland 2016); this could even occur in the near future (see Guizzo 2016). Indeed, Ronald Arkin (2008) anticipates such technologies—in particular, recognition software—to not only be developed but surpass human performance capabilities (see also O’Meara 2011; Egeland 2016). As he writes, “we must protect the innocent non-combatants in the battlespace far better than we currently do. Technology can, must, and should be used toward that end.” Like Nadeau, Arkin believes that moral LAWs would act in an ethically superior way to humans in war, saying that:

The commonplace occurrence of slaughtering civilians in conflict over millennia gives rise to my pessimism in reforming human behaviour yet provides optimism for robots being able to exceed human moral performance in similar circumstances (Arkin 2015).

One must also take into account the consequences of humans personally engaging in warfare. Historical records, including those of concurrent military engagements, recount numerous acts of barbarism as a result of the harsh conditions that combatants are exposed to (Arkin 2015). In fact, Lin et al. (2008) discuss how one of the most attractive prospects of LAWs is their inability to be affected by emotions on the battlefield (Lin et al. 2008). It is the emotional distress that often causes combatants to mistreat the enemy and commit war crimes. Hence, the introduction of LAWs that are unaffected by such emotional stress serves as an incentive for continued development (Klincewicz 2015).3

Second, the emotional and physical pressures that human combatants must endure during wartime have performance costs. The fatigue of a long and drawn-out battle affects the ability of individual soldiers to perform optimally, and thus affects the accuracy of their shots (Burke et al. 2007; Nibbeling et al. 2014). LAWs are naturally unaffected by similar physical pitfalls and can always—as long as the physical infrastructure is designed optimally from the start—permit the LAWs to continually perform accurately and as expected.

The ability for LAWs to engage in unwavering, precise combat also resolves some ethical issues that arise from human-waged war. In light of the fact that LAWs do not possess emotions to guide their behaviors or personal stakes that affect their combat approaches, LAWs will always perform duties accurately under even the most physically—or to a human, emotionally—stressful conditions, thus enabling them to, at least more often than not, kill in a more humane manner. LAWs can be programmed to only engage targets in manners deemed most ethical based on the dynamics of war at the time of combat: the changing environment, the weapons being used by both the aggressor and the defender, and the characteristics of the target (human, robot, or physical structure).

Already, computerized weapons platforms can engage targets far more accurately than any human counterpart can (Geibel 1997; Shachtman 2007; Katz and Lappin 2012; United States Navy 2017). Strong arguments can be levied that LAWs outfitted with such weapons platforms could engage in otherwise normal wartime duties but in a means that is far more accurate and thus ethical4 as a consequence of LAWs’ technological superiority.

Part of this ethical prowess exhibited by LAWs is not only because they never tire, but because they are impervious to the psychological shortcomings of humans. Though a contentious topic, several high-profile cognitive psychologists suggest that humans fabricate reasons for their actions after committing them (Davidson 1982; Nadeau 2006). Thus, it is human to be irrational, to make unreasoned decisions toward an action that is then validated after carrying through. Such is not the nature of a robot. As mentioned, LAWs do not have any particular affinity to or personal interests in surviving battle; they do not have any drive to exhibit particular harshness against enemies of a certain culture; and they do not, outside of their goals, worry about winning the war and heading back home after using any unsavory methods to do so. What they do mind is their particular set of rules, their value-laden code that dictates how they are to conduct themselves in an ethical manner during combat.

### AT: No Norms

#### LAWs are inevitable—limiting the tech fails—existing norms are sufficient

Anderson and Waxman, 13—professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University AND professor of law at Columbia Law School, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law (Kenneth and Matthew, “LAW AND ETHICS FOR AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: WHY A BAN WON’T WORK AND HOW THE LAWS OF WAR CAN,” American University Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2013-11, dml)

The incremental development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems is inevitable, and any attempt at a global ban will be ineffective in stopping their use by the states whose acquisition of such weaponry would be most dangerous. Autonomous weapon systems are not inherently unlawful or unethical. Existing legal norms are sufficiently robust to enable us to address the new challenges raised by robotic systems. The best way to adapt existing norms to deal with these new technologies is a combined and international-national dialogue designed to foster common standards and spread best practices.

### AT: Precision/Civilian Casualties

#### All metrics indicate drones are the most precise weapon we have—their ev conflates tech with policy and makes perfection the enemy of a good weapon

Dvorsky, 15—senior staff reporter at Gizmodo, citing Michael Horowitz, associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, Peter Singer, Strategist for the New America Foundation, not the eugenics dude, and Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Warfare Initiative at the Center for a New American Security (George, “Is War Becoming More Humane?,” <https://gizmodo.com/is-war-becoming-more-humane-1735636987>, dml)

But according to Michael Horowitz, modern guided weapons have become significantly more precise over the past several decades, dramatically reducing civilian casualties when used correctly. Evidence collected by the New America Foundation, a non-partisan think tank, affirms this claim, particularly as it pertains to actions in Pakistan. During the course of the Obama Administration, somewhere between 129 to 161 civilians were killed in Pakistan, while 1,646 to 2,680 militants were killed. But since 2012, no civilians have been killed at all in Pakistan (according to NAF data).

Undoubtedly, precision bombing has come a long way in the past 75 years. Guidance systems were so primitive in the 1940s that it took around 9,000 bombs to destroy a single building. Entire communities were leveled in the effort to destroy military targets (though it’s important to remember that Allied forces also deliberately targeted civilians during WWII). Today we have laser and GPS guided missiles, but back during the Second World War, field tests demonstrated that less than 5% of rockets fired at a tank actually hit the target—and that was in a test where the tank was painted white and stationary.

“Some modern precision munitions are accurate to within five feet, meaning fewer bombs are dropped and fewer civilians die,” says Horowitz. “Most militaries actually prefer using precision munitions simply because [they] help militaries accomplish their missions with higher confidence and lower costs.”

Horowitz says that countries can use even the most precise weapons in ways that generate more suffering than necessary. The recent U.S. bombing of a hospital in Afghanistan certainly comes to mind—an act which the charity Doctors Without Borders says may be a violation of the Geneva Conventions. Regrettably, mistakes and recklessness are still part of the equation, as witnessed by the 2014 U.S. drone strike that killed 12 people on their way to a wedding.

“But in general, the more precise the weapon, the lower the risk of civilian casualties,” says Horowitz.

Singer claims that people often misconstrue the capabilities of new weapons in two ways when it comes to civilian casualties.

“First they expect perfection, as if there could be such a thing in war,” he says. “Mistakes happen all the time even with precise weapons, with the causes ranging from tech failure to bad information on the target’s identity, to maybe it wasn’t a mistake. And second, we’ve changed our level of our expectations. Actions like the firebombing of Tokyo were accepted back in 1940s, while single digit casualty counts are viewed by many as unacceptable today, rightly so according to most ethicists.”

When it comes to drone strikes, Scharre says that the objections are not about the technology of drones, but America’s counterterrorism policy.

“What some people are objecting to is not the drone, but the fact that the U.S. is killing terrorists on what doesn’t seem like a traditional battlefield, or in a war as we typically recognize it,” says Scharre. “There’s no question that drones are more precise than other alternative weapons, whether they are cruise missiles, aircraft, or artillery shells.”

Scharre says that high-precision weapons like drones allow the military to choose the time and manner of attack—typically when targets are alone and when there aren’t civilians around.

#### Autonomy doesn’t prevent discrimination—they don’t assume future developments

Toscano, 15—Navy Judge Advocate and 2014 LLM Graduate of the George Washington University Law School (Christopher, “Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 8 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 189 (2015), dml)

Critics also argue that AWSs will be incapable of discriminating between combatants and innocent civilians. Robotics professor Noel Sharkey argues robots could not be programmed to understand the difference between a civilian and a combatant.2 0 4 HRW's report, which Sharkey advised on, expounds on this point by arguing that "fully autonomous weapons would not have the ability to sense or interpret the difference between soldiers and civilians especially in contemporary combat environments. 2 65 Thus, Sharkey and HRW advise that further AWS development should be prohibited. Their "take-our-word-for-it" approach is based on the current state of technology, excluding the possibility of innovative developments over the long haul, and it is currently inaccurate in limited environments (e.g., no-fly zones). In short, critics argue that AWSs will never distinguish between civilians and combatants, basing this conclusion solely upon current empirical data or theories, rather than participating in a debate to ensure that the inevitable development in AWS technology meets or exceeds the parameters set by IHL.

### AT: Sanitization/Culture Militarization

#### Civil-military overlap in drone control is overblown and no different than other military applications

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

Commentators who accuse drones of merging military and civilian technologies in problematic ways raise a number of interrelated points that need to be disentangled. Some of their ethical concerns could motivate a reevaluation of how drones and their associated technologies are produced. In particular, there is a danger of civil–military interaction being an avenue for wasteful spending or of collaboration leading to links that erode the division between the military and civilian industry. We should, of course, be alert to new developments in civil–military cooperation that could compromise the integrity of those in one or both domains. Nevertheless, the practice of borrowing or licensing existing technologies for use in drones is not inherently problematic. There is reason to think that technology sharing is harmful when there is clear evidence of wasteful spending, misappropriation, or inappropriate recruiting practices, but critiques of civil–military technology sharing do not stop at these clear cases of corruption. As the above examples illustrate, many commentators suggest that even mundane instances of technology sharing induce civilians to join the military, train civilians to fight, or trivialize war. That is to say, these critics suggest that any form of civil–military sharing could influence how people think about war. This type of ideational critique is most prominent when the offending technologies cited by critics of drone warfare are associated with entertainment, as evidenced by the objections to using Xbox controllers in military roles. These critiques suggest that there is something disconcerting about the military borrowing civilian entertainment devices—especially when soldiers may be using similar devices to kill people.

It is unclear why it should matter, at least from a moral perspective, that some technologies have both civilian and military applications. Global positioning systems (GPS) are used in missile guidance systems as well as in the commercially available devices that guide drivers. Some synthetic materials, such as nylon, have their origins in military research programs. And certain techniques for food preservation, including canning and the substitution of margarine for butter, were first adopted by armies struggling with logistical impediments. These kinds of technology sharing are not morally problematic, especially when the military and civilian applications of the technologies are usually far removed from each other. It is unlikely that many people who play an Xbox or use an iTouch know that these devices have military applications (unless they are already in the military and familiar with the control systems), which makes it unlikely that using these devices will increase support for military operations or otherwise cause problematic shifts in civilians’ attitudes toward war.

It makes sense for developers to create controls that will be familiar to most users, as in the case of drone controls being modeled on controls used for videogame consoles. Armed forces regularly make use of skills that soldiers have learned during civilian life. They seek recruits who are in good physical condition, which usually assumes that they were physically active prior to joining the military. They likewise seek recruits who are intelligent, which requires previous education in civilian schools. The military’s practice of taking advantage of recruits’ capacities and actively seeking those whose civilian aptitudes would make them good soldiers typically goes unnoticed, so why should we respond harshly when militaries try to make the best use of recruits’ experience in playing videogames or using other digital media?

Technology sharing seems benign when it is largely invisible and cannot have any plausible persuasive function. Stahl’s comment about an Xbox processor serving as a model for the design of the Predator is a prime example of this. 12 It would be concerning if Xbox was used to promote the use of Predator drones or if Predators were used to advertise game systems, as this would represent a dangerous effort to infl uence people’s judgments about drones through subversion. It is not clear why it should matter that military and civilian technologies share some parts when this cannot plausibly be a mechanism of promoting war or discouraging civic engagement in military affairs. If anything, it is less objectionable for the military to borrow existing technologies or even to license them from civilian companies than for the military to spend taxpayer money on unnecessary research and development costs.

We should conclude that while it is good to carefully scrutinize the relations of production that make drones possible and to actively resist wasteful spending, the unrestrained growth of the military–industrial complex, and the production of militaristic propaganda, we should not assume that all civil–military relationships are harmful. Drone technologies have been characterized by a high degree of civil–military interaction and yet much of that interaction seems to be benign and insufficient to suggest that there is something morally objectionable about drones.

#### Straight turn—this is inevitable and they don’t solve—but, LAWs do!

Schulzke, 16—assistant professor in International Relations at the University of York (Marcus, “The Moral Landscape of Drone Warfare,” *The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation*, Chapter 2, pg 55-78, SpringerLink, dml)

A related concern about drones is that they may raise new prospects for manipulating the civilian public. Because drones mediate war, placing machines between the human opponents on either side, they could arguably be used to create a distorted view of what war is like and what its effects are. This mediated vision of war could also influence civilian audiences’ attitudes about drones or about war in general by making it easier to selectively present information about how attacks are carried out and what costs they have. Civilians could not only be prevented from seeing the unfortunate consequences drone strikes may have on innocent people but might also be distracted from ever engaging in critical inquiry by the flashy videos of drones launching precise attacks against enemy military targets. Moreover, this influence could arguably be enacted via the kind of civil–military technology sharing I discussed in the previous section as civilian media producers are often complicit in creating the military spectacles for civilian audiences. 13

This concern is probably most effectively and famously expressed by James Der Derian in his discussion of the concept of virtuous war. 14 Der Derian does not focus on drones, but rather objects to a pervasive tendency in the representation of war that drones and other precision weapons participate in. As he sees it, contemporary wars and representations of war are marked by the logic of ‘virtuous war,’ which is a way of showing the action of combat without the consequences. Details like dead bodies, displaced populations, and ruined infrastructures are omitted to give the appearance that war is a relatively clean and casualty-free activity. This is a trend Der Derian thinks is increasing and that is closely related to robotic weapons. As he says, ‘[t]he low risk, high yield strategy of virtuous war has a logic of its own, in which the human role is shrinking in numbers and significance in an increasingly robotic battlespace.’ 15

Many others have expressed similar concerns, either by relying explicitly on the concept of virtuous war or by developing other accounts of the underlying phenomenon of the sanitization of war. Stahl highlights the extent to which drones are part of a larger process of merging entertainment and war, with the result that civilian culture becomes militarized. He argues that militainment has expanded dramatically in recent decades and has become more insidious as it has shifted from treating audiences as passive spectators to treating them like ‘virtual citizen-soldiers’ who are active participants in simulated wars. For Stahl, drones are particularly important in this process because they make it possible to wage war in the manner of a ‘sci-fi dystopia.’ 16 The ethical problem he raises is that militarized culture encourages citizens, who should be critical judges of war, to become engaged in fantasies in which they are complacent members of the military. Military entertainment thus appears to be a way of subverting democratic accountability and ensuring that citizens will be too busy playing war to raise any concerns about real wars.

Finally, Apel argues that real information about war is presented in carefully constructed ways that are apt to mislead viewers. ‘Like video games, the footage of war experience edited and set to music appeals to the young and creates a decontextualized and depoliticized effect that heightens visceral sensations while derealizing the less entertaining effects of war.’ 17 Apel cites drones as a prime example of this tendency as she argues that videos of drone attacks posted online glorify the strikes by showing their technical precision for those who like to see ‘things blow up without seeing the blood and gore.’ 18 As with Stahl, this characterization of the persuasive effects of media identifies drones as being a particularly insidious tool for manipulating civilian audiences.

Those who object to biased ways of presenting war are correct in noting that there is something disconcerting about using drones or other technologies to conceal the costs of fighting. I agree with them in thinking that it is unethical to use drone footage or other types of imagery to deceive the civilian public or to escape regulative constraints. Citizens of democratic societies must have access to information about war; they need reliable information to make reasonable decisions about whether to support military actions, weapons procurements, and the policymakers who are responsible for making military policy. Without this information citizens may not be able to exert the pressure on elected officials that is essential for maintaining popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, as with the other problems I have discussed, this critique is an instance of legitimate fears being poorly framed.

This objection, like so many of the other criticisms raised against drones, picks out a few possible misuses of drones while ignoring the many ways in which drones might be used responsibly. It is true that drones could hide the costs of war from drone operators or the general public, and that some videos may have had this effect because they were carefully edited or framed inaccurately. But as I will discuss later, it is also possible for drones to be used to provide more accurate information and increase government accountability. Drones do not simply increase the prospects for dissimulation. Rather, they increase the prospects for dissimulation while also, and unavoidably, raising unprecedented prospects for accurately representing war. They may be used to mislead or to inform. Deciding which role they play is a political challenge that is best approached through the kinds of regulations I will discuss later. In particular, the possibility that drones may distort war highlights the importance of having independent oversight of drone use and ensuring that members of the military are not able to alter the videos before they are reviewed by oversight bodies.

Most weapons of modern warfare conceal the casualties they inflict. In fact, this critique of drones could be applied more accurately to the many weapons that not only fail to show the consequences of their use under certain conditions but may not even be able to show those consequences under ideal conditions. Bombers, artillery, mortars, and landmines are regularly used against unseen enemies without producing records of their consequences. That is to say, they naturally hide the costs they inflict even under ideal conditions because video records are not a normal by-product of operating these weapons. Policymakers and members of the military may sometimes hide the costs of drone strikes, but they do this despite the fact that the mediated nature of drone operations makes them naturally amenable to creating video records. Drones’ latent potentials do not increase the scope of immoral conduct (the concealment of war), but do significantly increase the opportunities for disseminating information about war. We should not condemn drones for the misuse of the video records. Rather, we should recognize that drones increase the prospects of making battlefields more transparent and condemn the people who fail to take advantage of this capacity.

### AT: War On Terror

#### War on terror narratives scapegoat drone warfare and drones’ reduction in casualties

Shulzke 17 – *Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York, UK, PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, State University of New York, US, in 2013 with a dissertation on how soldiers make ethical decisions during counterinsurgency operations.* (Marcus, “The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation,” New Security Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan London, ISBN: 978-1-137-53380-7, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-137-53380-7>, accessed via Mich Library)//KH

It is wrong to assume that drones will always be used as they have been during the War on Terror, especially when they are operated by other armed forces or when different types of drones are deployed. Drones are not the cause of the US military’s controversial style of targeted killing or its geographically unrestricted counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations. Rather, they are one symptom of the American strategy of waging the War on Terror by any means available. UAVs fulfill a particular need—a need to carry out covert strikes against suspected terrorists and insurgents with minimal risk to US military personnel—and they are not alone in doing this. Special operations forces, private military contractors, cruise missiles, and cyber weapons can likewise be used to fulfill this need. UAVs may be more effective than these other means of attack insofar as they present lower risk to combatants than those associated with special operations missions and contractors and are more effective in targeting specific individuals than cruise missiles and cyber weapons, yet they are part of a range of weapons and tactics that are used for similar purposes and that do not necessarily have to be used as they have been by the US military.

In a study of US military’s special operations tactics, Niva correctly notes that ‘[d]rones…are a synecdoche for a bigger issue: the expanding system of a high-tempo regime of targeted strikes, special operations forces raids, and detention practices that are largely unaccountable to the public and draped in secrecy rules.’ 1 Niva’s assessment is apt, not only because he identifies the extent to which the controversial strategies for employing UAVs are symptomatic of larger strategic decisions but also in thinking that the root cause of these strategies is the lack of accountability and transparency. To these problems one should also add that the American strategies for waging the War on Terror are marred by inattention to state sovereignty, reliance on dubious targeting strategies, and disturbingly close relations between the military and intelligence services, especially the Central Intelligence Agency. UAVs certainly play an important part in waging the War on Terror and have been involved in attacks that are morally and legally questionable. However, the proliferation of tools for carrying out these questionable attacks is evidence that they are not necessarily connected to drones.

As we saw in the previous chapter, drones have broad latent potentials. The morality of drones is best evaluated in terms of whether these potentials increase or decrease the scope of ethical and unethical conduct. To say that UAVs can perform the same functions as cruise missiles, special operations forces, and other weapons and tactics does not excuse the misuse of UAVs in a particular context, yet it does show that UAVs’ latent potentials do not seem to have caused any significant change in how the US military operates. If UAVs did not exist, then it seems unlikely that targeted killings in Pakistan and elsewhere would simply stop. They might happen on a reduced scale, but would likely be performed by cruise missiles and special operations forces—a shift in tactics that might also produce **greater numbers of** American and **civilian casualties.**

Thus far, UAVs have only been used to replace humans and manned vehicles in missions that were already being carried out and have followed a developmental path that reflects the strategic goals of the USA. At the same time, drones have helped to promote a more ethically sensitive way of performing these missions. A cruise missile and a UAV may both be used to destroy the home of a suspected terrorist, yet a UAV can monitor the home for hours and help to ensure that the attack only comes when the terrorist’s civilian family members leave the building. Drones do not guarantee that attacks are only launched when civilians are a safe distance away—they may be used indiscriminately, just as any other weapons may be—but drones expand the potential for acting with much greater respect for civilians. In other words, even when UAVs are misused in the War on Terror, we should condemn those misuses while still recognizing that we are only objecting to specific practices of employing UAVs and that alternative methods for targeting suspected terrorists may be considerably worse.

For evidence that we should avoid conflating certain uses of drones with drone technology itself, one need look no further than the operations that have been conducted by the US military. The strikes that attract criticism are almost invariably targeted killings, and not the hundreds of ground support missions that drones have been involved in. The ground support operations are fairly unproblematic from a moral and legal perspective. These are an established part of war and are usually conducted against people who are clearly combatants because they are actively fighting. The fact that critics generally reserve their negative evaluations for targeted killings while saying little or nothing against drones in more conventional military roles reveals that the underlying moral concern is with the practice of targeted killings and associated actions like infringing on the sovereignty of foreign states or conducting military operations outside of war. Conversely, targeted killings involving other methods, such as the special operations raid that killed Osama Bin Laden or the cruise missile strikes on Al Qaeda training facilities in 1998, have been contentious because they target individuals or violate state sovereignty and not because of the methods employed. With this in mind, we can advance the debate over drone warfare by drawing a clearer distinction between drones and the countless different ways in which they can be used.

### Aff—AT: Human in the Loop

#### “Human in the loop” dehumanizes the victims of LAW attacks and defers to IR paradigms that justify violence against the “non-West”

Williams 21 – *Professor of International Relations at Durham University (UK), PhD, Politics and International Studies (*John, December 2021, “Locating LAWS: Lethal Autonomous Weapons, Epistemic Space, and ‘Meaningful Human’ Control,” *Journal of Global Security Studies*, Volume 6, Issue 4, ogab015, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab015)//KH

The epistemic paradigm of MHC emerging from Cold War experience sets the strategic agenda for analyzing LAWS. However, that experience is not characteristic of Western uses of force in the past 250 years. War has colonized non-European political communities, enabled slavery, eliminated indigenous peoples, imposed forms of economic interaction, and suppressed political opposition to established authorities most conducive to European governments, their settler colonies, or trading corporations. Predominant forms and experiences of military violence are marginalized. **IR's disciplinary intellectual history** bears **significant** responsibility because it **ignores non-Western traditions** of thought (Blaney and Tickner 2017), non-Western histories (Buzan and Lawson 2015; Acharya and Buzan 2019), non-Western experience (Phillips 2014, 2016), and occludes its indebtedness to discriminatory and racist concepts and theories (Hobson 2004, 2012; Vitalis 2015). While non-Western states raise issues of strategic stability (e.g., Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 2018, para. 4(f)), arms races, and discriminatory export controls (Brazil 2019a) in the CCW GGE, these remain within the epistemic space defined by particular and selective Euro-Atlantic-centric accounts. Engaging richer, and more honest, military and strategic history is the first research agenda item and one also applicable to international law and ethics, and engineering and technology policy as shown below.

The ideal-type “meaningful human” to control LAWS carries these legacies unnoticed and unquestioned. They are a “**meaningful human**” privileged by centuries of **violently oppressing non-Western** and non-white people, and legitimized by an ostensible strategic stability that rested on decades of Cold War violence fought out at the costs of millions of lives in proxy wars, coups, insurgencies, and dictatorships air-brushed from this debate. The ostensible neutrality of “human” and “humanity” in MHC instantiates this intellectual tunnel vision about security. Those categories **cannot escape** this epistemological legacy. To be a “meaningful human” able to exercise “meaningful control” assumes acceptance of this framing. “Meaningful” exists within this paradigm that portrays the absence of general, system-wide war since 1945 as the product of astute great power management, led by the West. “Control” must therefore contribute to reducing the dangers of destabilizing this delicately poised, but supposedly universally beneficial, management system. This is not to dismiss the potential severity of strategic destabilization or increased escalatory risks dominating the IR and security studies aspects of MHC debates. It is, though, to call for critical engagement with the selective history that is called upon as evidence of these risks and how to manage them, and of the epistemological assumptions about “rationality” that create the “meaningful human” who is both reference point for and idealized exerciser of “meaningful control.”

The post-9/11 security debate reinforces this **epistemological privileging**, showing how non-Western space and those who exploit it are the source of insecurity. This ties in to the development of a key precursor technology for LAWS, armed drones, as critical to **exercising control** over “dangerous” space. For example, the United States portrays “un-governed,” “under-governed,” or “ill-governed” space as key threats. This is where transnational terrorists will inevitably gather, exploiting opportunities to train, organize, and plan attacks against the west. This narrative, present in **every US National Security Strategy** since 2001 (United States 2002, 10–11, 2006, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 2010, 8, 19, 20, 2015, 9, 10–11, 26, 2017, 10, 11, 48), ostensibly necessitates penetrating these spaces for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes, in preparation for potential strike operations to “disrupt,” “dismantle,” “degrade,” “destroy,” or “defeat” transnational terrorist organizations (on multiple three-fold permutations of these “'D”s, see Page 2016). Presenting such organizations as “**cancers,”** or other **dehumanizing tropes**, is widespread, reinforcing these threats as inescapable and necessitating action (e.g., Obama 2014; Cameron 2015; Price 2019).

Drones, and their complex supporting infrastructure, have become central to US practice in places including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. A dangerous “non-West,” often invoking colonialist cultural tropes (Neocleous 2013; Satia 2014), is the source of threats, destabilization, and terror. What the “West” did to them in the past and which may help explain hostility and distrust is forgotten. Management to protect Western interests through military force is essential. The histories, experiences, perspectives, and epistemologies of people subjected to such violence are fundamentally irrelevant. They may be “objects” of violence, including the violence inflicted on them by terrorist and insurgent groups, but in thinking about the lessons of drone use for MHC, there is no sign such experiences and perspectives have anything significant to say about what “meaningful” control might entail from the position of those who are most likely to experience Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) uses of LAWS. **These people are not “meaningful humans.”**

Summarizing Cold War and post-9/11 influences on LAWS debates shows the epistemological privileging of Western IR and security expertise is ubiquitous. Defense and security “experts” are the “meaningful humans” able to exercise appropriate control. Expertise arises from, and is judged against, this framework and through the exercise of technical competence in understanding the framework's components. For example, authoritative interpretation of key reference points are claimed for US military authorities: Pentagon doctrine captures “the perceptions of practitioners across the globe,” and **former senior US officers are definitive interpreters of Clausewitz** as the canonical theorist of war (Kirkpatrick 2016; Jensen, Whyte, and Cuomo 2020, 527). The relevant expert constituency are political and military leaders making decisions about which systems to develop, how to integrate them within existing armed forces structures, when to deploy them to the field, and how to evaluate their contribution. Current efforts to quantify the effectiveness of “decapitation” drone strikes against terrorist and insurgent groups (e.g., Johnston 2012; Price 2012; Johnston and Sarbahi 2016; Rigterink 2020) focus on whether and to what extent LAWS reduce risks to “us.” When Roff and Danks (2018, 2) offer a neglected view, it remains a Western one: “The debate about autonomous weapons systems ... overlook[s] ... how such systems ... will affect those individuals they are supposed to help: the warfighters.” These are exclusively the warfighters of armed forces that match the blueprint of advanced industrial democracies, and key official reference points come from the US Airforce and the US Department of Defense.

### Aff—AT: Schulzke

#### Schulzke only considers unrealistic moral fantasies!

Archambault 21 – *MPhil in International Political Theory from the University of St Andrews and a Bachelors in Liberal Arts from Concordia University, Montreal, PhD Candidate at the School of Government and International Affairs at the University of Durham* (Emil, November 26, 2021, “Review Essay: A good guy with a drone: On the ethics of drone warfare,” Contemporary political theory., 19 (S3). pp. 169-175, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-019-00328-w)//KH

Throughout, Schulzke argues largely by refutation, drawing on a large number of critiques of drones to establish the value of his approach separating the weapon from practices of war, which would be problematic for all forms of warfare, not merely drone warfare. In so doing, however, he narrows the scope of his study: despite two chapters on the jus ad bellum (one on the ethical challenges of drones, and one on the potential regulation of drone use to strengthen ethical compliance), Schulzke’s vision is one where the availability of weapons systems bears no influence on the decision to use military force. He therefore rejects outright any argument to the effect that drones may encourage the use of military force, or that their secrecy may lead to more extensive uses of force. To the extent that these may constitute valid concerns, they can be remedied by a strengthening of ethical norms against aggression, by an emphasis on the need for a just cause, and by norms on domestic and international transparency, and therefore do not pose a particular challenge to drones themselves.

Neither of the books under consideration argues that drones are, in themselves, inherently and irredeemably immoral. As mentioned above, for Schulzke, drones are ‘defensible weapons platforms’, which can be deemed ethical only in their use or misuse (p. 12). Furthermore, because any weapon (except for WMDs) can be used for either ethical or unethical conduct, any evidence of negligence causing excessive collateral damage, or even of deliberate war crimes through drones cannot be used as evidence of their problematic morality. Drones, however, do change moral calculation by enabling further ethical conduct. By removing combatants from the battlefield and thus removing the justification for self-defence, by lowering the costs of restraint – i.e. by reducing the risk that spared enemies might attack friendly forces – and by allowing for the positive identification of targets through loitering and advanced visual capabilities, Schulzke states that drones present the ability to strengthen rules of engagement and tolerate little to no risk of collateral damage (p. 117).

In so arguing, however, **Schulzke finds himself in a double bind**. First, as Martin notes, these capabilities can hardly be described as moral ‘advantages’ (p. 173) outside of their use in practice. Thus, Martin argues, the ‘paradox’ may well be that these seeming benefits of drones will simultaneously lead to more pervasive legal violations (p. 39). As Megan Braun and Brunstetter note, a high proportion of targeted killing strikes lead to civilian deaths, more so than with other weapons systems (Braun and Brunstetter, cited by Brunstetter and Jimenez, p. 83). Short of considering the practices in which these drones are used, therefore, Schulzke’s moral advantages remain little more than hypothetical. Furthermore, as Derek Gregory has demonstrated – and Martin mentions (p. 54) – visual acuity does not equal understanding of a situation and distance does not equal detachment, leading potentially to violations of principles of just war (Gregory, 2018; see also Williams, 2015).

#### Schulzke falls prey to the bio-politicization of ethics of violence by skirting questions of us and effectiveness

Archambault 21 – *MPhil in International Political Theory from the University of St Andrews and a Bachelors in Liberal Arts from Concordia University, Montreal, PhD Candidate at the School of Government and International Affairs at the University of Durham* (Emil, November 26, 2021, “Review Essay: A good guy with a drone: On the ethics of drone warfare,” Contemporary political theory., 19 (S3). pp. 169-175, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-019-00328-w)//KH

Drones, for Schulzke, are not responsible for the wider character of war: ‘Drones are not the cause of the US military’s controversial style of targeted killing or its geographically unrestrained counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations. Rather, they are one symptom of the American strategy of waging the War on Terror by any means available’ (p. 57). The point is well taken that drones do not, in themselves, create the necessity for their use. It is equally correct that drones are part of an array of tactics – special forces raids, conventional aerial bombing, cruise missile strikes – and that a rejection of drone strikes would not mean an end to targeted killing (p. 58). However, in separating these two elements, Schulzke brackets off a crucial question, namely whether the availability of drones **creates pressures for their use.** Boyle, in comparison, openly inquires whether the ubiquity of drones may lead to the normalization of targeted killing, and whether the proliferation of technology may lead to a proliferation of norms enabling drone use (p. 16). Carvin, as well as Brunstetter and Jimenez, note how technological innovations can create pressures leading to changes in laws of war and human rights (Carvin, p. 26; Brunstetter and Jimenez, p. 88). Schulzke seeks to present drones as morally advantageous weapons by dismissing cursorily any suggestion that drones may impact the wider character of war and the norms governing it. Would the United States have pursued a strategy of targeted killing without drones? Would they have opted, as Schulzke suggests, for a more destructive strategy (p. 177)? At any rate, such questions deserve careful consideration, not summary dismissal.

Schulzke, therefore, falls prey to what Elke Schwarz criticizes as the biopoliticization of ethics of violence, that is, the transformation of ethics from a judgment to a code that can be applied blindly, in a calculating fashion, leading to ‘narrowed horizons for ethical debate’ (Schwarz, 2018, p. 172). Ethics, therefore, in Schwarz’s account, is transformed by violent technologies from an inquiry into whether it is right to kill into a technological endeavour to kill more effectively (Schwarz, 2018, pp. 191, 198). It is particularly jarring that Schulzke asserts the heightened ability of drones for proportionality (both ad bellum and in bello) while excluding the question of whether drones can achieve a given objective (p. 189). Carvin argues that ‘good inquiry about drones will focus on overall strategy’, including ‘second- and third-order effects’ (p. 33). Indeed, what Carvin highlights here is that it is impossible to discuss the proportionality of military actions effectively without a consideration of their role vis-a`-vis strategic objectives (and whether any tactical action furthers this strategic objective). In other words, if targeted killings can be shown to be effective in increasing security and defeating the given enemy, then considerations of how to pursue this strategy better become relevant, and Schulzke’s discussion becomes highly pertinent. If, however, targeted killings do not, in fact, further the pursuit of strategic objectives, then discussions of whether drones allow for more discriminatory killing become moot, as the requisite level of proportionality (both in bello and ad bellum) may never be established.

## NATO Good

### Ukraine—1NC

#### Critiques of American power ignore that the realistic alternatives are worse. Invasion of Ukraine proves.

Kagan 22 – Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. [Robert. “The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use Its Power?” Foreign Affairs, The World After the War, May/June 2022. June 1, 2022.]

But although this massive change had little to do with U.S. policies, it had much to do with the reality of the United States’ post–Cold War hegemony. Many Americans tend to equate hegemony with imperialism, but the two are different. Imperialism is an active effort by one state to force others into its sphere, whereas hegemony is more a condition than a purpose. A militarily, economically, and culturally powerful country exerts influence on other states by its mere presence, the way a larger body in space affects the behavior of smaller bodies through its gravitational pull. Even if the United States was not aggressively expanding its influence in Europe, and certainly not through its military, the collapse of Soviet power enhanced the attractive pull of the United States and its democratic allies. Their prosperity, their freedom, and, yes, their power to protect former Soviet satellites, when combined with the inability of Moscow to provide any of these, dramatically shifted the balance in Europe in favor of Western liberalism to the detriment of Russian autocracy. The growth of U.S. influence and the spread of liberalism were less a policy objective of the United States than the natural consequence of that shift.

Russian leaders could have accommodated themselves to this new reality. Other great powers had adjusted to similar changes. The British had once been lords of the seas, the possessors of a vast global empire, and the center of the financial world. Then they lost it all. But although some were humiliated at being supplanted by the United States, Britons rather quickly adjusted to their new place in the firmament. The French, too, lost a great empire, and Germany and Japan, defeated in war, lost everything except their talent for producing wealth. But they all made the adjustment and were arguably better for it.

There were certainly Russians in the 1990s—Yeltsin’s foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, for one—who thought that Russia should make a similar decision. They wished to integrate Russia into the liberal West even at the expense of traditional geopolitical ambitions. But that was not the view that ultimately prevailed in Russia. Unlike the United Kingdom, France, and to some extent Japan, Russia did not have a long history of friendly relations and strategic cooperation with the United States—quite the contrary. Unlike Germany and Japan, Russia was not militarily defeated, occupied, and reformed in the process. And unlike Germany, which always knew that its economic power was irrepressible and that in the post–World War II order it could at least grow prosperous, Russia never really believed it could become a successful economic powerhouse. Its elites thought that the likeliest consequence of integration would be Russia’s demotion to, at best, a second-rank power. Russia would be at peace, and it would still have a chance to prosper. But it would not determine the fate of Europe and the world.

WAR OR PEACE

In the fall of 1940, Japan’s foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, posed his country’s predicament starkly in a meeting with other senior officials. Japan could seek a return to cooperative relations with the United States and the United Kingdom, he noted, but only on those countries’ terms. This meant returning to “little Japan,” as the minister of war (and future prime minister), General Hideki Tojo, put it. To Japanese leaders at the time, that seemed intolerable, so much so that they risked a war that most of them believed they were likely to lose. The coming years would prove not only that going to war was a mistake but also that the Japanese would indeed have served their interests better by simply integrating themselves into the liberal order from the beginning, as they did quite successfully after the war.

Putin’s Russia has made much the same choice as did imperial Japan, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany, and many other dissatisfied powers throughout history, and likely with the same end—eventual defeat. But Putin’s choice should hardly have come as a surprise. Washington’s protestations of goodwill, the billions of dollars it poured into the Russian economy, the care it took in the early post–Cold War years to avoid dancing on the Soviet Union’s grave—all this had no effect, because what Putin wanted could not be granted by the United States. He sought to reverse a defeat that could not be reversed without violent force, but he lacked the wherewithal to wage a successful war. He wanted to restore a Russian sphere of interest in central and eastern Europe that Moscow had lost the power to sustain.

The problem for Putin—and for those in the West who want to cede to both China and Russia their traditional spheres of interest—is that such spheres are not granted to one great power by other great powers; they are not inherited, nor are they created by geography or history or “tradition.” They are acquired by economic, political, and military power. They come and go as the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates. The United Kingdom’s sphere of interest once covered much of the globe, and France once enjoyed spheres of interest in Southeast Asia and much of Africa and the Middle East. Both lost them, partly due to an unfavorable shift of power at the beginning of the twentieth century, partly because their imperial subjects rebelled, and partly because they willingly traded in their spheres of interest for a stable and prosperous U.S.-dominated peace. Germany’s sphere of interest once extended far to the east. Before World War I, some Germans envisioned a vast economic Mitteleuropa, where the people of central and eastern Europe would provide the labor, resources, and markets for German industry. But this German sphere of interest overlapped with Russia’s sphere of interest in southeastern Europe, where Slavic populations looked to Moscow for protection against Teutonic expansion. These contested spheres helped produce both world wars, just as the contested spheres in East Asia had helped bring Japan and Russia to blows in 1904.

Russians may believe they have a natural, geographic, and historical claim to a sphere of interest in eastern Europe because they had it throughout much of the past four centuries. And many Chinese feel the same way about East Asia, which they once dominated. But even the Americans learned that claiming a sphere of interest is different from having one. For the first century of the United States’ existence, the Monroe Doctrine was a mere assertion—as hollow as it was brazen. It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century, when the country was able to enforce its claim, that the other great powers were grudgingly forced to accept it. After the Cold War, Putin and other Russians may have wanted the West to grant Moscow a sphere of interest in Europe, but such a sphere simply did not reflect the true balance of power after the Soviet Union fell. China may claim the “nine-dash line”—enclosing most of the South China Sea—as marking its sphere of interest, but until Beijing can enforce it, other powers are unlikely to acquiesce.

Some Western analysts nonetheless argued when the Cold War ended, and continue to argue now, that Washington and western Europe should have given in to Russia’s demand. But if Moscow could not enforce a sphere, then on what grounds should the West have acceded? Fairness? Justice? Spheres of interest are not about justice, and even if they were, consigning the Poles and other eastern Europeans to subservience to Moscow would have been a dubious justice. They knew what it was like to be under Moscow’s sway—the loss of independence, the imposition of rulers willing to take direction from the Kremlin, the squelching of individual liberties. The only way they would have accepted a return to Russia’s sphere was if they were compelled to by a combination of Russian pressure and the studied indifference of the West.

In fact, even if the United States had vetoed the accession of Poland and others to NATO, as some suggested at the time that it should have, the Balts, the Czechs, the Hungarians, and the Poles would have done everything they could to integrate themselves into the transatlantic community in every other possible way. They would have worked to join the global economy, to enter other Western-dominated international institutions, and to gain whatever commitment they could to their security—acts that almost certainly would have still antagonized Moscow. Once Putin began taking slices out of Ukraine (there would be no way for him to restore Russia to its previous great-power status without controlling Ukraine), the Poles and others would have come banging on NATO’s door. It seems unlikely that the United States and its allies would have continued to say no.

Russia’s problem was ultimately not just about its military weakness. Its problem was, and remains, its weakness in all relevant forms of power, including the power of attraction. At least during the Cold War, a communist Soviet Union could claim to offer the path to paradise on earth. Yet afterward, Moscow could provide neither ideology, nor security, nor prosperity, nor independence to its neighbors. It could offer only Russian nationalism and ambition, and eastern Europeans understandably had no interest in sacrificing themselves on that altar. If there was any other choice, Russia’s neighbors were bound to take it. And there was: the United States and its strong alliance, merely by existing, merely by being rich and powerful and democratic, offered a very good choice indeed.

Putin may want to see the United States as being behind all his troubles, and he is right that the country’s attractive power closed the door to some of his ambitions. But the real sources of his problems are the limitations of Russia itself and the choices that he has made not to accept the consequences of a power struggle that Moscow legitimately lost. Post–Cold War Russia, like Weimar Germany, never suffered an actual military defeat and occupation, an experience that might have produced a transformation of the sort that occurred in post–World War II Germany and Japan. Like the Weimar Republic, Russia was therefore susceptible to its own “stab-in-the-back myth” about how Russian leaders supposedly betrayed the country to the West. But although Russians can cast blame in any number of directions—at Gorbachev, at Yeltsin, and at Washington—the fact is that Russia enjoyed neither the wealth and power nor the geographic advantages of the United States, and it was therefore never suited to be a global superpower. Moscow’s efforts to sustain that position ultimately bankrupted its system financially and ideologically—as may well be happening again.

SOONER OR LATER

Observers used to say that Putin played a bad hand skillfully. It is true that he read the United States and its allies correctly for many years, pushing forward just enough to achieve limited goals without sparking a dangerous reaction from the West, up until this latest invasion. But even so, he had help from the United States and its allies, which played a strong hand poorly. Washington and Europe stood by as Putin increased Russian military capabilities, and they did little as he probed and tested Western resolve, first in Georgia in 2008 and then in Ukraine in 2014. They didn’t act when Putin consolidated Russia’s position in Belarus or when he established a robust Russian presence in Syria, from which his weapons could reach the southeastern flank of NATO. And if his “special military operation” in Ukraine had gone as planned, with the country subdued in a matter of days, it would have been a triumphant coup, the end of the first stage of Russia’s comeback and the beginning of the second. Rather than excoriating him for his inhumane folly, the world would again be talking about Putin’s “savvy” and his “genius.”

Thankfully, that was not to be. But now that Putin has made his mistakes, the question is whether the United States will continue to make its own mistakes or whether Americans will learn, once again, that it is better to contain aggressive autocracies early, before they have built up a head of steam and the price of stopping them rises. The challenge posed by Russia is neither unusual nor irrational. The rise and fall of nations is the warp and woof of international relations. National trajectories are changed by wars and the resulting establishment of new power structures, by shifts in the global economy that enrich some and impoverish others, and by beliefs and ideologies that lead people to prefer one power over another. If there is any blame to be cast on the United States for what is happening in Ukraine, it is not that Washington deliberately extended its influence in eastern Europe. It is that Washington failed to see that its influence had already increased and to anticipate that actors dissatisfied with the liberal order would look to overturn it.

For the 70-plus years since World War II, the United States has actively worked to keep revisionists at bay. But many Americans hoped that with the end of the Cold War, this task would be finished and that their country could become a “normal” nation with normal—which was to say, limited—global interests. But the global hegemon cannot tiptoe off the stage, as much as it might wish to. It especially cannot retreat when there are still major powers that, because of their history and sense of self, cannot give up old geopolitical ambitions—unless Americans are prepared to live in a world shaped and defined by those ambitions, as it was in the 1930s.

Americans are part of a never-ending power struggle, whether they wish to be or not.

The United States would be better served if it recognized both its position in the world and its true interest in preserving the liberal world order. In the case of Russia, this would have meant doing everything possible to integrate it into the liberal order politically and economically while deterring it from attempting to re-create its regional dominance by military means. The commitment to defend NATO allies was never meant to preclude helping others under attack in Europe, as the United States and its allies did in the case of the Balkans in the 1990s, and the United States and its allies could have resisted military efforts to control or seize land from Georgia and Ukraine. Imagine if the United States and the democratic world had responded in 2008 or 2014 as they have responded to Russia’s latest use of force, when Putin’s military was even weaker than it has proved to be now, even as they kept extending an outstretched hand in case Moscow wanted to grasp it. The United States ought to be following the same policy toward China: make clear that it is prepared to live with a China that seeks to fulfill its ambitions economically, politically, and culturally but that it will respond effectively to any Chinese military action against its neighbors.

It is true that acting firmly in 2008 or 2014 would have meant risking conflict. But Washington is risking conflict now; Russia’s ambitions have created an inherently dangerous situation. It is better for the United States to risk confrontation with belligerent powers when they are in the early stages of ambition and expansion, not after they have already consolidated substantial gains. Russia may possess a fearful nuclear arsenal, but the risk of Moscow using it is not higher now than it would have been in 2008 or 2014, if the West had intervened then. And it has always been extraordinarily small: Putin was never going to obtain his objectives by destroying himself and his country, along with much of the rest of the world. If the United States and its allies—with their combined economic, political, and military power—had collectively resisted Russian expansionism from the beginning, Putin would have found himself constantly unable to invade neighboring countries.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult for democracies to take action to prevent a future crisis. The risks of acting now are always clear and often exaggerated, whereas distant threats are just that: distant and so hard to calculate. It always seems better to hope for the best rather than try to forestall the worst. This common conundrum becomes even more debilitating when Americans and their leaders remain blissfully unconscious of the fact that they are part of a never-ending power struggle, whether they wish to be or not.

But Americans should not lament the role they play in the world. The reason the United States has often found itself entangled in Europe, after all, is because what it offers is genuinely attractive to much of the world—and certainly better when compared with any realistic alternative. If Americans learn anything from Russia’s brutalization of Ukraine, it should be that there really are worse things than U.S. hegemony

### Ukraine—2NC

#### NATO support of Ukraine is good. The alternative is ruthless attacks on civilians. The Madrid Summit shows unity but more support is necessary.

Kempe 7/2 – President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council, a nonpartisans organization that analyzes solutions to global challenges. [Frederick. “Op-ed: In Putin’s evil vs good war against Ukraine, the forces of good prevailed at NATO this week.” CNBC. July 2, 2022.]

This is a story of evil versus good.

It’s the story of a despot’s ruthless attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine, versus the historic, but nonetheless insufficient, rallying of democratic states to save the country.

At midday on Monday, in the central Ukrainian industrial city of Kremenchuk, sitting serenely astride the Dnipro river, about 1,000 men, women and children wandered the Amstor shopping mall, trying to enjoy some normalcy amidst a brutal war.

Some 185 miles away and a few thousand feet overhead, Russian bombers flying over Russia’s Kursk region likely Tupolev Tu-22M3s, released at least two Kh-22 medium-range, 2,000 lb. nuclear-capable cruise missiles, developed in the 1960s to destroy aircraft carriers. An air raid siren wailed, and Ukrainians, well-practiced in the fifth month of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, scrambled for safety.

Around the same time at Schloss Elmau luxury retreat in Germany’s Bavarian Alps, the Group of Seven leaders, representing the world’s largest democracies, huddled around conference tables in an effort to add to their far-reaching sanctions on Putin and Russia. They debated options to choke the finances that fuel Putin’s war, including putting a price cap on oil sales to Russia that could reduce the $1 billion dollars the world pays Russia every day for energy.

As they struggled to make progress, one of the missiles screamed down on the shopping mall. A CCTV video captured a bucolic day, with wispy clouds adorning the otherwise blue sky, and then the massive fireball of the blast and the curling up of a gigantic black smoke plume. Shattered glass and debris flew past the camera.

A day later, as Ukrainian officials tallied the death toll — at least 20 dead and 59 wounded in a war where Putin’s military has already killed tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians — NATO leaders gathered for the summit that had brought me to Madrid. They were abuzz about the timing of Putin’s shopping mall strike, knowing that it was aimed as much at them as Ukraine.

“Talk as much as you want,” Putin seemed to be saying to them. “Sign whatever documents you like. I’ll outlast you and your spoiled societies with my war of attrition, restoring imperial Russia and sealing my place in history even as your decadent West continues its decay.”

Putin could be confident that despite historic agreements in Madrid this week and even though arms deliveries from the United States and its partners are increasing in numbers and quality, no one was yet willing to provide the heavier, longer range, precision weaponry that could have prevented the shopping mall strike and so many others, and might allow an urgently needed counteroffensive.

Even so, NATO reached a level of unity unseen in more than 30 years.

At the end of a marathon, hours-long negotiating session involving NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, and Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, the sides reached an agreement that cleared the way for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and end, in Sweden’s case, two centuries of neutrality.

The following day NATO leaders would sign off on a new Strategic Concept, highlighting Russia as their most present danger but including China for the first time as a matter of common concern. The leaders of Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand attended a NATO summit for the first time as partners and guests.

NATO’s China language signaled that the alliance understood it faced a global and interrelated challenge. Considering that 30 countries needed to sign off on the text, many of them still with China as their number one trading partner, it’s a powerful read.

“The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values,” it said. Later it continues, “The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic minerals and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in space, cyber and maritime domains.”

There was a lot of celebratory talk among allies about their increased unity and deepened purpose, including President Joe Biden’s declaration that NATO was sending an “unmistakable message” to Putin.

Among other agreements, NATO acted to shore up its eastern and southern flanks, and the U.S. Army will send a corps headquarters to Poland and more troops to the Baltics and Romania. NATO pledged to increase its high-readiness forces from 40,000 to 300,000, even as Sweden and Finland brought it significant new military weight.

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares heralded the summit as potentially as significant as Yalta (heaven help us) or the fall of the Berlin Wall.

At a NATO Public Forum that the Atlantic Council co-hosted on the margins of the summit, I asked French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna how she would rank the historic moment.

“History will tell,” she said.

No one should miss Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s message to G-7 leaders this week that they must provide him the means for a counteroffensive to push back Russian troops before winter sets in and Ukraine’s allies lose interest in the face of growing economic headwinds.

“Russia is waging two wars right now,” writes Greg Ip in the Wall Street Journal. “A hot war with Ukraine whose costs are measured in death and destruction, and a cold war with the West whose costs are measured in economic hardship and inflation.”

Putin might fold over time in the face of a more determined West and better armed Ukraine, writes Ip, but he’s wagering that he can “inflict enough short-term cost on Western consumers that political support for Ukraine will crumble.”

I leave Madrid encouraged by an increased consensus among European and Asian democracies that a Ukrainian defeat would be disastrous for Europe and world order as other despots calculate their own opportunities.

Yet I also come away discouraged that for all this week’s progress, the military support and sanctions still aren’t equal to the historic stakes.

In this contest between a determined despot and rallying democracies, the forces for good had an excellent week. If they don’t build upon it, and fast, it won’t be enough.

## War Games Good

### Ukraine—1NC

#### The war in Ukraine proves that cyber threats are real and escalating. Wargames are crucial to hone coordination and skills.

Kagubare 22 – Staff writer for The Hill specializing in technology reporting. [Ines. “NATO launches cyber wargame amid looming Russian threats.” The Hill. April 19, 2022.]

As the West braces for Russian cyberattacks amid the war in Ukraine, NATO’s Communication and Information Agency (NCI Agency) is beginning its annual Locked Shields cyber defense simulation.

The wargame, which began on Tuesday in Tallinn, Estonia, will provide technical training to cyber teams from NATO members and allies. The teams will compete against each other in a simulation aimed to help them understand how to best defend their networks and critical infrastructure against cyberattacks.

The annual exercise comes at a time when NATO members are on high alert for Russian cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure as the war in Ukraine escalates, along with diplomatic and economic sanctions on Moscow.

“Exercises like Locked Shields provide opportunities for both the offense and the defense to hone their skills,” said Michael Daniel, president and CEO at Cyber Threat Alliance.

“Given the war in Ukraine and the threat posed by Russian cyber activities, it’s important for NATO to exercise its cyber capabilities,” he added.

ADVERTISING

Daniel said that although the timing of the training and the war in Ukraine is a coincidence, the U.S. and NATO have the opportunity to incorporate the latest Russian cyber activities into their exercises so the participants can learn in real time.

James Turgal, vice president of cyber consultancy Optiv, said such exercises are meant to teach and train the participants on how to anticipate the enemy’s thought process and cyber tactics.

“It’s critical to understand where your vulnerabilities are but more importantly how you are going to respond,” Turgal said.

Since the war began, Ukraine has been the target of numerous cyberattacks that targeted its critical infrastructure and government websites. Last week, Ukrainian officials said they successfully prevented a cyberattack intended to disrupt the country’s electrical grid. Government officials said the hackers behind the attack are affiliated with the GRU, Russia’s military agency.

Earlier this month, Microsoft said it had disrupted Russian cyberattacks targeting Ukraine and organizations in the U.S. and the European Union, including media outlets and policy-related institutions. And just last month, a Google report found that Russian-backed hackers tried to penetrate the networks of NATO, U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations and the militaries of several European countries by launching phishing campaigns.

Finland, which is not a NATO member but an ally, was also hit with cyberattacks in early April that temporarily disrupted the country’s government websites, including the foreign and defense ministries. The attack occurred while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was addressing the Finnish parliament about Russia’s invasion of his country.

James Lewis, a senior vice president and director with the strategic technologies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that cyberattacks targeting Estonia in 2007 were a wake-up call for NATO, which subsequently decided to invest more in cybersecurity.

In 2007, Russian-based hackers targeted Estonia with a series of cyberattacks that hit key institutions including its foreign and defense ministries, banks and media outlets. The attack was in response to Estonia’s decision to remove a Soviet war monument from the capital city.

“Locked Shields is one result of the NATO response to 2007, and a big improvement in cyber defense,” Lewis said, adding that “practicing coordination before any attack is crucial.”

#### Cyber games test defenses and identify vulnerabilities. That’s good in the context of NATO because it increases interoperability and collective defense.

Stupp 22 -- Reporter for WSJ Pro Cybersecurity at the Wall Street Journal focusing in Cybersecurity. [Catherine. “NATO Cyber Game Tests Defenses Amid War in Ukraine.” Wall Street Journal Pro: Cybersecurity. April 18, 2022.]

NATO’s large, multiday cyber defense exercise is set to bring together technical experts from alliance countries and Ukraine nearly two months after Russia’s invasion.

The annual cyber wargames, known as the Locked Shields exercise, will start Tuesday in Tallinn, Estonia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence organizes the event, which includes fictional cyberattack exercises that test teams have to fend off under time pressure.

This year’s competition is significant for the countries participating because their cyber defense units have been on high alert since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, said Anett Numa, an international policy adviser in the cyber policy unit of Estonia’s ministry of defense.

“Like-minded countries have to work together in order to protect themselves,” Ms. Numa said. Ukrainian and Estonian experts will work on the same team in the exercise, she added.

Finland’s government websites were attacked on April 8 while the government had been discussing joining NATO. Ukrainian government websites were hacked in January while Russian troops gathered around the country’s borders. “Every single political decision can cause an attack,” Ms. Numa said, referring to current discussions in Finland about joining NATO. Estonia also experienced a large-scale cyberattack in 2007.

NATO officials have been discussing various ways the alliance could help Ukraine fend off cyberattacks, and gave the country access to its malware information-sharing platform in January. In February, U.S. deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology Anne Neuberger, traveled to Brussels and Warsaw to discuss Russian cyber threats with officials from NATO, the European Union, Poland and Baltic countries.

The NATO alliance team includes around 30 cyber defenders from different NATO bodies and member countries with specializations such as communications, digital forensics, legal expertise and recovering systems damaged from an attack, said Ian West, chief of the NATO Cyber Security Centre, which defends NATO networks and is a part of the organization’s communications and information agency.

The exercise is useful for cyber defenders from different countries to communicate with each other about attacks on the same technology products that several governments use, Mr. West said. “We all use commercial off-the-shelf systems. We’re all using the same technology and, as we know, many of these technologies come to market and unfortunately they are vulnerable,” he said.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO members to upgrade their weapons, deploy more troops east and possibly even welcome more countries to the alliance. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday details the three ways the war has strengthened the NATO alliance. Photo composite: Elizabeth Smelov

The NATO center organizing Locked Shields doesn’t make details of the simulated cyberattacks public. This year’s exercise will focus on the “interdependencies between national IT systems,” it said in a statement. The wargames don’t draw on elements of the recent cyberattacks in Ukraine because those were too recent, but the exercise generally does include scenarios that occurred in real cyberattacks, Ms. Numa said.

In 2021, more than 2,000 participants took part in a simulation that tested how a country might respond to a large-scale cyberattack on its financial system and keep critical functions running, such as payments.

The benefit of the exercises is that it sets a baseline for participants to measure their cyber defense skills against each other, said Stefan Soesanto, a senior cyber defense researcher at ETH Zurich.

The games also help experts get to know their counterparts in allied countries, he said. “They’re a huge alliance with partners behind them. If things happen, you can rely on them to assist you,” he said.

#### NATO cyber wargames are good. They help nations prepare and practice for real threats. The war in Ukraine bolsters their necessity.

McLaughlin 22 – Cybersecurity Correspondent for NPR, Reporter specializing in national security and technology. [Jenna. “A fake cyberwar held in Estonia could help nations prepare for real life threats.” NPR: All Things Considered. April 20, 2022.]

From the tiny Baltic nation of Estonia, some 30 nations are participating in mock cyberwar exercises. While the annual NATO-led exercise may be fiction, the threat emanating from Russia is very real.

ARI SHAPIRO, HOST: Just across the border from Russia, a war is taking place in a former Soviet republic. We're not talking about Ukraine here but Estonia. The war is in cyberspace, part of a NATO-led annual drill. And this year, the stakes couldn't be higher. NPR cybersecurity correspondent Jenna McLaughlin sends us this report from the Estonian capital.

JENNA MCLAUGHLIN, BYLINE: Berylia and Crimsonia are at war. The two islands disagree on politics, on who controls neighboring islands and their resources. One lashes out at the other in cyberspace.

MEJ YAKER: And as you can see on a screen there, about 20% of firewalls, for example, have been attacked out of a two-day campaign.

MCLAUGHLIN: Mej Yaker (ph) is the leader of the red team, Crimsonia, the bad guys in a cyber exercise held every year called Locked Shields. Normally, he's the head of a private cybersecurity company. Today, he's the adversary. A screen outside their war room shows the attacks they're launching. Right now, it's mostly attacks on energy companies and on the website of the Berylia institute of virology. And the red team is just getting started.

YAKER: We always play the, like in boxing, left and right hand. So we have a lot of very visible attacks. Usually, these are website defacements, and which are more of an annoyance, like drawing attention away to do the more prepositioning for the later attacks that the blue team most likely is not noticing yet.

MCLAUGHLIN: Everyone will notice when the attacks are really successful. For one thing, the giant screen imitating the power grid will turn red. Worst case, there's a box full of firecrackers for special effects.

KERRY COONGER: And yes, when it explode, it means that the system's down, basically.

MCLAUGHLIN: That's exercise director Kerry Coonger (ph).

COONGER: If the blue teams defend it, then it won't blow.

MCLAUGHLIN: The two imaginary island nations don't exist, of course. But Estonia has been running cyber drills since 2008, the year after Russia basically knocked the country offline in one of the first overt ideological cyberattacks on a nation.

COONGER: We look at how modern conflict is being conducted, and we bring it into our exercise environment.

MCLAUGHLIN: The mastermind of the exercise, Adrian Venables, says he has been working on the plot of this week's cyberwar for the last year, well before Russia invaded Ukraine.

ADRIAN VENABLES: I monitor global information warfare scenarios and real-world events, and then we incorporate them into our exercises. So they are absolutely real and are all inspired by what we see in today's world.

MCLAUGHLIN: That includes hackers targeting brand-new technology, like 5G and a communication system for international banking, plus, says Venables, a big emphasis on the power of social media.

VENABLES: As the exercise has developed, we've introduced much more social media in use, So we have Twitter emulators and we've introduced for the first time this year a TikTok-type emulator of short videos.

MCLAUGHLIN: Simulated TikTok and Twitter - or Birdle (ph) in this fictional country - might sound funny, but the tone of these games is notably serious. The real-life war in Ukraine is on everyone's minds.

KALLE LAANET: Of course, it's more serious. And if I'm looking at the faces behind the computers, they are serious, motivated and trying to do his best.

MCLAUGHLIN: That's Estonian Defense Minister Kalle Laanet. He stopped by the exercise wearing a blue flower pin on his lapel in honor of veterans month, a symbol of spring renewal. He noted the war in Ukraine is a stark reminder that Russia, just over the border, could attack any of the countries participating in the exercise at any time, something Estonia knows firsthand and is dead set on stopping.

Jenna McLaughlin, NPR News, Tallinn, Estonia.

### Cybersecurity—1NC

#### Wargames increase research and education about appropriate responses and prevent miscalculation. Critiques are based in misconceptions about cyber wargames. \*\*Schechter designs wargames, beware of bias args

Schechter 20 – faculty in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the US Naval War College, specialist in wargame design and cybersecurity research. [Benjamin. “Wargaming Cyber Security.” War on the Rocks. Sept 4, 2020.]

“Wargames can save lives” is axiomatic in the wargame community. But can they save your network? As modern conflict has become increasingly digital, cyber wargaming has emerged as an increasingly distinct and significant activity. Moreover, it’s doing double duty. In addition to its application to national defense, it’s also helping protect the economy and critical infrastructure. Wargaming is a military tool used to gain an advantage on the battlefield. However, it has also found a home beyond national security, frequently used in the private sector. Cyber security straddles the battlefield and the boardroom. As a result, it is not surprising that cyber wargaming is increasingly common across both the public and private sectors. As cyber security concerns intensify, so too does the attention given to cyber wargaming.

Designed well and used appropriately, cyber wargames are a powerful tool for cyber research and education. However, misconceptions about what cyber wargames are, their uses, and potential abuses pose challenges to the development of cyber wargaming.

What Are Cyber Wargames?

Cyber wargames are a specialized class of wargame about how human decisions relate to cyber actions and effects. They distill the complexities of cyberspace into a manageable and functional form, allowing discrete elements to be studied and taught.

They can be categorized as games with cyber and games about cyber. A wargame with cyber may have a significant cyber component, but that is not the wargame’s focus. Examples include some Department of Defense wargames that attempt to “bolt-on” cyber operations to games focused on conventional sea, land, and air operations. In these wargames, cyberspace is just one consideration among many. Wargames about cyber are primarily, if not exclusively, dedicated to some aspect of cyberspace, such as investigating how cyberspace operations impact strategic decisions. These are what we often think of when we describe “cyber wargames.” They run the gambit from cyber incident response inside individual organizations to large, interagency wargames.

Cyber wargames are still wargames about human decision-making. The nature of cyberspace fuels the misconception that cyber wargames should be highly technical as well. This error leads people to conflate several related but distinct technical activities. For example, hands-on-keyboard events like NATO’s Locked Shields cyber exercise or other capture the flag events are useful, but they are not wargames. Breach and attack simulations, penetration testing, cyber range training, and even hackathons play an important role in the cyber security ecosystem. But they shouldn’t be mistaken for wargames. There is a fine but important line between technical exercises, training, and modeling and simulation on the one hand, and wargames on the other.

Why Do Cyber Wargaming?

Cyber security is hard, but cyber wargaming can help. Cyberspace is a cross-cutting infrastructure upon which numerous other infrastructures and systems now rely. It helps drive the economy, guide weapons, deliver memes, and brings people together — or regrettably, drive them apart. Listing what networked and digital information technology has not been disrupted, transformed, or destroyed would be easier than thinking through what has. As a result, we face a sea of unknowns. What’s more, the topological vastness, technological complexity, and conceptual vagueness of this domain make cyber security difficult to study and teach. The techno-mysticism and buzzwords around cyber peace and conflict don’t help. When well done, cyber wargames can cut through this clutter, advancing education and investigation of a dynamic subject.

Like all wargames, cyber wargames can serve several different purposes — chiefly research and analysis, and education. The U.S. Naval War College’s 2017 Navy-Private Sector Critical Infrastructure Wargame, for example, was a research wargame about cyber. Along with private sector participants, it investigated the threshold at which cyber attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure become a national security incident and the role of government in such a crisis. Alternatively, the Atlantic Council’s Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge is an educational wargame series, wherein students around the world develop competing policy responses to fictional but realistic cyber incidents.

Despite ubiquitous workplace cyber awareness trainings, most people are not cyber experts. Generally, people don’t need deep expertise about cyberspace any more than they need a sophisticated knowledge about aerodynamics or epidemiology — but a basic understanding is valuable. This is especially true for leaders. Like it or not, “cybersecurity is commanders’ business.” Wargames have a long history as educational tools, and cyber wargames should be no exception. There is a marked difference between reading about the value of allies and partners in cyberspace and the wargaming experience of trying to secure public and private computer networks that, for instance, connect the United States and South Korea to Pyongyang by way of China. Furthermore, cyber wargames provide a unique vehicle for cyber experts and non-experts to work together towards resolving common problems, as they should in a real crisis. Wargaming helps leaders to understand and respond to the consequential realities about competition — between states or businesses.

What Goes into a Cyber Wargame?

For cyber wargames, like wargames in general, design decisions about what to include and exclude about the digital domain have a profound impact. It is impossible to include every aspect of cyberspace in any wargame. Nor is it desirable. Instead, good design identifies the critical elements of cyberspace that are necessary to address the wargame’s objective(s) and represents them — and little else — in the wargame. While a simple proposition, this is a difficult problem in practice, given how interdependent and complex many systems are in cyberspace. Determining what part of these complex systems to present, and how, is typically decided on case-by-case.

# K Aff Case Neg Updates

## All-Purpose

### Presumption—1NC

#### Presumption:

#### Vote neg, they haven’t met their burden of proof. [Explain!]

#### This is offense. Symbolically affirming their method despite its lack of ties to material resistance gives power a chance to adapt.

Rigakos and Law, 9—Assistant Professor of Law at Carleton University; PhD, Legal Studies, Carleton University (George and Alexandra “Risk, Realism and the Politics of Resistance,” Critical Sociology 35(1) 79-103, dml)

McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out the ‘justification for treating everyday practices as significant’ suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are not ‘duped’ by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness, subjects ‘are ironic, critical, realistic, even sophisticated’ (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday resistance in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to reaffirm the subject’s dignity. But this too causes a problem for the authors because they:

query why subversive ‘assertions of self’ should bring dignity and psychological empowerment when they produce no greater material benefits or changes in relational power … By standards of ‘realism’, … subjects given to avoidance and ‘lumping it’ may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227)

Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, everyday resistance fails to tell us any more about so-called false consciousness than was already known among earlier Left theorists; and second, that a focus on discursive resistance ignores the role of material conditions in helping to shape identity.

Indeed, absent a broader political struggle or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the authors that ‘powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and entrapment’ (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that ‘discursive practices that neither alter material conditions nor directly challenge broad structures are nevertheless’ considered by the authors he examined ‘the stuff out of which power is made and remade’. If this sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. Arguing against celebrating forms of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in part, recognizing the continued ‘real’ existence of identifiable, powerful groups (classes). In downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the label as those acts which bring about lasting social change), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing domination at the level of ‘constructs’ such as class.

Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears consideration:

[T]hese authors generally do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become more adept at domination or to dominate differently, or it might mean precluding alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power. … [I]t is necessary to do more than show that such discursive acts speak to, or engage with, power. It must also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes.

In other words, some of the acts of everyday resistance may in the real world, through their absorption into mechanisms of power, reinforce the localized domination that they supposedly oppose. The implications of this argument can be further clarified when we study the way ‘resistance’ is dealt with in a risk society.

Risk theorists already understand that every administrative system has holes which can be exploited by those who learn about them. That is what makes governmentality work: the supposed governor is in turn governed – in part through the noncompliance of subjects (Foucault, 1991a; Rose and Miller, 1992). For example, where employees demonstrate unwillingness to embrace technological changes in the workplace, management consultants can create:

a point of entry, but also a ‘problem’ that their ‘packages’ are designed to resolve. … In short, consultants readily constitute certain forms of conduct as ‘resistance to technology’ as this gives them some purchase on its reform by identifying a space in which expertise can be brought to bear in the exercise of power. Resistance consequently plays the role of continuously provoking extensions, revisions and refinements of those same practices which it confronts. (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994: 80)

This appears to be a very different kind of resistance from that contemplated by Rubin, but perhaps not so different from that of the authors whom he and McCann and March critique: those whose analysis ends at the discursive production of noncompliance. Instead, the above account is of a resistance that almost invariably helps power to work better. A conclusion in the present day that ominously foreshadows the futuristic, dystopic risk assemblage described by Bogard (1996).

Another example of the ‘resolution’ of resistance proposed above is the institution of a tool library described by Shearing (2001: 204–5). In this parable, a business deals with the issue of tool theft on the part of workers by installing a ‘lending library’ of tools instead of engaging in vigorous prosecution and jeopardizing worker morale. While the parable is meant to indicate a difference between actuarial and more traditional (moral) forms of justice, it also demonstrates how an act that may be considered ‘resistant’ is incorporated without conflict into the workplace loss-prevention scheme – an eminently preferable, ‘forward-looking’ solution within the logic of risk management. The same is possible in the case of more discursive forms of resistance. If I do not see myself as a Guinness man, for example, market researchers will do their best to adapt Guinness to the way I do see myself (Miller and Rose, 1997). The end result, of course, is that I purchase the beer. As manifested in a form of justice (Shearing and Johnston, 2005), it always consolidates, tempers emotions, cools the analysis, reconciles factions, and always relentlessly moves forward, assimilating as it grows. In this sense, therefore, Bogard’s ‘social science fiction’ actually pre-supposes and logically extends Shearing’s (2001) rather cheery and benevolent rendering of risk thinking. In this context of governmentality theory – as self-described and lauded for its political non-prescription by its own pundits – the acts or attitudes described as resistant are, in the end, absorbed by those who govern. Resistance as an oppositional force – that pushes against or has the potential to take power – is theoretically and politically neutralized. In the neutralization process, power is reproduced.

So, along with McCann and March’s observations that everyday resistance adds little to our understanding of false consciousness and that it denies the role of material factors in shaping identity, we can add Rubin’s two main criticisms of everyday resistance: it relies on an inaccurate understanding of power, and acts of resistance which supposedly emancipate actually may reinforce domination. All four of these criticisms demand the same thing: to know what is really going on, to get an adequate grasp of the social.

### AT: Assemblage Thinking

#### Assemblage thinking can’t change the political.

Savage, 18—School of Social Sciences, University of Western Australia (Glenn, “Policy assemblages and human devices: a reflection on ‘Assembling Policy’,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 39:2, 309-321, dml)

While Ureta’s emphasis here on the messy, heterogeneous and emergent nature of policy assemblages fits well with his broader conceptual framing of assemblage, these remarks left me unsatisfied and unclear as to how ‘alternative configurations’ (p. 164) or more productive ways forward might be gained as a result of policymakers accepting such a view of policy as an assemblage. For example, at the end of the day, all policymakers must do something, and whether this something is rational or optimal or not, it is difficult to imagine how a policymaker might advance a concrete proposal for reform based on the kind of summative insights above. I also disagree with Ureta’s general statement here that policymakers typically fail to be cognisant of the deterritorialising power of new policy assemblages. Whether policymakers see new policies as ‘new and shiny’ or not, my understanding from researching the motivations and modes of reasoning employed by Australian policymakers over the past decade is that such individuals are often highly aware of the existing policy assemblage they seek to deterritorialise through the development of new policies. For example, central to the recent creation of the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers (a national set of teaching standards) was an explicit desire to disrupt (deterritorialise) old and apparently ineffective teaching practices through introducing (territorialising) a new policy technology to measure and govern teaching practices across the nation. The very aim of the standards, therefore, was to ‘enact a new ordering’ by ‘vanishing other/s’ (p. 164): a process Ureta suggests ‘is seldom considered’ (p. 164) by policymakers. While I agree with Ureta that those who take such matters into consideration tend to do so through lenses of modernisation and improvement – which is hardly surprisingly, given a policy narrative based on making things worse is arguably not feasible – the notion of ‘seldom’ considering is surely an overstatement. I worry here that Ureta risks discrediting the work of policymakers by making policy processes appear overly flippant – which is, of course, out of step with his more nuanced treatment of policymakers when discussing processes of disruption earlier in the book (see previous section).

#### This is offense—failure to connect assemblage thinking to an explicitly political agenda means they reify violent power relations.

Kinkaid, 20—Doctoral Student in Geography at the University of Arizona (Eden, “Can assemblage think difference? A feminist critique of assemblage geographies,” Progress in Human Geography 2020, Vol. 44(3) 457–472, dml)

As these statements might suggest, assemblage as an ethos has placed much emphasis on transformation, flexibility, and openness, arguably at the expense of theorizing how socio-spatial orders endure and reproduce relations of symbolic-material inequality. Despite some qualifications (Mu¨ller, 2015: 36), themes of flux, transformation, and possibility remain central to the ethos of ‘thinking assemblage’ (Wachsmuth et al., 2011; Tonkiss, 2011: 584). As Brenner et al. observe, this possibility is ‘ontologically presupposed rather than being understood as historically specific or immanent to the sociomaterial relations under investigation’ (2011: 235), making it difficult to identify possible constraints or trajectories for concrete change. Further, this ‘overgeneralized insistence on the openness, contingency, malleability and indeterminacy of sociospatial forms prior to or independent of concrete, contextually embedded and informed investigation’ (Wachsmuth et al., 2011: 742) can recapitulate the logics of racial thinking (Schuller, 2017) and neoliberalism (Puar, 2017) in failing to account for which bodies are invested with fluidity and mobility, what forms of privilege enable this ‘openness to transformation’, and what causes other relations to persist and resist transformation.

Along similar lines, Brenner et al. worry about how questions of political agency are eclipsed by conceptions of ontological agency (2011: 236), while Puar questions the value ‘of investing in notions of vibrant matter without concomitant attention to the material conditions of the production of that matter, not to mention deracinated and desexualized notions of vibrancy and agency’ (2017: 26). Saldanha echoes these concerns:

When Anderson et al. observe race like any assemblage is fundamentally provisional by virtue of its heterogeneous composition, this is a first step, but staying with provisionality and fluidity is politically no different than what commercial multiculturalism promotes. The next step is to show how this is exactly what makes racial differences persist. (Saldanha, 2012: 196)

Without this kind of reflection, celebrations of ontological fluidity can rearticulate dominant orders; as Saldanha remarks: ‘ultimately cosmopolitanism without critique and intervention remains complacent with its own comfortably mobile position’ (2006: 22).

Assemblage thinking can begin to correct this imbalance by asking more questions about how social difference is (re)produced and how relations of inequality endure and resist transformation. Accounts of change must also consider how ‘transformations’ in systems often reproduce, recode, and further entrench dominant symbolic relations. We might then be led to a different set of questions.

There are resources within geography to pose these sorts of questions of assemblage geographies. McGuirk et al. advocate for an

explicitly strategic and politicised assemblage thinking that might inform strategic forms of assembling aimed to counter attempts to govern for particular interests and arrangements of power that prevent movement towards more ‘emancipatory assemblages’. (2016: 138)

Saldanha (2006) and Swanton (2010) provide some conceptualizations for working against overly fluid accounts of socio-spatial orders, describing how bodies are affected by different kinds of ‘stickiness’ and ‘viscosity’ in racialized ways:

Neither perfectly fluid nor solid, the viscous invokes surface tension and resistance to perturbation and mixing ... There are local and temporary thickenings of interacting bodies, which then collectively become sticky, capable of capturing more bodies like them. (Saldanha, 2006: 18)

Saldanha (2012) uses this concept to argue that assemblages racialize and sort bodies, whereas Swanton (2010) describes how perceptions of criminality ‘stick to’ Asian bodies in British post-industrial mill towns. Both provide important accounts of how bodies are differentially (de)mobilized and (in)capacitated by regimes of symbolic-material value.

These interventions open up larger questions for assemblage thinking that would be best addressed through more substantive engagements with ethical and political questions: ‘[r]ather than ending with questions ethical and political, perhaps we should start with them’ (Saldanha, 2012: 197). To examine the potential for assemblages to obscure or otherwise fail to dismantle racializing logics and projects, assemblage thinking must develop its vaguely defined ‘ethos’ toward a feminist ethics. This entails concrete commitments to engaging questions of positionality, reflexivity, and other epistemological problems that arise in assemblage thinking.

Positionality refers to a basic ethical requirement that we attend to how the subject positions we inhabit inform the knowledge we produce (England, 1994; Haraway, 1988; Nagar and Geiger, 2007; Rose, 1997). Positionality has emerged as an ethical principle from various strands of feminist epistemology, including standpoint theory (Collins, 1986; Harding, 2004). These concepts describe how a subject encounters and experiences the effects of a given set of relations depending on their ‘angle of vision’ (Murray Li, 2007: 265) and their position within material, social, and representational space, necessitating various ‘viewpoints’ to understand a given assemblage (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1992). Here, positionality does not refer to a view from a static or fixed ‘identity position’, or one that can be known in advance. Instead, it suggests the need for an accounting of how different bodies inhabit and navigate social systems, and how this informs our perceptions and conceptions of dominant socio-temporal and symbolic orders. This kind of accounting is largely missing from assemblage geographies; in so far as ‘assemblage analysts deny that their work entails a process of conceptual abstraction, most are disinclined to engage in a reflexive analysis of its sociohistorical conditions of possibility’ (Wachsmuth et al., 2011: 748), including questions of their own positionality and subjectivity. To the extent that work occurring in the ontological turn remains epistemologically locationless and unmarked (Puar, 2017: 25), positionality presents a key feminist intervention into this work.

When put into conversation with assemblage thinking, positionality becomes challenged and problematized in new ways that could prove productive for this longstanding feminist ethical principle (see Puar’s [2007: 213] discussion). If we accept that the differential effects of assemblages are racialized and racializing, we must consider that from privileged subject positions, particular elements and power relations of an assemblage are obscured from view. If we are to describe and analyze the workings of assemblages without rearticulating privileged subject positions, then we must account for how ‘codes shift for different bodies’ (Chen, 2012: 40) and how particular material, social, and symbolic arrangements support some bodies and obstruct others (Ahmed, 2006; Puar, 2017). An awareness of our positionality as intellectuals and social actors is indispensable in developing such understandings.

Like positionality, reflexivity is a feminist ethical principle through which we can more fully account for the political implications of the knowledge we produce and the power relations within which we do so (England, 1994; Rose, 1997). Reflexivity entails a critical accounting of one’s location and a commitment to interrogating one’s epistemological limitations and potential complicity in relations of dominance. Drawing specifically on feminist transnational praxis, Rankin argues that this sense of ‘critical reflexivity’ is crucial if assemblage thinking is to link up to any selfconsciously political practice (Rankin, 2011: 567). The development of such a critical capacity need not rely on the development of more philosophical lexicons and problematics to address it. It rather depends, as Saldanha describes, upon the development of a sense of responsibility, a mode of ethical relation to others (2006: 21).

Finally, these considerations of positionality and reflexivity in assemblage geographies point to a more general oversight in assemblage thinking: epistemology. While one might argue that assemblage thinking is concerned with ‘ontology’ and not ‘epistemology’, epistemological problems persist in its formulation. While the distinction between ontology and epistemology is useful for reminding us that there is a world outside of our descriptions of it, the distinction becomes counterproductive when it is taken to mean that in ‘doing ontology’ we can somehow produce accounts of that world that do not rely on our own limited interpretations and perspectives. This ‘naïve objectivism entails the view that the facticity of social life can be described “on its own terms”, without recourse to interpretation or theory’ (Wachsmuth et al., 2011: 744), invisibilizing epistemological locations and choices while running the risk of rearticulating ontological premises that are less than emancipatory. ‘Doing ontology’ without reflexive accounts of one’s epistemological position obscures the production of a powerladen reality and, in this way, ‘power dissimulates as ontology’ (Butler, 2004: 215).

Indeed, the history of philosophy is rife with evidence of the danger of separating ontology and epistemology (and questions of power). Chen reminds us how the differential ascription of valuation to particular bodies as an ontological principle and as the product of a particular epistemological position has long structured philosophical discourse:

Animate hierarchies have settled into their current life as a palimpsest of a long journey through Aristotelian categorizations, Christian great chains of being, Linnaean typologies, biopolitical governances, capitalisms, and historical imperialisms; these are the traces and marks of privileged views upon the world. (2012: 233)

We cannot, then, separate this production and maintenance of ontological difference in philosophy from the production of social difference through the taxonomics of race, gender, and sexuality; these metaphysical principles infuse and motivate scientific paradigms (Schuller, 2017), dominant political philosophies (Weheliye, 2008; Povinelli, 2016) and everyday social practice.

In addressing these concerns of epistemology, and attendant ethical problems, assemblage geographies have much potential for theoretical and methodological development. However, advocates of assemblage must connect these philosophical premises to clear normative and political commitments and agendas if this philosophical turn is to live up to its oft celebrated potentials (Wachsmuth et al., 2011: 743; Russell et al., 2011). In short, if we are not going to intellectually start from ‘abstractions’ like race, gender, and sexuality, we ought to at least begin from a politically engaged ethical position that is anti-racist, anti-sexist, etc. It may take such ethical commitments to ensure that assemblage thinking remains critical and sensitized to matters of social difference.

### AT: Capitalism Impacts

#### There’s no feasibly solvent alternative to capitalism.

Beardsworth, 10—Head of the School of Politics and International Studies and Professor of International Politics at the University of Leeds (Richard, “Technology and Politics: A Response to Bernard Stiegler,” Cultural Politics (2010) 6 (2): 181–199, dml)

Now, for Stiegler, the question of technics is a Greek question because the relation between the human and the technical is explicitly posed by the Greeks, and any thinking on technology necessarily works within this Greek framework.5 Whatever one makes of this thesis technologically speaking, the question of the modern and contemporary autonomy of the economic from the social whole is nevertheless not Greek. With the end of the Cold War, with increasing trans-border activity of capital, goods, and, to a much lesser extent, labor, capital comes to determine the terms in which the allocation of scarce resources is made. Capital becomes, that is, general, and there is for the foreseeable future no alternative to it.6 All human beings live within the system of capital, whatever the particular node they live on, or conjunction they make with it. This system is highly unstable and dissymmetrical with immense imbalances in equality, natural resource distribution, financial assets, and terms of trade. With no alternative to capital, a revolutionary politics is no longer tenable. The ethical question driving political innovation has, consequently, to be worked out in terms of universally coordinated, but locally determined equilibriums between growth, sustainability, and equity. Given economic interdependence and the necessity of large transfers of technology and wealth from the developed world to the developing world in the context of climate change, effective financial regulation, economic coordination, and staggered development present the right strategies to tame the excesses of neoliberal global capitalism. Whether these strategies are feasible or not is at present an open question given recent government failure to regulate risk-taking and the evident dilemma, for developing countries, between the need for curtailed energy use, on the one hand, and industrialization and exit from poverty, on the other.

Now, whatever our answers to these large questions, the political question today—‘who are we?’—can only be appraised if the political economy of a globalized world becomes the direct object of critical attention. Only by foregrounding this object and its dilemmas will one have any chance of critical purchase on the political challenges ahead. In this context, Stiegler's foregrounding of technology to promote a new critique of political economy is decisive in purpose and tone, important in detail, but misplaced in general intent. Stiegler is right to stress again the pertinence of the economy for critical thought after “the supposed economism of Marxism” (2009: 29). His technologically trained focus on the alienated consumer is important within the cognitive dimension of contemporary capitalism and debt-led growth. But, if he is concerned to show, as a philosopher, the general lines of a re-invented critical political economy, his object and attention need to be much larger than his “Greek” framework affords. Since there is no systemic alternative to capitalism at this moment in history, the question of political economy is one of whether effective regulation of capitalism is possible or not for the world as a whole.

In this regard, I fear that Stiegler's rhetorical logic of excess testifies to a straightforward shift of Marxist terminology (from producer to consumer) rather than a reinvention of Marxism's object (political economy). I say this despite the deep interest in understanding cognitive capitalism and consumerism through Stiegler's categories. To take a few examples from only the last pages of Pour une nouvelle critique de l'économie politique: we are witnessing the “extreme disenchantment of the world” (2009: 88), a “generalized proletariat [of consumption]” (89), the “disappearance of the middle classes” (89), the “destruction” of social association (87), and “lawless and faithless” elites of capitalism (88). This logic of excess ignores the need today to make small distinctions, under the canopy of political regulation, within the world as a whole. The art of politics today is the prudential art of making critical distinctions within an economy of the same. “Critical philosophy” may wish to eschew such distinctions, but it does so at its practical peril when there is no alternative to capitalism, and when, just as importantly, the mid-term horizon is global coordination of a world economy under circumstances of economic imbalance, energy-crisis, and poverty.

The political questions today are therefore: “what kind of regulation of capitalism is ethically and empirically appropriate?”; “at what level is it appropriate?”; and “what instance should and can decide?”. These are vast and difficult questions for philosophy, political science, and economics: they will occupy minds and bodies for a long time to come. It is my belief that, within these questions and their distinctions, an engaged philosophy (which Stiegler rightly advocates) has an important role to play. A generalized technological reading of Marx creates in this context important cultural work; but it does not give itself the terms of a contemporary critique of political economy.

I end this section with one example of what kinds of matter need to be “adopted,” and how. There has been much talk recently of the regulation of financial offshore centers. Such talk, when coming from elite bodies in power, can serve as a smoke-screen to evade the major issue of imbalances within the world economy as a whole (particularly the northwestern problem of public and private debt). Worldwide coordinated investment in the real economy remains in this context an outstanding question. That said, the political regulation of these tax havens forms part of the ongoing struggle against international and national neoliberal practices, since it was financial offshore centers, starting with the Eurodollar markets, which helped promote capital mobility at the end of the 1970s.7 It is this capital mobility that ended the “social democratic contract” between capital and labor at the level of the nation-state and in the framework of the Bretton Woods international system of fixed exchange rates. It consequently paved the way for “disembedded” global capitalism, widespread debt-led growth, and, under worldwide conditions of financial contagion, massive social disorientation.8 The financial and economic crises of 2007–09 resulted from “de-regulation” of domestic and global assets (from mortgages to complex financial tools like swaps and derivatives). This de-regulation enabled financial capital accumulation from the 1970s onwards. It is now generally accepted that 60 percent of profits in the corporate sector have been finance-based in the last ten years (Brenner 2006: 293). To regulate offshore accounts in this context is therefore ideologically and structurally crucial for the political “adoption” of contemporary capitalism. For, owners of these accounts have fed the recent spiral of risk-taking (a half of global capital is estimated to lie in such accounts!), but they have continued to refuse the social costs of (their) national public life. The object of concern for critical political economy is consequently less the credit-card-consumer (and profits based on the capitalization of his or her external memory supports) than effective regulation of their economic causes.

That said, how, in today's world economy, can one regulate these capital accounts? This is the urgent political question. To stop the businesses of nations moving large amounts of their capital offshore to avoid domestic taxation suggests either the necessity of global taxation or renewed domestic regulation of capital outflow (as in the 1960s and 1970s in “embedded” liberal states). The political cosmopolitan response—global regulations of all international capital flows—is certainly the best response theoretically since capital competition thrives on exceptions to legal norms. It is however institutionally impractical given the weak status of international rule. Nation-state fiscal policy is practical since it can block capital displacement to more competitive national markets. National monetary policy requires, however, clear leadership, democratic example, and effective bureaucratic surveillance (and in the case of the EU it is already not possible given the monetary sovereignty of the European Central Bank). And so forth. My point is this.

These kinds of dilemmas immediately face any progressive thinking of political economy today: they require careful ethical and empirical exposition before one can make general critical claims. The regulation of financial offshore centers is actually one of the more simple problems of global cooperation to solve, although its structural effects will be deep concerning finance-led growth. How much more conceptual and empirical thinking is needed to work out market and government motivation for effective climate change mitigation; or to work out long-term the global imbalance between Chinese savings and US debt … Regarding these political dilemmas concerning effective regulation of global capital flows, I remain unconvinced that Stiegler's philosophico-technical reading of the economy can (1) properly delimit the economic problems that need to be adopted; and (2) tease out the differences of approach required to adopt contemporary economic conditions effectively. Under the general conditions of a capitalist world economy, however, these differences constitute the very condition of more local social re-motivation (Stiegler's very concern).

### AT: Decentralized Networks

#### Their method devolves into alt-right fetishism of anonymous networks, free speech, and intellectual property that collapses on itself and accelerates inequality.

Baldwin, 18—London Metropolitan University (Jon, “In digital we trust: Bitcoin discourse, digital currencies, and decentralized network fetishism,” Palgrave Communications 4, Article number: 14 (2018), dml)

Networks are often fetishised, presented and assumed to be decentred and democratic because they supposedly exist without central command. This is supposed to facilitate non-hegemonic, noncoercive, individualistic freedom of movement, while encouraging some kind of distributed representation and engagement. To this utopian vision we have become increasingly suspicious: “Don’t we know now that networks also produce stoppages, closures, dark spots, and their own particular forms of control and governance?” (Aranda et al., 2015, p 7) Further possible problems, and the poverty, of decentred networks are outlined by Berry (2008). A new form of social organisation is developing in relation to the network and networks are celebrated as being “decentred, limitless and often, it is claimed, non-hierarchical and structureless forms or fluid organizations” (Berry, 2008, p 365). It follows that a distinction is made between two apparently antagonistic economic, social and technological forms: “industrial hierarchical mass production vs. peer-produced decentralized network production” (Berry, 2008, p 371). In this scheme a new priority is given to “ownership of the immaterial—software, algorithms, patents and copyright—that will determine the shape of the new age” (Berry, 2008, p 370). It is here, however, that Berry argues that we see the emergence of a problematic binary—material/immaterial—and that even “something as ephemeral as software has a concrete materiality which problematizes this distinction” (Berry, 2008, p 370). It is the case that the amount of power consumed by blockchain operations is so large that it has been suggested that bitcoin itself is “unsustainable” (Malmo in Golumbia, 2016, p 43). The materiality of the network, and the exploitative relations inherent in such materiality, are a blind-spot in network fetishism.

Trouble continues when we forget that the network models and diagrams we use are generative of a real yet to come,Footnote 21 when we think that the world conforms to our digital models and algorithms Footnote 22, or when, “we attempt to remake the world in terms of our network theories” (Berry, 2008, p 365). These models are simplifications of the world: “The network is not ontological it is analytical, and as such it is restricted in how much it can tell us and how useful it can be” (Berry, 2008, p 365). The problem is that “the existence of networks invites us to think in a manner that is appropriate to networks” (Berry, 2008, p 366). Networks privilege the connected, as the unconnected—by definition—are not within the network. They distort a reading of reality that highlights synchronic dispersal over diachronic unfolding. In this sense, networks “abolish history and shift our focus to the event, the happening or the now” (Berry, 2008, p 366). The idea of the decentred network remains only “a spatial diagram which provides topological information about the nodes that are connected with it” (Berry, 2008, p 371). Crucially, “it flattens reality and removes the distinctions between different nodes” (Berry, 2008, p 371). This means that in a network “an individual programmer and a multinational corporation become equal as connected nodes in the network” (Berry, 2008, p 371). What looks equal, democratic, and decentred in the diagram of the network, with simple links and lines of connectivity between indistinguishable nodes, conceals a massive distortion of power and power relations. Here we might make a distinction between the network and the node in the way that Bruno Latour, in philosophical discussion with Peter Sloterdijk, makes a distinction between the network and the sphere.Footnote 23Unlike networks, “spheres are not anemic, not just points and links, but complex ecosystems” (Latour, 2015, p 41). Likewise, nodes must be considered as complex ecosystems behind the apparent simplicity of points, links, and lines of diagrammatic representation. Decentralized network fetishism conceals relations and systems of domination, exploitation, and alienation. This is arguably what has happened with bitcoin. There is an illusion of circumventing economic power with decentralised nodes but what has emerged upon closer scrutiny is the corporate occupation of cyberspace in powerful and deep nodes.

Another bitcoin obituary

In its first few years, bitcoin was a digital cottage industry run by hobbyists and “the technology was still essentially just a volunteer project that relied on the goodwill of users” (Popper, 2015, p 67). Bitcoin could be mined by relatively fast home computers acting as relatively equal nodes in a decentralised network. Today, however, most successful mining is done by pools of dedicated high-power systems in a sign of increasing nodal power and capital colonisation of the internet. It is this nodal power that network fetishism is blind to. As Golumbia suggests, this fact alone “has raised significant questions about Bitcoins claim to ‘democratise’ or ‘decentralise’ currency operations” (Golumbia, 2016, p 43). This also makes the Bitcoin system exposed to the '51 percent problem’: if one node or cluster of nodes owns more than 51 percent of the mining operations it could, at least theoretically, “change the rules of Bitcoin at any time” (Golumbia, 2016, p 43). There are also debatesFootnote 24around bitcoin “forks”—in open source software development terms, a possible shift to a new version. These problems indicate that bitcoin is not as decentralised as it imagines: “Bitcoin’s own governance structures displayed exactly the autocracy, infighting, bad faith, and centralisation that the blockchain is often said to have magically dissolved” (Golumbia, 2016, p 101) In essence, the promise of decentralisation has not been kept and network fetishism has concealed the fact that certain nodes function as centralised power bases.

Has bitcoin succeeded, or hinted at potential, in becoming digital money? At a most basic level, moneyFootnote 25is typically held by economists to have three prime functions: it serves as an accounting unit, it has exchange-value (it serves as a medium of exchange), and it has a use-value (it can store wealth). Bitcoin is arguably so well-known because of its volatility—its price has fluctuated wildly, and it is open to derivation and speculation.Footnote 26There is, at present, no stability, which makes it hard to consider bitcoin a secure store of value in the way that modulated gold might store value, or even the way that fiat money (regulated by the state), which bitcoin was promoted to replace, might store wealth. Bitcoin’s very lack of regulation, and openness to the whim of the market—again, something that was championed—ensures a volatility that prevents the stability necessary to store wealth or, indeed, act as a unit of account. The fact that bitcoin largely “floats free of any anchor to ordinary valuing processes” (Golumbia, 2016, p 71). means that it cannot fully function as a stable accounting unit.Footnote 27In 2014 Goldman-Sachs announced that “Our best definition would be that it is currently a speculative financial asset that can be used as a medium of exchange”Footnote 28Most accounts of Bitcoin, such as Brian Kelly’s The Bitcoin Big Bang, ignore the other functions of money and reduce money to currency only. Early on, the pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin made it the currency of choice for illegal activity on Silk Road, a dark web vending site, using the anonymity software Tor. This may well be its legacy: for a short time facilitating illegal activity and the dissemination of drugs, weapons, and dubious pornography. It is as a speculative financial asset that the volatility of bitcoin can be understood. Like any Ponzi scheme, the investment must be constantly talked-up, the bubble inflated, and this allows understanding of much of the hyperbole of bitcoin discourse.

There has been hope in some quarters that bitcoin as digital money, peer-to-peer, with encryption, would be taken up and replace, or compete, with the likes of PayPal. However, this has not been the case. On the horizon for bitcoin is the attempt by the likes of Apple, Google, and Facebook to become payment platforms. They will, like bitcoin, collect a small fee for transactions, but they will also, crucially unlike bitcoin, obtain the data that goes along with the transaction. Data is the new “kind of raw material” (Srnicek, 2017, p 38) of the digital economy that is being extracted and exploited. The current strong position these house-hold name platforms have, as well as the business model of extracting more data, will see one or more of them attract enough investment and venture capital to fund a “growth before profits” model (Srnicek, 2017, p 20). This will raise use and activity, and eventually begin to monopolise the actions and transactions of the digital economy. In this proposed scenario, and with competition from other digital monies such as Ethereum, Dogecoin, and Litecoin—which purport to improve upon bitcoin’s inefficiencies—bitcoin is likely to be unable to compete. There may well be a bursting of the bitcoin bubble, or long drawn out deflation, and all that will be remembered is likely to be an early innovative experiment in cryptocurrency.

The bitcoin obituary is almost a genre of its own.Footnote 29In response to the failure of bitcoin, at least in terms of its own original ambition, new Silicon Valley advocates began arguing in 2014 that the significant technological development was not, as Nakamoto initially intended, a network that allowed participants to make anonymous transactions outside the reach of the government and banking system, but rather digital cryptology and distributed ledger technologies. It is ironic that centralised governments and banks are now taking opportunity of this digital technology to increase their control and power in a way that goes against the ethos of early bitcoin ideology. In 2016, the UK government’s chief scientific adviser issued a report which said that distributed ledger technologies “have the potential to help governments to collect taxes, deliver benefits, issue passports, record land registries, assure the supply chain of goods and generally ensure the integrity of government records and services” (Lanchester, 2016, p 11). It is thought that the blockchain can be adapted to do this with lower friction, lower cost, and higher security than any existing system. The use of the blockchain, albeit not in its original bitcoin form, has naturally attracted the attention of the banks. Financial institutions, whose centralisation bitcoin was originally intended to subvert, are going to use this new technology to maintain their power and keep themselves right where they are: “in the middle of every possible transaction network, extracting all the rent they can” (Lanchester, 2016, p 12). Far from weakening government, the banks, and transforming business, the irony and cautionary tale of bitcoin is that these enterprises are likely to be empowered by the digital technology that bitcoin inaugurated. In terms of wider social implications, DuPont has argued that cryptography is a new weapon in the Deleuzian control society: “controlling economics through the ordering application of Bitcoin” (DuPont, 2014). The digital economy has not seen the end of ownership and power but rather the concentration of property and power. In the future, one might have to modify Marx and Engels’ famous slogan somewhat: “Decentred digital networkers of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your blockchains!”

Conclusion, bitcoin, the commons, and collectivization

Can bitcoin and its technology have a more progressive future? One such claim is made In The Real World of the Decentralized Autonomous Society, where Garrod (2016) investigates the notion, celebrated by its enthusiasts, that bitcoin represents the coming of a decentralized autonomous society in which humans are free from centralised forms of power and control. Garrod is rightly critical of certain elements of this notion insofar as “freedom” and autonomy here is conceived of as only “freedom” and autonomy from the supposed tyranny of the state, not ‘freedom’ from, for instance, the tyranny of the market. Bitcoin discourse, “neglects the power that capital holds over us” (Garrod, 2016, p 62) Despite this criticism Garrod proposes that something can be saved from the bitcoin experiment in digital decentralization and utilised on the Left or for the Commons. Based on the model of bitcoin technology, it may be “possible to create distributed collaborative organizations or ‘open co-operativism’ ” (Garrod, 2016, p 73). This could be used to help smaller, regional areas protect their own commons—whether they be in the form of healthcare, education, water, air, Internet, knowledge, and so on. In Garrod’s scenario, there is the possibility of harnessing reactionary technology for progressive aims, that is, taking bitcoin and its technology outside of its neoliberal emergence and context to forward the aims of the Left and serve the Commons.Footnote 30With appropriate caution, Garrod claims that bitcoin can “provide the basis for progressive human development” (Garrod, 2016, p 74).

It is agreeable that one must challenge oppressive structures and technological practices, but what if one is employing the technology and tools of the oppressor, Footnote 31and that these tools transform and distort the holder in their application?Footnote 32 Has a technology that was developed to serve the interests of the political right ever been successfully recuperated by the left? Footnote 33 At least these are concerns worth raising. The discourse around utilization of digital cryptology appears to be dominated by issues surrounding the protection of wealth and security of private property—is this compatible with the aims of the Left and the Commons? Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the progressive possibilities of bitcoin technology is that bitcoin digital decentralisation is a thoroughly ideological and neoliberal notion, both in terms of its infrastructure and as a product of technology. As Golumbia has it, “political values are very literally coded into the [bitcoin] software itself” (Golumbia, 2016, p 102). If there is to be a progressive employment of this digital technology, then this code and software will need much reconsideration.

Ultimately it may only be the humanization Footnote 34 and collectivization of the Internet that sees true progressive values being met. “Perhaps today we must collectivise the platforms,” suggests Srnicek (2017, p 127) and Golumbia argues that what is required to combat power “is not more wars between algorithmic platforms and individuals who see themselves as above politics, but a reassertion of the political power that the blockchain is specifically constructed to dismantle” (Golumbia, 2016, p 102). A reaffirmation and resurgence of organised assembly, public controlled and collective power to govern and regulate certain elements of the digital economy could lead to the breaking up of digital monopolies, regulate business practices, ban exploitative “lean platform” employment conditions, impose new privacy controls, coordinate action on tax avoidance, liberate us from the tyranny of markets, and begin to place capital and power into public hands. Long-term egalitarian goals and progressive political objectives can come from the collective, rather than a designated centralised figurehead. All the while monitoring and mitigating the worst excesses of State power, and being independent of the “surveillance state apparatus” (Srnicek, 2017, p 127). This is ambitious of course, but would see the true progressive potential of the Internet finally in sight.

### AT: Liberalism Ks

#### Institutional cooperation solves violence.

Flockhart 20 (Trine Flockhart, Professor of International Relations at University of Southern Denmark, ‘The Liberal International Order and Peaceful Change: Spillover and the Importance of Values, Visions, and Passions”, December 23rd 2020, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/liberal-international-order-and-peaceful-change-spillover-and-the-importance-of-values-visions-and-passions/8C3B9D0407E6CFEE619FB1487C31FA6B#access-block>, WC-NAS)

The fundamental and enduring question in the academic discipline of international relations (IR) has always been how to change the world into a better and more peaceful place—peacefully. However, although the discipline has agreed that peaceful change is desirable, there has been less agreement on what peaceful change is and how to achieve it. The debate has centered on whether peaceful change should be understood as simply a change in the status quo without resorting to war, or rather as a change that produces a specific outcome, such as justice and well-being, and that it is achieved through persuasion without the threat of violence and anchored in the rule of law. During most of the history of IR, realists have dominated the discipline and focused on the former understanding, while liberal theorists, and later constructivists, have emphasized the latter. Yet, despite the disciplinary dominance of realism, in practical governance, the idea of peaceful change has long been closely associated with a perspective rooted in the idea of Immanuel Kant that free trade, democracy, and cooperation through international institutions is the best way to bring about peaceful change. This worldview was later articulated by Woodrow Wilson as “liberal internationalism” and it has guided the gradual institutionalization of international society culminating with the establishment of the liberal international order after the Second World War. For the purposes of this essay, I understand peaceful change to be change that is undertaken not only without the use of violence and coercion but also with the agreement and acceptance of those affected by it. I focus on the role of institutions operating as agents of peaceful change by way of making policy decisions that aim to foster cooperative rather than conflictual relationships. I do so from a perspective that emphasizes the importance of a wide spectrum of human emotions to better understand the less quantifiable but nevertheless important conditions for being able to sustain initiatives for peaceful change. The essay sheds light on the often overlooked psychological and emotional hurdles standing in the way of agents’ abilities to undertake and sustain action designed to lead to peaceful change. To do so, I return to the pioneering work of Ernst Haas and his important concept of “spillover,” which suggests that once a decision has been made to pursue an initiative designed to achieve peaceful change, unintended consequences and unforeseen problems often compel agents to undertake further steps within and beyond the initial policy area to achieve their set goals. Although the influence of Haas’s work faltered once it became clear that spillover was far from a universal response to unintended consequences and unforeseen problems, his work is a rare early example of theoretical IR thinking that paid attention to identity, emotions, and values as motivations for peaceful change. However, while acknowledging that Haas’s work was critically important, this essay will also argue that he was wrong to focus on negative emotions rather than positive ones to understand why peaceful change processes often cannot be sustained. To both illustrate the problems with Haas’s version of spillover and highlight the potential the theory still holds, I turn to the crisis of the liberal international order as an example of a forum where the agency to undertake peaceful change seems to be faltering. According to Haas, the current situation of crisis, frustration, and disappointment is precisely what he would argue would fuel the spillover process and therefore should enhance the process toward peaceful change. Yet, rather than fueling the spillover process, the current crisis appears to be having a negative impact on the motivation of those working on behalf of the liberal order. This seems to have left the liberal international order and its institutions unable or unwilling to start and sustain initiatives that could contribute to peaceful change.

### AT: Nation-State Paradigm Ks

#### Nationalism causally pacifies the world and prevents imperial interventions.

Metselaar, 18—Master’s candidate in International Cooperation, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University (Sebastiaan Laurens, “A study on how modern nationalism can prevent imperialism from re-emerging,” <http://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/141693/1/000000151525.pdf>, dml)

The nation currently has its limitations. To break down this limitation aspect, we can take any nation for our example as all of them, even the ones encompassing millions or even over a billion people has to deal with finite or to some extend elastic boundaries. Beyond these boundaries lie other nations. These boundaries represent the well-developed understanding in international relations on a nation’s legal property rights. These inviolable rights were absent prior to the establishment of the nation and were only to be acknowledged worldwide by the international community starting from the decolonization period, marking modern nationalism. Now that basically all land is claimed by a nation and that globalization has led to a world market where goods, services, and (human) resources can be exchanged with ease, it has drastically reduced the attractiveness of pull factors. Plus, no nation imagines itself as one with mankind, not a single nationalist dreams of a day where all human beings will join their nation as for say Christians dream of a wholly Christian planet.

Before the French Revolution started, both push and pull factors were present that would attract a tribe, kingdom, or empire to conquer territory without being held accountable for their actions. The development of the nation and the industrialization, created a larger gap between the developed areas and undeveloped areas (i.e. Europe and basically the rest of the world). Imperialism was a logical consequence as a distinction between nations, those who have nationalism, and non-nations, areas that do not have nationalism, became clear. No nationalism meant that no nation had claimed property rights over a certain territory. Thus, prior to the decolonization period and the development of the international system, there were no resisting forces that strong ever in the history of humankind that could oppose imperialism. Important for the understanding of these distinctions, it has to be emphasized that the world is divided per area and that each area was in a different stage of development. When in Europe the nations started to form, in other parts of the world the areas would be controlled by tribes, kingdoms, or empires. In the past, the West became more advanced than we could have seen for example in Asia in the 18th century. Even in present day the West takes the lead in technological, military, and economic development, despite Asia is catching up in some cases or even went beyond the level of certain Western developments. Africa however is still lacking behind and there will most probably be never a point in time where all areas in the world reach the same level of development.

If indeed the process of nation building follows similar paths as it did in Europe, then Africa could be in the phase of enlightenment as efforts are being made to modernize and to search for a solid national identity. As mentioned earlier, most developing countries are weak states. The Hutu’s and Tutsi’s were enforced to live within borders they have not chosen themselves but were enforced with by the end of the colonial period. On a world map, the boundaries of the nations are clear, but it does not show the nationalness of the citizens within those boundaries. It is a painful inheritance of the colonial era. By for example establishing a common language and modernizing education like the Europeans did during the transition from dynasticism to nationalism and imperialism, it will help to strengthen the imagined community that is the nation, further decreasing the pull factors.

Obvious mistakes have been made throughout the decolonization period that are still having disastrous consequences today. Also nations like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon had their borders drawn in the sand by England and France without them taking into account how local history, religion, geography, and economy had influenced the citizens. The people would not identify themselves with one another, they were descendants from the Abbasid Caliphate or the Babylonian or Ottoman Empire, all who had different cultures. Nonetheless, these nations were (forcefully or without much effort) created, and the problems for creating them created the many civil wars we see in the Middle East today. Nevertheless, these newly established nations had claimed full sovereignty and independence over their distinct territory, that any attempt of conquering would be illegal and costly as witnessed with IS and the Kurds, even here a re-emergence of imperialism will be prevented.

The imagined community feature was most important for the understanding of the roots of nationalism as it contains the element of belonging to something bigger than the individual. Explaining that it is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community (Anderson 2006). It is the limitation and sovereignty aspect of nationalism that marked these new nations’ their property rights (disappearing of pull factors).

Though we do live in the most peaceful era of our time, we tend to forget how much more violent the world has used to be. These days, more people die of car crashes than being killed by wars or terrorism. We commemorate the wars and celebrate our independence, to continue the realization of what happened and to what extend we are capable of committing inhumane crimes. Whether internal state conflicts have been decreased since the end of World War II is debatable, but that clashes between states have decreased is undeniable. The succession of the League of Nations by the United Nations, provides one of the most powerful resistance to pull factors in keeping nations in check with regards to imperial ambitions. Obviously there were tensions during for example the Cold War and conflicts did break out between states, but in light of the historic time frame, it has never been this peaceful as it is today. No Roman or Ottoman empire can start a conquest, in fact, ever since the end of the last great war no country recognized by the United Nations has been conquered or wiped off the map. Even the superpowers today who have all the means for starting their imperial conquest have to take into account that such conquest are too costly to undertake (e.g. Russia and Crimea, China and Tibet). And despite that conflicts are still present; the United Nations does not only have the tools to interfere military wise (i.e. peacekeeping operations), but also the capabilities to sanction perpetrators. The United Nations might be far from perfect as power struggles within the system exist, causing nations among each other to differentiate in meaning and action. However, as long as it is in place, nations will rethink once more their behavior.

Thus, no country has attempted to conquer another nation ever since the end of the decolonization period. The rise of the nation has a causal relationship to the decline in interstate violence. Moreover, the nationalists in a country do not want to start an imperial conquest and make colonies, instead, they want the colonials out of their country. The nationstate as we know it today is deeper rooted in the emotions of the masses than any other previous political organization has achieved before. In order for nationalism to develop and for sovereignty to be claimed by the populace, a complete revision of the status quo was required.

As for Korea, the foundation of nationalism developed during the annexation by Japan and it was not strong enough to prevent the separation between the North and South. These days, South-Korea has probably one of the strongest forms of nationalism. The love for the flag and the (popular) culture, the remembrance of its past, all contribute to strong sense of horizontal connection. The best and most recent display of Korea’s nationalism were the regular massive protests, by the millions, opposed to the Korean president. The fear of the Korean people in the survey stated in the introduction are therefore overrated.

Not only have the costs of imperial warfare gone up, its profits also declined. Looking into the history of empires, the mere reason for expanding was to search for resources that could still the economic hunger for growth. Thus, most conquests were focusing on securing material wealth such as gold, silver, spices, cattle, but also slaves. These days, we all have access to a global market and as our traditional resources are getting exhausted, there is a shift in focus to for example renewable energy sources. So, not only war did war became less profitable, peace became more lucrative than ever.

### AT: Nation-States=Obsolete

#### Nation-states are not obsolete.

Sneltvedt, 20—doctoral research fellow in the literature, area studies, and European languages department at the University of Oslo (Ole, “The Political Landscape and the Nation-State: Arendtian Commons and the American Revolution,” *Bringing the Nation Back In: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and the Struggle to Define a New Politics*, Chapter 3, pg 48-50, dml)

Now, a decade later, there seem to be several ways of critiquing Beck’s argument for methodological cosmopolitanism. Globalization has not led to a cosmopolitan condition, but rather renewed discourses of national identity, as well as attempts—as in the case of Brexit—to regain the territorial and economic sovereignty of the state. The failure to predict and come to terms with such phenomena might indicate that we are still being held prisoners, only this time by methodological cosmopolitanism.

A similar critique can be directed toward Fraser’s argument for transnationalizing the public sphere. Today, it is not only the case that transnational public opinion does not have an addressee in the form of “transnational public powers” (Fraser 23). Rather, it seems that despite the rapid increase in both quantity and speed of global communication, there is no formation of a global public opinion but a relatively stable plurality of not only conflicting but also mutually exclusive arguments.

The purpose of this paper is not to pursue further a critique of methodological cosmopolitanism or the notion of transnational public spheres. Rather, I direct my attention toward the notion that seeing nations, states, and territories as socially constructed and sustained through discourse involves the implicit assumption that political communities contain only two elements: people and communication. This enables the argument that, together with capital and commodities, members of the discursive community of the nation-state are swept away from their national islands into the streams of the global network (Cosmopolitan Vision 80). This view, by favoring movement over stability, discourse over action, and people over things, eclipses the fact that political communities contain more than the two elements above. Nation-states, as one type of political community, also involve two additional elements, action and things, which are related to situatedness and stability.

This primacy of communication appears not only in political theory, but also in its underlying metaphors. In considering a transition From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public, Bruno Latour argued that “political philosophy has often been the victim of a strong object-avoidance tendency” (15). Discussing the much-addressed frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s famous Allegory of Good and Bad Government, he makes the observation that they contain not merely people and their communication, but “clothes, a huge sword, immense castles, large cultivated fields, crowns, ships” and an array of buildings, walls, and cultivated landscapes (16–17). Arguably, the same applies to other metaphors of political communities. In Plato’s famous example of the Ship of State, which illustrates the troubled relationship between the people and the philosopher, the senate and the plebs, the ship, the sea and the wind serves as a mere stage for the unfolding action (Plato Book VI).

In these metaphors the social relationships and struggles for power are made intelligible against a particular context, which is taken for granted. The same arguably applies to theories of nation and state, as well as territory. The discourse of imagined communities, the governance by states or non-state actors, and the constant upkeep of territory take place somewhere and against something. Political communities, of which the nation-state is one type, thus involve more than imagined communities, more than state institutions; they also involve a third layer, a political landscape in which action literally takes place. Places do not easily liquidize and enter global flows. Rather, as Agnew noted, they “form nodes around which human activities circulate” (Place and Politics 28). In the following section I will argue that the cosmopolitan condition does not transcend Arendt’s human condition: our “web of human relationships” still relies on a “world of things” (The Human Condition 183, 52).

### AT: Xenofeminism

#### Xenofeminism undermines intersectionality, fails to address technological exclusion, and ignores the war economy

Jones 19 – *PhD from SOAS University of London, MA from University College London (UCL), LLB Law degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)* (Emily, 12-10-2019, "Feminist Technologies and Post-Capitalism: Defining and Reflecting Upon Xenofeminism," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0141778919878925?journalCode=fera)//KH

Xenofeminism does, however, have its potential limitations. Hester (2018a, p. 460) notes one possible limitation herself, highlighting the fact that the Xenofeminist Manifesto seeks to create a ‘universal’, something which could be seen as sitting **against the grain of intersectional** feminism. However, Hester states that the problem with the universal is not the universal itself, but rather what it has been filled up with. While the universal has, until now, been used to claim neutrality while imposing a white, masculinist worldview, it can also reflect difference. Hester (ibid.) thus defines xenofeminism’s universal as an intersectional universal, ‘cutting across race, ability, economic standing and geographical position’ (Laboria Cuboniks, 2015, Zero 0×00).

Despite xenofeminism’s attention to intersectionality and Hester’s clarification of the universal, xenofeminism remains open to critiques of Eurocentrism. The techno-utopian arguments put forward by xenofeminism clearly come from the standpoint of the highly technologically mediated **Global North**. While the manifesto notes inequalities in access to technological benefits to some extent, noting, for example, how ‘the world’s poor is adversely affected by the expanding technological industry’, explicitly noting the toxic conditions, for example, of those working in e-waste sites (ibid., Interrupt 0×08), the manifesto merely notes the need to acknowledge ‘these conditions as a target for elimination’ as part of the greater problem of late capitalism (ibid.). The impact of these inequalities in access and the subsequent impact on **who can be part of the xenofeminist techno-utopian future** are not, however, explicitly discussed. While capitalism is noted as a root cause of inequalities, colonialism is not highlighted despite the clear nexus between capitalism and colonialism in shaping global tech inequalities. Much would be gained from the application of transnational, postcolonial and decolonial feminist thought to xenofeminism, as Annie Goh (2019) has recently shown in great detail.

Another concern with xenofeminism is its lack of consideration for militarism and the ways in which capitalism and militarism are linked. While xenofeminism does note some of the dark sides to technology posed by capitalism, discrimination and oppression, the manifesto and the work published by Hester since do not address the links between militarism and technology. In the meantime, the war economy is vast. Global military spending has been estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to have been around US$1.6 trillion in 2016.8 Much of this war economy is driven by the development and deployment of technology, with many now civil-use technologies having originally been created by the military, such as Satellite Navigation. Given the vast amount of funding going into the research and development of machine intelligence in military settings, as exemplified by the US Department of Defense’s Project Maven,9 and the multiple calls for autonomous weapons systems (see, for example, Arkin, 2013; Jeangène Vilmer, 2015), the potentials for feminists in accelerating technological advancement seem somewhat less appealing when one thinks of **machines also doing the labour of killing (J**ones, 2018).

## Afropessimism

### Ontology—Gordon

#### The critique is wrong—anti-blackness is contingent upon functions of institutionalized social power, which requires institutional, not ontological transformations. Even if they win that antiblackness is ontological, it can only be resolved politically.

Gordon 17 [Lewis Gordon (A professor of philosophy with affiliations in Judaic studies, Caribbean and Latina/o studies, and Asian and Asian American studies at UCONN-Storrs), 2017, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, pp. 296-298] // st

Should the analysis remain at white and black, the world would appear more closed than it in fact is. For one, simply being born black would bar the possibility of any legitimate appearance. This is a position that has been taken by a growing group of theorists known as “Afro-pessimists” (Wilderson 2010; Sexton 2011). Black for them is absolute “social death:’ it is outside of relations. Missing from this view is; however, is at least what I argued in Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, which is that no human being is “really” any of these things; the claim itself is a manifestation of mauvaise foi. The project of making people into such is one thing. People actually becoming such is another. This is an observation Fanon also makes in his formulation of the tone of nonbeing and his critique of Self—Other discourses in Peau noir, masques blancs (Black Skin, White Masks). Fanon distinguishes between the zone of nonbeing (nonappearance as human beings) and those of being. ‘The latter presumes a self-justified reality, which means it does not call itself into question. The former faces the problem of illegitimate appearance (Fanon 1952, chapters; Gordon 1999; AIcoir 2006; Yancy 2008). Thus, even the effort “to be” is in conflict as the system in question presumes legitimate absence of certain groups. Yet, paradoxically, the human being comes to the fore through emerging from being in the first place. Thus, the assertion of being is also an effort to push the human being out of existence, so to speak. The racial conflict is thus changed to an existential one in which an existential ontology is posed against an ontology of being. Existential ontology pertains to human being, whereas ontological being pertains to gods. This is why Fanon concludes that racism is also an attack against human being, as it creates a world in which one set stands above others as gods and the rest as below human. Where, in this formulation, stand human beings? The argument itself gains some clarity with the etymology of “existence” which is from the Latin expression exsístere (to stand out, to emerge -that is, to appear). Blacks thus face the paradox of existing (standing out) as nonexistence (not standing out). The system of racism renders black appearance illicit. This conundrum of racialized existence affects ethics and morals. Ethical relations are premised on selves relating to another or others. The others must, however, appear as such, and they too, manifest themselves as selves. Implicit in such others as other selves is the formalization of ethical relations as equal. as found in the thought of Immanuel Kant and shifted in deference to the other in that of Emmanuel Levinas, Racism, however, excludes certain groups from being others and selves (if interpreted as being of a kind similar to the presumed legitimate selves). Thus, the schema of racism is one in which the hegemonic group relates to its members as selves and others, whereas the nonhegemonic groups are neither selves nor others. They, in effect, could only be such in relation to each other. It is, in other words, a form of ontological segregation as a condition of ethics and morals. The fight against racism, then, does not work as a fight against being others or The Other. It is a fight against being nonothers. Fanon’s insight demands an additional clarification. Racists should be distinguished from racism. Racists are people who hold beliefs about the superiority and inferiority of certain groups of racially designated people. Racism is the system of institutions and social norms that empower individuals with such beliefs. Without that system, a racist would simply be an obnoxious, whether overtly deprecating or patronizing, individual. With that system, racist points of view affect the social world as reality. Without that system, racists ultimately become inconsequential and, in a word, irrelevant beyond personal concerns of saving their souls from unethical and immoral beliefs and choices. Fanon was concerned with racists in his capacity as a psychiatrist (therapy, if necessary). but he was also concerned with racism as a philosopher, social thinker, and revolutionary (Fanon 1959/1975). The latter, in other words, is a system, from an antiracism perspective, in need of eradication. An objection to the Afro-pessimistic assertion of blackness as social death could thus be raised from a Fanonian phenomenological perspective: Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of antiblack racists? Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count as a social perspective? And if the question of racism is a function of power, why not offer a study of power, how it is gained and lost, instead of an assertion of its manifestations as ontological? An additional problem with the Afro-pessimistic model is that its proponents treat “blackness” as though it could exist independent of other categories. A quick examination of double consciousness (Du Bois 1903)—a phenomenological concept if there ever were one by virtue of the focus on forms of consciousness and, better, that of which one is conscious, that is, intentionality would reveal why this would not work. Double conscious ness involves seeing oneself from the perspective of another that deems one as negative (for example, the Afro-pessimistic conception of blackness). That there is already another perspective makes the subject who lives through double consciousness relational. Added is what Paget Henry (2005) calls polemic, ted double consciousness and Nahum Chandler (2014, 6o—6i) calls the redoubled gesture, which is the realization that the condemnation of negative meaning means that one must not do what the Afro pessimist does. Seeing that that position is false moves one dialectically forward into asking about the system that attempts to force one into such an identity: This relational matter requires looking beyond blackness ironically in order to understand blackness. This means moving from the conception of meaning as singular, substance-based, fixed, and semantical into the grammar of how meaning is produced. Such grammars, such as that of gender, emerge in interesting ways (Gordon 1999, 124—129; 1997,73—74). However, as all human beings are manifestations of different dimensions of meaning, the question of identity requires more than an intersecting model; otherwise there will simply be one (a priori) normative outcome in every moment of inquiry: whoever manifests the maximum manifestation of predetermined negative intersecting terms. That would in effect be an essence before an existence indeed, before an actual event of harm. This observation emerges as well with the Afro-pessimist model when one thinks of pessimism as the guiding attitude. The existential phenomenological critique would be that optimism and pessimism are symptomatic of the same attitude: a priori assertions on reality. Human existence is contingent but not accidental, which means that the social world at hand is a manifestation of choices and relationships in other words, human actions. Because human beings can only build the future instead of it determining us, the task at hand, as phenomenology-oriented existentialists from Beauvoir and Sartre to Fanon, William R. Jones, and this author have argued, depends on commitment. This concern also pertains to the initial concerns about authenticity discourses with which I began. One could only be pessimistic about an outcome, an activity. It is an act of forecasting what could only be meaningful once actually performed. Similarly, one could only be optimistic about the same. What however, if there were no way to know either? Here we come to the foi element in mauvaise foi. Some actions are deontological, and if not that, they are at least reflections of our commitments, our projects. Thus, the point of some actions is not about their success or failure but whether we deem them worth doing. Taking responsibility for such actions—bringing value to them— is opposed to another manifestation of mauvaise foi: the spirit of seriousness.

### Ontology—Mitchell

#### Shirking nuanced engagement for the sake of “abstraction” doesn’t make them radical, it obscures their own investment in every structure they critique.

Mitchell, 20—Associate Professor and Feminist Studies Graduate Director, Critical Race and Ethnic Studies Department, UC Santa Cruz (Nick, “The View from Nowhere: On Frank Wilderson’s Afropessimism,” <https://spectrejournal.com/the-view-from-nowhere/>, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Afropessimism trains its reader in the leaps and bounds of faith necessary for this notion to be entertained. Though Wilderson sheds considerable ink critiquing nonBlacks for analogizing their condition to Black folks, his own understanding of his Blackness gets established through analogy, too. Early on in the book, a young Frank is with his grandmother. They are watching the rebellions in the wake of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Their conversation reads as if a dress rehearsal for Afropessimist philosophy.

When, prompted by the billowing smoke and the scenes of looting, young Frank asks Grandmother Jules, “Why are we mad?” The reader is not prompted to question the integrity of the “we” that extends from the mansion in Kenwood—the well-heeled Minneapolis neighborhood that the Wildersons are integrating—to the unspecified Black postindustrial ghetto [zone] that “could have been anywhere and everywhere.”7 Kenwood is nowhere on that map, but it’s a nowhere that extends, by way of a gaze accompanying the presumption of shared affect, to a Black anywhere and everywhere.

The presumption of shared feeling does the work of analogy without calling attention to it. When young Frank’s grandmother shouts “Go ahead, son!” at a man depicted on television as a looter, it doesn’t strike the budding Afropessimist as theoretically significant that the looter can neither hear nor speak back. The gap between Frank and Grandmother Jules on one side, and the looter on the other, gets bridged through affective projection, not a solidaristic expression among equals.

For Wilderson, the defining features of the violence foundational to modern slavery (and therefore antiBlackness) are its gratuitousness, its freedom from having to serve any rational purpose, and, above all, its personal nature. (I’ll elaborate on this final point below.) Such a theory of violence makes for a situation where a reader who is left skeptical about the conclusions Wilderson draws as a narrator or theorist is encouraged to see herself [themselves] as sort of like Dr. Zhou—as someone unwilling or unable to face that nonsensical violence is precisely what makes Blackness.

To insist that antiBlack violence make sense would be to impose onto it an ahistorical rationality. It would force antiBlack violence to be recognizable within the norms of violence that nonBlacks face. So, while there are moments when I questioned whether there might have been other plausible interpretations of many of the book’s pivotal scenes, part of the thrust, it would seem, is to challenge its reader to suspend disbelief. Gratuitous violence doesn’t make sense. That’s the point.

It’s a hell of a rhetorical mechanism, and one of the reasons why I advocate for reading Afropessimism with a certain degree of care. Any theoretical formation with a self-defense mechanism that refashions those that disagree with it into a symptom of the problem it is diagnosing has most likely crossed the line from theory into theology. Like Marxists who reflexively label any criticism as petty bourgeois, or Lacanians anxious to read any pushback as the outcome of unconscious repression, there is no way to test it except on the terms that it has itself provided.

At times it seems like Wilderson’s reading of the slave relation as a personal one turns the self into an upscaling mechanism. If second wave feminists insisted that the personal was political, Wilderson’s interpretive practice suggests that the personal is always already peculiar-institutional. It provides a means of refashioning one-on-one dynamics and interactions such that they become immediately available for generalization.

Wilderson’s descriptions of the concrete seem overwhelmed by an apparent demand to represent people, in the first instance, on the model of archetypes. It is not simply that nonBlack people are always invested in the position of the master in some hazy or general way. Wilderson’s narrations indicate that nonBlack people are invested in the personal character of that relationship in such a way that makes him their slave, in particular.

THE DISAPPEARING STATE

This analytic practice of turning social relations between Black and nonBlack persons, formal and informal, into one organized in the first instance by the slave-master dualism has serious implications for Wilderson’s ability to assess complex relationships. In the art center, his co-worker Sameer, an immigrant from Palestine who seems to share with Frank an interest in revolutionary internationalist politics, is grieving. Sameer has just received news of the death of his cousin who, in a tragic accident, was trying to craft a bomb in Ramallah. As Sameer is relating his grief, he shares stories with Frank about life under settler occupation. Yet the account hinges on Sameer’s comment that, for the Palestinian under occupation confronted with Israeli troops, “shame and humiliation runs even deeper if the Israeli soldier is an Ethiopian Jew.”

Wilderson is quick to dispense those questions of the complex and contradictory imbrications of racialization, religion, and nation. He instead makes Sameer’s expression of grief into one not only about Blackness, but about a Blackness that Wilderson, in spite of his geopolitical location, has an obvious and transparent claim to immediate understanding. That Sameer and Frank stand in for the possibility—now, more specifically, the impossibility—of Palestinian-Black solidarity simply goes without saying.

Details of actual coalition building needn’t be fussed with. These proportions, and the idea that they can be generalized, must be treated as obvious or unspoken in order to offer the encounter its dramatic framing. With Sameer’s words, Wilderson explains, “The earth gave way. The thought that my place in the unconscious of Palestinians fighting for their freedom was the same dishonorable place I occupied in the minds of Whites in America and Israel chilled me.”8

The assumed personality of the slave relation offers a hair-trigger impulse to abstraction and analogy. With stunning quickness, it turns a state soldier into a slave and a suffering comrade into a theoretical occasion. As selves scale across space and time, they scale up in proportion: Sameer, in his grief, appears to offer unyielding access to a Palestinian collective unconscious that is already fixated on putting the slave in his place.

As it scales, the Afropessimist practice of abstraction has to erase, or ignore, a lot of complicating details. The reader is not invited to consider the possibility that Sameer might have meant something quite different, that it might not make sense to analogize the racial organization in a different geopolitical context, or the significance of the fact that a Black person might participate in the consolidation of state power as anything other than its unwilling instrument. The Ethiopian soldier’s gun, for instance, is explained away in a dependent clause.

But those who have embraced Afro-pessimism will likely not be swayed by anything I have said above. In the final instance, the Afropessimist imaginary is fueled by a confidence toward which it gestures but rarely states explicitly. The idea is that the virtue of Afropessimism consists in the fact that it does something important for Black people, that it allows Black people to speak deeply repressed truths about the social world, truths that make their nonBlack enemies and allies feel profoundly unsafe.

My first response to this repressive hypo- thesis would of course be, “which Black people?” The second would be about the nature of the relationship between speech and action envisioned here. While many who embrace Afropessimist ideas imagine that doing so will animate a radical politics that can live beyond a kind of collective world-historical recognition of antiBlackness, that is not a confidence shared by its principal theorist. He is consistently vague: “[Afropessimism] makes us worthy of our suffering.” Or “Afropessimism is Black people at their best. . . [It] gives us the freedom to say out loud what we would other- wise whisper or deny: that no Blacks are in the world, but, by the same token, there is no world without Blacks.”9

Or, the virtue of the theory exists in the pleasure of scaling itself. Speaking of the relief of being in an all-Black group at a multiracial conference, Wilderson writes,

I was able to see and feel how comforting it was for a room full of Black people to move between the spectacle of police violence, to the banality of microaggressions at work and in the classroom, to the experiences of chattel slavery as if the time and intensity of all three were the same.10

Extending the feel-good experience of this proto-Afropessimist scene of affirmation, for Wilderson, is the fact that no one asks any questions, inserts any uncertainty, or demands any specificity when group members talk about the contemporariness of chattel slavery. “Folks cried and laughed and hugged each other and called out loud for the end of the world. No one poured cold water on this by asking, What does that mean—the end of the world?”11

But when the all-Black group’s breakout session ends, they are at an impasse, because they are supposed to talk with their nonBlack “allies” about what happened. Eventually one member of the group suggests what will become their ultimate course of action: “We would go back in and refuse to speak with them. Not a protest, just a silent acknowledgement of the fact that we would not corrupt what we experienced with their demand for articulation between their grammar of suffering and ours.”12

Wilderson offers little insight into the process that led to this decision, partly because the point of the scene is to teach us to read silence in the Afropessimist register. Just as young Frank viewed Grandmother Jules laughing and yelling at the television, the reader is led, by the overwhelming sense of joy and relief in the scene, to read the absence of disagreement as the presence of assent. Silence, here, appears to affirm the criticality of Afropessimism.

THEORY—CRITIQUE—THEORY

In the book’s final pages, Frank tells a student who is visiting his office that “the thing that prevented most students from getting their heads around Afropessimism was the fact that it described a structural problem but offered no structural solution to that problem.”13 My read is different. It is not that Afropessimism offers no solution so much as it substitutes itself for one. It offers knowledge itself as the end, as a good that resides in the place that other theories would put the exhortation to practice—and in practice, to test the theory.

This is something different than saying that, when it comes to Afropessimism’s political imaginary, there’s no there there. My point is that in the end, Afropessimism is a view from somewhere, and that somewhere is, perhaps all too obviously, the university. The place where all roads in Afropessimism ultimately lead, that place where theorizing is a valued mode of practice in and of itself, and where it does not need to be justified on any other terms. The modern university does not only enable the practice of diagnosing problems with no solutions to hand, and to develop critiques that do not open immediately onto strategies of redress; it enshrines the right to do so and valorizes the subject that does. Afropessimism claims to offer no sanctuary while its practitioner is in fact modeled on the privileged subject of Enlightenment humanism, which sought to liberate knowing from being judged by the actions it did or did not enable.

### Ontology—More

#### Err aff—ontology is descriptive, not prescriptive. Presuming anti-Blackness is ontological prevents change, but assuming it isn’t has liberatory force.

More, 19—former professor of philosophy at the University of the North, University of Durban-Westville, and University of KwaZulu-Natal (Mabogo, “The Transformative Power of Lewis R. Gordon’s Africana Philosophy in Mandela’s House,” *Black Existentialism: Essays on the Transformative Thought of Lewis R. Gordon*, Chapter 6, pg 75-76, Kindle, dml)

What these critics ignore in Gordon’s work is, first, the role “liberation” plays in the tripartite constitution of his Africana philosophy. This is of course a basic failure to grasp a philosophy that is based upon an approach to struggle, an approach that is fundamentally about consciousness raising and, I may add, the massification of the philosophy of resistance so that those who are in the struggle can provide rational answers for themselves. This kind of philosophizing is precisely what Biko and those in the Black Consciousness movement referred to as “conscientization.” In all the articulations of conscientization, “action” or “praxis” is the key. This kind of philosophical tradition, from Sartre to Fanon to Gordon, is not simply a meditative or abstract self-reflective and aloof contemplation process outside real existence, but a complete involvement in the drama of that very existence. As a philosopher of existence, Gordon subscribes to Sartre’s description of philosophy as “concerned with man—who is at once an agent and an actor, who . . . lives the contradictions of his situation, until either his individuality is shattered or his conflicts are resolved” (1975, 11–12).

Second, Headley and Curry seem to ignore the existentialist concept of “radical conversion” or what Simone de Beauvoir calls “existential conversion.” Salvation from the terror of racism, Gordon argues, requires a radical conversion; that is, the acceptance of our contingent unjustifiable existence. This conversion means a move through a process of self-recovery from a consciousness that was previously corrupted to one in which freedom is the absolute value, one in which we recognize that our situation does not have to be as it is, that this racist situation can and ought to be changed. For liberation to occur, Gordon explains: “We need to admit, at bottom, that our situation doesn’t have to be as it is. We need to embrace the negative aspect of existence in the form of existential or radical conversion” (1995a, 134).

Clevis Headley, for example, faults Gordon for not paying attention to the question of agency in an antiblack world. Flowing from this charge, Headley, as mentioned above, asks: “How can a black person living in an antiblack world express human agency? Should blacks simply resign themselves to the fact the world is antiblack?” (1997, 341). The latter question is reminiscent of the charge of “quietism” leveled against existentialism. The problem with this critique is that it does not, in the first place, take into account the methodological constraints imposed on Gordon by phenomenological ontology. Within this framework, and in line with philosophical (logical) requirements, one cannot simply move from description to prescription. Since phenomenology is fundamentally descriptive, prescription gets thrown out of the window. In his own defense, Gordon claims that criticism from a Sartrean perspective is misguided precisely because “the concern for a form of prescriptive ethics on the basis of a Sartrean ontology reflects a mistaken view of the Sartrean project, . . . since the role of the philosopher . . . is not to be our shepherd” (1995a, 164).

At the ontological level, Gordon’s position, just like Fanon’s, becomes radical ontology that emanates from the recognition of the importance of contingency in existence. The danger of committing ourselves to an ontology that focuses exclusively on what must be the case resides in our forgetfulness of the contingency of being and thus the failure to appreciate that what is the case need not always be the case. Liberation from distorted ontology, therefore, requires the rejection of the kind of ontology that is predicated on the idea of necessity. Instead, it requires the admission of the fact that fundamentally, the situation doesn’t have to be as it is. As mentioned above, when existentialists ask, “What is the meaning of Being?,” a black consciousness raises the question: “What is the meaning of the Being of a black person in an antiblack political, social, cultural, religious and moral world?” Such an ontology has liberatory potential precisely because humans do indeed judge that the way things are in their lived political, social, and moral world is certainly not the way they ought to be; that what is need not be as it is. From this judgment human beings do set about to change the way things are to what they must and ought to be. It is this realization that their situation need not be as it is, as the epigraph above indicates, that made the Black Consciousness youth activists question the continuing racism and hegemonic white supremacy in the “New” South Africa of Nelson Mandela.

### Perm

#### Even if pessimism is a good academic stance, it can’t be used to justify accepting the harms of the status quo—life is a prerequisite to struggle

Syedullah, 18—Visiting Assistant Professor of Sociology at Vassar College (Jasmine, “Afro-pessimism: Critical Exchange,” Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 17, 1, 105–137, dml)

Given that the endgame of Afro-pessimism as an academic enterprise is limited by its location within the neoliberal university (see Fred Moten and Stephano Harney’s ‘‘The University and the UnderCommons,’’), the most generative aspects of its analysis of anti-blackness and Western civilization are indebted to knowledge about black life and liberation produced outside the academy and on the ground of struggles for freedom. The pessimism of conventional philosophical concern presses on the ontological foundations of a person’s individual sense of agency and purpose, throwing one’s will to live into question.

Prophetic despair, such as that which Baldwin expresses in an often quoted interview between James Baldwin Dr. Kenneth Clark in May of 1963, presses on the material cohesion of our moral infrastructure. In the interview Baldwin professes to remaining pessimistic with regard to his own life when he says, ‘‘It doesn’t matter any longer what you do to me; you can put me in jail, you can kill me. By the time I was 17, you’d done everything that you could do to me. The problem now is, how are you going to save yourselves?’’ He goes on a bit later to refuse, in no uncertain term, pessimism as a politics of the future.

When Clark asks, ‘‘Jim, what do you see deep in the recesses of your own mind as the future of our nation, … I think that the future of the Negro and the future of the nation are linked … What do you see?,’’ Baldwin replies, ‘‘I can’t be a pessimist because I’m alive. To be a pessimist means that you have agreed that human life is an academic matter, so I’m forced to be an optimist. I’m forced to believe that we can survive whatever we must survive. But the future of the Negro in this country is precisely as bright or as dark as the future of the country (Clark et al., 1963).

I want to savor the tensions of Baldwin’s response. I want to hold them, not resolve them, and observe how they situate pedestrian personal pessimism outside the movement for black life, while calling out the limits of a political process propelled and legitimated by white supremacy. Even insofar as pessimism is a social expression of the affective limits of social death, a feeling that brings us back to life, out of isolation, and into conversation with each other the promise of pessimism is clearly far more than an academic matter.

The antithesis of pessimism in this instance is not optimism but apathy, willful passive acceptance of the untenable conditions of a people systemically and forcibly made to understand that there are some whose existence is at best immaterial and at worst a clear and present danger, and then there are those lives that do matter. What we have been witnessing in the activist and academic movements for black life is the implosion of identity politics and the failure of its possessive claims to liberal demands for rights and protection. The abolition of whiteness demands a kind of justice the state may not yet know how to sanction. As Patrisse Cullors (2015), one of three original founders of #BLM, argues, ‘‘I believe we can’t wait on the State to take care of our Black lives. We have to show up now to build the world we want to see.’’

Thinking the purchase of the pessimistic prophetically then, as a residual, inevitable, yet generative practice of the black prophetic tradition with reparative properties that precede and exceed Afro-pessimism’s formal incorporation into scholarly journals and conferences, I find myself constantly reminding my students that while we can take the analysis of power Afro-pessimism offers and run with it, academic enunciations of pessimism run the risk of remaining loyal to the limits of legibility and respectability of politics as usual. As Nick Mitchell (forthcoming, p. 10) writes: ‘‘When the intellectual becomes interchangeable with the slave, it is perhaps too easy … to smooth over the fact that black intellectuals have interests as intellectuals that can and do diverge from those of the people for whom they might want justice. Without an acknowledgement (not a confession) of this divergence … the project of race theorization risks deploying the generalizing force of theory and the moralizing tendency of critique to generalize a class perspective.’’

What we are dealing with here is more than occidental anxiety of ontological uncertainty. It is an ethical imperative to engage in a struggle to change the meaning of rights and protection from the ground up (or suffer senselessly at the altar of the state’s right to defend itself by any means necessary). As Baldwin (in Clark et al., 1963) suggested in the interview with Kenneth Clark, the pessimism of antiblack racism is not just a black problem, it presses on the condition of whites and upon the country as a whole: ‘‘These people have deluded themselves for so long, that they really don’t think I’m human. I base this on their conduct, not on what they say, and this means that they have become, in themselves, moral monsters.’’

The predicament of the pessimist is not a personal problem that is easily selfcontained. It presses upon the body, moving it to unrest, unleashing a rage that cannot stand to be at home in moral monstrosity. It just wants to burn it all down. ‘‘Now, we are talking about human beings, there’s not such a thing as a monolithic wall or some abstraction called the Negro problem, these are Negro boys and girls, who at 16 and 17 don’t believe the country means anything that it says and don’t feel they have any place here, on the basis of the performance of the entire country.’’ The question Afro-pessimism poses as a practice of prophetic desire then, turns away from a politics of recognition and respectability toward an abolitionist praxis of fugitive reparation to ask, ‘‘Will you run with me?’’ Does my pessimism press on your sense of superiority, exception, perfection enough for you to forfeit your status and help us move the country, force the nation to believe there is freedom beyond this world, a more prophetic imagination of difference, identity, and inclusion? ‘‘What white people have to do,’’ Baldwin (in Clark et al., 1963) reminds us, ‘‘is try and find out in their own hearts why it was necessary to have a nigger in the first place, because I’m not a nigger, I’m a man, but if you think I’m a nigger, it means you need it.’’

In the present moment Black Lives Matter (BLM) is advancing the cause for the abolition of white supremacy in local ways in chapters throughout the world. They call us to account for the material consequences of the unfinished work of antislavery abolition and reconstruction. They are part of an underground lineage of fugitive communities that emerged from the marshes, swamps, and hiding spaces of the plantation South. Their message is decentralized. It is not uniform. It does not reproduce old antagonisms. It does not pit moral suasion against direct confrontation. It does not ask that we choose to remain either optimistic or pessimistic. It exercises a practice of the political that harnesses both. In this last section then I turn to a speech against apathy by Patrisse Cullors, a beacon in a leader-full movement who has been animating pessimism as a protocol of self-care and prophetic political organizing powerful enough to propel activist and intellectual movements from isolated places of loss into collective liberation, out of abstractions into objections, subjecting the logics of antiblack racism to the collective force of intersecting fugitive communities of abolitionist movement against nihilism and toward an affirmation of life.

We Can Survive? At age 25 on 19 April 2015 Freddie Gray died from injuries sustained while shackled by his feet in a Baltimore Police Department van where he was being held in custody following his arrest. Baltimore stood up, rose up, died in, and rolled out. We all bore witness. His death was deemed a murder by the medical examiner a few weeks later. That Sunday morning, May 3, 2015, I, a Buddhist, found my way to church, to All Saints in Pasadena, CA, into the strikingly upper-class congregation of post-service attendees who piled in along with an unlikely mix of young greater Los Angeles activists-of-color and their white hipster allies. It would be my first time hearing our speaker in person. The whole room stood and cheered as she entered – the woman who helped coin the hashtag, the longtime activist organizer, Patrisse Cullors greeted us like family, all knowing eyes, bright smiles, and then began a talk she called ‘‘Abolition Theology.’’ Her voice was clear and certain, free of the cross-bearing affect of black suffering that often accompanies talk of state-sponsored antiblack violence in predominately white spaces. Cullors gave us a speech that touched us, that moved us – mourning, rage and all – into a mood for collective action. She impressed upon us the fact that the movement for black lives was a call to action for all black life, not just the names we could recite, not just cisgendered young men, not just ‘‘innocent’’ ‘‘children,’’ not just Americans. She let us know there had been recent formations of #Black Lives Matter chapters beyond U.S. borders. There were Afro-Latino chapters, chapters forming in Haiti, and in Ghana. She reminded us that the concept of blackness that resonates across the globe called on us to broaden the scope of our movements and to build alliances, to build with Latino communities in particular. It was a call for #BLM without borders. We were being enlisted in a movement that began, she reminded us, with the movement to abolish the institution of slavery. We were being reeducated as she drew connection between the hard-won efforts of formerly fugitive abolitionists to build resilient communities out of the so-called contraband during and following the Civil War through to the present-day ‘‘leader-full’’ movement of #BLM. ‘‘Isn’t this a great time to be alive?’’ Cullors asked in closing. Is she joking I wondered? I found not one drop of cynicism in her question. Without missing a beat, she proceeded to relay the names, the facts, the numbers, the bodies felled by police, by gun, by force. As she listed the lives taken a wave of loss flooded the room and we were still, breathless. ‘‘Protest is about disrupting apathy,’’ she continued.

She left us eager to join her in this twenty-first century revival of reconstruction, in a fight for food, for access to housing, for access to education, and for a kind of justice for black lives that will not come without our willingness to show up, stand up, and throw down. In the streets, in solidarity, we will find the power to change people, she said, to change policy. She echoed the words of civil rights organizer Ella Baker, ‘‘the system under which we now exist has to be radically changed… It means facing a system that does not lend itself to your needs and devising means by which you change that system.’’

For Cullors that ‘‘means’’ came by way of waves grief, rage, despair, the loss of family, the loss of hope, bearing witness, heartbreak, and the will to return to face it all again. She closed us out with the rallying chant of the movement for black lives, the recitation of a prayer by Twentieth century fugitive slave Assata Shakur, ‘‘It is our duty to fight for our freedom. It is our duty to win. We must love each other and protect each other. We have nothing to lose but our chains.’’ The congregation’s joy burst through the siren of her words and bound us toward another way of sitting with the litany of loss.

We Must Survive

What Baldwin and Cullors make clear is that pessimism is most powerful as an unrelenting political process of coming back to life, beginning to feel one another’s humanity. What my students who are taking up the work of Afro-pessimism are in most need of are new ways to put their pessimism to work, to come together and collectively counteract the mind-numbing soul-crushing isolation centuries of antiblack racism have waged on our humanity. We need not fear falling short. The more we ‘‘fail,’’ the stronger we rise to try again armed with the alchemy of despair. What we need are stories and speeches, and spaces that moves us from abjection toward that fertile ground of self-transformation one can only find in the witness of another. What might we give up in a move from critique to healing and reparation, generative of the choice to be fearless in the face of the impossibilities of freedom? What might the audacity to ‘‘lean on each other,’’ as Jasmine Abdullah Richards says in the epigraph, and imagine a future for black life otherwise, add to the pursuits of the pessimist?

### AT: Grammar Of Suffering

#### Social death is a spectrum, not an antagonism—Black suffering is communicable.

King Watts, 15—Associate Professor, Media and Technology Studies, UNC Chapel Hill (Eric, “Critical Cosmopolitanism, Antagonism, and Social Suffering”, Quarterly Journal of Speech Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015, dml)

I have been asked by more than one graduate student at more than one university how I hope to reconcile the claims of Afro-Pessimism with my insistence that voice is a fundamental human capacity. I maintain, more or less consistently, that voice is a public occurrence animated by the acknowledgment of the ethical and affective dimensions of speech.16 The repetition of the inquiry is energized by the fact and mode of Afro-Pessimism being taken up in debate and argument organizations, programs, and competitions. I am not going to attempt to complete this reconciliation in this space, in part because I have not quite accomplished it. But I do have to briefly sketch out the terms of the challenge in order to try to evaluate the strengths and limits of critical cosmopolitanism as an academic practice that would ask “why and how” Communication Studies might interact with the Afro-Pessimistic enclave in Black Studies. While criticizing the work of Black film theory, Frank Wilderson embarks upon an ambitious and provocative campaign meant to foster an understanding of the conditions of impossibility for Black subjectivity within the contemporary ontological paradigm. The term “Afro-Pessimism” signals the work of scholars who are “theorists of structural positionality.”17 As such, Blackness and Whiteness18 are interrogated as emerging through a conjuncture with brutal modern technologies of organization and domination, and the birth of the very idea of race. Put simply, it took the modern invention of slavery and colonialism to bring about the racial ideologies that make Blackness and Whiteness intelligible. The Slave/Black, then, should not be considered exploited labor or simply oppressed. “Rather, the gratuitous violence of the Black's first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, ‘wiped out [his or her] metaphysics … his or her customs and sources on which they are based.’”19 The Black occupies a coordinate that marks a fundamental structural antagonism with the West, with Whiteness and, indeed, with the Human. It is quite easy to see why the term “Pessimism” is apt. The Black names the condition of state violence, a flesh-object brought into the world for “accumulation and fungibility.”20 The Black is essential to the production of Western subjectivity and to notions of what it means to be human. “In short, White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity: Without the Negro, capacity itself is incoherent, uncertain at best.” Not only is the Black incapacitated as a structural determinate, the Black is “a structural position of noncommunicability.”21 But there is a form of communication here nevertheless because the Black paradoxically signifies the “outside” that allows for the articulation of “anti-Black solidarity.”22 There is theoretical and historical support for such an analysis. For example, the early twentieth-century Americanization projects used Blackness as an exclusionary trope meant to help spur non-White immigrants from Europe and Asia toward Whiteness.23 And here is where the term “Pessimism” seems inadequate. As a structurally overdetermined body-image in the Western imaginary and symbolic field, Blackness registers near-nothingness: In perceiving Black folk as being alive, or at least having the potential to live in the world, the same potential that any subaltern might have, the politics of Black film theorists' aesthetic methodology and desire disavowed the fact that “[Black folk] are always already dead wherever you find them.”24 Given this dire diagnosis, why and how might we interact with Afro-Pessimism? Speaking from the point of view of a Black rhetorical scholar (and a scholar of Blackness), the answer to why is virtually self-evident: thinking through Blackness as a condition of possibility for rhetorical action and social justice is a life-long pursuit that, given the tragic killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014, feels especially burning.25 Given the affective intensity of the charge of Black noncommunicability, a failure to meaningfully interact would engender a different kind of “violence”; in this case a structural injunction sponsored by a lingering and recurring anxiety regarding the authority of Communication Studies. And so how might we interact? If I take up the orientation of critical cosmopolitanism, I need to recognize immediately that my efforts can be dismissed by the Afro-Pessimist as colonial; that is, as a reiteration of the sort of practices that presume that one's epistemologies can translate other's bodies of knowledge into comprehensible and useful concepts and constructs. And yet, we must begin where we are, not where we hope to be. Hence, I want to make two modest and one not-so-modest suggestions for how Communication Studies in general and Rhetorical Studies in particular might interact: first, Wilderson calls for “a new language of abstraction” to elaborate “Blackness's grammar of suffering.”26 But in my reading, Afro-Pessimism is already too reliant on a language of abstraction. Lois McNay, in The Misguided Search for the Political, recently contends that theories of political power are overwrought owing to a social weightlessness brought about through high abstraction. She recommends the reinvigoration of the concept of “social suffering”—not as an entrenched category of victimage but, rather, as the habitus of lived experience that must be articulated to analyses of structural positionality.27 Second, I agree with McNay (who says nothing about Afro-Pessimism, by the way) that structural antagonisms are not static, but are movable and moving configurations. The Afro-Pessimist in Wilderson's account must agree that when a non-Black person is thrust toward the horrible condition approximating (but not identical to) the Black's structural position, that adjustment can rightfully be called a “Blackening.” As a happening—and not an event that has simply always already happened—this racialized procedure makes itself felt and knowable in the dense social fabric of the everyday. If the Black is in a structural position that delimits the impossibility of capacity, might we enjoin an analysis of the vocabulary of that impossibility itself? And since a “Blackening” receives intelligibility from the structural position of the Black, might we gain some productive understanding from a scrutiny of key discursive and material forms of “Blackening”? Was not Michael Brown “Blackened” in and through (and not only a priori to) his bodily encounter with state violence? Given my ongoing scholarly interest in the Zombie, I am willing to concede that an Afro-Pessimist might claim that Brown was, at the moment he was shot to death, “the dead but sentient thing, the Black” struggling “to articulate in a world of living subjects.”28 This concession functions as an assertion: the Zombie is not wholly outside Western intelligibility; it haunts the nether regions between Human and Black. Its undead existence is material and social, and supplies some vital resources for inventing a new language—a grammar of (Black) suffering. Perhaps “there is no way to Africa through the Black,”29 but maybe there is a route through the Zombie. I have argued for such a project using the terminology of reanimating Zombie voices.30 Lastly, we might think of this gloomy predicament as a tenuous point of contact with Afro-Pessimism. Wilson's intellectual history provides the basis for such a conception. Communication Studies has been (and continues to anguish over the extent that it still is) in the structural position of inferior and alienated. There should be no shame in admitting that the discipline, in relation to both the Social Sciences and the Humanities, has been and is subject to being “Blackened.” Indeed, its originary moment, as I alluded to above, meant the rejection of a set of nationalistic proprietary politics that treated Speech teachers like disposable labor. By any reasonable measure, that structural positioning—despite the fact that the people involved were White—was a racialization, a “Blackening.” Let's be perfectly clear: there is no identification being made here with the fundamental antagonism associated with the Black. However, this racialized politics (among other political registers) might provide a new critical vocabulary for Communication scholars if we do the painful work of coming to grips with the discursive and material practices of “Blackening.” There are structures of different scales. Academic structural dynamics are not dissociated from the identity ideologies implicated in nationalism and cosmopolitanism, citizenship and exile, privilege and destitution, Whiteness and Blackness. Indeed, Wilderson's critique is launched from and resides within those very same structural dynamics. It seems to me then that, at the very least, our shared social suffering with Afro-Pessimism—although of vastly different magnitudes and qualities—should be asserted as a mode of transnational fidelity.

### AT: End The World

#### [Their method] leaves current political coordinates intact at best and strengthens them at worst. Analogy and solidarity are good.

O’Donnell, 20—Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oakton Community College (Patrick, “Ontology, Experience, and Social Death: On Frank Wilderson’s Afropessimism,” <https://philpapers.org/archive/ODOOEA.pdf>, dml)

Finally, it is worth discussing the political upshots of Afropessimism, and how the book “reads” within our current political moment. Wilderson’s own political stance is clear enough in its broad outlines: Black liberation requires the total destruction of the existing relation between Slaves and Humans. In one of the book’s more hopeful moments, Wilderson grants that “social death,” like class and gender, can be overcome, since it is ultimately “constructed by the violence and imagination of other sentient beings.” Overcoming social death, however, is necessarily apocalyptic: “The first step toward the destruction is to assume one’s position… and then burn the ship or the plantation, in its past and present incarnations, from the inside out” (103). Afropessimism proposes a political ethic for those outside politics, whose engagement with the political would signify the end of politics as we know it.

Wilderson’s political vision is a “grenade without a pin,” or a “looter’s creed” which strives to bring about the Fanonian “end of the world” (174). Yet if your politics requires you to “burn the ship or the plantation…. from the inside out” with yourself inside, you should be extremely sure that this politics is rooted in a true and comprehensive vision of Black people’s situation in the world. Pinless grenades and looter’s creeds can fall into anyone’s hands. They can harm countless bystanders. Their volatility makes them unpredictable. What if the theoretical conceits of Afropessimism not only fail to bring about the end of the world, but give succor to projects dedicated to making an already awful anti-Black world worse? Ironically, those with reactionary anti-Black politics, or those in thrall to the magic of Whiteness and convinced of the subhumanity of Blackness, should appreciate the work that Wilderson accomplishes here. In fascist hands, a claim like “it is absolutely necessary for Blacks to be castrated, raped, genitally mutilated and violated, beaten, shot, and maimed” in order for non-Blacks to achieve “confirmation of Human existence” is just the sort of work a society running on the myth of Black inhumanity and subpersonhood requires.

More predictably, Afropessimism takes aim at leftist coalitional, solidarity-based, and intersectional politics. It is not just that historically existing forms of socialism, feminism, and multiculturalism have left Black people out (which they often have). Rather, in Wilderson’s mind, these forms of politics terrorize Black people simply by positing analogies and similarities among diverse forms of Black and non-Black oppression (220). The monolithic view of Blackness Afropessimism presents seems to have little room for the idea that Black people are lots of things besides Black, and that their interests and concerns are often formed in ways similar to non-Blacks’ interests. To be sure, we should mark a distinction between Wilderson’s politics and misappropriations of his vision. Yet if Black people are literally terrorized by working-class struggle, multicultural coalitions, immigration rights, feminism, and other forms of counter-hegemonic politics, one might wonder why Black liberation strategies should bother accommodate the stated interests of people who are, in addition to Black, queer, religious, anti-capitalist, female, poor, immigrant, working class, indigenous, and/or incarcerated.

Those sympathetic to Wilderson might suggest that Black people have little to lose by abandoning solidarity-based politics. Yet not-so-ancient history suggests that there may be higher stakes here. As Paul Ortiz (2018) has recently demonstrated, many of the material, political, social, and symbolic gains for Black and Latinx people throughout the 18th and 19th centuries were generated by an emancipatory internationalism that drew explicit analogies between Black and non-Black freedom struggles. The United States’ interest in slavery of course first and foremost oppressed Black people. Yet because slavery was so deeply interwoven with the oppression of non-Black people as well (in the form of Indian removal and extermination, violent expropriation of Mexican land in a war to expand slavery, etc.), Black and non-Black abolitionists were able to engage the problem of Black oppression not in isolation, but with a view to how it undergirded a more generally unacceptable social order. Of course, just because solidarity was a useful tool for achieving those political goals doesn’t mean it will work now. Yet in a time when Black oppression has once again become one of the clearest symptoms of a more broadly unacceptable social order, perhaps it is wise to remember this emancipatory spirit.

Finally, one wouldn’t think that a political imaginary that at first seems so radical would be so amenable to the status quo. Wilderson suggests that his view of the fundamental distinctiveness of Black suffering extends “the critique of neoliberalism,” and registers surprise that leftists do not welcome his perspective (182). Yet it is just as easy to see Afropessimism’s performative transcendence of the political as embracing a neoliberal class politics. The book’s simplistic social ontology and monolithic conception of violence makes each Black person into All Black People, thus aiding a crucial neoliberal elision: even if Wilderson draws no essential distinction in station and suffering among Black people, the market certainly does and will continue to do so. Afropessimism’s Sturm und Drang is often a pleasure to explore, but it fits right in with a masochistic cultural moment that cedes the floor to public proclamations of suffering and rituals of deference to it while simultaneously cordoning off these performances from any political will to eradicate the causes of such suffering in the first place. Performing catharsis itself may be a political act, but it is increasingly one whose relation to subversive strategies is not always clear. Whether had by feminists, anti-racists, anti-capitalists, or Afropessimists, the small pleasures of lamentation do not threaten. One imagines the dominant social order quoting Nietzsche to itself: “‘what are my parasites to me?, it might say, ‘may they live and prosper: I am strong enough for that!’” (Nietzsche 1967: 72).

In a final irony, perhaps Afropessimism is not pessimistic enough. We occupy a stultifying political moment whose routines have been so corporatized that even avowed anti-racists must negotiate racism roughly the same way a human resources department must negotiate an unruly employee: correct, cancel, or cash in, depending on what the cost-benefit analysis says. As a result, self-congratulatory anti-bias training, identification with the “right side of history” (on which side of course can be found the most “socially conscious” brand-name corporations), underclass tourism, performative wokeness, cyclical rituals of call out and contrition, and perhaps a “diversity initiative” here and there seem to be the only intellectual and practical tools current institutions are willing to raise against the nexus of racial and socioeconomic oppression. Wilderson of course recognizes that racism is a deep feature of the social order, and so is rightly pessimistic about the efficacy of the usual “anti-racist” tools. But he may be right for the wrong reason: pessimism about the end of racism isn’t warranted because Black suffering necessarily anchors the world, it’s warranted because it is nigh-impossible to imagine a future world so thoroughly reorganized around the well-being of the dispossessed that racism and anti-racism themselves have ceased to be useful strategies for consolidating and protecting elite power and wealth. Perhaps this is the source of the unsettling feeling that Wilderson’s tools might simply be retrofitted to the neoliberal apparatus. The content of Wilderson’s version of Afropessimism makes it a stranger cousin than most, but its uptake in the mainstream may signal neoliberal politics as usual: a lucrative but politically impotent brokerage relationship between elites willing to monetize Black suffering and its supposed antidote, and the audiences happy to consume both.³

### AT: Libidinal Economy/Psychoanalysis

#### Wilderson’s theory of the political relies on lacanian psychoanalysis – which isn’t based in any falsifiable evidence

Billig 6 (Michael, prof social psych @ Loughbourgh U “Lacan's Misuse of Psychology : Evidence, Rhetoric and the Mirror Stage” Theory Culture Society 2006 23: 1)

It has been noted that Lacan makes a distinction between the ‘facts’ of the mirror stage and his theoretical interpretations of those apparent facts. The emphasis here has been upon examining the ‘facts’, rather than on Lacan’s theoretical interpretations. It is assumed that if the facts are thrown into doubt, then the validity of the interpretation is substantially weakened. This assumption can be held to reflect a general feature of psychology. Psychological concepts need to be grounded in observations of human actions. They cannot, or, rather, they should not, be constructed out of pure theory. Crucially, Lacan recognizes this. Hence he begins this theorizing about the splitting of the ego with evidential claims about what the child does in front of the mirror. Such behaviour provides the reason for thinking that something hidden and essentially unobservable might be occurring psychologically. Thus, Lacan’s theorizing about the ideal image is grounded in claims about observable actions. He does not present further evidence to support his speculations about the mirror image providing the child with an idealized image. To the extent that the grounding is weakened, then so are the speculations, at least as possible descriptions of what occurs in the mind of the child. Without such grounding, psychological concepts become vague, spinning round in self-contained theoretical loops and never coming down to earth. It is arguable that many cultural theorists use Lacanian concepts in ways that are, at best, metaphorical and, at worst, disconnected from specific human activity. What is needed is a form of critical psychology that is more clearly anchored in human activity. This is why a change in the mirror trope – from the visual mirror image to the activity of mirroring – might have psychological significance. It would draw attention to the way that development occurs through imitation. The actions of the parents are virtually absent in Lacan’s account, as indeed they are in much of Freud’s writing on infant development (see Billig, 2005: ch. 7, for details). It is as if children independently create their own inner psychological world, rather than being encouraged, even bullied, to mirror the repression and the order of the social world that surrounds them.

#### Libidinal explanations for racism are too sweeping to carry analytic value.

Hook, 21—Associate Professor of Psychology at Duquesne University (Derek, “Pilfered pleasure: on racism as “the theft of enjoyment”,” *Lacan and Race: Racism, Identity, and Psychoanalytic Theory*, Chapter 2, pg 36-39, dml)

What is immediately striking in these extracts is the role played by affect, or more accurately yet, by the “pained stimulation” of the aroused passions of enjoyment. What both authors highlight—and this speaks to the analytical value of the concept—is that forms of excess stimulation (the “negative pleasure” of jouissance) underlie and propel Symbolic and political constructions of otherness. Different cultural modes of enjoyment are, furthermore, fundamentally discordant. We have then not so much a “Clash of Civilizations”—to reference the Samuel Huntington’s (1997) much cited thesis—as a clash of enjoyments.

Moreover, the difficulty that we have in realizing “full” enjoyment—something that is impossible in Lacanian theory for “castrated” speaking beings—is dealt with by imagining the supposedly unimpaired and inevitably disturbing enjoyment possessed by cultural/racial/sexual others. In short, the fact that we cannot attain the jouissance we feel we deserve results in perceptions of an unhindered, illegitimate, and undeserved enjoyment on the part of others. As Sheldon George notes: “the other’s jouissance, or enjoyment, [is] … the very core around which … otherness articulates itself” (2016: 3). Political jealousy, as Žižek calls it, is thus (at least in part) the result of incompatibilities and more importantly yet, perceived sacrifices of jouissance.

Jouissance: unserviceable tool of political analysis?

Despite having offered only a brief introduction to the above Lacanian ideas, we should pause here for a moment to voice a number of prospective methodological and conceptual problems implied by the racism as (theft of) enjoyment thesis. Doing so will help us focus the expository comments to follow, and indeed, to highlight the potential analytical advantages the thesis may have to offer.

The first critique, which applies to a wide historical range of psychoanalytic theories of racism (see Cohen, 2002; Frosh 1989; Stavrakis 1999), is that of psychological reductionism. Simply put: the complexity of the various historical, discursive, and socioeconomic causes of racism are invariably deprioritized and accorded a peripheral explanatory role once the domain of the psychological is privileged. Accounts of the psychological factors underlying various instances of racism are thus not only de-historicizing and hopelessly generalizing; they are also invariably depoliticizing.

A second critique: is jouissance not a hopelessly open-ended concept? Virtually any cultural behaviour, bodily intensity or libidinal activity can, it seems, be considered to be an instance of jouissance. In view of racism, for example, the other’s enjoyment can refer to everything from their incomprehensible cultural customs and/or religious beliefs (epitomized, for example, in odd food and dress restrictions), to perceived aspects of their distinctive physicality/sensuality (their food, the way they dance, the sound of their music), to attributions of superabundant vitality (they are excessively promiscuous, religious, lazy, etc.)? The concept of jouissance seems thus to be both underdifferentiated and overly inclusive, applying to a potentially endless array of behaviors and experiences. Without a clearer sense of how to differentiate what qualifies as enjoyment and what does not, the concept loses analytical value.

A third line of critique: different modes of enjoyment are implied within the literature, without being properly distinguished. In Žižek’s descriptions of racism and jouissance, for example, jouissance is used broadly to refer to: visceral or passionate modes of experience (the “thrill of hate”); an array of enviable possessions (our “libidinal treasures”) perceived as under threat by cultural others; and a type of noxious “surplus vitality” possessed by such others. So, whose enjoyment are we most fundamentally concerned with in these notions of racism as jouissance, the other’s, or our own? What is the relationship between these two types of jouissance? And how are they related to a third mode, namely the “negative pleasure” of making—experiencing—such troubling attributions in the first place?

Fourth, there is ever-present problem of de-contextualization in “shorthand” applications of the term. This leads to a situation in which enjoyment itself is treated as a causative force beyond adequate consideration of a series of accompanying concepts (the frame of fantasy, the operation of the signifier, the role of the law, the “object a” as cause of desire) that necessarily accompany its proper psychoanalytic application. What auxiliary terms must thus be utilized alongside the concept if it is to serve us as a viable analytical tool?

Critique 1: the notion of enjoyment as psychologically reductionist

There is a crucial passage that is repeated in a number of Žižek’s earlier books (1992, 1993, 2005) and that serves as perhaps his most direct exposition of racism as the theft of enjoyment:

What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always [a kind of ] possession: the “other” wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our “way of life”) and/ or he has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment. In short, what gets on our nerves, what really bothers us about the “other” is the peculiar way he organizes his enjoyment (the smell of his food, his “noisy” songs and dances, his strange manners, his attitudes to work—in the racist perspective, the “other” is either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labour)” (1992: 165).

While this seems, in many ways, a gripping account, from a sociologist or historian’s perspective, the degree of reductionism is staggering. The multiple complex sociological, economic, and socio-historical variables underlying distinctive historical forms of racism are brushed aside in favor of a generalizing psychoanalytic formula. Racism = reaction to perception that the (perversely enjoying) other has stolen our enjoyment. This reduction of racism to an affective equation is evident also in Žižek’s precursor in this conceptual domain, Jacques-Alain Miller:

Why does the Other remain Other? What is the cause for our hatred of him, for our hatred of him in his very being? It is hatred of the enjoyment in the Other. This would be the most general formula for the modern racism we are witnessing today: a hatred of a particular way the Other enjoys … The question of tolerance or intolerance is … located on the level of tolerance or intolerance toward the enjoyment of the Other, the Other who essentially steals my own enjoyment (Miller, cited in Žižek 1993: 203).

The depoliticization (indeed, the implicit psychologization) inherent in such a conceptual move is surprising inasmuch it is something that Žižek has proved critical of elsewhere. In a 1998 text, for example, Žižek outlines the charge of psychological reductionism against standard psychoanalytic explanations of racism, which offer

a way of explaining racism that ignore … not only racism’s socioeconomic conditions but the sociosymbolic context of cultural values and identifications that generate reactions to the experience of ethnic otherness (1988: 154).

Surely this also applies to the racism as theft of enjoyment formula outlined above? Explanations of racism as jouissance are surely prone to psychological reductionism inasmuch as they often appear to privilege a series of psychoanalytic assumptions (drive, fantasy, libido, projection, etc.) as existing prior to—or independently of—considerations of economic, historical, political, and socio-symbolic context?

#### Psychoanalysis isn’t universal and scaling it up to political conclusions is colonialist.

Rogers, 17—Senior Lecturer in Criminology in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne and Adjunct Professor at Griffith Law School, Queensland (Juliet, “Is Psychoanalysis Universal? Politics, Desire, and Law in Colonial Contexts,” Political Psychology, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2017, dml)

The presumption of a universal form of desire is an important starting point for the analyst of any patient who arrives on the couch in the psychoanalytic clinic. The psychoanalyst can only offer certain parameters, with all their limitations. The patient, if the analyst allows for an interrogation of their own forms of resistance, however, can speak back to any frame of desire that the analyst presumes or proposes. And the analyst—if Jacques Lacan’s thoughts on resistance are taken seriously (Lacan, 2007, p. 497; Rogers, 2016, pp. 183–187)—must listen, attend, learn, and adapt. But when the desires of subjects are extended into the political realm, when the wants and needs of every subject are presumed to articulate with a psychoanalytic notion of universal desire, then something is lost. That something might be called the desire of the other, or it might not be called desire at all.

The desire of the other is not easily seen in the wake of European Enlightenment that has engulfed the imagination of psychoanalytic and political theorists and practitioners alike. It is not easily seen, and it is not easily conversed with when epistemological work presumes a trajectory of desire and then applies it. In this application, there is little space for a radically other performance of politics as action or imagination to appear. The subject who is subsumed into this imagination—the subject Gayatri Spivak (1996)1 describes as “the Other of Europe”—has little opportunity to do more than “utter” under the weight of its imagined subjectivity. As Spivak (1999) says:

[I]n the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary—not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. (p. 266)

Psychoanalysis is as guilty of exercising such a form of “great care” as many of the occupations of French intellectuals that Spivak has criticized for doing so. Psychoanalysis, with its attention to the many forms of the unconscious, can appear otherwise than guilty of this. It can appear more open, generous, and curious about the many forms that desire can take. In its later forms of attention to a politically constituted “symbolic order” under the guidance of Lacan (2007), it can also appear more attentive to the particularities of desires informed by a politics of the time. I argue here, however, that attention is already constituted by an imagination of a subject who wants, who needs, who desires objects, things, rights, in a mode which cannot not start from a point of origin, and a particular political form of origin which then precludes the recognition—in both the clinic and in political analysis2 —of other forms of desire, “with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary.” When practices such as political psychoanalysis presume a particular form of desire, what is at stake in this constitution of desire is the political subject or the Other of Europe who cannot “speak,” in Spivak’s terms. What is lost might be called radical desire; it might be an itinerary which is cathected or invested otherwise, and, as such, it might not be recognizable in psychoanalysis or in contemporary political psychology at all.

The nonrecognition of the Other of Europe, in her many forms, is a consistent political problem—documented often and insistently by critical race and postcolonial analysts such as Spivak, but also Sanjay Seth, Leila Gandhi, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Elizabeth Povinelli, Ashis Nandy, Christine Black, and Homi Bhabha. Such nonrecognition, however, when repostulated in political psychoanalysis has another effect. The trajectory of the symptoms of political practice—including desires for law, justice, particular election outcomes, rights, socioeconomic configurations, or even for the formation of political structures themselves (democracy being only one)— presume a form of desire that refers to, and endures in, its constitution. As Spivak (1999) notes in her critique of power and desire as universal:

[S]o is “desire” misleading because of its paleonomic burden of an originary phenomenal passion—from philosophical intentionality on the one hand to psychoanalytic definitive lack on the other. (p. 107)

The psychoanalytic definitive lack she speaks of refers to the Lacanian configuration of desire as always attempting to recover, to master, to instantiate an identity that is supposedly interminably lost as soon as language acts upon the subject. This lack is inaugurated through the subjects relation to what it cannot have, or, in Spivak’s terms, the “originary phenomenal passion” referring to the oedipal scene, which is presumed to be the origin of desire for all. This configuration of desire renders all subjects desiring of overcoming that lack. But it is a particular form of desire and a particular quality of lack. The presumption of this quality—the presumption about what and how people desire—I argue here, must be accountable to the politico-historical configurations which have produced it.

Politico-historical configurations, by definition, are not universal. That is, contra Zizek (2006), I argue that not all the world is a symptom, but that any psychoanalysis of a political symptom, of a political subject, or of the desires examined through psychoanalysis as they emerge in a political arena, assume a particular formation of desire. And that such an analysis operates within the parameters and employs the understandings of the oedipal scene, or, simply of a subjectivity split by language, including the language of law. As Lacan (2006) says “language begins along with law” (p. 225). While this split subjectivity may appear to be universal—and is convincingly employed as such by psychoanalytic and political theorists, and often philosophers (Butler, 1997; Epstein, 2013; Zevnik, 2016; Zizek, 2006), this splitting refers specifically to an oedipal lineage, as a particular instantiation of Oedipal Law, and, as I argue positive law as a liberal law concerned with rights and with what once can or cannot have from the polis as much as what one can take from the father. Thus the “originary phenomenal passion,” which a psychoanalysis of the political engages, always refers back as I will explain, to a (primal) father as a sovereign in a wrangle with his sons, a scene which itself cannot not be understood without its resonances to the French Revolution.

## Baudrillard

### Action Key—1NC

#### Even if Baudrillard’s right about hyperreality, he’s wrong about the response --- we need to act against the various mechanisms of social control that still permeate society

Steven Best 97, Assoc Professor and Chair of Philosophy at U-Texas, El Paso and Douglas Kellner, chair in the philosophy of education at UCLA, The Postmodern Turn, 1997, p. 105-106

In particular, we argue that capitalism is currently undergoing a global reorganization based on new technologies and a transnational corporate restructuring and that consequently our contemporary moment is between a disorganized and reorganized capitalism, a situation that requires intense focus both on political economy and on technology and culture. Part of this transformation involves new functions for the state, as well as the loss of national sovereignty to transnational forces, and the creation of new identities and experiences. But we believe that Baudrillard is wrong when he says that we are no longer within a disciplinary society, or a society of the spectacle, but are completely within a fully processed simulatory, cybernetic, postmodern society where distinctions such as those between subject and object, appearance and reality, surface and depth, and so on, are obliterated. Just as a feudal mode of production can coexist with capitalism, so too can disciplinary or "spectacular" forms of power coexist with the society of simulation. What **we see today is not discipline or simulation, the society of the spectacle or the world of the panopticon, hyperreality or political economy, but a complex** interplay of various mechanisms of social control **that include** discipline, spectacle, surveillance, simulation, the classic overt violence of the state, and the global restructuring of capitalism, along with good old **sexism, racism, and class domination.**

### Anti-War Activism—1NC

#### Political activism is affective – 65 years of empirics prove that creating new public interpretations of how violence operates makes material changes

Berinsky 7, Adam J. professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict,” Journal of Politics, Volume 69, Issue 4, pages 975–997, November 2007

Many political scientists and policymakers argue that unmediated events—the successes and failures on the battlefield—determine whether the mass public will support military excursions. The public supports war, the story goes, if the benefits of action outweigh the costs of conflict. Other scholars contend that the balance of elite discourse influences public support for war. I draw upon survey evidence from World War II and the current war in Iraq to come to a common conclusion regarding public support for international interventions. I find little evidence that citizens make complex cost/benefit calculations when evaluating military action. Instead, I find that patterns of elite conflict shape opinion concerning war. When political elites disagree as to the wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. But when elites come to a common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to wage war.¶ In recent years, a charitable view of the mass public has emerged in the public opinion and foreign policy literature. Increasingly, scholars have attributed “rationality” to public opinion concerning war. Many political scientists and policymakers argue that unmediated events—the successes and failures on the battlefield—determine whether the mass public will support military excursions. The public supports war, the story goes, if the benefits of action outweigh the costs of conflict and should therefore have a place at the policymaking table.¶ In this paper, I argue that military events may shape public opinion, but not in the straightforward manner posited by most scholars of public opinion and war. I draw upon and expand the work of scholars who contend that the balance of elite discourse influences levels of public support for war. Integrating research on heuristics and shortcuts with information-based theories of political choice, I demonstrate that patterns of conflict among partisan political actors shape mass opinion on war. It is not the direct influence of wartime events on individual citizens' decisions that determines public opinion, as “event response” theories of war support claim. Instead, consistent with the “elite cue” theory I advance in this paper, the nature of conflict among political elites concerning the salience and meaning of those events determines if the public will rally to war. To a significant degree citizens determine their positions on war by listening to trusted sources—those politicians who share their political predispositions.¶ I present evidence from World War II and the Second Iraq war, two cases that span 65 years of American history, to come to this common conclusion. In both wars, I find that significant segments of the mass public possessed little knowledge of the most basic facts of these conflicts. Thus, there is little evidence that citizens had the information needed to make cost/benefit calculations when deciding whether to support or oppose military action. Instead, I find that patterns of elite conflict shaped opinions both throughout the six years of World War II and during the Iraq conflict. When elites come to a common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to wage war. But when prominent political actors take divergent stands on the wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. Furthermore, even in cases—such as the Iraq war—where prominent political actors on one side of the partisan divide stay silent, the presence of a prominent partisan cue giver can lead to divergence in opinion. In sum, while members of the mass public are not lemmings—they have agency to determine their own opinion and may even, in the aggregate, reasonably react to changing events—in the realm of war, any apparent rationality arises largely through the process of elite cue taking, not through a reasoned cost/benefit analysis. The mass public is rational only to the extent that prominent political actors provide a rational lead.

### Anti-War Activism—2NC

#### Anti-war activism is affective – empirical studies done on public opinion and the influence of the media from World War 2 all the way up to the Iraq war prove that the opinion of elites structures public consensus, and that only by using our power as advocates to shift those opinions can create the social transitions necessary to stop global military interventionism.

#### The impact is sanitization—that allows policy-makers to coopt poststructural concepts to justify interventions gone wrong while doing nothing to change the squo.

Hynek 13 Nik, Prof of International Relations and Theory of Politics at the Metropolitan University Prague and Charles University, with David Chandler, No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies, Critical Studies on Security, 2013 Vol. 1, No. 1, 46–63, <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/spais/migrated/documents/cssrg1.pdf> [Note: CSS = “Critical Security Studies”]

Conclusion¶ This article has argued that the appendage ‘critical’ should be removed to allow Security Studies to free itself of the baggage of its founding. It is clear that what little emancipatory content critical security theorising had initially has been more than exhausted and, in fact, thoroughly critiqued. The boom in CSS in the 1990s and early 2000s was essentially parasitical on the shift in Western policy discourses, which emphasised the radical and emancipatory possibilities of power, rather than on the basis of giving theoretical clarity to counter-hegemonic forces.¶ We would argue that the removal of the prefix ‘critical’ would also be useful to distinguish security study based on critique of the world as it exists from normative theorising based on the world as we would like it to be. As long as we keep the ‘critical’ nomenclature, we are affirming that government and international policy-making can be understood and critiqued against the goal of emancipating the non-Western Other. Judging policy-making and policy outcomes, on the basis of this imputed goal, may provide ‘critical’ theorists with endless possibilities to demonstrate their normative standpoints but it does little to develop academic and political understandings of the world we live in.¶ In fact, no greater straw[person] man could have been imagined, than the ability to become ‘critical’ on the basis of debates around the claim that the West was now capable of undertaking emancipatory policy missions. Today, as we witness a narrowing of transformative aspirations on behalf of Western policy elites, in a reaction against the ‘hubris’ of the claims of the 1990s (Mayall and Soares de Oliveira 2012) and a slimmed down approach to sustainable, ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding, CSS has again renewed its relationship with the policy sphere. Some academics and policy-makers now have a united front that rather than placing emancipation at the heart of policy-making it should be ‘local knowledge’ and ‘local demands’.¶ The double irony of the birth and death of CSS is not only that CSS has come full circle – from its liberal teleological universalist and emancipatory claims, in the 1990s, to its discourses of limits and flatter ontologies, highlighting differences and pluralities in the 2010s – but that this ‘critical’ approach to security has also mirrored and mimicked the policy discourses of leading Western powers. As policy-makers now look for excuses to explain the failures of the promise of liberal interventionism, critical security theorists are on hand to salve Western consciences with analyses of non-linearity, complexity and human and non-human assemblages. It appears that the world cannot be transformed after all. We cannot end conflict or insecurity, merely attempt to manage them. Once critique becomes anti-critique (Noys 2011) and emancipatory alternatives are seen to be merely expressions of liberal hubris, the appendage of ‘critical’ for arguments that discount the possibility of transforming the world and stake no claims which are unamenable to power or distinct from dominant philosophical understandings is highly problematic. Let us study security, its discourses and its practices, by all means but please let us not pretend that study is somehow the same as critique.

### Communication Good—1NC

#### Communicative rationality and intersubjectivity founded on minimal guidelines create intellectual experimentation around the resolution in a form of play that helps combat ideological attachments---this is a better way to dissolve metaphysical understandings of the subject than the aff’s abandonment of reason

Merawi 11, Fasil Addis Ababa University, Faculty Of Humanities, Department Of Philosophy (Graduate Programme), Habermas And The Discourse Of Modernity, etd.aau.edu.et/dspace/bitstream/123456789/3695/1/FASIL%20MERAWI.pdf

Heidegger and Derrida should have avoided appealing to ontico-ontological significance of a being that can give an insight to Being itself as such, and a heterogeneous state determining all meaning. Instead they should have resorted to the communicative paradigm. As we have seen in Heidegger, Dasein has a unique place as a being that interrogates Being as such, and thus was taken as a point of departure. Habermas urges the interlocutors in the philosophical discourse of modernity to abandon the subject-object metaphysics, where the subject is oriented towards an objective possible state of affairs, and instead tries to strengthen the communicative action taking place between individuals in modern societies. Hence, he remarks, “I have already suggested that the paradigm of the knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action.” (PDM, 295-296) Habermas sees in Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault a rejection of the subject that establishes its primacy by its reflection on the world. But, whereas Heidegger and Derrida tried to make some compromise, by establishing the Dasein Analytic, and show how the subject participates in a Heterogeneous deferred meaning formation ;Foucault on the contrary tried to completely denounce the subject in placing it under concrete, material, and specific power/knowledge relationships. From Habermas’s point of view, the divisions between empirical and transcendental, Being and beings, noumenal and phenomenal, all point to the fact that, the reason of the modern project is ‘exhausted’. All these distinctions are attempts to preserve the philosophy of the subject under different formulations. Some situated the subject as locus of possible cognition. Others show that the subject is completely autonomous, while there are also some that place the subject under different repressive relations. But all these are exhausted for Habermas since as we have seen in the last three chapters no attempts have been successful to come up with a strong alternative. The solution is making the move to communicative rationality and intersubjectivity. Hence Habermas remarks that, “[t]he paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness is exhausted. If this is so, the symptoms of exhaustion should dissolve with the transition to the paradigm of mutual understanding.” (PDM, 296 The essence of communicative rationality lies in how language coordinates actions; how actors in an intersubjective communicative process tend to respect some rules and in the process how understanding is to be achieved. In the communicative paradigm, when a speech act is forwarded, the one to which its directed, recognizes it and thereby offers a reply establishing an intersubjective communicative process. What makes this communicative process possible are the shared backgrounds of meanings and idealizing presuppositions that guide communicative processes, and also the fact that those in communication are, oriented towards consensus. This differs radically from the paradigm of consciousness where a relation is to be established to a possible state of affairs. Habermas thinks that in the communicative paradigm, the subject is no longer viewed as being divided between empirical and transcendental domains. Accordingly, Habermas claims that in communicative rationality, “no mediation is possible between the extramundane stance of the transcendental I and the intermundane stance of the empirical I” (PDM, 297). The ego finds itself in an intersubjective communicative arena and it affirms itself by presenting its validity claims. For Habermas, a speech act as the smallest unit of every-day communication, serves as a platform for raising validity claims, or the claims of individuals in asserting that what they are claiming is true and that they can provide 94 reasons for it in relation to the objective, social and subjective worlds. Hence, the “ego stands within an interpersonal relationship that allows him to relate to himself as a participant in an interaction from the perspective of alter.”(ibid) This differs from subject-object metaphysics where everything becomes a possible state of affair to be known in the objective the world. Instead in communicative rationality, the ego becomes the one which founds its claims in a world of other possible claims, oriented towards the objective, social and subjective dimensions.

### Materialism—1NC

#### The aff’s reductionist view of war disconnects simulacra from their real institutional determinants---only countering simulations with better military scholarship can prevent endless intervention

Mitchell Hobbs 6, The University of Newcastle, Australia, REFLECTIONS ON THE REALI TY OFTHE IRAQ WARS: THE DEMISE OFBAUDRILLARD’S SEARCH FORTRUTH?, https://www.academia.edu/2569231/Reflections\_on\_the\_reality\_of\_the\_Iraq\_Wars\_the\_demise\_of\_Baudrillards\_search\_for\_truth

Although Baudrillard’s work on “simulation” and “simulacra” is valuable in highlightingthe relationship between the mass media and reality, and, in particular, the ways in which media content (images and narratives) come to be de-contextualised, his theses are per se insufficient for the analysis of the contemporary mass media. For instance, asmedia theorist and researcher Douglas Kellner (2003:31) notes, beyond the level of media spectacle, Baudrillard does not help readers understand events such as the Gulf War, because he reduces the actions of actors and complex political issues to categories of “simulation” and “hyper-reality”, in a sense “erasing their concrete determinants”. Kellner, who like Baudrillard, has written extensively on media spectacles, including theGulf Wars, sees Baudrillard’s theory as being “one-dimensional”, “privilege[ing] the form of media technology over its content, meaning and…use” (Kellner, 1989:73). In thisregard, Baudrillard does not account for the political economic dimensions of the newsmedia, nor the cultural practices involved with the production of news (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Thus, he suffers from the same technologically deterministic essentialism thatundermined the media theories of Marshall McLuhan, albeit in a different form (Kellner,1989:73-74). Although Kellner (2003:32) believes that Baudrillard’s pre-1990s works on “the consumer society, on the political economy of the sign, simulation and simulacra,and the implosion of [social] phenomenon” are useful and can be deployed within criticalsocial theory, he prefers to read Baudrillard’s later, more controversial and obscure, workas “science fiction which anticipates the future by exaggerating present tendencies” In order to understand war and its relationship with the media in the contemporary era it is, then, necessary to move beyond Baudrillard’s spectacular theory of media spectacle. For although our culture is resplendent with images, signs and narratives, circulating in aseemingly endless dance of mimicry (or, rather, simulacra), there are observable social institutions and practices producing this semiotic interplay. Although all that is solidmight melt into air (Marx and Engles, 2002:223), appearances and illusions are not an end for sociological analysis, but are rather a seductive invitation to further social inquiry. As the research of Douglas Kellner (1992; 1995; 2005) has shown, when media spectacles are dissected by critical cultural analysis, re-contextualisation is possible. Images and narratives can be traced back to their sources: whether they lie in Hollywood fantasies or government ‘spin’. In short, by assessing the veracity of competing texts, war (as understood by media audiences) can be re-connected to its antecedents and consequences. Indeed, through wrestling with the ideological spectres of myth and narrative, and by searching widely for critically informed explanations of different events, the social sciences can acquire an understanding of the ‘truthfulness’ of media representations; of the ‘authentic’ in a realm bewildered by smoke and mirrors. As long as there are competing media voices on which to construct a juxtaposition of ‘truths’, sociologists can, to a certain extent, force the media to grapple with their own disparate reflections. 3 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 REST IN PEACE BAUDRILLARD? In the final analysis, then, Baudrillard’s work on the Gulf War and the September 11terrorist attacks should (respectfully) be laid to rest. For although some, such as RichardKeeble (2004:43), have followed Baudrillard in arguing that “there was no war in the gulf in 2003”, such statements are somewhat antithetical to the truth aims of the social sciences. Baudrillard, being both an icon and iconoclast, pushed his language and arguments to rhetorical extremes in order to force the collapse of representations andarguments he saw as having supplanted truth. His fatal theory was in a sense intellectual ‘hype’, for a capricious world in which only ‘hype’ can be noticed. Yet in shouting his arguments he served to obfuscate their nuance and subtext, the very intellectualessences of his work and, ultimately, his contribution to the body of knowledge. However, although fatal theory is of little practical use for media researchers seeking anempirically derived ‘truth’, Baudrillard’s oeuvre is still (somewhat) instructive, remindingus of the importance of de-mystifying reality. For although the voice of the scholar is that of a pariah in the entertainment driven public sphere, we must force our voices into the public sphere if we are to re-contextualise events such as the Iraq war, by providing audiences with better, more veracious accounts of events. Failing this, we will continue to find our ‘defence’ forces engaged in military operations under spurious casus belli arguments. Accordingly, despite the many faults of his work, Baudrillard should not beforgotten. For although his contribution was more of a slap-of-the-face than a gentlepush in the right direction, his ideas regarding simulacra and reality have helped to further our understanding of media spectacles (and their potential repercussions). In apost-Baudrillard world, as social inquiry (it is to be hoped) returns to a more empiricallyinformed understanding of the media, we should not forget the implications posed by thiscultural field. For if sociology seeks to explain the social world, then it must work to prevent the dislocation of reality from the ‘real’ that Baudrillard so feared.

### Policy Focus—1NC

#### Hyperreality theory is wrong – a concrete focus is key to solving your impacts

**Hobbs 07** – (Mitchell, Lecturer and PhD Candidate (Sociology and Anthropology), The University of Newcastle, Australia, ‘REFLECTIONS ON THE REALITY OF THE IRAQ WARS: THE DEMISE OF BAUDRILLARD’S SEARCH FOR TRUTH?,” Fall, 2007, <http://www.tasa.org.au/conferences/conferencepapers07/papers/379.pdf>)

As has been noted by Barry Smart (2000) (and others), Baudrillard’s theorising, which has its roots in neo-Marxism, eventually led him to the proposition that if current sociological critique was incapable of ascertaining truth because reality was being superseded by de-contextualised images (or, rather, signs), then a new system of social inquiry was needed, one capable of breaking out of the endless cycle of simulacra and the intellectual “inertia” brought about by the meta-physical dead end of capitalism. To this end, **Baudrillard sought to employ a “fatal strategy**” or “fatal theory”, **where he could highlight the deceptions of “hyper-reality” by pushing them into a “more real than real situation”,** to force them into a clear “over-existence which is incompatible with that of the real” (Baudrillard cited in Smart, 2000:464). Accordingly, by claiming that the Gulf War did not take place, **Baudrillard was seeking to push our thinking of this event beyond the orthodox political economic approach, in order to draw attention to the “simulated” nature of the news media and to the antithetical consequences of this seemingly endless use and reproduction of images and simplistic narratives deprived of socio-historic contexts.¶** 2.2 BRIDGING THE REALITY GULF: FROM BAUDRILLARD TO KELLNER¶ Although Baudrillard’s work on “simulation” and “simulacra” is valuable in highlighting the relationship between the mass media and reality, and, in particular, the ways in which media content (images and narratives) come to be de-contextualised, his theses are per se insufficient for the analysis of the contemporary mass media. For instance, as media theorist and researcher Douglas Kellner (2003:31) notes, beyond the level of media spectacle, **Baudrillard does not help readers understand** events such as **the Gulf War,** because he reduces the actions of actors and complex political issues to categories of “simulation” and “hyper-reality”, in a sense “erasing their concrete determinants”.¶ Kellner, who like Baudrillard, has written extensively on media spectacles, including the Gulf Wars, sees Baudrillard’s theory as being “one-dimensional”, “**privilege[ing] the form of media technology over its content, meaning and…use”** (Kellner, 1989:73). In this regard, **Baudrillard does not account for the political economic dimensions of the news media, nor the cultural practices involved with the production of news** (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Thus, he suffers from the same technologically deterministic essentialism that undermined the media theories of Marshall McLuhan, albeit in a different form (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Although Kellner (2003:32) believes that Baudrillard’s pre-1990s works on “the consumer society, on the political economy of the sign, simulation and simulacra, and the implosion of [social] phenomenon” are useful and can be deployed within critical social theory, he prefers to read Baudrillard’s later, more controversial and obscure, work as “science fiction which anticipates the future by exaggerating present tendencies”.¶ In order to understand war and its relationship with the media in the contemporary era it is, then, necessary to move beyond Baudrillard’s spectacular theory of media spectacle. For although our culture is resplendent **with images, signs and narratives, circulating in a seemingly endless dance of mimicry** (**or**, rather, **simulacra**), there are observable social institutions and practices producing this semiotic interplay. Although all that is solid might melt into air (Marx and Engles, 2002:223), appearances and illusions are not an end for sociological analysis, but are rather a seductive invitation to further social inquiry. As the research of Douglas Kellner (1992; 1995; 2005) has shown, when media spectacles are dissected by critical cultural analysis, re-contextualisation is possible. **Images and narratives can be traced back to their sources: whether they lie in** Hollywood **fantasies or government ‘spin’.** In short, by assessing the veracity of competing texts, war (as understood by media audiences) can be re-connected to its antecedents and consequences. Indeed, through wrestling with the ideological spectres of myth and narrative, and by searching widely for critically informed explanations of different events, the social sciences can acquire an understanding of the ‘truthfulness’ of media representations; of the ‘authentic’ in a realm bewildered by smoke and mirrors. **As long as there are** competing media voices on which to construct a juxtaposition of ‘truths’, **sociologists can**, to a certain extent, **force the media to grapple with their own disparate reflections.**

### Policy Focus—2NC

#### Protest is effective—speaking the language of policymakers and pointing out their hypocrisy isn’t a tactic that gets coopted but rather has empirically produced effective change.

Mellor 13, Ewan E. Ph.D. candidate, Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, 2013, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,”

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 Conclusion This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

### Practicality—1NC

#### The affirmative over-states the role played by illusion in politics---their emphasis on unmasking reality leaves us unable to deal with practical political problems

Unger 9—founding member of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Roberto, The Self Awakened, 15-8)

15¶ they have much more often been put forward by different thinkers and different schools of thought. However, even when living separate lives, the two bodies of belief have regularly coexisted in a broad range of civilizations and historical periods. Everything happens as if, despite their seeming distance and even contradiction to each other, they were in fact allied. What is the meaning of this working partnership between partners with such widely differing motives, ambitions, and tenets?¶ The world may be strife and illusion, but its troubles, sufferings, and dangers do not dissipate simply because they have been denied solidity and value. Once devalued, the world—especially the social world—must still be managed. We must prevent the worst from happening. Those who can apprehend the truth of the situation, divining ultimate being under the shadows of mendacious difference, and permanence under the appearance of change, are a happy few. Their withdrawal from social responsibility in the name of an ethic of contemplative serenity, inaction, and absorption into the reality of the One fails to solve the practical problems of social order. On the contrary, such a retreat threatens to leave a disaster in its wake: the calamity of a vacuum of initiative and belief. Into this vacuum steps the doctrine of hierarchical specialization in soul and society. ¶ Seen through the sharp and selective lens of the perennial philosophy, this doctrine may be no more than a holding operation, as inexorable in its claims on those who must govern society as it is groundless in its metaphysical justification. There is then no surprise in seeing it most often represented by traditions of thought different from those that have adhered to the perennial philosophy.¶ Some in the world history of thought, however, have claimed to discern a more intimate connection between the doctrine of order and the perennial philosophy. If ultimate reality is spirit residing in all the apparent particulars, and most especially in living beings, then identification with universal spirit creates as well a basis for universal solidarity or compassion. The same compassion can then reappear in a commanding place among the highest faculties of the soul. It can therefore also be most closely identified with rulers and priests. The bonds of reciprocity, of mutual allegiance and devotion, among supe¶ ¶ 16¶ riors and subalterns as well as among equals, can be founded on the expression and the worship of universal spirit, manifest among us as compassion and solidarity.¶ It is a belief we find articulated in philosophical and religious teachings as different as those of Buddha and Confucius. It reappears in that uniquely relentless Western statement of the otherwise un-Western instance of the perennial philosophy—the teaching of Schopenhauer. This belief turns the doctrine of social and moral order into something more than an effort to contain calamity and savagery in this vale of tears and illusions: into a concerted effort to soften the terror of social life, shortening the distance between ultimate being and everyday experience. The perennial philosophy suffers from both a cognitive and an existential defect. The former is manifest in its vision of the world, and the latter, in its quest for happiness through serenity, and for serenity through invulnerability and distance.¶ Its cognitive flaw is its failure to recognize how completely and irreparably we are in fact embodied and situated. Not only our sufferings and our joys but also our prospects of action and discovery are engaged in the reality and the transformation of difference: the differences among phenomena and among people. To understand a state of affairs, whether in nature or in science, is to grasp what it might become as it is subject to different directions and varieties of pressure. Our imagination of these next steps—of these metamorphoses of reality—is the indispensable sign of advance in insight. When we deny the reality— at least the ultimate reality—of differences, we sever the vital link between insight into the real and imagined or experienced transformation. ¶ The existential failing of the perennial philosophy is the revenge of this denied and unchained reality against the hope that we would become freer and happier if only we could see through the illusions of change and distinction. The point of seeing through these illusions is supposed to be greater freedom on the basis of truer understanding. ¶ However, the consequence of the required denial of the reality of particulars may be the inverse of the liberation it promises. Having declared independence in the mind and ceased war against the realities¶ ¶ 17¶ around us, we find ourselves confined within a narrowing space. In the name of freedom, we become more dependent and more enslaved.¶ We may cast on ourselves a spell temporarily to quiet our restless striving. However, in so doing we deny ourselves instruments with which to explore the real world. We forego the means by which to see how everything in it can become something else when placed under resistance. By the same token, we lose the tools with which to strengthen our practical powers. We become cranks, slaves, and fantasists under the pretext of becoming free men and women. It is true that there will always be moments when we can transport ourselves, through such self-incantation, into a realm in which the particulars of the world and of the body, to which we have denied ultimate reality, cease to burden us. However, we cannot live in such a world; our moments of supposed liberation cannot survive the routines and responsibilities of practical life.¶ The alliance of the perennial philosophy with the practical doctrine of hierarchical specialization in soul and society has been the predominant position in the world history of speculative thought. Its major opponent has been a direction of thinking that, though exceptional in the context of world history, has long been the chief view in Western philosophy. The expression of this view in philosophical texts, however, is secondary to its broader articulation in religion, literature, and art. It is not merely the artifact of a tradition of speculative theorizing; it is the mainstay of a civilization, though a mainstay that represents a radical and uncompromising deviation from what has elsewhere been the dominant conception. Today this deviation has become the common possession of humanity thanks to the global propagation of its ideas by both high and popular Western culture. Its assumptions nevertheless remain inexplicit and its relation to the representation of nature in science unclear. To render this Western deviation from the perennial philosophy both perspicuous and uncompromising is a major part of the work of a radicalized pragmatism.¶ The hallmark of the deviation is belief in the reality of time as well as in the reality of the differences around which our experience is organized: in the first instance, the reality of the individual person and of¶ ¶ 18¶ differences among persons; in the second, the discrete structure of the world we perceive and inhabit. It is the view of individual personality that is most central to this belief system; everything else follows as a consequence.¶ The individual, his character, and his fate are for real. Each individual is different from every other individual who has ever lived or who will ever live. A human life is a dramatic and irreversible movement from birth to death, surrounded by mystery and overshadowed by chance.¶ What individuals can do with their lives depends on the way society is organized and on their place within the social order, as well as on achievement and luck. What happens in biographical time turns in large part on what happens in historical time. For this reason alone, history is a scene of decisive action, and everything that takes place in it is, like individuality itself, for real, not an illusory or distracting epiphenomenon obscuring a timeless reality. History is not cyclical but rather resembles individual life in being unilinear and irreversible. The institutions and the beliefs we develop in historical time may expand or diminish the life chances of the individual, including his relative power to challenge and change them in the course of his activities.¶ The reality of difference and of transformation, rooted in the basic facts of individual experience, then becomes the model on which we see and confront the whole world. Nothing is more crucial to the definition of such an approach to the world than its way of representing the relation between its view of humanity and its view of nature. This representation is subject to three related misstatements that narrow the reach and weaken the force of the alternative it offers to the perennial philosophy. In the process of criticizing and rejecting these alternatives, we come to see more clearly just what is at stake in the advancement of this alternative conception. Many of the most influential positions in the history of Western philosophy—including the “rejected options” discussed in the previous section—represent variations on qualified and inadequate versions of the alternative.

## Becoming-War

### Empiricism Good—1NC

#### Tracing the quantitative implications of empire isn’t the computational logic they critique. It’s liberatory.

O’Sullivan, et al, 18—University of California, Berkeley (David, with Luke Bergmann and Jim Thatcher, “Spatiality, Maps, and Mathematics in Critical Human Geography: Toward a Repetition with Difference,” The Professional Geographer, 70:1, 129-139, dml)

Quantitative methods in geography are often assumed to be intrinsically tied to absolute, Euclidean and Cartesian perspectives on space. This relationship is not inevitable, as is clear from even the brief examination of work in quantitative geography we undertake here. There have long been quantitative approaches to space centered on the idea that proximity and interaction are not simply related to distance “as the crow flies,” and these can provide jumping-off points for the creative exploration of sociospatial structures. Indeed, we want to suggest that one source (among many) of contemporary human geography’s rich streams of thought on the production of space, place, scale, connectivity, relationality, territory, and so on (see, inter alia, Smith 1984; Massey 1993; Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005; Secor 2013) is a lesser known tradition of self-styled theoretical geography, prominent in the 1960s and 1970s and experimental in its use of computation and mathematics (see Bunge 1966). This tradition has many differences in origins and commitments from much of the social theory and continental philosophy that informs what contemporary geographers think of as theory. Yet too little work has moved on to explore how ontological resonances between such approaches can be productive for contemporary human geography.

To encourage reconsideration of received understandings of the quantitative and cartographic, we assemble several intriguing early innovations that rely on geometries that move beyond the Euclidean. To begin, in the next section we consider three examples of the kind of work we have in mind: first, Bunge’s (1988) Nuclear War Atlas; second, Tobler’s work on innovative geographical projections; and third, a range of work through the 1970s, struggling to represent and theorize new concepts of geographical space, ably reviewed in a then-contemporary paper by Forer (1978).

Our argument is that these (and other examples) were and remain highly relevant to theoretical developments in geography, including social theory (Harvey 1973; Sack 1980; Soja 1980; Smith 1984; Gregory and Urry 1985; Massey 1999; Sheppard 2008; Secor 2013), precisely because they grapple with the challenges of understanding non-absolute, non-Newtonian models of space suggested by those theoretical developments. In effect, mathematical and visual approaches for extending the geographical imagination (Harvey 1973; Gregory 1994; Massey 2005) were being developed alongside and in conversation with social theory that suggested the value of such methods for critical perspectives in geography. Yet, although the conceptual innovations in theory have been widely taken up, researchers have rarely brought parallel developments in computational methods into the conversation. It is one thing to critique quantitative, computational, and cartographic methods and quite another to constructively engage them to advance critical social theory. Such engagement is not easy given the very different notions of theory traded in by social theory and mathematical science, but we agree with Schuurman (2002) that such engagement is urgent and with Wilson (2015) that “a tacking back and forth between technical practice and critical practice” (31) is possible and necessary. As part of this focus section on critical studies of data and technology, we offer paths toward Dalton, Taylor, and Thatcher’s (2016) desired “dialog between the deeply theoretical and the robustly empiric” (1).

Geospatial visualization and analysis are more accessible than ever. Feminist and critical GIS have further transformed the epistemological stakes of representation, visualization, and analysis (McLafferty 2002; Pavlovskaya and St. Martin 2007; Kwan 2008; we return to these contributions later). Yet it is ironic that more-than-Euclidean, nonabsolute spatial representations remain rare in broader scholarship and professional practice. In a double irony, the relentless absolute model of space embedded in geographical information systems1 and also (perhaps even more so) in newer Web-based mapping platforms is directing renewed enthusiasm for quantitative, cartographic approaches in critical human geography into precisely the narrow “view from nowhere” mappings of which now-mainstream and other radical theories remain deeply skeptical (see Haraway 1988). Through a careful tracing of the theoretical geography of the 1960s, we suggest how scholars, drawing on methodological traditions past and present, mathematical and critical, might move beyond absolute spatiality and explore manifold “views from somewhere” that further critique the power geometries (Massey 1993) and spatial structures of contemporary society.

Mappings of Non-Euclidean, Nonabsolute Spaces

Bunge’s Nuclear War Atlas Bunge’s (1988) Nuclear War Atlas is about nuclear war, about peace and human flourishing, and about how a geographical imagination can advance one over the other. The importance of the book to our argument does not rest on these themes but on how it reconstructs maps and our geographic imagination to develop arguments. It is significant that this volume comes many years after Bunge’s work with the Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute (DGEI) of the 1970s yet addresses many of the same themes, often using imaginative visualizations that show that other cartographic spatialities are possible beyond those offered today by GIS. It is particularly important to note Bunge’s approach, given the recent revival of interest in his Fitzgerald (Bunge 1971; note its 2011 reprinting; see also Barnes et al. 2011). Fitzgerald was, as Bunge noted, the product of a much larger effort involving, among many others, Betty Bunge and Gwendolyn Warren, and needs to be understood as such. At the same time, reading Fitzgerald out of the context of Bunge’s larger oeuvre risks underplaying Bunge’s enduring contributions to cartographic and quantitatively engaged theoretical geography (Bunge 1966; see also Cox, Macmillan, and Bunge 2001; Goodchild 2008).

If Fitzgerald is a “tortured book, controversial, angry, partial, withering, hyperbolic, with non sequiturs and unsubstantiated claims” (Heynen and Barnes, in their Foreword to the 2011 reprint of Fitzgerald [Bunge 1971]), so, too, is Nuclear War Atlas. Much of Nuclear War Atlas is repetitive, both within its own pages and in the wider context of Bunge’s oeuvre. It picks up where Fitzgerald closes with the “total species’ effort to tame the machines” (Bunge 1971, 242), no longer now merely automobiles and the harsh urban landscape but the spectre of global nuclear warfare. The theme of human survival is consistent with the earlier work (see also Bunge 1973). Figures and maps from Fitzgerald (Bunge 1971) and from Theoretical Geography (Bunge 1966) also reappear. Mapping was central to the approach of the DGEI, which has been an important impetus and inspiration for contemporary practitioners of participatory GIS, community mapping, and countermapping (Wood 2010b; Heynen 2013; Benach 2017). The innovation in the maps produced by DGEI and later projects in Canada (Bunge and Bordessa 1975), however, lies not principally in their cartographic construction but in their critical content. Maps are presented of the “region of rat-bitten babies” in Detroit (Bunge and Bordessa 1975, 326) or of “children’s pedestrian deaths and injuries by automobiles” (DGEI 1971, 12–13).2 These maps reappear in Nuclear War Atlas (the former as Map 3.16 on page 167, the latter as Map 2.16 on page 123). Such maps dramatically draw attention to the injustices they document, even today, when mapping the everyday has itself become quotidian, whether as volunteered geographic information (Elwood, Goodchild, and Sui 2012), neogeography (Haklay, Singleton, and Parker 2008), or the geoweb (Stephens 2013). In Nuclear War Atlas, the cartographic drama is heightened because “The color red is used throughout the atlas on the maps to depict death, and green life” (Bunge 1988, ix; there is very little green ink in the book).

What is most striking about Nuclear War Atlas is how Bunge pushes the possibilities of maps and diagrams to advance his position that nuclear weapons render conventional geopolitical concepts of territory inadequate. In suggesting that the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) constitutes a “topological space collapse” (Bunge 1988, 83), Bunge builds on material in Theoretical Geography (Bunge 1966) to develop his argument that advances in transportation and logistics have produced “The Shrinking World” (Bunge 1988). Just as the advent of sea travel and naval power meant that “all nations would be connected to all others” (91), the advent of ICBMs makes their possessors “three-dimensional powers” (92). As such, we must think not of national boundaries but of “boundary surfaces” (84). The United States and Soviet Union became “the closest neighbors ever” (93; this map also appeared in an earlier form in Bunge 1966, 277). These spatial conceptual arguments draw heavily on novel mappings and visual representations of the world. They demand considerable geographical imagination from readers as they are challenged to consider the global existential threat of nuclear armageddon. These arguments and mappings have much to contribute to current debates in human geography concerning volumetric space and verticality and their implications for notions such as territory (see Elden 2013; Graham 2016).

Bunge was quite distant from the centers of the academic world by the late 1980s, and his stridently partial writing was sometimes considered insufficiently disinterested to be taken entirely seriously (see, e.g., Cutter 1990). It is notable that although Fitzgerald (Bunge 1971) has seen a revival in recent years, its cartographic novelty lies in the subject matter of its maps, not in how those maps represent space and geography. Nuclear War Atlas is different, arguing through cartography at multiple levels, rendering the production of space, expanding the possibilities of mapping so that it becomes integral to the book’s bleak discussions of geopolitics. Space is reimagined not as Euclidean but via measures of distance such as “death miles from London” as a way to understand the reach of the British Empire (79). He suggested that the globe must be reimagined in terms of different metrics than the purely Euclidean to fully understand the complex spaces of Cold War nuclear geopolitics. Although Bunge’s conceptual reach might exceed his cartographic and technical grasp, not to mention the facilities available as an independent scholar producing the Nuclear War Atlas, it is telling that the relational geopolitical geographies across scales from the local to the global call for such “metacartography” (Bunge 1966) and that words alone are insufficient to convey such complex spatialities.

(Map) Transformations of Geography

The most sustained engagement with the challenges of geographic projections and the kinds of representations that Bunge was reaching for is found in the work of Tobler (1961, 1979, 2000). Indeed, perhaps incongruously for contemporary readers, for whom Tobler is eponymously associated with the first law of geography (Sui 2004) and thus often enrolled in justifying geographical analysis in absolute space, Bunge and other cartographers have understood Tobler’s work as fundamental to constructing relational spaces in mathematical and visual languages (Bunge 1988, especially xxv, 78; see also the dedication to Tobler in Cauvin, Escobar, and Serradj 2010). Much of Tobler’s work was anticipated in his PhD dissertation (Tobler 1961), a comprehensive rethinking of map projections as “transformations of geographic space.” Tobler’s framework enables the creation of cartograms (Tobler 1963) where Euclidean space gives way to spaces defined by the phenomena that inhabit them. Many have since advanced these and related visual approaches to space that move beyond enlightenment cartographic concerns of absolute spatial accuracy (e.g., Dorling 1991).

Tobler acknowledged the influence of Thompson’s (1917) On Growth and Form on his own theory of transformations (Tobler 1961). Indeed, as Werritty (2010) retells geography’s quantitative revolution, Thompson’s morphogenetics was quite central in its development. Morphogenetics’s dialectical linking of process and form deemphasizes Euclidean measures of distance in favor of relational measures tied to the processes driving changes in form. Applied geographically, this perspective opens up the prosaic world of map projections into a set of interpretative practices both fluid and exploratory. Alternative metrics for distance or area can be reconstructed from data to create unconventional maps of variable scale, which may then be used to explore what sorts of processes might have produced such spaces (Tobler 2000).

### Political Engagement Good—1NC

#### Martial empiricism is most effective when connected to political mobilization.

Elwood and Mitchell, 13—Professors of Geography at the University of Washington (Sarah and Katharyne, “Another Politics Is Possible: Neogeographies, Visual Spatial Tactics, and Political Formation,” Cartographica 48:4, 2013, pp. 275–292, dml)

New forms and applications of Internet-based spatial media continue to rise in number and diversity, with these technologies increasingly present in various forms of civic engagement and activism. Multimedia data collection, compilation, and mapping toolkits such as those provided by Ushahidi are being deployed for citizen monitoring of ethnic violence, election fraud, and disaster relief needs and resources (Okolloh 2009; Goodchild and Glennon 2010; Roche, Propeck-Zimmermann, and Mericskay 2011). A growing number of urban governments now use online and mobile geo-services that allow residents to submit their observations of infrastructural problems and other local needs via a geo-tagged text message or photograph or by adding an object to a map interface (Foth and others 2009; Elwood and Leszczynski 2013; Johnson and Sieber 2012). Citizens have used the high-resolution imagery of virtual globes like Google Earth to monitor military buildup or reveal supposedly secret sites and facilities (Aday and Livingston 2009; Perkins and Dodge 2009). These examples extend a vibrant history of civic applications of the earliest interactive mapping tools, including map mashups of Chicago crime data or post-hurricane evacuation and relief needs in New Orleans (Miller 2006; Crutcher and Zook 2009).

The technologies and practices that underlie these applications of Internet-based spatial media have become known by a dizzying array of new terms in the past several years. Volunteered geographic information (VGI) refers to spatial data sets compiled from the contributions of many individuals, such as citizen reports to a disaster relief map interface (Goodchild 2007; Elwood, Goodchild, and Sui 2012). The geospatial Web originally referenced only the centrality of geographic location as a means of organizing and retrieving online content (Scharl and Tochtermann 2007). The term ‘‘geoweb’’ is now used more broadly to identify this location-mediated Internet content and the hardware and software that enable its production, such as GPS-enabled handheld devices or freely available mapping APIs (Elwood and Leszczynski 2013). ‘‘Neogeography’’ has been used to refer to what some users do with interactive online mapping tools – namely to the production of maps and other visual spatial artefacts through various geoweb resources, often by laypersons, activists, artists, grassroots groups, and other ‘‘non-expert’’ actors (Eisnor 2006; Turner 2007; Wilson and Graham 2013).

Geographers’ interest in these phenomena is wide-ranging, including core GIScience questions about ontologies, data quality, and data integration (De Longueville and others 2010; Grira, Bedard, and Roche 2010; Haklay 2010); disciplinary concerns about the future of cartography and related arenas (Gartner 2009; Kraak 2011; Goodchild and Turner 2013; Kitchin and Dodge 2013); and questions about their social and political implications (Crampton 2009; Dodge and Perkins 2009; Elwood 2010). In the latter arena – the social and political implications of neogeography – we see divergent concerns and predictions. Some scholars trace trends of increasing surveillance and state/ private-sector control over the production and circulation of geospatial imagery, maps, and the resources needed to produce and share them (Perkins and Dodge 2009; Gerlach 2010; Leszczynski 2012). Others suggest that neogeography constitutes new spaces of civic engagement or resistance and begins to level access to cartography, geovisual imagery, and deliberative or decision-making forums in which they are used (Madden and Ross 2009; Okolloh 2009; Meier 2011). In particular, as scholars have debated this empowerment/marginalization dialectic (Sheppard 2005), there has been a great deal of interest in whether and how neogeography might enable the participation, influence, and agency of less powerful actors. The existing literature offers two kinds of propositions for how they might do so – by offering less powerful actors greater access to conventional spheres/practices of deliberative decision making and cartography (see Tulloch 2008; Hall and others 2010; Gryl and Jekel 2012), or by enabling them to create their own alternative spheres of deliberation/engagement and cartographic praxis (cf. Kingsbury and Jones 2009; Okolloh 2009; Lin 2013).

These different propositions are, at heart, arguments about the forms of politics that are or might be constituted through the practices associated with neogeography, and it is this concern that will take centre stage in our discussion here. By ‘‘politics’’ we are not referring to the specific realm of electoral politics but rather to a much broader range of individual and collective practices which act on or engage structurally mediated inequalities, the social and material relations of everyday life, and negotiations over identity (Kofman and Peake 1990; Brown and Staeheli 2003). This wider definition of politics is critical for theorizing neogeography, given that it has from inception tended to be pluralist, processual, and rooted in everyday life. For all the discussion of participation, empowerment, democratization, or even liberation with respect to neogeography praxis, there has been comparatively little direct theorization of the forms of politics that are or might be advanced via neogeography, save for two recent papers that draw on Michel de Certeau’s (1984) notions of ‘‘strategy’’ and ‘‘tactics’’ (Gryl and Jekel 2012; Lin 2013).

For de Certeau, ‘‘strategy’’ is constituted through the spaces and practices of hegemonic actors/institutions and forms of knowledge. Voting, presenting a map and oral testimony at a public hearing, staying out of an area framed in local discourses as a ‘‘bad’’ neighbourhood, or analysing local needs through community development’s ubiquitous strength, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) technique are all examples of strategy. In contrast, tactics rework (or at least refuse to cooperate with and reproduce) the norms, representational practices, and spatial meanings of strategy. Going walking in a neighbourhood commonly said to be dangerous challenges this spatial imaginary of danger through the action of occupying the space, and it transgresses a tacit prohibition against going there. ‘‘Walking’’ this neighbourhood in the virtual space of a neogeography platform such as Google Maps is a visual spatial tactic (Lin 2013) that transgresses the same prohibitions in a digital environment. Of course, these two examples of spatial tactics are not identical experiences, given that one occurs in a material space and the other in a virtual space. But the broader point to be taken from Lin’s notion of visual spatial tactics is that such digital practices can constitute a transgression or reworking of the spatial norms and restrictions of strategy.

As we will develop further in the next section, much of the existing literature on the societal significance of neogeography is already tacitly structured around this concept pair. Some work focuses upon the potential of neogeography as a practice of strategy (or a politics ‘‘from within’’), and others emphasize neogeography as an arena for tactics (the means and practice of a ‘‘politics from outside’’ by disempowered and excluded actors). Yet on both sides, this work has to date focused primarily on neogeography as a practice or site of political action or engagement. We will argue here that neogeography practices – specifically visual spatial tactics – are significant not only because they constitute a space for political action or engagement by less powerful actors, but also because they can function as key sites of political formation. In what follows we show how the visual spatial tactics of neogeography can foster the formation of political subjects, the formation of collective action frames (which may spur these political subjects to action), and collaborative formation of shared knowledge. Thus, visual spatial tactics in neogeography are significant not just as practices of alternative political engagement or action by actors ‘‘from below’’ but even more so as practices constituting critical antecedents to such action. Tactical neogeography practices constitute subjects as critical thinkers, mobilized actors, and active agents in collaborative knowledge-making.

As we will develop further in the next section, much of the existing literature on the societal significance of neogeography is already tacitly structured around this concept pair. Some work focuses upon the potential of neogeography as a practice of strategy (or a politics “from within”), and others emphasize neogeography as an arena for tactics (the means and practice of a “politics from outside” by disempowered and excluded actors). Yet on both sides, this work has to date focused primarily on neogeography as a practice or site of political action or engagement. We will argue here that neogeography practices – specifically visual spatial tactics – are significant not only because they constitute a space for political action or engagement by less powerful actors, but also because they can function as key sites of political formation. In what follows we show how the visual spatial tactics of neogeography can foster the formation of political subjects, the formation of collective action frames (which may spur these political subjects to action), and collaborative formation of shared knowledge. Thus, visual spatial tactics in neogeography are significant not just as practices of alternative political engagement or action by actors “from below” but even more so as practices constituting critical antecedents to such action. Tactical neogeography practices constitute subjects as critical thinkers, mobilized actors, and active agents in collaborative knowledge-making.

We develop these arguments from research conducted with young teens ages 10–13 at two Seattle schools from 2009 to 2012. School A is a public middle school enrolling approximately 500 students, 95% of whom are racial or ethnic minorities and 75% of whom come from low-income families. It is located in one of Seattle’s areas of highest poverty, with comparatively high rates of unemployment, foreclosure, crime, and violence. School B is a private middle school of 100 students, 35% of them racial or ethnic minorities and 40% of whom receive financial aid for their tuition. Its surrounding neighbourhood grapples with many of the same concerns facing School A’s neighbourhood, but arguably to a somewhat lesser degree.

Our action research with these two schools examined the potential roles of interactive mapping platforms in fostering civic engagement, collaboration, and place-based teaching and learning. In each of the three years, we conducted a 7- to 15-session module of interactive mapping activities, designed to complement the school’s or teacher’s existing efforts to have students learn from and about their city. In year 1, in a class we offered as part of the educational after-school program at School A, sixth and seventh graders created interactive maps of their “everyday geographies.” In creating and sharing their maps, they represented and reflected upon the opportunities, constraints, and patterns in the places and movements of their own daily lives and those of their classmates. In year 2, as part of our activities with a seventh grade social studies class at School B, students created interactive multimedia maps exploring key sites and spatial processes in the urban histories of racial and ethnic minority groups in Seattle. In year 3, we conducted our mapping activities in the “environmental stewardship” curriculum of a fifth grade science class at School B. Students researched and mapped the environmental and cultural histories of two river systems in the Puget Sound area.

In each of these three mapping units, participating students created their interactive maps in an open-source mapping platform developed for this project. Offering a simpler set of tools than many existing commercial mapping web-sites, our platform enables students to create a map object (point, line, or polygon), position this object on a base map, give the object a name or title, and add text, images, URLs, or video in a textbox. When a map object is selected, this associated content appears in the window to the right of the map view (Figure 1). Another key feature of our platform is an interactive commenting function that allows users to select a map object and add (or respond to) comments, questions, or additional information. These comment streams appear beneath the map view and are accessed by clicking the map object (see Figure 1). The students primarily created their maps in this platform, but many of them knew about and used Google Maps in parallel, to access some of its additional services.2 Specifically, they used its search engine to find particular addresses or place names and its street view service to explore photographic street-level panoramas of specific areas.

While our three mapping units were quite different in substantive theme, we structured all three around a similar cycle of individual and collaborative mapping, exploration of content, and critical reflection. Using Kolb’s (1984) “experiential learning” cycle, this process moved from observing, sharing, or learning about concrete activities, events, or places in the “real world” to understanding the more abstract processes that generate them. As students mapped sites or spatial processes they deemed important (to the theme of each of the three units), our goal was for them to learn about and critically reflect upon the social, political, and economic processes and relationships [End Page 277] that produce these geographies. Unsurprisingly, they also gained cartographic skills and experience with digital spatial technologies, but this was not our primary pedagogical objective. Further, while this research has generated contributions to scholarship in geography education and youth geographies (Elwood and Mitchell 2012; Mitchell and Elwood 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013), our purpose here is to use evidence from this project to illustrate a more theoretical contribution to ongoing efforts to articulate the forms of politics that are or might be advanced in neogeography practice. With their emphases on examining and engaging social and spatial processes and relationships, especially vis-à-vis the past histories and present conditions of places in which they live, the youth neogeographies generated as part of our project are a rich source of evidence through which to consider these questions.

The pedagogic practices described above generated the empirical basis of our research on neogeography, children’s politics, and citizenship education. Our research design follows Burawoy’s (1998) extended case method, an inductive approach for generating theory from qualitative ethnographic research (as opposed to deductive research designs structured around testing hypotheses). In this approach, a case is selected on the basis of its ability to illuminate the conceptual questions of the research – for us, questions about the forms of politics that are possible for neogeographers who operate from positions of disempowerment and exclusion. Our questions about the political potential and significance of neogeography for less powerful actors further demand an inductive analysis of evidence that can illuminate processes, meanings, and social relations. To this end, our evidence included the students’ multimedia maps; map comments from teachers, parents, and peers; and field notes produced by all members of our research team after each class session. Our inductive analysis involved iterative interpretive review of the data to generate and refine propositions about the nature and forms of politics advanced through the children’s neogeographies. We validated our emerging findings through triangulation across multiple sources of evidence, aimed at identifying tensions, contradictions, and commonalities in the data. The specific examples presented below are illustrative demonstrations of the forms of politics practised by our young neogeographers but are not the only instances in which these practices occurred in the project.

Neogeography and the political

Recent scholarly work on neogeography has moved in several different directions. Some scholars have begun to trace the conditions of its emergence, particularly the hardware and software developments enabling it (Goodchild 2007; Haklay, Singleton, and Parker 2008). Others examine the shifting political-economic relationships around the production of spatial data and maps signalled by neogeography, with particular interest in the changing roles and relations of state and private-sector actors in this enterprise (Goodchild 2007; Harvey 2007; Radcliffe 2009; Boulton [End Page 278] 2010; Kinsley 2010; Leszczynski 2012). Others have focused on the substantive content produced through neogeography practices, with particular interest in how people, places, or phenomena are represented (or not) and implications of these presences and absences for the (re)production of social difference, inequality, and the digital divide (Zook and Graham 2007; Crutcher and Zook 2009; Graham 2010; Graham 2011; Graham and Zook 2011).

Another key debate has been the implications of neogeography for cartography, GIScience, and geography. Some have characterized the roles of academic and professional cartographers and geographers as diminished, whereas others argue they are transformed but still essential (Gartner 2009; Goodchild 2009; Goodchild and Turner 2013). Map quality and public cartographic and spatial literacies have also sparked concern. For instance, the head of the British Cartographic Society recently worried that neogeographers (or “lay cartographers”) will diminish the quality of maps (Crampton 2010), a concern mirrored in criticisms of neogeographers’ cartographic design (Das and Kraak 2011; Kraak 2011). Perhaps prompted by these concerns, a number of recent interventions offer pedagogies aimed at using neogeography platforms to foster spatial literacy, principles of cartography and GIS (Patterson 2007; Allan 2008; Campbell 2008; DeMers and Vincent 2008; Papadimitriou 2010), and active citizenship and civic participation (Milson and Earle 2008; Harris, Rouse, and Bergeron 2010; Gryl and Jekel 2012).

Finally, this ever-growing literature has examined the social and political significance of neogeography by considering the purposes for which individuals and social groups engage these platforms. Some have considered the potential and limits of neogeography for public involvement in local government planning and decision-making (Rouse, Bergeron, and Harris 2007; Tulloch 2008; Johnson and Sieber 2012; Sieber 2012) or for citizen participation in activities such as redistricting (Crampton 2013). Several studies consider the rising use of neogeography interfaces to elicit and circulate citizens’ observations of on-the-ground needs and conditions in natural disasters and other crises, with particular emphasis on the extent to which these applications may enhance the effectiveness of government and NGO relief efforts (Liu and Palen 2010; De Longueville and others 2010; Zook and others 2010). Some studies examine the ways that activist groups, NGOs, and other citizen groups use neogeography to connect with diasporic communities, disseminate counter-narratives, or mobilize diverse forms of action by members or potential advocates (Corbett 2012; Elwood and Leszczynski 2013; Lin 2012, 2013). Many of these counter-hegemonic neogeographies have included forms of recreation or art, ranging from “spot the black helicopter” games that “surveil back” on the state to digital map art that troubles traditional cartographic rationalities (kanarinka 2006; Cobarrubias and Pickles 2009; Crampton 2009; Kingsbury and Jones 2009; Lauriault and Wood 2009; Perkins and Dodge 2009).

Threading throughout this work on neogeography applications is a strong interest in their potential to foster inclusion, agency, and empowerment, especially for disempowered/excluded social groups or the context of deeply asymmetrical state-society relationships. Yet they tend to seek these outcomes in two very different arenas. Some focus on how neogeography has been or might be used in conventional spheres of deliberative politics, such as participatory governance schemes or the negotiations of NGOs/citizen organizations with state actors and institutions (Elwood and Leszczynski 2013). Others examine how neogeography may constitute an alternative site for citizens’ articulations, deliberations, and cartographies (Kingsbury and Jones 2009; Lin 2012, 2013) – a way for citizens to advance counter-narratives, cartographic representations, or forms of (political) speech unlikely to be recognized or included in conventional deliberative spheres. These two approaches are implicitly differentiated by where and how they situate the realm of the political neogeography practice, and they do so in ways that draw on de Certeau’s (1984) notions of “strategy” and “tactics.” One emphasizes a “politics from within” – neogeography as a means to gain access to existing structures of deliberative democracy – whereas the other emphasizes a “politics from outside,” neogeography as an alternative realm for citizen voice.

As an example of neogeography politics conceived as strategy, Gryl and Jekel (2012) argue that collaborative online “geo-media” (which has been termed neogeography in this article) can be sites for the development and practice of critical spatial citizenship. They argue that this critical spatial citizenship depends upon citizens’ abilities to engage in “strategic practices” (de Certeau 1984), such as having the cartographic and spatial thinking skills necessary to use geo-media in ways that will be recognized by policymakers or other citizens and to use these platforms to disseminate their own spatial narratives or challenge those put forth by others. A more inclusive public sphere will emerge, Gryl and Jekel argue, when citizens are able to use interactive geo-media to engage in the representational and deliberative practices of “strategy.”

Yet conceiving of the political potential of neogeography through notions of strategic practice has inherent limits. Critical cartography and GIS scholarship have long underscored that access to the bounded disciplinary practices of cartographic “strategy” is by definition partial and that many forms of spatial knowledge cannot be represented as “geographic information” nor expressed through conventional cartographic representation (Pickles 1995, 2004; Crampton and Krygier 2005). Feminist critiques remind us that structural inequalities and even definitions of “the political” exclude some social groups from the realms and practices of deliberative politics (Fraser 1990; Howell [End Page 279] 1993). Indeed, de Certeau’s effort to recognize the actors, practices of politics, and forms of knowledge that remain outside the realms of “strategic practice” are at the heart of his concept of “tactics.” Because of these inherent limits, theorizations of the political significance and possibilities of neogeography must also include tactics.

Though not theorized as such, tactics are in evidence in many initiatives that use neogeography platforms for performance, art, and other counter-cartographic practices (kanarinka 2006; Kingsbury and Jones 2009; Perkins and Dodge 2009).3 These performative/artistic neogeographies are characterized as political on the basis that they parody notions of cartographic omniscience or expose the inability of their representational practices to fully capture human experience/perception, or that they challenge state control over spatial data production and circulation by revealing (and making fun of) what is supposed to be secret or concealed. Lin (2013) engages the notion of tactics directly in her study of Chinese neogeographers fighting rapid urbanization, forced demolition, and illegal expropriation. In this context, the sites and practices of a politics of ‘‘strategy’’ simply do not or cannot exist – online activities are tightly controlled and monitored, and citizens have little access to formal decision-making structures. Yet citizens concerned with forced urban removal have developed neogeography tactics that contest dominant narratives and institutions and restrictions on activities and mobilities in particular places. For example, in one of their Googlebased map mashups, users can ‘‘stroll’’ an off-limits lakeshore or share artistic representations of it, virtually reclaiming and reimagining a space that cannot be occupied in real life.4

These examples show the potential of neogeography as the basis for a politics of tactics – a site for citizens to produce new spaces and share counter-narratives in a context where direct confrontation is not possible and for actors who are excluded from a politics of ‘‘strategic practice.’’ As Lin (2013) and others suggest, attention to tactics as an important part of the political repertoire of neogeography greatly expands the forms of politics (and by extension, the range of political actors) we can recognize. Yet our research with young teens’ neogeographies suggests that the significance of visual spatial tactics extends beyond their potential as a form of political action or civic engagement. The visual spatial tactics profiled in much of the literature on counter-hegemonic neogeographies are largely performed by already existing political subjects, already mobilized by their concerns about various inequalities, injustices, or social, political, economic, and environmental conditions. Neogeography serves as the site or space in which these mobilized subjects perform their resistance. Our evidence suggests that visual spatial tactics in neogeography can have an even more foundational significance, serving not just as a site of political action but as a site of political formation. That is, we will show how visual spatial tactics of neogeography can be sites for (1) the formation of political subjects, (2) the formation of interpretive frames that can mobilize these subjects for action, and (3) the formation of shared knowledge through collaborative cartographies. Neogeography praxis has the potential to constitute political subjects, mobilized political collectivities, and shared knowledge – the critical antecedents to any form of political engagement.

### AT: Grove

#### Grove is too pessimistic about modernity’s potential—means at best they solve nothing and at worst they actively empower fascists.

Tallis, 20—senior researcher, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg (Benjamin, “Un-cancelling the future,” New Perspectives, OnlineFirst, July 8, 2020, dml)

Examples of this way of thinking are plentiful but, for convenience, one need to look no further than Jairus Grove’s scintillatingly pessimistic keynote at the Hamburg Sessions (forthcoming as an essay in NP and based on his 2019 book, Savage Ecology).3 It is not that Grove doesn’t make compelling critical arguments – he does and in brilliant, imaginative ways – but that they lack balance. And balance matters, whether we are reckoning with horrendous pasts or trying to boldly imaging new futures.

To see, or certainly to dwell on, only the bad in what we in the West have collectively done (however, Grove or anyone else defines who we are), over the entire course of our past and present is grossly unfair. It also amounts, in effect, to a counsel of despair, however much Grove protests to the contrary or claims to eschew nihilism. In his keynote, having written off our past and present, Grove also explicitly urged us in Europe and the West to stop imagining better, progressive futures, arguing that this has led to precisely the problems he identified. Grove’s critique thus not only leaves us out of time (without an avowable past, present or future) but also leaves us without space for contesting negative, regressive and repressive political trends. In his book, he laments the ‘debilitating stupor’ in which the work of thinkers like Theodor Adorno and Giorgio Agamben leaves us (Grove, 2019: 238). But Grove’s own pessimism, if we took it seriously, would leave Europeans without a political leg to stand on. It would leave us in just such a stupor – or worse – with no solid ground and no lever: no way to move the world and no platform for positive, progressive change.

Why bother, if everything we do only makes things worse?

However much harm we Europeans and Westerners have done, we haven’t done, don’t and won’t only do harm. The real danger of Grove’s type of timelessly pessimistic and literally hopeless critique is that (again, if taken seriously) it breeds only damaging inertia, inaction and resentment – its hopelessness makes it a debilitating critique; its timelessness offers no possibility of salvage, let alone progress. It cedes the ground of action to those who many of us (including Grove) would explicitly disagree with – whether to exponents of ‘traditional’ approaches to IR who are more than happy to offer policy advice or, worse, to authoritarians and populists in practical politics (as ably described in Johanna Sumuvuori’s essay in this issue). Critical scholars too rarely see it as their task to construct positive visions of better worlds. Instead, too often they content themselves (if no one else) with evermore thoroughgoing deconstructive critique – including of other critical academics. Whether totalising or parasitic, even some of its leading proponents admit that IR’s critical project has, thus far, had insufficient impact on the world at large (Austin, 2017, 2019).

Few critical scholars will thank me for this comparison, but, in their pessimistic, misanthropic zeal, they echo what French President Emmanuel Macron called the ‘sad passions’ of the author Michel Houellebecq4 (Carre`re, 2017). They may not share Houellebecq’s politics, but many critical scholars certainly share his exhaustive (and exhausting) disenchantment with contemporary (neo)liberal societies, the state of Europe and of the West. Too often they also share his miserabilist outlook on the impossibility of change for the better and the futility or harm of even trying to improve things.

Grove does propose several forms of political action: micro-kindnesses, however vague (e.g. ‘the impossible generosity and affirmation of deconstruction’, 2019: 231); resistant acts by brave individuals (e.g. ‘William ‘‘Fox’’ Fallon, who sacrificed his prestigious position as head of [US Military] Central Command because he would not go along with the plan to attack Iran’, 2019: 232); embracing entirely new ‘forms of life 5 ’; or welcoming apocalypse as driver of change (2019: 229–248). Grove will not be confused with Goldilocks anytime soon – these forms of action each seem either too little or (much) too much.

Few of us would question the value of and need for kindness and, indeed, the most hopeful part of Grove’s book is the touching introduction where he details many of the kindnesses he has himself benefitted from, mainly from people in the West where he has spent most of his life. There is also, clearly, a role for resistance and for the kinds of acts that Grove notes have prevented executions and even nuclear war. Yet without a wider programme, without a bigger positive vision, kindness and resistance cannot sufficiently change our world for the better. Apocalypse, on the contrary, changes too much, junks too much that is good and is rarely likely to be an appealing option, or something we can all get behind. The apocalyptic aspect of Grove’s position, like that of many critical scholars, seeks to inflict destructive harm on Western institutions rather than constructively reform them – something Houellebecq would also relish. Apocalyptic change also smacks of the recklessly callous, negative sides of early 20th-century futurism (Marinetti, 1909), as Grove acknowledges when asking ‘How do we go wild without the cruelty of indifference?’ (2019: 280). Again, a more balanced approach to boldness would help.

To be clear, major change is needed – that was the whole point of the Hamburg Sessions and the motivation behind giving it the theme of ‘Un-Cancelling the Future’. I’ve argued elsewhere that the kind of socio-economically regressive, technocratic, defensive liberalisms that have dominated large parts of the last 40 years in the West have a lot to answer for (Tallis, 2018). So too, of course, does the type of narrowly, teleological individually atomising (neo)liberalism that neither saw (Fukuyama, 1992) nor allowed (Fisher, 2009) alternative visions of politics, societies and economies. Mark Fisher (2009), echoing the artist Gerhard Richter (Elger, 2009), called this myopic liberalism ‘Capitalist Realism’. You don’t have to be a Marxist or even a leftist to see that a mandated lack of alternatives and a commensurate narrowing of possibilities and horizons is a bad thing. As noted above, both climate change and sociotechnical upheavals in the ways we work and live need bold visions to address the challenges they pose while also seizing the opportunities they present.

It is, however, eminently possible to recognise the full horrors of Europe’s (colonial) pasts and presents without immediately discounting the possibility of improvement coming from the West, from Europe. Similarly, one can recognise the myriad problems that Europeans have caused while also celebrating the many positive things they have also achieved. Moreover, it is possible to use those achievements as inspirations for better ways of doing things – as catalysts to new, progressive creativity and to positive visions of the future. Just as Kraftwerk did in the fragile yet fertile Germany of the second half of the 20th century when they acknowledged the abyss yet still sought a better future, including as atonement for that past.

The cancellation of the future

William Gibson recently tweeted ‘‘In the 1920s, the phrase ‘the 21st Century’ was already popubiquitous. How often do we see the phrase ‘‘the 22nd Century’’, now?’’. And it’s true – we don’t have these dates anymore. As a boy, as a young man, I had mental pictures of the 21st Century. But I don’t have any sense of 2050 or 2100 – except as a deterioration or a collapse. (Simon Reynolds, Hamburg Sessions 2019, see essay in this issue)

I return to Kraftwerk below but first, a little more is needed on the ramifications of contemporary hopelessness. Rather than striving to create new and compelling positive, progressive visions, many thinkers content themselves with critique (Austin, 2017) while others, like Grove, see positive, progressive visions and futures – especially those coming from Europe or the wider West – as being necessarily harmful in themselves.

This is postmodernism as hangover. The depressed – and depressing – aftermath of the shortcomings, broken promises and unintended consequences of modernisms of different kinds, in which strange connections are made and selective, guilty memory runs amok (Fisher, 2014). Forgetting the good, it fuses the bewitchingly pertinent aspects of the post-positivist critical project (which influenced many of us, myself very much included), with more zealously (self-)destructive and paralysing tendencies. As Fisher puts it: ‘Deconstruction [is] a kind of pathology of scepticism, which induced hedging, infirmity of purpose and compulsory doubt’ (2014: 16). In this mode, scholarship no longer seeks to invent the train but fixates on the train crash or even pre-empts and precludes the train’s invention for fear of the seemingly inescapable imagined train crash to come.

Like Grove’s denunciation of the future, many of the critiques of (popular) modernisms are not so much wrong as imbalanced (although some are wrong of course, others not even). They take insufficient account of modernisms’ multiple and meaningful successes (there’s no time here, but see, e.g. Fisher, 2014: 22; or Meades, 2014, for a flavour). This leaves us in an odd situation where many of the scholars, commentators and others who criticise neoliberalism, capitalist realism and so on, find themselves in de facto agreement with its notion that there should be no alternative. In this view, we simply shouldn’t do big vision politics because our ‘schemes to improve the human condition’ have not only ‘failed’ but will always, inevitably, do more harm than good (Scott, 2008). This approach, all post and no modern, will take us nowhere, even as it fast-forwards the academic careers of its exponents.

The future visions that are left, on the left, tend to be Marxist ones (see, e.g. Grove, 2019: 198– 202). Tarred not only by the brush of the communisms that actually existed (and their distinctly less balanced ledger than that of modernism more widely) they understandably fail to inspire mass enthusiasm. Many of their proponents are still really more interested in explaining the failure to bring about the inevitable (full communism) in the past and present than in imagining new futures that go beyond the narrow world view and limiting subjectivity of too many Marxist approaches (see, e.g. Scribner, 2003; Sˇitera, 2015). This has done little to address the crisis of hope or to countervail prevalent contemporary pessimism.

The loss of the belief in the progressive future – that tomorrow can be better than yesterday and today – and the related erosion of faith in our ability to positively shape our own destiny are what Berardi (2011: 13) called ‘the slow cancellation of the future’. As Simon Reynolds noted in his Hamburg Sessions keynote (included in this issue of NP), the cancellation may have started slowly in the 1970s, but, by the 2000s, it had picked up speed and its effects could start to be seen. The first of these – its more (neo)liberal variant – was the feeling of living in an endless present. For a lot of people in the West, this has been comfortable in many ways (although often unevenly and unfairly) and has had distinct advantages over the past (the extension of rights and opportunities to broader swathes of the population) but without much hope, optimism or greater purpose. Unless it provokes the nostalgic responses outlined below, this endless present can lead to a sense of ennui, a lack of direction and loss of momentum.

The second, more overtly sinister, variant that fills the vacuum left by the dearth of positive, progressive visions for the future takes the form of darker re-enchantments focused on the (imagined) past (e.g. Campanella and Dassu`, 2019). Whether ‘making America great again’, ‘taking back control’ in the United Kingdom or claiming to offer an ‘alternative for Germany’, these movements are fundamentally premised on a backward-looking politics of nostalgia. The pessimism about the present and worries about the future on which these movements have each capitalised have given rise to an increasingly defensive politics of closing down and protecting, at the expense of opening up and integrating. Nativism and pessimism tend to go hand in hand: shrinking pies bring narrowed horizons and hasten the circling of wagons around exclusive and chauvinistic visions of national communities. Too often, this retro-rightism has been met only with retro-leftism or a tired centrism that merely seeks more of the same, to smooth the endless present. But that can change ...

Reclaiming the spirit of Kraftwerk

COVID-19 has cancelled the endless present6 – or at least it can if we make the best of it. The scale of the response to the pandemic highlights the degree to which radical change is possible if people are persuaded of the need. This crisis will be (and is already being) used politically. The challenge for those of us who want a more progressive future is to ensure that the disruption caused by COVID-19 is put to positive effect – to ensure that it is creative rather than wanton disruption – and to spur the kind of action that can address our biggest challenges but also to create new opportunities to make a better ‘Post-Coronial’ world (Tallis and Renic, 2020).

From climate change to the changing world of work, bold action is needed to address the causes of our biggest problems rather than simply alleviating their symptoms. But also seeing these issues as possibilities to be seized for progressive improvement, rather than just seeing them as problems to be managed will be key. As Merje Kuus was at pains to emphasise in her Hamburg Sessions keynote, perspective is vital (see her essay in this issue). Building resilient societies and a more equitable global order calls for the political will to formulate and make the case for positive proactive policy, not the piecemeal passivity, timid tinkering or (critical) conservatism that have characterised too much of European politics and public debate in recent times.

### AT: Humanism Bad

#### They have it backwards—even if modernity’s violence originated in humanism, it’s evolved into an attempt to overcome human categories that sounds a lot like the alt.

Featherstone, 20—senior lecturer in Sociology at Keele University (Mark, “Simmel’s (non-human) humanism: On Simmel’s ‘ethics of endings and futures’,” Journal of Classic Sociology, May 1, 2020, dml)

Following Simmel’s own death of liver cancer in 1918, the Futurists would, of course, make use of art to represent modern mobility and endless change, but there is, I think, a significant difference between what Marinetti and others (e.g. Umberto Boccioni) wanted to represent and what Simmel saw in Rembrandt’s works of the seventeenth century. Where the Futurists celebrated the movement, speed, and in a sense the anonymous flows of life that symbolise the death of every form, organism, and structure, Simmel’s Rembrandt is more about recognising the limit of death in order to reflect upon the fragile beauty and limitless value of life in temporary form capable of inspiring the creation of human meaning and significance beyond the violence of life in itself. In respect of their love for the violence of life stripped bare, the Futurists would more likely identify with the anonymous flows of Simmel’s money economy where meaning disappears before bare objectivity, while the conclusion Simmel himself reaches in Rembrandt is that life only takes on value inside the formal structures that make it matter precisely because they have and are made by their limits. This is, in his language, the true significance of ‘the metaphysics of death’ (see Simmel, 2007 [1910]). As Simmel (2015 [1918]: 69) explains in his final work, ‘death...appears as the shaper of life’.

This understanding of the value of death is, of course, a lesson we can also learn from Borges’ (2000) short story The Immortal where Borges imagines what endless life would look like. While we might imagine immortal creatures displaying the highest levels of intellectual and cultural development and so on, Borges reveals the truth of endless life in the slovenly immortals who have degenerated to the level of the lowest beasts, precisely because they have no limits, no future, no reason to do anything. The key point of this example is, therefore, that life takes on meaning only when we become aware of the ‘border of death’ and we can only think significant thoughts on the basis of our ignorance of what lay on the other side. Following Heidegger (2010) who saw that authenticity relied on what he called being-towards-death, Simmel (2015 [1918]) was led to the conclusion that life matters most when it teeters on the brink, when it runs up against the edge of death, and we face looming catastrophe and potential apocalypse (World War I and his own failing health), where the Greek word ‘apocalypsis’ means ‘revealing’ or ‘uncovering’. Thus, the borderline (See Simmel, 2007 [1908]), the dividing line between two states, is key in Simmel’s final works. Indeed, Beer (2019) very skilfully explains this over the course of his book and in particular when he reflects upon Simmel’s concept of ‘world’, which refers to the symbolic forms we live through in the name of making sense.

Given this reading of Simmel’s final works, we might conclude that the key problem of the present is founded in the violence of late capitalist global economy, which has colonised life itself and subjected every meaningful form to the necessity to move for the sake of circulation and what Simmel (2015 [1918]) calls ‘more life’. What should be clear, however, from the above is that in the Simmelian universe the issue with the wholesale identification with life and ‘more life’ is that it also represents the death of ‘more than life’, the death of form, the death of significance, and in a sense the death of death itself. Although we might imagine that the effort to eliminate death represents a positive move, Beer (2019) explains that the hypertrophy of life and the atrophy of form reflects the way in which the human world ‘wounds’ and destroys itself to free anonymous post-human flows. Against the endless transformations of life in itself (endless circulation, metabolism), Beer’s ‘late Simmel’ looks to embrace the limit of death in order to impose some meaningful form upon ‘the quantitative vastness of existence’. In this way, Beer shows how Simmel suggests the construction of worlds able to make life matter and provides his reader with a model to read Simmel into the non-humanism of the contemporary moment. Reflecting upon the excessive nature of communication in the hyper-connected, hyper-related society, Beer (2019) notes that we need to find ways to make sense and build worlds. However, what he does not do is extend this theory of the need for what we might call worlding to an exploration of the violence of the global money economy and the politics of post-/non-/more-than-/humanism.

In my view, the problem of the politics of post-/non-/more-than/humanism is the key to understanding the relevance of Simmel’s work today. As we have seen above, the central issue of the global money economy, particularly under the political ideology of neoliberalism where everything is understood in economic terms (see Davies (2014) on this point], is that the identification with anonymous flows destroys any understanding of limits and endings that might enable the formation of a meaningful world able to shape the future. Even though it might be the case that this situation sprang from the philosophy of humanism, a humanism of the Godlike nature of the human vis-à-vis the rest of existence that becomes a Heideggerian (1977) ‘standing reserve’, the truth is that it is has now transgressed itself in the emergence of a violent technological post-humanism that identifies with the anonymous flows of life beyond the formal limits of anything we might call ‘human’. This violent transformation of humanism into post-humanism is, of course, behind the economic ideas of endless growth, endless work, and endless profit founded upon a liberal, capitalist fantasy that flows of life are in themselves infinite, limitless, and endlessly open for exploitation, monetisation, and capitalisation. Despite the apocalypticism of Swedish Teenagers, School strikes, and social movements (Extinction Rebellion), this vision of limitlessness persists in the institutions of late capitalism.